The Role of Information Disparity in the Mexican Peso Crisis 1994/95: Empirical Evidence

Christina E. Metz∗ and Jochen Michaelis†

February 6, 2003

Abstract

In the Mexican Peso crisis 1994/95, the lack of readily available information, particularly regarding monetary aggregates, has often been commented on. This paper scrutinizes the events and analyzes empirically whether information disparities with respect to economic fundamentals attributed to triggering the crisis. Using historical forecast data collected by Consensus Economics, it is shown that uncertainties as measured by the forecast variation played a significant role in explaining the pressure on the fixed Peso rate. This effect is additional to the one that actual and expected fundamentals had on the exchange rate pressure. Furthermore, the impact of information disparity is found to be contingent on the prevailing market sentiment. For the Mexican case it even seems that the central bank’s strategy of not publicly disclosing information was detrimental especially because the market was generally optimistic with regard to the monetary development.

JEL-Classification F31, D84, D82

Keywords: Currency Crisis, Speculative Attack, Private and Public Information, Transparency

∗Christina E. Metz, Goethe University Frankfurt, Finance Department, Mertonstrasse 17-21, 60325 Frankfurt, Germany, E-mail: cmetz@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de and Center for Financial Studies, Taunusanlage 6, 60329 Frankfurt, Germany, E-mail: metz@ifk-cfs.de
†Jochen Michaelis, University of Kassel, Economics Department, Nora-Platiel-Str. 4, 34127 Kassel, Germany, E-mail: michaelis@wirtschaft.uni-kassel.de
1 Introduction

The Mexican Peso crisis 1994/95 is an interesting subject for studying the impact of information disparity among market participants in currency crises. Following the increase in the volume of information disclosed to financial markets and in the sheer number of information processing and disseminating sources, analyses of informational impacts have gained importance in economic research. Financial crisis situations, in which market participants tend to coordinate their actions, are an especially noteworthy case to study whether informational uncertainty might have triggered the event. Finding an answer to this question is also critical for policy purposes. Since the central bank is one of the major sources for information disclosure with regard to economic fundamentals, it stands to reason whether, as is often proclaimed, increased transparency in situations of financial turmoil is actually conducive to preventing a crisis. In the case of the Mexican Peso crisis in 1994/95, the central bank rather chose a two-tiered strategy: whereas information about the real economy (GDP, trade balance etc.) was made public regularly and timely, the central bank decided to disclose hardly any figures on monetary aggregates. This strategy, however, did not prevent the attack on the Peso and its eventual free fall in December 1994. This paper scrutinizes the course of events and tries to verify empirically whether aspects of information disparity attribute to an explanation of the Peso crisis.

Theoretical studies on the role of information in currency crises came to different conclusions regarding the informational impact on speculators’ behaviour. Second-generation currency crisis models (Obstfeld 1994, 1996) claimed that large sets of economic fundamentals may be accompanied by multiple equilibria. These are characterized by self-fulfilling expectations, such that a currency crisis takes place whenever market participants believe an attack to be successful. The same fundamental state of the economy, however, might coincide with financial stability as long as speculators do not believe in the success of an attack. Second-generation models therefore neither allow to predict the occurrence of a crisis, nor to assess the exact role of information and traders’ expectations. Underlying these models, however, are rather extreme assumptions with regard to traders’ knowledge of the economic fundamental state. Ensuing work relaxed these presumptions and focussed on information asymmetries among speculators. The models by Morris and Shin (1998, 1999, 2000) analyzed both private (individual) and public (common) information about economic fundamentals. They showed that whenever private information is sufficiently precise relative to public information, the currency crisis model displays a unique equilibrium. In this case, the fundamental state of the economy determines exclusively whether a successful attack on the fixed parity will take place or whether the exchange rate peg will remain stable. Following work scrutinized the impact of information and information disparities on crisis situations. Heinemann and Illing (2001) argue that in an environment where information is purely private, decreasing uncertainty by disseminating very precise information reduces the danger of a speculative attack. Metz (2002) comes...
to different results provided that market participants have access to both private and public information. In such a model, not only the market sentiment, defined as the mean of public information about economic fundamentals, influences the probability of a speculative attack, but so does the uncertainty among speculators, as represented by the variance of information. Surprisingly, the effect of uncertainty in private information on the onset of a crisis is to the largest part opposite to the impact of uncertainty arising from public information. Another intriguing finding is that the impact of uncertainty in general is contingent on the market sentiment, i.e. on whether the market is optimistic or pessimistic with regard to the development of the economy’s fundamental state. Hence, according to Metz (2002), the effect of information disparity on a currency crisis depends on both the source of information, i.e. whether uncertainty stems from private or public information, and on the general market sentiment regarding the economic environment.

Until recently, hardly any empirical work had studied the role of information disparities in currency crises. Two recent exceptions are the papers by Prati and Sbracia (2001) and Tillmann (2002). Prati and Sbracia (2001) study the impact of uncertainty stemming from both public and private information in the sense of Morris and Shin (1999, 2000) on the Asian crisis 1997/98. Using forecast data from Consensus Economics as an indicator of information uncertainty, they find for a panel of six Asian countries in the period January 1995 to May 2001 that the variance of information has a significant effect on the observed currency devaluations. The authors succeed in showing that the sign of the variance’s impact depends on whether expected fundamentals are “good” or “bad”. A different approach has been chosen by Tillmann (2002). He analyzes the impact of uncertainty stemming from only private information among foreign exchange traders. Within a Markov-switching framework, he finds for the crises of the French Franc and the Italian Lira in 1992 that increasing information disparity indeed raises the probability of a speculative attack. As a measure of information disparity among market participants he employs so-called country fund discounts, the difference between the price of closed-end country funds and their underlying net asset value.

This paper examines empirically the influence of information and uncertainty on the event of a currency crisis as derived in Metz (2002). Since the Mexican Peso crisis 1994/95 has often been mentioned as a situation in which the lack of information about economic variables triggered the currency turmoil, we try to test the theoretical implications against the background of the Mexican economy using a data set from 1993 to 2000. Indices representing private and public information at the time are taken from Consensus Economics. This statistic contains one-year forecasts of various economic variables as announced by different forecasting research agencies, banks and other financial institutions. In contrast to the work by Prati and Sbracia (2001) our regression model contains a more comprehensive, two-dimensional index of information. It thereby allows for different sources of uncertainty, i.e. private and public, to attribute to the crisis simultaneously. We
show that the mean of forecasted values has an unambiguously negative impact on the exchange rate pressure. Hence, we can conclude that an increase in the market sentiment, i.e. in the commonly believed fundamental state of the economy, weakens the danger of a currency crisis. Furthermore we find that informational uncertainty exerts a significant influence on the incidence of a crisis as well. This effect can be shown to depend on whether the prevailing market sentiment is optimistic or pessimistic. Hence, our empirical study sustains the hypothesis that the impact of uncertainty among market participants may be both harmful or benevolent, depending on the underlying market sentiment. We therefore cannot conclude that increased disclosure of information as a transparency enhancing policy measure is necessarily conducive to preventing crises. In the case of the Mexican Peso crisis, it seems that the central bank’s strategy of disclosing hardly any figures about monetary aggregates was particularly harmful since the market in general was still very optimistic with regard to the monetary development. For information about the real economy, however, our analysis states that rather a decreasing uncertainty among speculators accompanied by a deteriorating market sentiment might have triggered the crisis.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. It delivers testable implications with regard to information influences on the event of a currency crisis. Section 3 delineates the course of events in the Mexican Peso crisis 1994/95 with emphasis on the disclosure of information. Section 4 gives an overview of the data and the testing procedure and finally reveals the test results. Section 5 concludes.

2 Theoretical Model

The model we use as background for our empirical study is a simple coordination game that builds on Morris and Shin (1999) and Metz (2002). It rests on the presumption that speculators possess both private and public information about economic fundamentals. Private information in this respect can be interpreted as insider information or simply as individual interpretation of commonly accessible information. Hence, private information will differentiate within market participants. Public information, in contrast, is commonly shared by all traders. Moreover, all traders know that each of them disposes of this information, so that it becomes common knowledge. Both types of information can be incomplete in the sense that they are faulty signals of the true fundamental state of the economy. In the model, each speculator will use both types of information to make a best guess about the unknown economic state. The state variable expected by each trader is therefore a weighted average of the two types of information with the weights being determined by the respective precision of information.

This section depicts a very simple coordination game between a large number of foreign exchange traders, $i \in [0, 1]$, and a central bank that tries to defend
a fixed exchange rate parity. The speculators will attack the peg if they expect the net payoff from this action to be positive. Otherwise they will choose not to attack. The central bank will defend the peg if the costs from this action are not higher than the positive benefit from keeping the fixed parity. However, the costs from fighting an attack increase in the number of attackers. As can easily be seen, a coordination problem arises since traders’ actions display strategic complementarities.

The structure of the game is as follows. Assume that the fundamental state of the economy is represented by an index, denoted $\theta$, of fundamentally relevant variables. Let $\theta$ be normally distributed with mean $y$ and variance $\frac{1}{\alpha}$. The distribution of $\theta$ presumably is common knowledge to all market participants, i.e. they all know that the economic state follows a long-run trend of $y$ and may fluctuate around this mean with a variance of $\frac{1}{\alpha}$. Since the distribution of $\theta$ is common information, we refer to $\alpha$ as the precision of public information. Hence, the more precise public information, i.e. the higher $\alpha$, the closer will the unknown fundamental state $\theta$ be to the commonly expected value $y$. This common mean of public information is also denoted as the market sentiment. A good or optimistic market sentiment then refers to a high prior mean of the fundamental state, a bad or pessimistic sentiment to a low prior mean $y$.

Additionally to the common information, speculators receive individual private signals about the unobservable fundamental state of the economy. Trader $i$ observes a signal of $x_i$, which is assumed to be normally distributed around $\theta$ with a variance of $\frac{1}{\beta}$. Again, $\beta$ is referred to as precision of private information. The more precise private information, i.e. the higher $\beta$, the closer will the individual private information $x_i$ of speculator $i$ be to the unknown fundamental state variable $\theta$. In our model it is assumed that the distribution of information is common knowledge to all market participants. In particular, they know the precision of their two types of information.

Each trader possesses one unit of the domestic currency and has to decide whether to use this unit in a speculative attack on the fixed parity or not. A successful attack delivers a fixed payoff of $D$ ($>0$) to each of the attackers.\footnote{The assumption of a fixed payoff is made out of simplicity. The general results do not change if we presume $D$ to be a decreasing function in $\theta$.} However, choosing to attack is always associated with transaction costs of $t$ ($0 < t < D$). Choosing to refrain from attacking leads to a gain and a loss of zero. For the central bank it is assumed that she perceives a positive utility from keeping the peg. The costs of defending the parity, however, increase in the proportion $l$ of attackers, but decrease in the economic fundamental index $\theta$. For reasons of simplicity, we suppose that the central bank has to give in to an attack and devalues the exchange rate whenever the proportion of attacking traders $l$ is at least as high as $\theta$. If $l < \theta$, the central bank can maintain the fixed-rate regime.

The time structure of the model is the following. In a first step, nature selects the fundamental state $\theta \sim N(y, \frac{1}{\alpha})$. The central bank observes the true funda-
mental state, whereas speculators only get to know its distribution. Additionally to the public information of $\theta$’s distribution, they individually receive private signals $x_i|\theta \sim N(\theta, 1/\beta)$, that are independent of each other. Contingent on private and public information, traders simultaneously have to decide whether or not to attack the fixed parity in the second step. The central bank finally observes the proportion $l$ of attackers and abandons the peg whenever $l \geq \theta$.

The equilibrium in this model is found in best-response trigger strategies.² It consists of a unique value for private information, denoted by $x^*$, such that each speculator with a signal $x_i$ lower than $x^*$ attacks the parity, but refrains from doing so for better private information. The central bank’s best response to this strategy is to abandon the fixed parity whenever a fundamental state $\theta$ is realized which is lower than a unique threshold value $\theta^*$. For better, i.e. higher, economic states $\theta$ the fixed-rate regime is maintained.

The solution to this model can be found by solving the equilibrium conditions backwards. The central bank is indifferent between abandoning and keeping the peg whenever the proportion of attacking speculators $l$ is equal to the realized fundamental state $\theta$. Out of the continuum of speculators, only those will attack who observe private signals lower than $x^*$, i.e.

$$
\begin{align*}
\theta &= l \\
\theta &= \text{Prob}(x \leq x^*|\theta) \\
\theta &= \Phi(\beta(x^* - \theta)) .
\end{align*}
$$

Each individual speculator is indifferent between attacking or not attacking the fixed parity if both actions lead to the same expected net-payoff

$$
0 = D \text{Prob(attack successful}|x_i) - t
$$
$$
0 = D \text{Prob(}\theta \leq \theta^*|x_i) - t .
$$

Given the public information about the distribution of the unobservable fundamental state $\theta$ and the private signal $x_i$, a trader believes $\theta$ to be normally distributed with mean

$$
E(\theta|x_i) = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta}y + \frac{\beta}{\alpha + \beta}x_i
$$

and variance

$$
\text{Var}(\theta|x_i) = \frac{1}{\alpha + \beta} .
$$

Hence, the speculators’ indifference condition translates into

$$
t = D \Phi\left(\sqrt{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta}(\theta^* - \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta}y - \frac{\beta}{\alpha + \beta}x_i)}\right) .
$$

²For the proof of best-response strategies delivering the unique equilibrium see Morris and Shin (1998).
The equilibrium trigger values $\theta^*$ and $x^*$ can then be determined as those values which simultaneously make both speculators and central bank indifferent between their respective actions:

$$\theta^* = \Phi \left( \frac{\alpha}{\sqrt{\beta}} \left( \theta^* - y - \frac{\sqrt{\alpha + \beta}}{\alpha} \Phi^{-1} \left( \frac{t}{D} \right) \right) \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

$$x^* = \frac{\alpha + \beta}{\beta} \theta^* - \frac{\alpha}{\beta} y - \frac{\sqrt{\alpha + \beta}}{\beta} \Phi^{-1} \left( \frac{t}{D} \right).$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

As Morris and Shin (1999, 2000) and Metz (2002) have shown, the equilibrium $(\theta^*, x^*)$ is unique as long as private information is sufficiently precise, i.e. for $\beta > \frac{\alpha^2}{2\pi}$. The intuition behind this result is straightforward if one thinks along the lines of the infection argument as in Morris et al. (1995). Assume that a speculator optimally chooses a certain action at some private information set. Knowing this, his opponents might select a unique response action at some of their private information sets, where the first trader’s information set is thought to be possible. This, in turn, might induce the first trader to choose this action at an even larger information set etc. If, however, private information is not sufficiently precise, speculators will consider their private signals as unreliable and might even neglect the informational content completely. Eventually, they will only take into account public information when selecting an action. Making their decision contingent solely on common information reinvites multiple equilibria, since there is no way to predict one’s opponents actions.

The existence of a unique equilibrium allows us to analyze rigorous comparative statics. In the following, we will briefly restate the main results by Metz (2002) with regard to the influence of the informational parameters on the probability of a currency crisis. Afterwards we will focus on testable implications of the model, building on Prati and Sbracia (2001), to use in an empirical analysis of the Mexican Peso crisis 1994/95.

In the delineated model the fixed parity will be abandoned whenever the index of economic fundamentals falls short of the trigger threshold $\theta^*$. Hence, the ex-ante probability of a currency crisis can reasonably be approximated by the length of the interval $[-\infty, \theta^*]$. The following proposition sums up the results by Metz (2002) regarding the model parameters’ influence on the crisis probability.

**Proposition 1** (Metz 2002)

The probability of a currency crisis as approximated by the length of the interval $[-\infty, \theta^*]$ decreases in the market sentiment $y$, i.e. in the commonly believed fundamental state of the economy. For $y > \theta^* - \frac{1}{2\sqrt{\alpha + \beta}} \Phi^{-1} \left( \frac{t}{D} \right)$, the danger of a crisis decreases (increases) in the precision $\alpha$ of public information. For $y > \theta^* - \frac{1}{\sqrt{\alpha + \beta}} \Phi^{-1} \left( \frac{t}{D} \right)$, the danger of a crisis increases (decreases) in the precision $\beta$ of private information.
The most interesting result of this proposition concerns the largely opposite effects of private and public information’s precision. The impact of both precision parameters is moreover found to be contingent on the market sentiment. Hence, an increasing market sentiment not only decreases the danger of a crisis, but is also accountable for the effect of private and public information’s precision. Whenever the market is very optimistic, so that $y$ exceeds both of the above mentioned thresholds ($\theta^* - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}} \Phi^{-1}(\frac{1}{2})$ as well as $\theta^* - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}} \Phi^{-1}(\frac{1}{2})$), more precise public information will lower the crisis probability, whereas more precise private information will raise the crisis probability. The opposite holds for a pessimistic market sentiment. If the commonly believed fundamental state $y$ falls short of the two thresholds, more precise public information increases the danger of a crisis and more precise private information decreases it.

How do we have to interpret the inherently opposite effects of $\alpha$ and $\beta$ on the crisis probability? The basic idea underlying this result is the role of coordination in the model. When deciding whether or not to attack, each speculator not only has to take into account his own information about the unknown fundamental state, but also his opponents’ expectations about $\theta$. The more strongly one speculator believes his opponents’ private information to be similar to his own, the more he is willing to rely on this type of information. As can be seen from equation (2), the ratio $\frac{\alpha}{\beta}$ determines the weights attached by each trader to his two types of information when calculating the posterior expected fundamental value. Consider the following example: assume that a priori the market expects the fundamental state to be bad, i.e. $y$ is low. If public information is very precise relative to private information ($\frac{\alpha}{\beta}$ is high), each speculator knows that all other traders will attach a large weight to the pessimistic prior mean $y$. This gives a strong incentive to attack the fixed parity. If, in contrast, private information is much more precise than public, traders know that all others will tend to neglect the low prior mean. This might decrease the incentive to attack. Exactly the opposite holds for an optimistic market, where the prior expected value of the fundamental state $y$ is high.

Concerning our primary target of empirically analyzing the role of information disparities in a currency crisis, it is hard to find a measure for the crisis probability, though. In a paper by Prati and Sbracia (2001) slightly different results are derived from the above delineated crisis model, which deliver more easily testable implications. Instead of studying the impact of information on the occurrence of a currency crisis, they focus on the parameters’ influence on the proportion of attacking speculators. A natural empirical counterpart for the share of attackers might be found in the exchange rate pressure. Since in our model all speculators with private signals lower than $x^*$ will attack the fixed parity, the interval $[-\infty, x^*]$ can serve as a rough approximation of the speculative pressure on the fixed exchange parity. In order to also account for the realized fundamental in-

\[3\text{For a more comprehensive delineation of the comparative statics and the underlying structure of the equilibrium in this model, see also Metz (2003).}\]
dex $\theta$, however, Prati and Sbracia define the theoretical measure of exchange rate pressure as the share of speculators receiving sufficiently low private information given the actual fundamental state of the economy:

$$\text{Prob}(x \leq x^*|\theta) = \Phi(\sqrt{\beta(x^* - \theta)}) .$$

(6)

Differentiating this probability with respect to the model parameters delivers the following results as of proposition 2.

**Proposition 2** (Prati and Sbracia 2001)

The share of attackers on a fixed exchange rate, as given by $\text{Prob}(x_i \leq x^*|\theta)$, decreases in the fundamental index $\theta$ and in the market sentiment $y$. For $y > (\theta > )$, the share of attackers decreases (increases) in the precision of public information $\alpha$. If $\theta > (\theta < ) x^* + 2\beta^2z^2/D$, the proportion of attacking speculators decreases (increases) in the precision of private information $\beta$.

Intuitively, both improving fundamentals and an improving market belief about fundamentals decrease the pressure on a fixed exchange rate. As before, the effect of a change in the precision of public information $\alpha$ depends on the market sentiment. Whenever the market is optimistic, i.e. $y$ is sufficiently high, more precise public information reduces the incentive to attack so that the share of attackers diminishes. For a low prior mean of fundamentals $y$ the opposite holds. However, the impact of changes in $\beta$ is no longer necessarily opposite to the effect of $\alpha$. The influence of private information’s precision $\beta$ is not even directly contingent on the market sentiment any more. It rather depends on the actually realized fundamental state of the economy $\theta$. How do we have to interpret this result? In contrast to $\alpha$, the precision of private information $\beta$ not only influences the posterior expected fundamental state and hence the trigger value $x^*$, but it also determines the distribution of private signals around the unknown $\theta$. Thus, $\beta$ has two distinct channels through which it influences the proportion of attacking traders. First of all, $\beta$ affects the threshold $x^*$ through equilibrium condition (5). This effect is again by and large opposite to the effect of $\alpha$ on $x^*$ as can be seen from corollary 1.

**Corollary 1** (Prati and Sbracia 2001)

The trigger value $x^*$ decreases (increases) in $\alpha$ if $y > (\theta > ) x^* + 2\beta^2z^2/D$, and it increases (decreases) in $\beta$ if $y > (\theta < ) x^* + 2\beta^2z^2/D$.

Secondly, whenever the realized fundamental state of the economy is sufficiently good ($\theta > x^*$), more precise private information makes less speculators receive private signals below the threshold of $x^*$, since the distribution of private signals becomes more dense around its mean of $\theta$. Hence, the proportion of attacking traders decreases. The opposite holds in the case of a bad fundamental state $\theta$.
(θ < x∗). This second effect of β on the share of attackers may even outweigh the first, which tends to be the case if either θ and y are both sufficiently good or both are sufficiently bad. Then, the impact of private information’s precision β is analogous to public information’s precision α on the proportion of attackers. In contrast, if either θ is low and the market sentiment very optimistic, i.e. y is high, or vice versa, then α and β tend to have opposite effects on the share of attackers.

What are the testable implications of the theoretical model? First of all, the model states that the prior expected fundamental state of the economy, i.e. the market’s general expectation of the fundamental index y, decreases the pressure on the exchange rate. Secondly, the model shows that the precision of information has an individual effect on exchange rate pressure. This effect, however, is contingent on i) the source of uncertainty, i.e. on whether it is private or public information that changes its precision, and on ii) the prior mean of economic fundamentals, i.e. on whether the market is optimistic or pessimistic with regard to economic development.

Before the testing procedure with respect to these statements and the data are delineated, let us first focus on the course of events in the Mexican Peso crisis 1994/95. As we will see, the way in which the events unfolded displays most interesting traits regarding the influence of informational disparities.

3 The Mexican Peso Crisis in 1994/95

Mexico had been a textbook example of financial stability and growth from the mid-1950s to the 1970s. This stability, however, ended when Mexico became insolvent in 1982. After the complete collapse of the economy, the Mexican government started a comprehensive reform program. Reform comprised a fundamental opening of the country towards international competition, privatization and deregulation, fixing the exchange rate against the U.S.$, and the so-called Pacto, an agreement between government, labor unions and the private sector to guide the development of prices, wages and the exchange rate. The successful execution of the reforms shifted international attention towards the Mexican financial markets and strengthened investors’ confidence into the country. By the end of 1992, Mexico had reached fiscal balance and inflation was reduced to single digits. Restrictive fiscal policy also gave support for stabilizing the exchange rate. Between 1988 and 1994 Mexico had changed its exchange rate system several times, from a completely fixed parity over a preannounced rate of devaluation to a band with sliding ceiling. Until autumn 1993, the Peso exchange rate was extremely stable, remaining in the lower half of the band.

Concerning the success of the reforms, Edwards (1997) notes, however, that a significant difference had arisen between Mexico’s achievements in terms of reform policies and in terms of economic results. Although political achievements were
sometimes even spectacular, economic results remained rather modest. The real
growth rate averaged 2.8 percent between 1988 and 1994. Productivity growth
was near zero and private savings were decreasing. Yet, on the positive side,
capital inflows into the country remained strong until the beginning of 1994.

What is important for interpreting the onset of the crisis in the light of our
theoretical findings is that the economic situation in Mexico at the beginning of
the 1990s was highly praised by economists, financial experts, academics and the
media in general. With only very few exceptions, the Mexican reforms were seen
as a major success, with Mexico’s development representing a miracle among the
group of emerging countries. The fact that economic growth was still low and the
current account deficit increasing, was mostly neglected by commentators. Even if
the lack of fundamental growth was taken into account, it was argued that positive
results were “around the corner” (Calvo et al., 1996). One of the few economists to
argue against this common trend of praising Mexican reform efforts was Rudiger
Dornbusch. As early as 1992, he claimed that Mexico’s most urgent problem was
its overvalued exchange rate. However, there was large dissent about this point in
the community. Whereas some market observers did not believe the fixed exchange
rate to be overvalued at all, others claimed that due to the surge in capital inflows
Mexico experienced an “equilibrium appreciation”, that was fully justified by
fundamentals. A more modest view admitted that although Mexico had a growth
problem, this was only transitory and would be solved automatically over time
(Gil-Diaz, 1997). Dornbusch and Werner, however, feared the overvaluation to
be a serious long-lasting problem: “Overvaluation stops growth and, more often
than not, ends in a speculative siege on the exchange rate and ultimately currency
realignment” (Dornbusch and Werner, 1994).

In order to give an overview of the confusingly large number of different views that
economists, financial analysts and market commentators held at the beginning of
the 1990s, consider the following collection of statements as taken from Edwards
(1997):

- The IMF praised Mexico’s reform efforts, even until only a few months before
  the crisis hit the economy in December 1994. In October 1994, the IMF’s
  World Economic Outlook predicted that although growth had been low, it
  would pick up speed rapidly.

- The World Bank spoke with two voices. At the 1993 Annual Meeting, it
  stated that the Mexican reform process was mature and appeared to be
  consolidated. In a publication in November 1994, the World Bank argued
  that the president elect, Ernesto Zedillo, would enable a rapid improvement
  of the economy, so that economic growth should reach its highest level in
  five years. In contrast, an article in Trend in Developing Economies in
  1993 remarked that the recent slowdown in Mexican growth was a direct
  consequence of the real exchange rate appreciation. In November 1992, the
  bank noted that the opening of the capital account exposed Mexico to large
  risks resulting from the volatility of short-term capital movements, which
might need adjustment through higher interest rates or a depreciation of the Peso.

- Investment bankers and fund managers were generally very enthusiastic concerning the Mexican prospects. In this respect, JP Morgan as late as October 1994 and the Swiss Bank Corporation even in December 1994 urged a credit rating upgrade for Mexico. Due to Edwards (1997), out of twenty analyses released by major institutions in the *Emerging Markets Investor* in November/December 1994, twelve dismissed the possibility of a Peso devaluation.

- *Euromoney* raised the country risk ranking for Mexico between March and September 1994.

- Dornbusch argued in November 1992 that the daily rate of depreciation for the Peso should be tripled to prevent a major crisis.

- The Mexican central bank explained that, although the capital account was in deficit, the exchange rate band might deal with eventual disequilibria. Furthermore, productivity was expected to surge before long and fundamentals to remain healthy. In an interview with the *Economist* in January 1994, the Governor of the Mexican central bank stated that the current account deficit was associated with an inflow of foreign funds rather than expansionary domestic policy and hence presented no problem.

Summing up we find that during 1993 to mid-1994 large uncertainties prevailed over the question whether the Peso appreciation was a temporary phenomenon or a non-equilibrium real overvaluation. In 1994 the economic situation was aggravated by political distress, and uncertainty among analysts shifted from economically related aspects to questions of political strategy. While at the end of 1993 the market was still enthusiastic about Mexico on average, the Chiapas uprising on January 1st 1994 reminded the world that Mexico remained to be a country with social problems and inequalities. Following this event, the exchange rate rose to the upper bound in February. Surprisingly, international reserves held by the Mexican central bank did not fall, and inflow of direct foreign investments did not recede. The Mexican capital markets did not even react to the Fed’s decision to tighten U.S. monetary policy in February 1994, which was taken as a sign of fundamental stability.

However, the climate changed abruptly with the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio, the presidential candidate of the ruling party PRI on March 23rd, 1994. This time, investors reacted in panic and strongly reduced their exposures in Mexico. To secure the Peso parity, the Mexican authorities intervened: reserves fell from $26 billion to $18 billion almost overnight (Lustig, 1995). Moreover, Peso denominated interest rates were increasing rapidly. Yet, the financial community swiftly regained its faith after the U.S. government decided on March 24th to extend a $6 billion swap facility to Mexico. The Financial Times on March 25th
reflected the confidence in Mexico with the front page stating “Even with Mexico’s
dependence on foreign capital to cover a current account deficit of over Dollars
20bn, a crisis is eminently avoidable”. On March 28th, the Financial Times
claimed that a “sense of calm returned to Mexico”.

Contrary to the regaining faith by the media, though, Mexico was experiencing
ever larger difficulties rolling over its maturing Peso denominated debt (Cetes).
What is more, the financial community seemed to have been wide aware of this
fact. In April 1994, JP Morgan publicly stated that the Mexican government
would have to weigh the trade-off between rising interest rates and devaluing the
fixed exchange rate to solve its problems. Quite generally, during the first half
of 1994 concerns grew among international analysts regarding Mexico’s external
situation. In the spring meeting of the Brookings Institution Economics Panel,
Calvo argued that the Mexican fixed-rate regime was at risk due to lack of credi-
bility. Stanley Fischer expressed doubts concerning the sustainability of Mexico’s
external situation. Members of the Fed argued that a devaluation of the Peso
should not be ruled out. On the opposite side, on May 2nd 1994, the U.S. Under
Secretary of the Treasury in a memorandum emphasized that Mexico’s exchange
rate policy was still sustainable.

Between April and October 1994, the Mexican central bank did not disclose any in-
formation about changes in the position of its international reserves. The exchange
rate, however, rose with the ceiling band. Additionally, it was observed that the
central bank increasingly replaced Peso-denominated debt (Cetes) with Dollar-
denominated Tesobonos, thereby changing the composition of money. Again,
these facts were discussed in the media and in financial circles. During the course
of the year 1994, it became clear to financial observers that the Mexican authorities
deliberately withheld information on money market aggregates and international
reserves. In June 1994, an IMF mission returned to Washington after only two
weeks in Mexico, complaining that it did not obtain any data from the Bank of
Mexico on the recent development of international reserves. The level of reserves
was timely revealed for the third time in 1994 only as late as the end of October.
Several investors actively commented on the lack of readily available and reliable
information (Edward and Savastano, 1998). Yet, risk measures as publicly an-
nounced by different financial institutions at the time indicate that the market’s
perception of the situation in Mexico remained roughly stable until December.
In August 1994, Ernesto Zedillo was elected president, the Pacto was renewed
and the exchange rate system maintained. Following the assassination of another
politician in September 1994, investors became increasingly nervous and the Mex-
ican authorities intensified the substitution of Tesobonos for Cetes. Although on
October 21st the Mexican central bank announced the level of international re-
serve holdings to be at $17.12 billion, many analysts believed this number to be
too high. At the end of November 1994, reserves in the hand of the central bank
had reportedly decreased to $12.5 billion, with short term public debt in excess of
$27 billion. Hence, reserves were clearly insufficient to back short term domestic
debt, and a major financial crisis loomed.
On December 1st 1994, the new administration under President Zedillo took office. Reserves were suspected to continue their declining trend, although the Mexican central bank did not disclose any new figures. On December 5th, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury was informed by institutional analysts’ calculations that Mexican international reserves must be close to only $10 billion. The private sector in Mexico, however, seemed to have been rather unaware of the fast decline of reserves during November and December 1994. Yet, as Edwards (1997) points out, analysts should have had enough information to calculate the necessary figures and get an idea about the country’s international reserve position. Obviously, however, financial market participants preferred to be seduced by the still positive information given by Mexican policy makers (Frankel and Schmukler, 1996). Due to the vanishing reserves, Mexican authorities decided on widening the exchange rate band on December 20th, to allow for a devaluation of 15 percent. Yet, this policy change was not accompanied by a supporting program, and hence did not appear very promising to solve the current problems. Investors started to flee the country in disbelief. As a result, the Mexican central bank lost $4 billion of reserves in one day, and eventually the fixed Peso exchange rate had to be abandoned, giving in to a fully fledged currency crisis.

4 Informational Disparities: Empirical Evidence

4.1 Testing Methodology

In order to verify whether mean and dispersion of speculators’ information have a significant impact on the exchange rate pressure at the onset and during the Mexican Peso crisis 1994/95, we use forecast data collected by Consensus Economics. These statistics comprise forecasts from different research agencies, banks and other financial institutions concerning various economic variables, such as GDP, industrial production, consumer prices, current account, currency reserves, etc. In order to relate the data to the theory delineated above, consider the following. Building on Prati and Sbracia (2001), it is reasonable to assume that each of the $n$ individual forecasters announces his posterior mean of the respective economic variables to Consensus Economics. From theory, we know that the posterior expected value of $\theta$ is given by (2). The mean of these $n$ individual forecasts, denoted by $f^e(x_1, ..., x_n)$, can then be calculated as

$$f^e(x_1, ..., x_n) = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta} y + \frac{\beta}{\alpha + \beta} \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i.$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

With a sufficiently large number of forecasters, i.e. $n \rightarrow \infty$, this random variable for given fundamental state $\theta$ converges to

$$f(\theta) = E[f^e(x_1, ..., x_n)|\theta] = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta} y + \frac{\beta}{\alpha + \beta} \theta.$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)
The mean of the forecasts provided by Consensus Economics is therefore influenced by both the prior mean \( y \), i.e. the market sentiment, and the truly realized fundamental state \( \theta \). Recall that both parameters have the same impact on exchange rate pressure (proposition 2). Moreover, from the model it follows that \( E(\theta) = y \), so that the average of the posterior expected values should be equal to the prior mean \( y \). Note that this average does not depend on the precision values \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) any more. We can therefore take the average forecast value as a proxy for the prior mean of fundamentals as represented by the market sentiment \( y \).

Concerning the variance of individual forecasts, the theoretical model suggests that

\[
[\sigma^2(x_1, \ldots, x_n)]^2 = \sum_i [f^c_i(x_i) - f^c]^2 = \frac{\beta^2}{(\alpha + \beta)^2} \sum \frac{(x_i - \bar{x})^2}{n},
\]

(9)

with \( \bar{x} = \frac{\sum x_i}{n} \). For \( n \to \infty \), the variance of forecasts approaches a value of

\[
\sigma^2 = \frac{\beta}{(\alpha + \beta)^2}.
\]

(10)

Hence, for a large number of forecasts, the dispersion of predictions only depends on the precision parameters. It decreases in \( \alpha \), whereas the impact of \( \beta \) on the variance is negative if \( \beta > \alpha \), and positive otherwise. This can be explained by the fact that although more precise private signals tend to be closer to the actual fundamental \( \theta \) and as such decrease the variance of forecasts, a higher precision of private information also increases the weight that speculators attach to their private signals relative to public information. This makes forecasts more heterogeneous across traders. In the sequel, we follow Prati and Sbracia (2001) and assume that \( \beta > \max\{\alpha, \frac{\alpha^2}{\pi}\} \), so that equilibrium is always unique and the precision of private information always exerts a negative influence on the variance of forecasts. Thus, precision of both private and public information reduce the dispersion of forecasts.

As we can see, using the mean and variance of the economic forecasts collected by Consensus Economics should allow a realistic assessment of the influence that market sentiment and information dispersion exert on the exchange rate pressure. In order to capture the informational effects, we use an estimation equation of the following general form:

\[
ERP_t = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 f^c_t + \gamma_2 \sigma^c_t (f^c_t - \gamma_t) + \gamma_3 g_t + u_t.
\]

(11)

\( ERP_t \) represents a measure of exchange rate pressure in period \( t \). \( f^c_t \) and \( \sigma^c_t \) are the mean and the standard deviation of forecasts regarding specific economic variables as taken from Consensus Economics. \( \gamma_t \) represents the threshold separating “good” from “bad” expected fundamentals. It is a proxy for the threshold functions of \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \)’s influence on exchange rate pressure. \( g_t \) represents a function of economic variables, that might play a significant role in explaining exchange rate pressure. Finally, \( u_t \) gives the error term of the regression equation.
From the theoretical analysis we expect $\gamma_1$ to take on a negative sign. The better the market sentiment, represented by the mean of economic forecasts, the lower should the pressure on the exchange rate be. The influence of the forecasts’ standard deviation, however, depends on two aspects: the market sentiment and the source of uncertainty, private or public. If the market sentiment is very optimistic, the expression in brackets in regression (11) is positive. In that case, uncertainty stemming from public information should have an increasing effect on exchange rate pressure due to proposition 2, so that $\gamma_2$ should be positive. If the market is pessimistic, the expression in brackets will be negative, so that a decreasing effect of uncertainty in public information is captured by a positive sign of $\gamma_2$ as well. $\gamma_2$ will also be positive if uncertainty is due to private information and actual and expected fundamentals are either both sufficiently good or both bad. If, however, the market sentiment is optimistic and actual fundamentals turn out to be bad or vice versa, then uncertainty stemming from private information will have a negative influence on ERP. The sign of $\gamma_3$ is contingent on which specific economic variable we choose to include into the model. The exchange rate, for instance should have a positive impact on exchange rate pressure, i.e. the closer the exchange rate moves to the upper ceiling of the currency band, the larger is the incentive to attack and as such the higher is the exchange rate pressure.

4.2 The Data

To study the impact of information disparity on the event of the Mexican currency crisis, we use an index of exchange rate pressure based on three parameters. The calculation builds on Prati and Sbracia (2001). The index ERP is given by the sum of i) the monthly depreciation of the Peso against the U.S. $, ii) the normalized fall in international reserves in percent of the 12-month moving average of imports, and iii) the normalized short-term real interest rate. Figure 1 shows the time-series behaviour of the index. As can be seen, exchange rate pressure was decreasing in 1993. It built up during 1994, with a first maximum at the time of Colosio’s assassination in March 1994. Exchange rate pressure reached its absolute maximum in December 1994 at the top of the crisis, while decreasing afterwards.

Informational data for Mexico has been taken from Consensus Economics. Note that all historical data for Latin America from Consensus Economics are bi-monthly, except for the year 1993 in which only 5 data points are available, since data collection started as late as March 1993. In each period, about 20-25 institutions announced their predictions for various economic variables. In order to work with a constant forecast horizon of one year, we follow Gourieroux and

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4In order to clarify the informational impact in the months leading up to the crisis and at the onset of the turmoil, we will in the following concentrate on data in the period March 1993 to December 1996. The regression analysis, however, is based on data from March 1993 to December 2000.
Monfort (1997), and compute the weighted average of the current and following year forecast with weights of $\frac{5}{6}$ and $\frac{1}{6}$ in the first period, $\frac{4}{6}$ and $\frac{2}{6}$ in the second period etc.

As the regression results will show, in order to get a concise picture of the market’s information at the time, only two variables turn out to be significant: forecasts of GDP-growth and predictions of currency reserves held by the central bank. Once these two variables are included into the regression, all other information parameters turn out to be largely insignificant. For a first impression of informational data for Mexico, consider figure 2. It presents the mean forecasts for GDP-growth (in percent), as one of the most comprehensive indicators of economic development. As can be seen, before the crisis hit the Mexican economy in December 1994, average predictions for GDP-growth were relatively stable. At the time of the attacks, GDP-growth forecasts plummeted to record lows, while increasing steadily in the two years following the crisis. Interestingly, the months before the start of the currency turmoil are characterized by a decreasing dispersion of GDP forecasts. While the standard deviation of GDP-growth forecasts took a value of 0.8 at the end of 1993, it fell to less than 0.5 immediately before the speculative attack hit the country, as shown in figure 3. Of course, the variation in GDP-growth forecasts spiked at the onset of the crisis in December 1994.
Figures 4 and 5 portray the development of expected currency reserves as the second explanatory variable in our regression model. While market observers generally expected currency reserves to increase during 1993 and still at the beginning of 1994, expectations faltered during 1994, reaching their lowest level at the time of the crisis in December 1994/January 1995. The spike in October 1994 can be explained by one of the central bank’s few declarations of currency reserves, which gave a very optimistic view. Figure 5 shows that the variation of reserves predictions decreased during the first half of 1994 from a standard deviation of about 4 to half that value, while increasing from August 1994 on and hovering around a level of 3 until the crisis hit. Forecasts’ standard deviation reached its maximum of 5.3 at the end of 1995.

In order to arrive at a first assessment of traders’ information about the economic state during the Mexican currency turmoil 1994/95, it is reasonable to compare the predicted economic values with the actually realized ones. Actual and predicted development of GDP can be seen from figure 6, the development of actual international currency reserves and forecasted values from figure 7.

Regarding GDP-growth, figure 6 shows that in 1993 actual growth rates, represented by the light grey line, were lower than expected (the black line), whereas during 1994 speculators tended to underestimate actual GDP-growth. Hence, for the months leading up to the currency crisis, we find that actual and expected
development of GDP did not coincide and that the market was rather pessimistic. Combining this with our theoretical results, we have to state that uncertainties stemming from private information about GDP-growth should have had opposite effect on the exchange rate pressure than uncertainties arising from public information about GDP development. Since expectations about GDP-growth displayed a diminishing variance in the months leading up to the crisis, this leads to the following conclusion: If the regression analysis results in a positive sign of uncertainty regarding GDP forecasts, this suggests that public information was driving the predictions. If the sign of GDP forecast variation is negative, this should be taken as private information being the root cause of uncertainty.

For the development of international currency reserves, figure 7 shows that in particular in the second half of 1994, traders were much more optimistic than justified by the amount of reserves actually held by the central bank (the light grey line). Again, private and public information precision therefore tend to have opposite effects. Combined with the formerly delineated finding that the variance of forecasts with respect to the central bank’s currency reserves was decreasing during the first half of 1994 but increasing during the second half, we might expect the source of uncertainty again being found in public information. Hence, if the market generally believed currency reserves to be still sufficiently high, increasing
uncertainty about this knowledge would raise the pressure on the fixed exchange rate. Again, this conclusion would be corroborated by a positive sign of reserves predictions’ variation in the regression analysis.

4.3 Regression Results

Our estimation procedure in the following is similar to Prati and Sbracia (2001). These authors tried to verify informational influences in a panel data regression on six Asian countries in 1995-2001. In contrast to their method, we include a two-dimensional proxy for information, instead of their one-dimensional approach. This allows us to discriminate between different sources of information (private or public) driving the uncertainty among market participants. Furthermore, our test is based on a pure time-series regression and comprises the period March 1993 to December 2000.

Our empirical model makes use of the following regression equation:

$$ERP_t = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 f_{GDP_t} + \gamma_2 \sigma_{GDP_t} \cdot (f_{GDP_t} - \gamma_{GDP_t}) + \gamma_3 df_{CR_t} + \gamma_4 \sigma_{CR_t} \cdot (f_{CR_t} - \gamma_{CR_t}) + \gamma_5 e_t + u_t.$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

As a proxy for information, we use forecasts both of GDP-growth ($f_{GDP_t}$) and of the change in currency reserves ($df_{CR_t}$). In order to allow for different sources of information (i.e. private or public) driving the variation in forecasts, we treated the two information parameters separately instead of combining them in one global information index. In this respect we might think of GDP-forecasts being driven through public information mainly, whereas the described lack of general information about the Mexican central bank’s international reserves in 1994 might have lead predictions to be more strongly based on individual interpretations and hence to stem from private information. This presumption is substantiated by the way in which information regarding these two variables has been disclosed in Mexico. While information about GDP has been disseminated by the Mexican authorities timely and constantly throughout the crisis, this does not hold for international currency reserves. As delineated in section 3, the Mexican central bank withheld as much information as possible about monetary aggregates, in particular about
the development of international reserves. Hence, traders were forced to interpret
the few information that was accessible at their own account, a fact that naturally
leads to uncertainty about currency reserves being driven by private information.

In regression equation (12), the threshold value $\gamma_{\text{GDP}}$ was chosen as the yearly
growth rate of GDP, while the threshold $\gamma_{\text{CR}}$ was calculated as the 5-term moving
average of predicted currency reserves. Note that the expression representing the
deviation of market sentiment from the actual economic variable is measured in
growth rates for GDP information, but in absolute values for currency reserves
information. This is due to the fact that Consensus Economics announces only
growth rates forecasts for GDP. However, the slightly different treatment of the
two variation variables of GDP forecasts and currency reserves forecasts should not
be expected to have any influence on the regression outcome, since it only impacts
the calculation of sign of the precision values, but not the dispersion values per se.

The same peculiarity of Consensus Economics data forced us to use two slightly
different types of thresholds. Whereas the threshold for GDP information, $\gamma_{\text{GDP}}$, was calculated from actual GDP-growth rates, we had to build a threshold from
forecast data for currency reserves, $\gamma_{\text{CR}}$. This is due to the fact that the set
of research agencies announcing their forecasts to Consensus Economics changes
roughly from period to period. Hence, we are not able to calculate the standard
deviation of changes in individual predictions with regard to currency reserves.
Using actual reserves values as thresholds, however, leads to an overweight impact
of uncertainty with regard to this variable, since currency reserves were changing
strongly before and at the time of the crisis. One reasonable compromise to find an
acceptable index of optimism or pessimism in the market therefore is to compare
predicted currency reserves with the long-run trend of forecasts, which leads to
the described threshold series $\gamma_{\text{CR}}$.

Additionally to information with respect to GDP-growth and currency reserves
development, we also included the change in the exchange rate as an explanatory
variable into the equation. Since the fixed Peso exchange rate has been abandoned
in December 1994, we will find that the exchange rate plays a significant role in
explaining exchange rate pressure in particular for the year 1995 and onwards.
In order to correct for serial correlation in the series, we finally allowed for an
autocorrelated error term with lag 1, AR(1).

The results from our regression on data in the period March 1993 to December
2000 can be found in table 1. As can be seen, the two variables representing the
market sentiment have the expected negative sign, so that indeed the more opti-
mistic the market is with respect to economic development, the lower the pressure
on the exchange rate tends to be. Both coefficients ($\gamma_{1}$ and $\gamma_{3}$) are highly signifi-
cant at the 1%-level. With respect to information dispersion, our analysis states
that uncertainty has a significantly positive influence on exchange rate pressure,
since both coefficients $\gamma_{2}$ and $\gamma_{4}$ have positive sign. However, significance for
the variation in predictions of currency reserves is given at the 1%-level, whereas
GDP-growth forecasts have a significant influence through their variation only at
the 15%-level. Taking these results as such, the model implies that the main force
Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std.Error</th>
<th>t-Statistic</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$c$</td>
<td>3.6283</td>
<td>0.7956</td>
<td>4.5605</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{GDP} \cdot (f_{GDP}^e - \gamma_{GDP})$</td>
<td>-1.999</td>
<td>0.3208</td>
<td>-3.4255</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$df_{CR}$</td>
<td>0.3784</td>
<td>0.2386</td>
<td>1.5862</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{CR} \cdot (f_{CR}^e - \gamma_{CR})$</td>
<td>-1.1846</td>
<td>0.2351</td>
<td>-5.0392</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$e$</td>
<td>0.7399</td>
<td>0.0934</td>
<td>7.9196</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$AR(1)$</td>
<td>-0.1474</td>
<td>0.1638</td>
<td>-0.8996</td>
<td>0.374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2$ 0.7315

DW-Statistic 2.0751

F-Statistic 17.2554

Prob(F-Statistic) 0.0000

Lying underneath fundamental uncertainty may either be a change in the precision of public information, so that the whole market is less sure about economic fundamentals, or uncertainty is due to a change in the precision of private information while at the same time both expected and actual fundamentals are either good or bad. Since we learned from the data for predicted and actual fundamental values as displayed in figures 6 and 7, that expectations did hardly coincide with the true development of fundamentals, neither for GDP-growth nor for international currency reserves, the type of information driving the results should to the largest part be public. Furthermore, we know that in the months leading up to the crisis uncertainty with regard to GDP-growth forecasts was decreasing while the market in general was overly pessimistic. The opposite holds for predictions regarding currency reserves. Here, the market was quite optimistic while uncertainty about this view was increasing. Hence, we might conclude that neither the way information about GDP-growth influenced the speculators was in favour of the fixed exchange rate regime in Mexico, nor was information dissemination about currency reserves. Thus, if the Mexican central bank deliberately held back information about reserves in order to keep speculators from attacking, the result of this strategy was exactly opposite to the intention.

Running the same regression on the pre-crisis sample, i.e. on data in the period March 1993 to December 1994 only, delivers roughly the same results. However, it is reasonable to drop the exchange rate out of the regression, since the currency peg was almost stable during that period. Furthermore, the influence of the mean
GDP-growth forecasts and of its variation is not as highly significant as for the whole sample (significance is given at the 25%- and 20%-level, respectively).

What remains to be done is to verify whether the influence of information disparity on the exchange rate pressure is indeed contingent on the market sentiment, as stated in proposition 2. The following regression therefore, additionally to the explanatory variables of equation (12), allows for an impact of the simple standard deviation of GDP-growth forecasts and of currency reserves forecasts as well. As can be seen from the results in table 2, both explanatory variables turn out to be not significant. Yet, the mean forecasts of GDP-growth and currency reserves still have a significantly negative impact on exchange rate pressure. Also, the effect of uncertainty contingent on the market sentiment has a significantly positive sign.

Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std.Error</th>
<th>t-Statistic</th>
<th>Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>5.4521</td>
<td>2.0402</td>
<td>2.6724</td>
<td>0.0112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f_{GDP}^e$</td>
<td>−1.1612</td>
<td>0.3489</td>
<td>−3.3284</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{GDP}^e$</td>
<td>−3.6862</td>
<td>2.9348</td>
<td>−1.2561</td>
<td>0.2172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{GDP}^e \cdot (f_{GDP}^e - \gamma_{GDP})$</td>
<td>0.3958</td>
<td>0.2406</td>
<td>1.6451</td>
<td>0.1087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$d\bar{f}_{CR}^e$</td>
<td>−1.143</td>
<td>0.2389</td>
<td>−4.7846</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{CR}^e$</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td>0.2713</td>
<td>0.7877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{CR}^e \cdot (f_{CR}^e - \gamma_{CR})$</td>
<td>0.7057</td>
<td>0.0987</td>
<td>7.1493</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$e$</td>
<td>0.2078</td>
<td>0.0688</td>
<td>3.0208</td>
<td>0.0046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR(1)</td>
<td>−0.1634</td>
<td>0.1669</td>
<td>−0.9786</td>
<td>0.3343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2$ | 0.7435  
$\text{DW-Statistic}$ | 2.1162  
$\text{F-Statistic}$ | 13.0413  
Prob(\text{F-Statistic}) | 0.0000 |

Summing up our regression results we may state that information disparities strongly attribute to an explanation of exchange rate pressure on the Peso exchange rate before, during and in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis in 1994/95. Whereas the market sentiment has a positive influence on the fixed rate regime, the effect of information uncertainty depends on whether the market is optimistic or pessimistic with regard to economic development and on whether it is private or public information that lies at the ground of the uncertainty. For the Mexican case, the model points to public information having triggered the event. In particular, it seems to have been the lack of publicly available information about
international currency reserves held by the central bank that was attributable to
the onset of the currency attack.

5 Conclusion

Financial market crises pose a particularly difficult problem for central banks
that typically have superior access to information about economic variables: how
should they disseminate their information about the state of the economy? What
aggravates the problem is the fact that in crisis situations often traders’ actions
are strategic complements so that for each individual market participant it is ra-
tional to coordinate the own action on the actions expected to be taken by the
others. Even though it is usually proclaimed that the best remedy to deal with
financial crises is to create full transparency about all relevant economic variables,
central banks frequently choose the opposite strategy. This has also been done by
the Mexican central bank at the onset of the Peso crisis in 1994/95. During the
economic deterioration in 1994, she decided to disclose hardly any new informa-
tion on the development of monetary aggregates, since this was believed to be the
most sensitive information to the market. In our paper, we questioned whether
the chosen strategy worked. Based on the results of a theoretical model, we stud-
ied whether the market sentiment, defined as the common belief of the market
with regard to the economic development, has a significant impact on exchange
rate pressure and hence on the onset of the Mexican Peso crisis. Furthermore,
we tried to verify the theoretical result that information disparity has an indi-
vidual effect on exchange rate pressure that is contingent both on the market
sentiment and on the source of uncertainty. Our regression analysis comes to a
favourable result with respect to both questions. We can show that an optimistic
market generally decreases exchange rate pressure. Moreover, the specification
of information disparity that we chose for our regression equation has a positive
influence on exchange rate pressure in an optimistic market and a negative im-
 pact in a pessimistic environment. Comparing the market sentiment as observed
during the Mexican crisis using data provided by Consensus Economics with the
actual development of fundamentals, our model indicates that the major source
driving uncertainty was public information. This finding leads us to conclude that
the strategy of creating intransparency as conducted by the Mexican central bank
was detrimental to the stability of the exchange rate peg. Our empirical find-
ings are thus in line with theoretical work by Heinemann and Metz (2002), which
demonstrates that the success of information policy by monetary authorities is
very sensitive to the market sentiment and to the way in which information is
disseminated. In the case of the Mexican crisis, our model indicates that is was
not necessarily the pure difference in speculators’ perceptions about monetary ag-
ggregates, but rather the fact that the central bank was publicly known to not give
any information about international currency reserves, that might have triggered
the crisis.
References


