Grg. 466A-468E (Zeyl's tr.)

466a4   {ΠΩΛ.} Τί οὖν φής; κολακεία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ
466a5 ῥητορική;
  PO: What is it you are saying, then? You think oratory is flattery?

466a6   {ΣΩ.} Κολακείας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μόριον. ἀλλ'
466a7 οὐ μνημονεύεις τηλικοῦτος ὤν, ὦ Πῶλε; τί τάχα
466a8 δράσεις;
  SO: I said that it was a *part* of flattery. Don't you remember, Polus, young as you are? What's to become of you?

466a9   {ΠΩΛ.} Ἆρ' οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
466a10 φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες;
  PO: So you think that good orators are held in low regard in their cities, as flatterers?

466b1   {ΣΩ.} Ἐρώτημα τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέγεις;
  SO: Is this a question you are asking, or some speech you're beginning?

466b2   {ΠΩΛ.} Ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε. / PO: I'm asking a question.

466b3   {ΣΩ.} Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.
  SO: I don't think they're held in any regard at all.

466b4   {ΠΩΛ.} Πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς
466b5 πόλεσιν;
  PO: What do you mean, they're not held in any regard? Don't they have the greatest power in their cities?

466b6   {ΣΩ.} Οὔκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαί γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ
466b7 δυναμένῳ.
  SO: No, if by "having power" you mean something that's good for the one who has the power.

466b8   {ΠΩΛ.} Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγω γε. / PO: That's just what I do mean.

466b9   {ΣΩ.} Ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει
466b10 δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες.
  SO: In that case I think that orators have the least power of any in the city.

466b11   {ΠΩΛ.} Τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεινύασίν τε
466c1 ὃν ἂν <u>βούλωνται</u>, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν
466c2 ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν <u>δοκῇ αὐτοῖς</u>;
  PO: Really, don't they, like tyrants, put to death anyone they <u>want</u>, and confiscate the property and banish from their city anyone <u>they see fit</u>?[1]

466c3   {ΣΩ.} Νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐφ' ἑκάστου
466c4 ὧν λέγεις πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ γνώμην σαυτοῦ
466c5 ἀποφαίνῃ, ἢ ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾷς.
  SO: By the Dog, Polus! I can't make out one way or the other with each thing you're saying whether you're saying these things for yourself and revealing your own view, or whether you're questioning me.

466c6   {ΠΩΛ.} Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε σὲ ἐρωτῶ. / PO: I'm questioning you.

466c7   {ΣΩ.} Εἶεν, ὦ φίλε· ἔπειτα δύο ἅμα με ἐρωτᾷς;
  SO: Very well, my friend. In that case, are you asking me two questions at once?

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[1] "They see fit": *dokei autois*. Schleiermacher has "... ihnen gut dünkt". – GH (23.5.2011): was ihnen paßt

466c8   {ΠΩΛ.} Πῶς δύο; / PO: What do you mean, two?

466c9   {ΣΩ.} Οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες· "Ἢ οὐχὶ ἀποκτεινύασιν
466d1   οἱ ῥήτορες οὓς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα
466d2   ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ
466d3   αὐτοῖς;"

SO: Weren't you just now saying something like "Don't orators, like tyrants, put to death anyone they want, don't they confiscate the property of anyone they se fit, and don't they banish them from their cities?"

466d4   {ΠΩΛ.} Ἔγωγε. / PO: Yes, I was.

466d5   {ΣΩ.} Λέγω τοίνυν σοι ὅτι δύο ταῦτ' ἐστιν τὰ ἐρωτήματα,
466d6   καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ
466d7   Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι
466d8   μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον· <u>οὐδὲν</u>
466e1   <u>γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν</u>, <u>ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅτι</u>
466e2   <u>ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι</u>.

SO: In that case I say that there are two questions, and I'll answer you both of them. I say, Polus, that both orators and tyrants have the least power in their cities, as I was saying just now. For <u>they do just about nothing they want to</u>, though <u>they certainly do whatever they see most fit to do</u>.

466e3   {ΠΩΛ.} Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι;
PO: Well, isn't this having great power?

466e4   {ΣΩ.} Οὔχ, ὥς γέ φησιν Πῶλος. / SO: No; at least Polus says it isn't.

466e5   {ΠΩΛ.} Ἐγὼ οὔ φημι; φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε. / PO: I say it isn't? I certainly say it is!

466e6   {ΣΩ.} Μὰ τὸν—οὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἔφης
466e7   ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.

SO: By ..., you certainly don't! since you say that having great power is good for the one who has it.

466e8   {ΠΩΛ.} Φημὶ γὰρ οὖν. / PO: Yes, I do day that.

466e9   {ΣΩ.} Ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἴει εἶναι, ἐάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα <u>ἃ ἂν</u>
466e10 <u>δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι</u>, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς
466e11 σὺ μέγα δύνασθαι;

SO: Do you think it's good, then, if a person does whatever <u>he sees most fit to do</u> when he lacks intelligence?[2] Do you call this "having great power" too?

466e12 {ΠΩΛ.} Οὐκ ἔγωγε. / PO: No, I don't

466e13 {ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ
467a1   τέχνην τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας; εἰ
467a2   δέ με ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς
467a3   πόλεσιν <u>ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς</u> καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο
467a4   κεκτήσονται, ἡ δὲ δύναμίς ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ φής, ἀγαθόν, τὸ
467a5   δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνευ νοῦ <u>ἃ δοκεῖ</u> καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν εἶναι·
467a6   ἢ οὔ;

SO: Will you refute me, then, and prove that orators do have intelligence, and that oratory is a craft, and not flattery? If you leave me unrefuted, then the orators who do <u>what they see fit</u> in their cities, and the tyrants, too, won't have gains any good by this. Power is a good thing you say, but you agree with me that doing <u>what one sees fit</u> without intelligence is bad. Or don't you?

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[2] "Intelligence": *nous*. Schleiermacher's "Erkenntnis" isn't better. But note that having *nous* here serves as a criterion for being a practitioner of a craft (*technê*, cf. e13-a1 where *kai* = "that is"; see Penner 1991, 156).

467a7   {ΠΩΛ.} Ἔγωγε. / PO: Yes, I do.

467a8   {ΣΩ.} Πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι
467a9 ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πώλου ὅτι
467a10 ποιοῦσιν <u>ἃ βούλονται</u>;

  SO: How then could it be that orators or tyrants have great power in their cities, so long as Socrates in no refuted by Polus to show that they do <u>what they want</u>?

467b1   {ΠΩΛ.} Οὗτος ἀνήρ— / PO: This fellow--

467b2   {ΣΩ.} Οὔ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς <u>ἃ βούλονται</u>· ἀλλά μ' ἔλεγχε.

  SO: --denies that they do <u>what they want</u>. Go ahead and refute me.

467b3   {ΠΩΛ.} Οὐκ ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις ποιεῖν <u>ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα</u>
467b4 εἶναι, [τούτου πρόσθεν];

  PO: Didn't you just now agree that they do <u>what they see fit</u>?

467b5   {ΣΩ.} Καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ. / SO: Yet, and I still do.

467b6   {ΠΩΛ.} Οὐκ οὖν ποιοῦσιν <u>ἃ βούλονται</u>; / PO: Don't they do <u>what they want</u>, then?

467b7   {ΣΩ.} Οὔ φημι. / SO: I say they don't.

467b8   {ΠΩΛ.} Ποιοῦντες <u>ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς</u>; / PO: Even though they do <u>what they see fit</u>?

467b9   {ΣΩ.} Φημί. / SO: That's what I say.

467b10   {ΠΩΛ.} Σχέτλιά γε λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

  PO: What an outrageous thing to say, Socrates! Perfectly monstrous!

467b11   {ΣΩ.} Μὴ κακηγόρει, ὦ λῷστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε
467c1 κατὰ σέ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον ὅτι
467c2 ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου.

  SO: Don't attack me, my peerless Polus, to address you in your own style. Instead, question me if you can, and prove me that I'm wrong. Otherwise you must answer me.

467c3   {ΠΩΛ.} Ἀλλ' ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι
467c4 λέγεις.

  PO: All right, I'm willing to answer, to get some idea of what you are saying.

467c5   {ΣΩ.} Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο <u>βού-</u>
467c6 <u>λεσθαι</u> ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἑκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράτ-
467c7 τουσιν τοῦθ' ὃ πράττουσιν; οἷον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες
467c8 παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν τοῦτο <u>βούλεσθαι</u>
467c9 ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο,
467c10 τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνεκα πίνουσιν; {—ΠΩΛ.} Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ
467d1 ὑγιαίνειν.

  SO: Do you think that when people do something, they <u>want</u> the thing they're doing at the time, or the thing for the sake of which they do what they're doing? Do you think that people who take medicines prescribed by their doctors, for instance, <u>want</u> what thy are doing, the act of taking the medicine, with all its discomfort, or do they <u>want</u> to be healthy, the thing for the sake of which they're taking it?

  PO: Obviously they <u>want</u> their being healthy.

{—ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλέοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον

467d2 χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ <u>βούλονται</u>, ὃ

467d3 ποιοῦσιν ἑκάστοτε (τίς γὰρ <u>βούλεται</u> πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυ-

467d4 νεύειν καὶ πράγματ' ἔχειν;) ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οἶμαι οὗ ἕνεκα

467d5 πλέουσιν, πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν. {—ΠΩΛ.}

467d6 Πάνυ γε.

SO: With seafarers, too, and those who make money in other ways, the thing they are doing at the time is not the thing they <u>want</u> -- for who <u>wants</u> to make dangerous and troublesome sea-voyages? What they <u>want</u> is their being wealthy, the thing for the sake of which, I suppose, they make their voyages. It's for the sake of wealth that they make them.

PO: Yes, that's right.

{—ΣΩ.} Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων; ἐάν τίς

467d7 τι πράττῃ ἕνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο <u>βούλεται</u> ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο

467e1 οὗ ἕνεκα πράττει; {—ΠΩΛ.} Ναί.

SO: Isn't it just the same in all cases, in fact? If a person does anything for the sake of something, he doesn't <u>want</u> this thing that he's doing, but the thing for the sake of which he's doing it?

PO: Yes.

{—ΣΩ.} Ἆρ' οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν

467e2 ὄντων ὃ οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν γ' ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων,

467e3 οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν; {—ΠΩΛ.} Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώ-

467e4 κρατες.

SO: Now is there any thing that isn't either *good*, or *bad*, or, what is between these, *neither good nor bad*?

PO: There can't be, Socrates.[3]

{—ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ

467e5 ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τἀναντία

467e6 τούτων; {—ΠΩΛ.} Ἔγωγε.

SO: Do you say that wisdom, health, wealth and the like are good, and their opposites bad?

PO: Yes, I do.

{—ΣΩ.} Τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε

467e7 κακὰ ἆρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,

468a1 ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ

468a2 βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα

468a3 καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλ' ἄττα καλεῖς

468a4 τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακά; {—ΠΩΛ.} Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.

SO: And by the things which are neither good nor bad you mean things which sometimes partake of what's good,[4] sometimes of what's bad, and sometimes of neither, such as sitting or walking, running or making sea voyages, or stones or sticks and the like? Aren't these the ones you mean? Or are there any others that you call things neither good nor bad?

PO: No, These are the ones.

468a5 {— ΣΩ.} Πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἕνεκα τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράτ-

468a6 τουσιν ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τἀγαθὰ τῶν μεταξύ; {—ΠΩΛ.} Τὰ

468b1 μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

SO: Now whenever people do things do they do these intermediate things for the sake of the good ones, or the good things for the sake of the intermediate ones?

PO: The intermediate things for the sake of the good ones, surely.

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[3] The negation is missing in the Greek. Schleiermacher inserts "eins von diesen".

[4] If I have grasped Penner's point right, "partaking" (*metechein*) is the key term in the argument.

{—ΣΩ.} Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες

468b2 καὶ βαδίζομεν ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ
468b3 τὸ ἐναντίον ἕσταμεν ὅταν ἑστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦ
468b4 ἀγαθοῦ· ἢ οὔ; {—ΠΩΛ.} Ναί.

SO: So it's because we pursue what's good that we walk whenever we walk; we suppose that it's better to walk. And conversely, whenever we stand still, we stand still for the sake of the same thing, what's good. Isn't that so?

PO: Yes.

{—ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνυ-

468b5 μεν, εἴ τιν' ἀποκτείνυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα
468b6 χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή; {—
468b7 ΠΩΛ.} Πάνυ γε.

SO: And don't we also put a person to death, if we do, or banish him and confiscate his property because we suppose that doing these things is better for us than not doing them?[5]

PO: That's right.

{—ΣΩ.} Ἕνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα

468b8 ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες. {—ΠΩΛ.} Φημί.

SO: Hence, it's for the sake of what's good that those who do all these things do them.

PO: I agree

{—ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν

468b9 ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἕνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι,
468c1 ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν; {—ΠΩΛ.} Μάλιστα.

SO: Now didn't we agree that we <u>want</u>, not those things that we do for the sake of something, but that thing for the sake of which we do them?

PO: Yes, very much so.

468c2 {—ΣΩ.} Οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν <u>βουλόμεθα</u> οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν
468c3 πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐὰν
468c4 μὲν ὠφέλιμα ᾖ ταῦτα, <u>βουλόμεθα</u> πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερὰ
468c5 δὲ ὄντα οὐ <u>βουλόμεθα</u>. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ <u>βουλόμεθα</u>, ὡς φὴς
468c6 σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ <u>βουλόμεθα</u>, οὐδὲ τὰ
468c7 κακά. ἢ γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ οὔ; τί
468c8 οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ; {—ΠΩΛ.} Ἀληθῆ.

SO: Hence, we don't simply <u>want</u> to slaughter people, or exile them from their cities and confiscate their property as such; we <u>want</u> to do these things if they are beneficial,[6] but if they are harmful we don't (sc. <u>want</u>, GH). For we <u>want</u> the things that are good, as you agree, and we don't <u>want</u> those that are neither good nor bad, nor those that are bad. Right? Do you think that what I'm saying is true, Polus, or don't you? Why don't you answer?

PO: I think it's true

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[5] "For us" (*hêmin*) did not occur earlier. I doubt that it adds anything to the meaning of "good". Otherwise, Polus is being deceived.

[6] Both *ouk ... haplôs houtôs* and *all' ean* etc. qualify *boulometa*. Stripped of the context, the translation might leave it open whether "if ..." qualifies "we want" (which gives the correct meaning) or "to do".
It should be also noted that Zeyl leaves *hêi tauta* (c4; "as such", i.e. beneficial) untranslated.

468d1   {ΣΩ.} Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει
468d2   τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε
468d3   τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχά-
468d4   νει δὲ ὂν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ <u>ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ</u>· ἦ γάρ; {—
468d5   ΠΩΛ.} Ναί.

SO: Since we are in agreement about that then, if a person who's a tyrant or an orator puts somebody to death or exiles him or confiscates his property because he supposes that doing so is better for himself when actually it's worse, this person, I take it, is doing <u>what he sees fit</u>, isn't he?
PO: Yes.

       {—ΣΩ.} Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ <u>ἃ βούλεται</u>, εἴπερ τυγχάνει
468d6   ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ; {—ΠΩΛ.} Ἀλλ' οὔ μοι
468d7   δοκεῖ ποιεῖν <u>ἃ βούλεται</u>.

SO: And is he also doing <u>what he wants</u>, if these things are actually bad? Why don't you answer?
PO: All right, I don't think he's doing <u>what he wants</u>.

       {—ΣΩ.} Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος
468e1   μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνα-
468e2   σθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν; {—ΠΩΛ.} Οὐκ
468e3   ἔστιν.

SO: Can such a man possibly have great power in that city, if in fact having great power is, as you agree, something good?
PO: He cannot.

     {—ΣΩ.} Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄν-
468e4   θρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει <u>ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ</u> μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι
468e5   μηδὲ ποιεῖν <u>ἃ βούλεται</u>.

SO: So, what I was saying is true, when I said that it is possible for a man who does in his city <u>what he sees fit</u> not to have great power, nor to be doing <u>what he wants</u>.

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