

T1¹ (*PA* I 1, 642a11-2) τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον (ἔνεκά τινος γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅλον)

Kosman (1987,376) tr.: "The body is an instrument (*organon*); for just as each of its parts is for the sake of something, so for the whole body."

T2 (*Anim.* II 4, 415b18-20): πάντα γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα τῆς ψυχῆς ὄργανα, καθάπερ τὰ [sc. σώματα] τῶν ζώων, οὕτω καὶ τὰ [sc. σώματα] τῶν φυτῶν, ὡς ἔνεκα τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντα

Hamlyn tr.: "... for all natural bodies are instruments for soul, and just as it is with those of animals so it is with those of plants also, showing that they exist for the sake of soul."

cf. *Anim.* II 1, 412a27-b1: σῶμα φυσικόν δυνάμει ζῶην ἔχον = σῶμα φυσικόν ὄργανικόν.

EE VII 9, τὸ τε γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν ὄργανον σύμφυτον

T3 (*PA* IV 12, 694b11-7): Ἐνιοὶ δὲ μακροσκελεῖς τῶν ὀρνίθων εἰσίν. Αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ βίος τῶν τοιούτων ἔλειος· τὰ γὰρ ὄργανα πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ἔργον πρὸς τὰ ὄργανα. Διὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ μὴ πλωτὰ (b15) εἶναι οὐ στεγανόποδά ἐστι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ὑπέικοντι εἶναι τὸν βίον μακροσκελεῖ καὶ μακροδάκτυλα, καὶ τὰς καμπὰς ἔχουσι πλείους ἐν τοῖς δακτύλοις οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν.

Lennox tr.: "Some birds are long-legged. This is because such birds have a marsh-dwelling way of life (*bios*); and nature makes the instruments (*organa*) to fit the function (*pros to ergon*), not the function to fit the instruments. Hence on account of being non-swimmers, they are not web-footed, and on account of spending their life on boggy ground they are long-legged and long-toed, and the majority of them have many joints in their toes.

T4 (*PA* III 14, 674a27-b5): [i] πλὴν εἰ μὴ τι διὰ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς δύναμιν, οὕσαν οὐκ εὐπεπτον ἀλλ' ἀκανθώδη καὶ ξυλικήν, ἔχει πλείους, οἷον (a30) κάμηλος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ κερατοφόρα. [ii] Τὰ γὰρ κερατοφόρα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμφώδοντα· διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἡ κάμηλος οὐ τῶν ἀμφώδοντων ἐστίν, ἀκέρατος οὕσα, διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαιότερον εἶναι αὐτῇ τὴν κοιλίαν ἔχειν τοιαύτην ἢ τοὺς προσθίους ὀδόντας. Ὡστ' ἐπεὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἔχει (b1) τοῖς μὴ ἀμφώδουσι, καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας ὁμοίως ἔχει αὐτῇ, ὡς οὐδὲν ὄντας προέργου. [iii] Ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ τροφή ἀκανθώδης, τὴν δὲ γλῶτταν ἀνάγκη σαρκώδη εἶναι, πρὸς σκληρότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κατακέχρηται τῷ ἐκ τῶν ὀδόν-(b5) των γεώδει ἢ φύσις.

Lennox tr.: "[i] ... owing to its bodily magnitude and the potency of its thorny, woody, hard-to-concoct nourishment, ... the camel has many stomachs, even as horn-bearing animals do. [ii] The horn-bearing animals have many stomachs because they do not have a complete set of teeth; because of this the camel too, though without horns, is not among those animals with a complete set of teeth – that is, because of the greater necessity for it to have such a stomach than to have front teeth. So since the camel is, in this respect, like those animals without a complete set of teeth, it is like them too with respect its teeth, since they would be of no use. [iii] Yet at the same time, since its nourishment is thorny, and it is a necessity that the tongue be fleshy, nature makes use of the earth from the teeth to provide for hardness in the roof of the mouth."

¹ For my ms., see [www.uni-kassel.de/philosophie/Heinemann/Work in Progress](http://www.uni-kassel.de/philosophie/Heinemann/Work%20in%20Progress).

Remark GH. As a rule, (T4ii) ruminants (with the characteristic division of stomachs) have horns but no complete set of teeth according to Aristotle. The camel is an exception, described in two ways:

(T4i) having no horns, it nevertheless has ruminant stomachs;

(T4iii) having ruminant stomachs it has a horny palate rather than horns.

In both respects, the exception is explained the kind of nourishment used. – As to the material necessities involved (concerning the use of earthy stuff), see Lennox, "Material and Formal Natures ...")

T5 (Hesiod, *Erga* 42-50): Κρύψαντες γὰρ ἔχουσι θεοὶ βίον ἀνθρώποισιν. / ηιδίως γὰρ κεν καὶ ἐπ' ἥματι ἐργάσσαιο, / ὥστε σε κείς ἐνιαυτὸν ἔχειν καὶ ἀεργὸν ἔοντα· / αἰψὰ κε πηδάλιον μὲν ὑπὲρ καπνοῦ καταθεῖο, / ἔργα βοῶν δ' ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἡμιόνων ταλαεργῶν. / ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς ἔκρυψε χολωσάμενος φρεσὶ ἧσιν, / ὅτι μιν ἐξαπάτησε Προμηθεὺς ἀγκυλομήτης· / τοῦνεκ' ἄρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ἐμήσατο κήδεα λυγρὰ, / κρύψε δὲ πῦρ· ...

Evelyn-White (Loeb / Perseus) tr.: "For the gods keep hidden from men the means of life. Else you would easily do work enough in a day to supply you for a full year even without working; [45] soon would you put away your rudder over the smoke, and the fields worked by ox and sturdy mule would run to waste. But Zeus in the anger of his heart hid it, because Prometheus the crafty deceived him; therefore he planned sorrow and mischief against men. [50] He hid fire; ..."

T6 ([Hippocrates], *On ancient medicine* (VM) c. 3 sect. 3-4): **3.** ... οὐδ' ἂν τὴν τῶν ὑγιαίνοντων διαίταν τε καὶ τροφήν, ἣ νῦν χρέονται, εὐρεθῆναι, εἰ ἐξήρκει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ταῦτ' ἐσθίοντι καὶ πίνοντι βοῦ τε καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ πᾶσιν ἐκτὸς ἀνθρώπου, οἷον τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα, καρπούς τε καὶ ὕλην καὶ χόρτον· ἀπὸ τούτων γὰρ καὶ τρέφονται καὶ αὐξοῦνται καὶ ἀπονοὶ διάγουσιν οὐδὲν προσδεόμενοι ἄλλης διαίτης. Καί τοι τὴν γε ἀρχὴν ἔγωγε δοκέω καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπον τοιαύτη τροφή κεχρησθαι· τὰ δὲ γε νῦν διαιτήματα εὐρημένα καὶ τετεχνημένα ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γεγενῆσθαι μοι δοκεῖ. **4.** Ὡς γὰρ ἔπασχον πολλὰ τε καὶ δεινὰ ὑπὸ ἰσχυρῆς τε καὶ θηριώδεος διαίτης ὡμά τε καὶ ἄκρητα καὶ μεγάλας δυνάμιας ἔχοντα ἐσφερόμενοι – ... πόνοισι τε ἰσχυροῖσι καὶ νοῦσοισι περιπίπτοντες καὶ διὰ ταχέος θανάτοισιν· ... διὰ δὴ ταύτην τὴν χρεῖν καὶ οὗτοί μοι δοκεῖσι ζητῆσαι τροφήν ἀρμόζουσαν τῇ φύσει καὶ εὐρεῖν ταύτην ἣ νῦν χρεόμεθα.

Schiefsky tr. (with corr.): "... not even the regimen and nourishment that the healthy make use of today would have been discovered if it were sufficient for the human being to eat and drink the same things as an ox or horse and all the animals other than man – for example, the things that grow from the earth: fruits, brush, and grass. From these things they are nourished, grow, and lead their lives free of trouble. And indeed I believe that in the beginning, human beings too made use of such nourishment; as for our current regimen, I believe that it arose through a process of discovery and artful elaboration over a long period of time. **4.** For human beings endured much terrible suffering because of their strong and brutish regimen, consuming foods that were raw, unblended, and possessing great powers -- ... falling into severe pains and diseases followed by a speedy death. ... It was on account of this need,² I believe, that these people sought for nourishment suited to their constitution and discovered that which we make use of today."

² And "for the sake of the health, preservation, and nourishment of the human being" (sect. 6: ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑγείῃ τε καὶ σωτηρίῃ καὶ τροφῇ).

T7a (Protagoras in Plato, *Prot.* 320de): (sc. θεοί, d2) προσέταξαν Προμηθεΐ καὶ (d5) Ἐπιμηθεΐ κοσμησαί τε καὶ νεῖμαι δυνάμεις ἐκάστοις (sc. of the θνητὰ δὲ γένη, c8) ὡς πρόπει. Προμηθεΐα δὲ παραιτεῖται Ἐπιμηθεὺς αὐτὸς νεῖμαι, ... νέμων δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἰσχὺν ἄνευ τάχους προσήπτεν, (e1) τοὺς δ' ἀσθενεστέρους τάχει ἐκόσμει· τοὺς δὲ ὠπλιζε, τοῖς δ' ἄοπλον διδοὺς φύσιν ἄλλην τιν' αὐτοῖς ἐμηχανᾶτο δύνάμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν.

Lamb (Loeb/Perseus) tr. "... they charged Prometheus and Epimetheus to deal to each the equipment of his proper faculty. Epimetheus besought Prometheus that he might do the dealing himself; ... and in dealing he attached strength without speed to some, while the weaker he equipped with speed; and some he armed, while devising for others, along with an unarmed condition, some different faculty for preservation."

T7b (Protagoras in Plato, *Prot.* 321bc): ἄτε δὴ οὖν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς ὢν ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἔλαθεν αὐτὸν (c1) καταναλώσας τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς τὰ ἄλογα· λοιπὸν δὴ ἀκόσμητον ἔτι αὐτῷ ἦν τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἠπόρει ὅτι χρήσαιτο. ἀποροῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς ἐπισκεψόμενος τὴν νομήν, καὶ ὄρα τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ζῶα ἐμμελῶς πάντων (c5) ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπον γυμνὸν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ ἄστροτον καὶ ἄοπλον.

Lamb tr. "Now Epimetheus, being not so wise as he might be, heedlessly squandered his stock of properties on the brutes; he still had left unequipped the race of men, and was at a loss what to do with it. As he was casting about, Prometheus arrived to examine his distribution, and saw that whereas the other creatures were fully and suitably provided, man was naked, unshod, unbedded, unarmed; ..."

T8 (*PA* IV 10, 687a23-b7): [i] Ἄλλ' οἱ λέγοντες ὡς συνέστηκεν οὐ καλῶς ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἀλλὰ χειρίστα (a25) τῶν ζῶων ἀνυπόδητόν τε γὰρ αὐτὸν εἶναι φασὶ καὶ γυμνὸν καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντα ὄπλον πρὸς τὴν ἀλκίην) οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν. [ii] Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα μίαν ἔχει βοήθειαν, καὶ μεταβάλλεσθαι ἀντὶ ταύτης ἕτεραν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ὥσπερ ὑποδεδεμένον ἀεὶ καθεῦδεν καὶ πάντα πράττειν, καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸ (a30) σῶμα ἀλεωρᾶν μηδέποτε καταθέσθαι, μηδὲ μεταβάλλεσθαι ὃ δὴ ἐτύγχανεν ὄπλον ἔχων. [iii] Τῷ δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰς τε βοηθείας (b1) πολλὰς ἔχειν, καὶ ταύτας ἀεὶ ἔξεστι μεταβάλλειν, ἔτι δ' ὄπλον οἷον ἂν βούληται καὶ ὅπου ἂν βούληται ἔχειν. Ἡ γὰρ χεὶρ καὶ ὄνυξ καὶ χηλὴ καὶ κέρασ γίνεται καὶ δόρυ καὶ ξίφος καὶ ἄλλο ὅποιον οὖν ὄπλον καὶ ὄργανον· πάντα γὰρ (b5) ἔσται ταῦτα διὰ τὸ πάντα δύνασθαι λαμβάνειν καὶ ἔχειν. [iv] Ταύτη δὲ συμμεμηχανῆσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶδος τῆ φύσει τῆς χειρός. Διαίρετή γὰρ καὶ πολυσχιδής· ...

Lennox tr.: "[i] Those who say that mankind is not well constituted, but on the contrary is the worst constituted of animals – for (they say) he is barfoot, naked, and without weapons for defense – are mistaken. [ii] For the other animals have but one protection, and cannot exchange another one for it. Rather, it is necessary for them to sleep and do everything as if they would be permanently shod, and never to shed the shelter surrounding their body, not to exchange whatever weapon they may have. [iii] But for mankind it is always possible to have many forms of protection and to exchange them, and furthermore, he may choose what sort of weapon to have, and where. For the hand becomes a talon, claw, horn, spear, sword or any other weapon or instrument – it will be all these thanks to thanks to its ability to grasp and hold them all. And for this the form of the hand has been adapted by nature. For it is divided and has many digits ..."

T9a (*Phys.* II 2, 194a33-5): ἐπεὶ καὶ ποιούσιν αἱ τέχναι τὴν ὕλην αἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς αἱ δὲ εὐεργόν, καὶ χρώμεθα ὡς ἡμῶν ἕνεκα πάντων ὑπαρχόντων

Wardy (1993, 26 f.) tr., with corr.: "For the arts too make their matter, some from scratch, while others render it more workable, and we use it on the ground that everything exists to our benefit,"³

T9b (*Phys.* II 2, 194a35-6) (ἐσμὲν γὰρ πῶς καὶ ἡμεῖς τέλος· διχῶς γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· εἴρηται δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας).

"For in a sense, we are also an end – taking into account that the term 'for a purpose' is ambiguous, as was said in my *Peri philosophias*."

T10 (*Pol.* I 8, 1256a19-40): [i] ἀλλὰ μὴν εἶδη γε πολλὰ (a20) τροφῆς, διὸ καὶ βίοι πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ζῆν ἄνευ τροφῆς, ὥστε αἱ διαφοραὶ τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους πεποιήκασιν διαφέροντας τῶν ζώων. [ii] τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἀγελαῖα τὰ δὲ σποραδικὰ ἐστίν, ὁποτέρως συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν τροφήν αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν (a25) ζωοφάγα τὰ δὲ καρποφάγα τὰ δὲ παμφάγα αὐτῶν εἶναι, ὥστε πρὸς τὰς ῥαστώνας καὶ τὴν αἴρεσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ φύσιν τοὺς βίους αὐτῶν διώρισεν, [iii] ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἕκαστῳ ἡδὺ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλὰ ἕτερον ἕτεροι, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ζωοφάγων καὶ τῶν καρποφάγων οἱ βίοι πρὸς ἄλληλα διεστᾶσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ (a30) καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρουσιν οἱ τούτων βίοι. [iv] οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀργότατοι νομάδες εἰσὶν ... (a35) οἱ δ' ἀπὸ θήρας ζῶσι, καὶ θήρας ἕτεροι ἕτερας, οἶον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ ληστείας, οἱ δ' ἀπ' ἀλιείας, ὅσοι λίμνας καὶ ἔλη καὶ ποταμοὺς ἢ θάλατταν τοιαύτην προσοικοῦσιν, οἱ δ' ἀπ' ὀρνίθων ἢ θηρίων ἀγρίων· τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ζῆ καὶ τῶν ἡμέρων (a40) καρπῶν.

Rackham (Loeb) tr.: "[i] But furthermore, there are many sorts of food, owing to which both animals and men have many modes of life; for it is impossible to live without food, so that the differences of food have made the lives of animals different. [ii] Among wild animals some are nomadic and others solitary, according to whichever habit is advantageous for their supply of food, because some of them are carnivorous, others graminivorous, and others eat all kinds of food; so that nature has differentiated their modes of life to suit their facilities and their predilection for those articles of food. [iii] And as different kinds of animals by nature relish different sorts of food, and not each kind the same, even within the classes of carnivorous and graminivorous animals their modes of life differ from one another. And similarly in the human race also, for there are wide differences of life among mankind. [iv] The idlest men are nomads ... Other men live from hunting, and different people from different kinds of hunting, for instance some from brigandage, others from fishing—these are those that dwell on the banks of lakes, marshes and rivers or of a sea suitable for fishing,—and others live on wild birds and animals. But the largest class of men live from the land and the fruits of cultivation."

T11 (*HA* IX 12, 615a24-6): Ζῶσι δὲ περὶ θάλατταν καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ λίμνας οἱ μὲν στεγανόποδες ἅπαντες· ἢ γὰρ φύσις αὐτῆ ζητεῖ τὸ πρόσφορον·

Balme (Loeb) tr.: "Residents by sea and rivers include all the web-footed; for nature itself seeks what is suitable."

³ Wardy: "... for our sake".

T12 (*Pol. I 11, 1258b12-7*): ἔστι δὲ χρηματιστικῆς μέρη χρήσιμα· τὸ περὶ τὰ κτήματα ἔμπειρον εἶναι, ποιῶ λυσιτελέστατα καὶ ποῦ καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἵππων κτήσις ποῖα τις ἢ βοῶν ἢ προβάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ (b15) τῶν λοιπῶν ζώων (δεῖ γὰρ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλά τε τούτων τίνα λυσιτελέστατα, καὶ ποῖα ἐν ποίοις τόποις· ἄλλα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλαις εὐθηνεῖ χώραις), ...

Rackham (Loeb) tr.: "The practically useful branches of the art of wealth-getting are first, an expert knowledge of stock, what breeds are most profitable and in what localities and under what conditions, for instance what particular stock in horses or cattle or sheep, and similarly of the other animals also (for the farmer must be an expert as to which of these animals are most profitable compared with one another, and also as to what breeds are most profitable on what sorts of land, since different breeds flourish in different places)."

T13 (Aristophanes, *Ran.* 970 ff., Euripides speaking) Τοιαῦτα μέντου γὰρ φρονεῖν / τούτοισιν εἰσηγη-
σάμην, / λογισμὸν ἐνθεῖς τῇ τέχνῃ / καὶ σκέψιν, ὥστ' ἤδη νοεῖν / ἅπαντα καὶ διειδένα / (975) τὰ τ'
ἄλλα καὶ τὰς οἰκίας / οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἢ πρὸ τοῦ / κάνασκοπεῖν· «Πῶς τοῦτ' ἔχει; Ποῦ μοι τοδί; Τίς
τοῦτ' ἔλαβε;»

Dillon (Perseus) tr.: "Well, to ponder such things, I / instructed these folks here,/ putting logic in my art / and scrutiny, so now they notice / everything and know through and through / most especially how to run / the household better than before, / and they inquire, 'How's this doing? / Where's this? Who took that?'"

T14 (*Pol. I 8, 1256b7-22*): [i] ἢ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη κτήσις ὑπ' αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως διδομένη πᾶσιν, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθύς, οὕτω καὶ (b10) τελειωθεῖσιν. [ii] καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν τὰ μὲν συνεκτίκει τῶν ζώων τοσαύτην τροφήν ὥσθ' ἱκανὴν εἶναι μέχρι οὗ ἂν δύνηται αὐτὸ αὐτῷ πορίζειν τὸ γεννηθέν, οἷον ὅσα σκωληκοτοκεῖ ἢ ὠτοκεῖ· ὅσα δὲ ζωτοκεῖ, τοῖς γεννωμένοις ἔχει τροφήν ἐν αὐτοῖς μέχρι τινός, τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου (b15) γάλακτος φύσιν. [iii] ὥστε ὁμοίως δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις οἰητέον τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζώων ἔνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἡμερᾶ καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν, τῶν δ' ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ γε πλεῖστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοήθειας ἔνεκεν, ἵνα (b20) καὶ ἐσθῆς καὶ ἄλλα ὄργανα γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν. [iv] εἰ οὖν ἢ φύσις μὴθὲν μήτε ἀτελεὲς ποιεῖ μήτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν.

Rackham (Loeb) tr.: "[i] Property of this sort then seems to be [GH: "the supply required by their *bios* (*hê toiautê ktêsis*) is evidently ..."] bestowed by nature herself upon all, as immediately upon their first coming into existence, so also when they have reached maturity. [ii] For even at the original coming into existence of the young some kinds of animals bring forth with them at birth enough sustenance to suffice until the offspring can provide for itself, for example all the species that bear their young in the form of larvae or in eggs. The viviparous species have sustenance for their offspring inside themselves for a certain period, the substance called milk. [iii] So that clearly we must suppose that nature also provides for them in a similar way when grown up, and that plants exist for the sake of animals and the other animals for the good of man, the domestic species both for his service and for his food, and if not all at all events most of the wild ones for the sake of his food and of his supplies of other kinds, in order that [20] they may furnish him both with clothing and with other appliances. [iv] If therefore nature makes nothing without purpose [GH: "incompleted"] or in vain, it follows that nature has made all the animals for the sake of men."

T15 (*Phys.* II 1, 192b34): ὑποκείμενον γὰρ τι, καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις αἰεί.

"Nature is always the nature of something, and is in the thing of which it is the nature."

T16 (Platon, *Soph.* 244a5-6): τί ποτε βούλεσθε σημαίνειν ὅποταν ὄν φθέγγησθε

"... what people want to signify when they use the word 'is'."

(Note that the participle (*on*) is just the standard form in which Greek verbs are referred to.)

T17 (*Met.* IV 1, 1103a21-2) ... ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὄν ἢ ὄν καὶ τὰ τοῦτω ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὐτό

"... a discipline which studies that which is *qua* thing-that-is and whatever holds good of this in its own right." (tr. Kirvan, with corr.)

T18 (Platon, *Soph.* 242c5-6) τὰ ὄντα διορίσασθαι πόσα τε καὶ ποῖά ἐστιν

"to determine how many and what kinds of things there are"

cf. Isokrates, or. 15 (*Antidosis*), c. 268)

T19 (*Met.* VII 1, 1128b2-6): τὸ πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν καὶ αἰεὶ ζητούμενον καὶ αἰεὶ ἀπορούμενον, τί τὸ ὄν, τοῦτό ἐστι τίς ἡ οὐσία (τοῦτο γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἐν εἶναί φασιν οἱ δὲ πλείω ἢ ἓν, καὶ οἱ μὲν πεπερασμένα οἱ δὲ ἄπειρα).

"the question that was, is, and always will be asked, and always will cause difficulty: what is the thing-that-is? – that is: what is substance? This it is that some say is one, some more than one; that some say is finite in number, some infinite." (tr. Bostock, with corr.)

T20 ([Hippocrates], *V.M.* 20.1): ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅ τί ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅπως ἐγένετο πρῶτον καὶ ὅπόθεν συνεπάγη

"from the beginning, what is *F*, how did *F* come to being in the first place, and of what things was *F* composed?" (*F* = ἄνθρωπος)

T21 (Homerus, *Il.* 4.118): αἶψα δ' ἐπὶ νευρῇ κατεκόσμηι πικρὸν οἶστόν, cf. *Il.* 14, 187: *kosmos*, *Il.* 2, 655: *dia tricha kosmêthentes*.

T22 (*Phys.* II 1, 193a3-9): ὡς δ' ἔστιν ἡ φύσις, πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι γελοῖον· φανερόν γὰρ ὅτι τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν πολλά. τὸ δὲ δεικνύναι τὰ (α5) φανερὰ διὰ τῶν ἀφανῶν οὐ δυναμένου κρίνειν ἐστὶ τὸ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτὸ γνώριμον (ὅτι δ' ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο πάσχειν, οὐκ ἄδηλον· συλλογίσαιτο γὰρ ἂν τις ἐκ γενετῆς ὦν τυφλὸς περὶ χρωμάτων), ὥστε ἀνάγκη τοῖς τοιούτοις περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων εἶναι τὸν λόγον, νοεῖν δὲ μηδέν.

"To try to show that the nature exists would be foolish. For evidently many things of the sort described [i.e. having natures] exist. To show what is evident by what is not evident is a sign of inability to distinguish between what is, and what is not, known by itself (which evidently may happen: a person who is blind from birth would have to make inferences about colours). Necessarily, such people make arguments about words but grasp nothing."