Hamid Mohammadi

Citizen Participation in Urban Planning and Management

The Case of Iran, Shiraz City, Saadi Community

ISBN 978-3-89958-884-2
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Acknowledgments

This study as a Ph.D. work has been developed at the University of Kassel, Faculty of Architecture, Urban Planning and Landscape Planning. This research was carried out under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Detlev Ipsen. I would like to thank him for his careful advice, suggestions and encouragement during the research. I would also like to thank Prof. Dipl.-Ing. Christl Drey, the consultant of the study, for her precise advices.

I would also like to thank Maab Consulting Engineers, especially Masoud Aghaei and Reza Ahmadian who helped me to provide information related to Shiraz city and Saadi community.

My gratitude also goes to Mehdi Heidari and Iman Shokrollahi who supported me to fill in the questionnaires in Saadi community.

I am also very grateful to all my friends for their continuous encouragement and support during the execution of this work especially Reza Hosseini Arab, Mohsen Masoudian, Naser Mohammad Khanlou, Amin Davazdah Emami, Korous Khoshbakht and Pejman Behin.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their love and unconditional support.
Dedicated to my wife, Sepideh and my son, Arman
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
1.1. Introduction

In the economic and political conditions prior to 1960, urban planning was taken into consideration by governments, especially on its economic and management aspects, so it had imperative and top-down characteristics. On the other hand, growing trend of industrialisation and urbanisation caused the domination of scientific and technocratic elites especially engineers and architects in this scope.

From 1960 on, vast critical reactions impacted this situation and caused urban planning change from imperative and technocratic to participatory and democratic shape. Sustainable development¹, rapid growth of democracy and human rights, development concepts of civil society and present cultural reactions placed urban planning in a critical situation in a type of theoretical and practical difficulties. In order to release from this critical situation, urban planning begins with democratic methods, searching justice and human aims. In fact, urban planning and design in the beginning of 21th century goes to a revolution in duties, aims and methods.

Some researchers and specialists believe that we ought to speak about ‘planning through debate’ and ‘communicative turn’ in planning theory. Most practical and theoretical efforts that have been done in this field are based on a combination of methods and principles of planning to democracy, public and private sector participation, defence of poor people and protection of cultural values, thus providing justice and social welfare (Campbell, 1997).

In his recent contribution to communicative planning theory, Sager (1994) elaborates two planning models—rational-scientific planning and dialogical incrementalism— which are in opposition to each other concerning the relation between knowledge and communication. The differences can be summarized as follows: rational-scientific planning accepts the means-end scheme and relies strongly on analytical technique, whereas incremental planning rejects the means-end scheme and depends heavily on communication. The planners in the synoptic process have nearly unlimited calculative capacity, and the planners in the dialogical incremental process nearly unlimited communicative capacity. Therefore synoptic and incremental planning can be viewed as opposites with regard to information, knowledge and communication. To Habermas’s (1984) terms, synoptic planning involves a strategic rationality whereas dialogical incrementalism involves a communicative rationality. Obviously, one single form of planning has rarely been entirely adhered to in reality. However, through this ideal type of formulation, Sager creates fixed reference points for discussing communicative aspects of planning.

Communicative Planning offers new roles for planners. Traditional planners have important roles in the planning process, such as Investigators, Analysts, Evaluators and Controllers. However, it is evident that there is also a need for complementary planners with a new and different kind of competence based on communicative rationality in roles as Facilitators, Intermediaries, Negotiators, and Mediators (Malbert, 1998).

In order to improve the decision-making processes towards participatory ones, many efforts have been made by international organizations, among which the role of plans and actions of organizations related to the U.N. is obvious.

¹ The concept of sustainable development is founded on four ethical principles: Intergenerational equity, participatory decision-making, human-human interdependencies, and human-biosphere interdependencies. Sustainable development is promoted when these ethical principles are applied to development in the process of social, economic, political and cultural change. This review concentrates on the application of the principle of participatory decision-making in urban planning (Malbert, 1998).
One of the most important efforts of this kind was the ‘Habitat II conference’ held in 1996 in Istanbul with undertaking of governments to develop urban governance in the world in two ways; firstly acquaintance with urban governance parameters by starting world discussion in this field and secondly acquaintance and propagation of sample actions—Best Practices— or successful local actions in providing urban governance in different cities of the world.

The importance of participatory planning can also be seen in ‘Local Agenda 21 Programme’. Since 1992, local government has been making progress towards Local Agenda 21. Agenda 21, which was signed at the ‘Earth Summit in Rio’, is an agreement to work towards sustainable development. Local authorities have a particularly poignant and important role in the delivery of sustainable development, because “as the level of government is closest to the people, they play a vital role in educating, motivating and responding to the public to promote sustainable development”.

Local Agenda 21, calls for all local authorities to consult with their communities and develop a vision and plan of action for the future of their locality. Public participation and consultation are central to Local Agenda 21. Local Agenda 21 offers an opportunity to radically reappraise and re-devise local authority participative structures, and to develop fresh and innovative methods of working with and for the community (Carter and Darlow, 1997).

Therefore, one of the most important characteristics of the new urban planning theories and international programs is the concept of citizen participation in decision-making process.

1.2. Functions of Citizen Participation

Planning academics and practitioners call widely for citizen participation in planning decisions. The literature provides theoretical and practical functions and reasons for this emphasis on citizen participation.

- In the communicative planning paradigm, for example, participation is at the core of deliberation among agencies, stakeholders, and the public at large.
- In practice, there are two kinds of normative and instrumental functions for citizen participation:

  The normative functions of participatory planning are related to demands for direct (or indirect) democracy. One of the arguments is that in an active democracy the voice of citizens should be listened to. Another argument is that participation is necessary to enlarge the legitimacy of the decision-making process. Participation is also valuable as a political goal, because it increases social capital and empowers citizens as they seek a stronger voice in decision that affects their lives. Participatory planning is seen as central to the promotion and protection of their interests.

  The instrumental function for participatory planning is related to the use of participation to make influential, effective and efficient planning products. The instrumental argument of a participatory approach for government implies that participation provide citizens with an opportunity to influence decision-making. It is recognized as a method to gain control, because positions and interests remain transparent. Participatory planning contributes to effectiveness, because it enables the inclusion of lay knowledge in decision-making and improves public support for policies and improves planning outcomes. And finally, participatory planning contributes to efficiency, because it provides a way to gain time (shorter decision-making process
in long-term), and averts implementation problems, objections and appeal. Citizen participation also has the potential to strengthen the planning profession by increasing the visibility and value of planning in the citizens’ eye (Woltjer, 2002; Laurian, 2004).

1.3. Limits to Citizen Participation

Citizen involvement in urban planning process has suffered from a number of problems and limits. Researchers and planners have resolved some of these limits, while others have remained unresolved. Here, I refer to the main issues that planners face.

Lack of resources and staff are likely to be a major constraining factor on both local authorities and other organizations that are involved in process at a local level. Good quality participation demands administrative support and other resources. Although, citizen participation gains time and money in long-term, but it needs financial resources and time in short-term. A second problem is lack of clear guidance from national government about the relationship of citizen participation to other areas of activity of local government (Carter and Darlow, 1997). More importantly, citizen participation rarely reached a good-quality level where citizens had some power to influence decision-making (Wang and Van Loo, 1998). Logically, continuous lack of good quality of citizen participation can create the citizens’ apathy. Sometimes local planners and politicians have no incentive to make an effort to maximise citizen participation (Wang and Van Loo, 1998). The need to achieve consensus in the participation process is another major problem. How should this be achieved when views are directly conflicted?

There are also a number of problems due to the participants themselves. For example, most of the participants are from a restricted social spectrum—middle class and well educated—that implies an unrepresentative process (Bedford et al, 2002). Similarly, it is hard to gain lower and lower middle income residents’ participation, because they see development matters as threats and possibly costly (Wang and Van Loo, 1998). More importantly, it seems inevitable that objectors will be those with a personal interest in an area, because this is where the planning system manifests itself in the reality of people’s every day lives and is the point at which personal interests need protection. Objector’s opinions contrary to those of the planning officer are likely to be rejected on grounds of NIMBYism. These groups of people try to legitimize their concerns by supplementing them with less self-interested reason for objection (Bedford et al, 2002).

Finally, although there are rational reasons for public participation in planning, power structures have a rationality of their own in the form of networks of interest—interests of authorities and developers. Citizen participation programmes will no longer be successful if the roles and the structures of power are not aptly recognized and considered. This issue will be discussed in more detailed in chapter two.

1.4. Definition of Concepts

In this section, a number of concepts related to the subject such as democracy, citizen participation, participatory democracy, collaborative planning and informal settlement have been defined. More over, I will discuss the difference between direct and indirect participation.

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2 Although participatory planning is a time-consuming process in short-term.
Democracy

The word ‘democracy’ is used in contemporary debate in a wide and confused range of meanings. I align myself with the position adopted by Held (1996), who argue for a notion of democracy based on the principle of autonomy in both political and economic spheres, in a system which promotes “discussion, debate and competition” among many divergent views. Within this conception, open debate, access to power centres, and general political participation are key requirements for democratic public life (Held, 1996).

Participation

Citizen participation can be defined as “providing citizens with opportunities to take part in governmental decision or planning process” (Glass, 1979), but a desirable participation as Laurian (2004) suggests, is one that enables citizens to shape planning decisions and outcomes while increasing their levels of social and political empowerment. It is therefore more than simply encouraging local inputs, it is about the capacity of groups and individuals to assert degrees of influence and power (Pattison, 2001). As Ipsen (2003) aptly stated, “participation today no longer means that the population is merely informed or that it has a formal right of objection, but is rather evolving into conflict management in order to overcome the blockage of developments and to actively participate in designing future developments”.

Participatory Democracy

A theoretical consideration of participatory planning is closely related to the concept of democracy. Direct (participatory) and indirect (representative) democracy are two separate democratic perspectives. Generally, people that are actively involved in planning situations have different conceptions about the function, necessity and range of participation within democratic decision-making. An important feature includes the directness of democracy. This feature—and other features which will not be discussed here—reflects different types of democracy (Held, 1996).

In direct democracy, citizens make decisions by themselves. The direct participation of all members of society is central to democracy types such as deliberative democracy and plebiscitary democracy. Indirect democracy, on the other hand, refers to a type of involvement by citizens and other groups where, eventually, representatives decide. Indirect participation matches with representative democracy. In representative democracy, delegates represent their people and use their skills to speak for people. Consensus democracy, for example, is a type of representative democracy, usually aiming at getting a broadly based consensus to support its decisions. It involves the participation of citizens via representatives or delegates. In indirect democracy, participation occurs by means of elections or via established interest groups.

With the “communicative turn” the emphasis on representation has shifted towards an emphasis on direct involvement. Direct democracy means that people speak for themselves. Planning processes are then no longer run by representatives who represent the absent; these absentees are actually present (Woltjer, 2002).
Governance

In theory Governance means a more bottom-up approach with a much wider input from as many stakeholders as possible (Pattison, 2001).

Collaborative Planning

As Healey discussed this term in her book (Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies, 1997), the term was used to explain the process, in which the stakeholders and interest groups and participants, try to reach consensus on actions that express their mutual benefits and interests.

Informal Settlement

Informal settlements (often referred to as squatter settlements or shanty towns) are dense settlements comprising communities housed in self-constructed shelters under conditions of informal or traditional land tenure. They are common features of developing countries and are typically the product of an urgent need for shelter by the urban poor (Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, 2004).

Spontaneous informal settlements are the means of access to land and serve as a main source of shelter for the low-income migrating population. Home to poor inhabitants with insecure employment, and suffering from lack of services and poor physical conditions, the informal settlement is prone to social problems.

Informal settlements occur when the current land administration and planning fails to address the needs of the whole community. On a global scale, informal settlements are a significant problem especially in underdeveloped and developing countries.

A clear definition of informal settlements is hardly available. Many synonyms have been used in literature to refer to informal settlements. These include spontaneous, irregular, unplanned, marginal and squatter settlements. Some literatures have used the terms slums and informal settlements interchangeably (UNHSP, 2003b). While a clear definition for informal settlements is still elusive, some organizations have given descriptions of informal settlements and slums. The UN Habitat categorizes informal settlements into two categories(UNHSP, 2003a):

1. Squatter settlements: settlements where land and/or buildings have been occupied without the permission of the owner.
2. Illegal land development: settlements where initial occupation is legal, but unauthorized land developments have occurred (e.g. change of land use that breach zoning plans, building extensions without building permits, subdivisions without regard to services and infrastructure, etc).

The UN Commission on Sustainable Development, UNCSD (1996) provides a similar description. According to the Commission, informal settlements refer to: residential areas where a group of housing units have been constructed on land to which the occupants have no legal claim, or which they occupy illegally; and/or unplanned settlements and areas where housing is not in compliance with current planning and building regulations i.e. unauthorized housing.

On slums, UN Habitat has adopted an operational definition that describes slums as an area that combines, to various extents, the following characteristics (UNHSP, 2003a):
• Insecure tenure i.e. no protection from arbitrary and/or unlawful eviction
• Inadequate access to basic urban services especially water and sanitation facilities
• Non-permanent structures built with non-durable building materials
• Insufficient living area i.e. overcrowding
• Location on hazardous land

The term slum, appears to have a different usage in the developed and developing countries. In the developed countries, it is often used to describe formal housing whose condition has been deteriorated due to neglect and which is progressively occupied by lower income groups. In the developing countries, however, the term is used to refer to low-income, densely populated settlement that lack basic services and infrastructural amenities. The term informal settlement, on the other hand, is mostly used to denote the tenure status of a residential area.

Since this research is concerned with informal settlements in Iran, the characteristics of these settlements in Iran should be mentioned. According to Sheikhi (2002) and Sarrafi (2002a), an informal settlement in Iran is an area that combines to various extents the following characteristics:

• Spontaneous formation of the settlement and its development based on dwellers’ motivation and possibilities;
• Lack of supervision and control of governmental formal management and public institutions and rapid growth at least during the first decade of their appearance;
• Formation and development based on social and cultural structures of the dwellers, not authorized and planned land development;
• Inadequate access to basic urban services and infrastructures and overcrowding;
• Poor structural quality of housing;
• Insecure tenure: land ownership, occupation, and use and providing services occurred out of usual formal and legal framework and buildings constructed without ‘permit to construct’.

1.5. The General Picture of Citizen Participation in Urban Management and Planning in Iran

Democratic movements in urban fields can be shortly reviewed through three stages; before the Constitutional Revolution, between the Constitutional and Islamic Revolutions, and after the Islamic Revolution.

1.5.1. Urban Administration before the Constitutional Revolution (1906)

Until the end of the nineteenth century, in Iran as elsewhere in the Middle East, the executive head of the town was a Prince or, more often, a military man appointed by him as the governor, with unrestricted duties and prerogative except sitting in judgement in the religious court. Most of the town business, however, was passed on to the governor’s assistants, qadi and muhtasib, whom he had the privilege to appoint. The office of legal secretary to the governor developed to be the theoretically independent office of qadi as one of the most vigorous institutions in Islamic society. Nevertheless, he did not control the criminal justice, police, and taxation. The qadi was
the trustee of the pious foundations who provided the maintenance of mosques, seminaries, and miscellaneous public services such as fountains or hospitals, and could become the actual regent of the town (Madanipour, 1998).

1.5.2. Urban Management between Two Revolutions (1906-1979)

The constitutional revolutionaries were eager to establish the rule of law in the country. That is why in 1907, the first parliament after the revolution passed a Baladiyeh Act for the establishment of modern municipalities. According to this Act, cities were to be run by a municipality under the control of a council of elected representatives (Mozayeni, 1995). The council members were to be elected for four years and their leader, who carried the traditional title of *kalantar*, now the equivalent of a mayor, was also in charge of the municipality. The mayor and three others appointed by the council were the main members of the municipal organization. The main aim of parliament in the establishment of municipalities was “to protect the interests of cities and to respond to the needs of the citizens” (Madanipour, 1998).

In 1930, this municipal Act was replaced by another which eroded the relative autonomy of municipalities and turned them into local agencies of central government (Hamshahri, 25 January 1996).

From these early stages, the Ministry of the Interior became the main actor in establishing municipalities, in appointing their management, and in controlling their affairs, a situation which has essentially remained unchanged until now. The first attempt to create an autonomous urban government was therefore only partly implemented. With the accession to the throne of Reza Shah, who suppressed political freedom and built up a strong central government, a new municipal law was devised. Now the municipality was an institution entirely dependent on central government. Mayors were installed by the Ministry of the Interior and the city councils found the role of advisory groups whose main decisions had to be approved by the Ministry. Town people could elect five times the required number of representatives, from whom the government would choose and appoint the members of the council.

The attachment of municipalities to the central government was part of Reza Shah’s drive to centralize political power. After his demise in the Second World War, which led to a renaissance of democratic forces, municipalities once again became the focus of attention. The third municipal Act was approved in 1949, which returned to the municipalities a degree of legal autonomy. City councils were to be elected by citizens for a period of four years and had wide-ranging power in the management of the city. The mayor was to be appointed by the Ministry of the Interior from three candidates put forward by the city council. The councils had the right to legislate, devise local taxes, engage in a degree of urban management, and become relatively independent from the Ministry of the Interior. Three years later under the premiership of Dr. Mossadegh, this law was amended to provide municipalities with more independence and limit their relationship with the Ministry of the Interior (Madanipour, 1998).

From the premiership of Dr Mossadegh until the Islamic Revolution, the municipal Act has frequently changed. In these stages of legal provision and change, the struggle to establish a democratically elected local government distinctive from the central power can be seen clearly. The debate was also centred on the relationship between city council, the mayor, and the municipality as the constituent parts of the municipal government. What has remained outside the discussion, however, has been the limited range of issues in which a municipal government is allowed to engage. In all these pieces of legislation, the duties of the local government are limited to mostly physical development and provision of urban utilities (Hamshahri, 25 January 1996).
1.5.3. Democratic Government after the Islamic Revolution (1979)

In 1982, the first post-revolutionary parliament devised a system of democratic councils for the country. With enthusiasm similar to that of the constitutional revolutionaries before them, the Islamic revolutionaries proposed a complete set of Islamic councils at all levels: from villages and rural districts to towns, cities, counties, and regions. With similar fate, however, the councils have mostly remained on paper until 1998. The Act was amended in 1986, 1991, and 1994 (Madanipour, 1998). After the revolution, some duties and powers of the councils have expanded. These duties are divided into four categories including: consulting, supervising or controlling, planning and executive affairs (Alavitabar, 2000).

From 1998, the elections of city councils are being successfully held. During these years, the city councils have had more considerable roles in controlling urban development, but the urban development plans have been provided by planners and consultants and citizen involvement has not been part of the planners’ duties and there have been no regulations about citizen involvement in city councils’ Act. Despite these problems, some planners and consultants involve citizens to improve the quality of urban development plans, but the scattered attempts are still not organized and systematic.

Moreover, the municipalities understood the necessity and importance of citizen participation in urban administration. Until now, several participatory projects and plans have been provided and/or implemented by municipalities after Islamic revolution. Some of these plans are as follow: The Safe City Project³, The Mayor-School Plan⁴, The Comprehensive Plan of Green Space⁵, The Safe Neighbourhood Plan⁶, etc.

*The Safe City Project:* The Safe City movement based on two key and essential principles of inter-sectoral cooperation of organizations at national and local level from one hand, and the direct and continuous participation of citizens in decision-making and execution of inclusive and comprehensive safe plans of urban life from the other hand.

Seven committees including “health, education, urban services, employment and income, mental health, sport and citizen participation” are active in this project and the members of every committee have at least a public meeting in a week in which the members analyse the problems and devise the proposals (Alavitabar, 2000).

This project could involve the citizens directly in decision-making. The movement have had valuable outcome, however, it needs continuous critiques to improve its methods.

*The Mayor-School Plan:* This plan is provided with the point of view that a society consists of some inter-related institutions. The administration of the school is not separated from the other institutions of the society. School is an institution that has its own organization, simultaneously it is a kind of society. It means that the student during his or her school should learn and be informed that the society is here and now, not anything in the future or inaccessible. In other words, school is not a separated element of society.

The main objectives of the plan are as follow:

To give prestige to the students to create behavioural and mental balance;

³ Proj-e Shahr-e Salem (Persian name)
⁴ Tah-e Shahrare-Madreseh (Persian name)
⁵ Tah-e Jame ja Pishgaman-e Fazay-e Sabz (Persian name)
⁶ Tah-e Mahalle-ye Salem (Persian name)
To improve the spirit of voluntary participation of the students in their family, school and city; and Recognition of the city and school and the methods of their administration to create responsibility toward the surroundings.

Furthermore, this plan aims at giving necessary information, education and effective social participation to the students in the fields of safety, traffic and transportation, environmental problems, social and cultural affairs and sport (Alavitabar, 2000).

Generally speaking, the main aim of this plan is educating students—or citizens—in urban fields and areas.

The previous and current situation of citizen participation will be discussed in more detail in chapter three.

1.6. Key Problems

As some studies (Ministry of Interior, Centre for Urban Planning Studies, Vol. 2, 2000 & Vol. 3, 2001; Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, 2004) show, lack or poor level of citizen participation in both providing urban development plans and addressing the problem of informal settlements, leads to failure of urban development plans and extend of informal settlements in Iran. These problems can be discussed separately as follow:

1.6.1. Problems Concerning Urban Development Plans

One of the essential problems of urban planning and management in Iran is the failure of implementation and execution of the urban development plans. In recent years, researches have been done to find the affecting factors on the failure of urban development plans. The studies (Ministry of Interior, Centre for Urban Planning Studies, Vol. 2, 2000 & Vol. 3, 2001) show that lack or poor level of citizen participation is one of the influential reason to this problem.

Comparison of the criteria concerning citizen participation in preparation, approval and implementation of urban development plans in different countries (Table 1-1) shows that there is a significant distance between Iran and other sample countries. Iran has the lowest degree of citizen participation in urban development plans and it leads, as one of the important factors, to lack of realism in goal setting, inaccuracy, inefficiency, unjust and inequity in urban development plans (Ministry of Interior, Centre for Urban Planning Studies, Vol. 2, 2000 & Vol. 3, 2001). In other words, lack of citizen participation challenges to possibility of implementation and success of urban plans.

The study under the title of “The Methods of Implementing Urban Development Plans—The Formulation of Appropriate Methods of Providing Urban Plans in Iran” concludes: The most important change concerning preparation, approval and implementation of urban plans in Iran has to be done, is to change the role of citizens that can be appeared in the forms of direct citizen participation and involvement of their representatives in local communities.
Table (1-1): Comparing Citizen Participation in Preparation, Approval, and Implementation of Urban Development Plans in Iran and 10 Sample Countries

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
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low: 1
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too much : 4

too much : 4

too much : 4

1.6.2. Problems Concerning Informal Settlements in Iran

Spontaneous Informal settlements have gradually developed during recent decades in the periphery of large cities in Iran. Correctly called ‘Informal’, these marginal settlements are the means of access to land and serve as the main source of shelter for the low-income migrating population.

Home to poor inhabitants with insecure employment, and suffering from lack of services and poor physical conditions, the informal settlements is prone to social problems. As shown by international experience and urban studies, this is not a transient phenomenon in developing countries, but on the contrary it is continuously expanding.

Parallel to the expanding urbanisation observed over the recent decades, irregular and spontaneous settlements on the peri-urban areas, prominently larger cities have been increasingly rising which have the following common features (Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, 2004):

- Hastily constructed housing often built by their eventual occupants, mostly without permit to construct and outside existing formal planning leading to an irregular compound.

7 To compare the situation of citizen participation in urban development plans in Iran with other sample countries, the study (Centre of Studies for Urban Planning, Vol. 2 & 3, 2000) used scores 0 to 4 to show the lowest and the highest levels of citizen participation. By this it should not be misunderstood that the situation of citizen participation in countries with high scores (3 and 4) is perfect and is a real participation. Rather it means that there is a considerable distance between Iran and other sample countries.
Concentration of lower income groups or poor people with functional linkages to the main city despite physical segregation.

A habitat with low quality of life and desperately low urban services and infrastructure and high population density.

The particularities mentioned above expose their inhabitants to high social, environmental, and natural risks leading to a break away from the main fabric of the city. It is currently estimated that about one eighth of urban population (about four and half million people) in Iran live in informal settlements. A proportion which may increase to a quarter within the next decade representing a doubling in numbers (Iranian Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, 2004).

To face and solve problems of informal settlements, during past decades, following strategies have been experienced (Ardeshiri, 2003).

1. Absolute destruction (without giving any right to the dwellers)
2. Destruction and causing to migrate to previous living or birth place
3. Destruction after allocation of cheap land
4. Destruction after allocation of cheap land and cheap housing materials
5. Destruction after allocation of cheap land and free housing materials
6. Buying and destruction
7. Destruction after transfer of dwellers to the low-price housing especially apartments
8. Obligation to reconstruction and renovation of housing units by owners with acceptance of their legal right of tenure
9. Connivance, but control of future development
10. Absolute connivance

Implementation of most of the above programmes not only did not solve the housing problems of low-income citizens, but also resulted in expanding of these regions in all districts of the city (Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, 2004). Failure of governments in providing housing for low-income groups resulted in acceptance of renovation and reconstruction attitude based on ‘Enabling’ informal sector and inhabitants of informal settlements in recent years. This approach focuses on all encompassing participation of inhabitants in these settlements.

1.7. The Research Aim and Objectives

The aim of this research is to analyse the most important and influential factors to involve citizens in urban planning and management in Iran. The objectives are as follow:

- To find obstacles and potentials of citizen participation in urban planning and management in Iran
- To find obstacles and potentials of citizen participation in urban planning and management in informal settlements especially in ‘Saadi Community’

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8 Saadi Community is an informal settlement in Shiraz city in Iran. This community is the case which I studied and will be described in chapter four.
1.8. The Research Questions

- Do the urban planning and management structures in Iran have the necessary conditions to expect active citizen participation?
- Which roles do the city and community councils and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have concerning citizen participation?
- According to the Arnstein’s so-called ‘ladder of participation’, what kind and which level of participation is possible and can be expected regarding the current social, cultural, political, economical, and legal structures of Iran (focused on informal settlements)?
- Which factors affect citizen participation (focused on informal settlements)?

1.9. The Research Methodology

To answer the research questions, three methods including documentary studies, interview, and questionnaire (citizens and councillors questionnaires) have been used. Documentary studies have been done in both national and local levels. The authorities and experts in Fars Province and the councillors and dwellers of Saadi Community have respectively been interviewed and filled out the questionnaires. Before I explain the research methods and procedures, it is necessary to refer to the reasons that encouraged me to choose Saadi Community as the case study of this research.

1.9.1. Selection of the Case

As it has been previously mentioned, ‘Saadi Community’ has been chosen as the case study. The community is located at North-East of Shiraz city (in Iran) and has been developed on two sides of Shiraz-Qarameh road. Here, I will address the criteria and/or reasons for selecting this area as the case of research.

- Saadi Community is an informal settlement. As it has been referred in previous sections, informal settlements hold big challenges for urban planners in Iran. On the other hand, regarding the severity of the problem, Iranian Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (2004) approved a document under the title of “Strategies for Enabling and Regularizing Informal Settlements” to help control and improvement by focusing on participation of local dwellers. That is to say, there is a strong enthusiasm for citizen involvement in these settlements by the governmental apparatuses. It may facilitate the process of citizen participation and can help the realization of the participatory planning according to the supporting and backing of the related programmes.

- Shiraz is known as a cultural city in Iran and along with Isfahan is a popular destination for national and international tourists. In the periphery of Shiraz city and at the heart of Saadi Community as an informal settlement, Iranian famous poet—Saadi⁹ was buried. While Saadi’s tomb is one of the most interesting places for national and international tourists, it is surrounded by an overcrowded and unpleasant informal settlement.

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⁹ Saadi is one of the most famous Iranian Poets who had been living eight centuries ago in this area and he was finally buried in his living place—nowadays called Saadiyeh. His tomb has been reconstructed several times during past centuries.
• Although there are several informal settlements with various sizes of population in Shiraz, Saadi Community is one of the largest informal settlements in Shiraz and even in Iran as well. Moreover, severity of problems in this settlement distinguishes it from majority of informal settlements in Iran. It would be reasonable to pay more attention to this community.
• After formation and establishment of city and village councils in 1998, only a few cities in Iran tried to form community councils, from which Shiraz is one of them and Saadi community councilors cooperate with Shiraz city councilors in solving problems. This possibility (community councils) may help the process of citizen involvement in decision-making and make it more profound.
• In addition to all of the above reasons, I have worked on some urban projects related to Shiraz city before I begin my doctoral studies and it helped me to become more familiar with the region and the city in addition to making a professional contact with experts and local authorities. These could facilitate the process of data collection and save time and money.

1.9.2. The Research Methods (Data Collection)

1.9.2.1. Documentary Studies: To study the history of citizen participation, the previous and current structures of urban planning and management, city councils, NGOs and CBOs, and some other related issues, the nation-wide documentary studies have been done. Moreover, to have a better recognition of Saadi Community, I have studied Fars Province (in which Saadi Community is located) and current situation of Saadi community. I have also added photos, films, and observation to my field studies and I reviewed previous urban plans of the community. Therefore, documentary studies have been done on both national and local levels. Infact, the documentary studies helped me to address partly the first and second questions of the research related to the capacity of urban planning and management structures in Iran to expect citizen participation from one hand, and the role of city and community councils and NGOs in citizen involvement on the other hand. There is, in addition, one further use of documentary studies to address the affecting factors on citizen participation in Iranian cities.

1.9.2.2. Interviews: Saadi Community is a part of Shiraz city and Shiraz is located in the Fars Province. According to the national administrative division, Fars is one of 30 provinces of Iran and is located south of Iran. As the authorities and experts of the organizations related to urban planning and management in Fars Province are directly engaged with the planning and administration of Saadi Community, I interviewed 20 people as representatives of the related organizations. The distribution of interviewees is as follow:

Authorities (as the representatives of governmental apparatuses)
Fars Housing and Urban Development Organization 3 people
Fars management and Planning Organization 2 people
Municipality of Shiraz 2 people
Municipality of District 3 of Shiraz City 2 people
Office of Governor General 2 people

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10 With approximate population of 52,000
**Experts:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expert/Group</th>
<th>Participants</th>
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<tr>
<td>Shiraz University</td>
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<td>Shiraz City Council</td>
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<td>Consulting Engineers</td>
<td>3 people</td>
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<td>Representatives of Related NGOs</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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The interviews with authorities and experts in Fars Province gave me an opportunity to understand local possibilities and limits regarding citizen involvement especially in informal settlements. However, to complete the research and to be more familiar with the possibility of citizen participation and its conditions in an informal settlement, it was necessary to contact the dwellers of Saadi community themselves, and the job was done by questionnaires.

1.9.2.3. **Questionnaire:** After preparing a primary questionnaire to do pilot and pre-test studies, 20 people of Saadi dwellers from 20 different blocks were interviewed. Afterwards, the questionnaire was corrected to prepare the final questionnaire. An approximate population of 52,000 are living in five neighbourhoods of Saadi Community, from which almost 11,000 are living in the Fohandej\(^{11}\) neighbourhood.

Regarding the significant difference between the Saadi councillors and the citizens from the point of view of attitudes to participation and to some extent their economic and social status, two different questionnaires have been prepared, filled out, and analysed by different methods. Here, two kinds of questionnaires will be discussed in more detail:

**Councilors Questionnaire:** Each neighbourhood in Saadi Community is represented by three councillors. 15 councillors of five neighbourhoods are being asked to fill out the mailed questionnaire. The answers showed that because of their familiarity with the participation terminology, the councillors did not face significant problems to fill out the questions.

**Citizens Questionnaire:** 200 dwellers of Fohandej neighbourhood responded personally (fact to face) to the questionnaires. This sample was selected from a population of 11,000. In other words, nearly two percent of the population filled out the questionnaires. The neighbourhood was divided equally to twenty blocks and using “Systematic Random Sampling”\(^{12}\), 10 people have been selected from each block. As was expected, some of selected responders (in housing units) were not at home at the time of survey\(^{12}\), in these cases the next housing units (their neighbours) have been asked to fill out the questionnaires.

1.9.3. **The Research Methods (Data Analysis)**

The collected data had to be analysed. As mentioned previously, I employed documentary studies, interview and questionnaires. The qualitative information and data including documentary studies, interviews and some parts of questionnaires related to the opened questions have been analysed using qualitative methods. The quantitative data—the closed questions in

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\(^{11}\) Fohandej is one of five neighbourhoods in Saadi community.

\(^{12}\) The questionnaires have been filled out in September 2006 and it took three weeks. Two urban planners who were local inhabitants and familiar with Saadi community, helped me to do the field survey.
questionnaires—have been analysed using SPSS programme. The results are reported in chapter five of the research.

1.10. The Outline of the Research

A study on citizen participation in urban planning and management focused on informal settlements was conducted in the south of Iran, Shiraz city, Saadi community. The research is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is the introduction of the study. In this part I defined some of the key words, and explained the research aims and objectives, key problems, the research questions and the research methodology.

Chapter two explains the main concepts and related theories to the subject. The top-down and bottom-up planning theories, communicative action and planning theories, the theory of powerlessness and some other related issues are discussed in this part. By discussing these theories, I tried to support the ideas of the research.

In chapter three, the historical and current situation of urban management and planning with emphasis on the role of city councils and citizen participation is investigated. In this chapter, the research tries to explore and show the origins and signs of democratic urban governance, the historical obstacles to city councils, the approval of Acts and laws, and especially the problems of this process during one hundred years after Constitutional Revolution.

Chapter four illustrates the detailed information about the research case—Saadi community as an informal settlement. In this section, the physical, social and cultural, economic and the environmental aspects of the settlement are described and introduced. Moreover, I described briefly the related aspects in Iran and Shiraz city respectively. By this part of the research, I tried to give a general picture of the country and region, and a detailed picture of Saadi community itself.

Chapter five consisted of four parts. All of the data collected in numerous methods, have been analysed and discussed here. That is to say, four research questions have been separately answered in this section. The first part analyses the structure of urban planning and management to expect citizen participation. The second part deals with the role of city and community councils and related NGOs to involve citizens in urban planning and management. In third part of the chapter, the level of citizen participation has been analysed. It means that it tries to answer which level of participation can be expected in Saadi community by citizens and/or their representatives according to the current situation of the settlement. And finally, the fourth part analyses the affecting factors on citizen participation especially in informal settlements. As the conclusion of the research, all the findings and results of the research are included in this chapter.

1.11. The State of Research

During recent years especially in 1990’s, vast researches have been done regarding the subject of this study and some of the important results were discussed in Habitat II Conference in 1996. The conference had considerable emphasis on democratizing the urban planning process and citizen’s real participation in urban management and planning. Afterwards, in most countries of the world, the participatory approach in urban planning and management has become one of the dominant paradigms in this field.

Vast researches and projects have been done in several underdeveloped, developing and developed countries, however, it is important to consider that with regard to economic, social and political conditions of each country, the democratization process in urban planning and
management is not the same in practice and involves its own solutions and strategies at regional, national and local levels. That is to say, we need native methods and so-called ‘Best Practices’, set forth by UN.

In Iran, a few researches addressed the issue of citizen participation especially after formation of city and village councils in 1998, without focussing on informal settlements. Only in recent years, and after approval of the document of ‘strategies for enabling and regularizing informal settlements’ by Ministry of Housing and Urban Development in 2004, task forces have been established at national and local levels to manage and facilitate the affairs related to informal settlements in Iran. These task forces in cooperation with planners and other experts are going to conduct projects and researches in few informal settlements to regularize these communities and neighbourhoods, in which citizen involvement have been given more attention. However, Saadi community was not one of them. Instead, in Saadi area, two projects have been undertaken by Shiraz University\(^\text{13}\) and Maab Consulting engineers\(^\text{14}\) to regularize this urban area with focus on issues related to urban design. Although these projects tried to address issues like citizen involvement in planning and design process, but it was out of the main concentration of the projects. Generally speaking, the subject of this study has never been researched before.

\(^{13}\) This project was undertaken by Ardeshiri and Kabgani under the title of ‘Regularising Plan of Saadi Community’ in 2003.

\(^{14}\) This project was part of a larger plan under the title of ‘Detailed Plan of Shiraz City-District 3’ and was carried out in 2003.
CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND GENERAL THEORIES
2.1. Introduction

During recent decades, there have been two dominant planning models. These two models have been used extensively with different terms, although the concept of these terms are similar and sometimes the same.

The first model was dominant in planning literature and practice until the 1990s. The so-called ‘top-down’ and/or ‘scientific rational’ planning model is still the dominant one in some countries. In this model, planning experts plan using the scientific methods and analytical techniques and they trust, confide and believe in these methods and techniques. In this model, citizens usually are not being engaged and in exceptional cases, the citizens will only have the chance to take part in lower levels of participation ladder. This kind of planning is ‘outcome-oriented’ and the ‘planning process’ holds a low importance for the theorists and planners.

Top-down planning approach believes strongly in cause-effect relationship. According to Healey, in term of physical planning, leading by architects and urban planners, urban built environment has been previously planned to respond urban activities. Infrastructure like roads, drainage system, and land use planning has been defined, accessed, and predicted according to the scientific methodology within a set of control variables. In term of economic planning, several plans and programmes relating to physical pre-determined land use and zoning are designed and expected to serve their functions. For example, well-planned commercial and residential zoning relating to economic activities are linked by each other with transportation system and infrastructure. All of these things can be called as ‘proactive planning’, the long-term planning which expects controllable change of variables. In recent decades, there have been numerous critiques on this model. As Beauregard (1987) says, this model in its most complete form is not only indifferent to the actors who are active in planning field, but also pays no attention to the ‘object of effort’.

The second model supports the ‘bottom-up’ approach and is based on ‘the theory of communicative action’ from Jürgen Habermas—the German philosopher and sociologist. In this model—that has been in the planning field since 1990s—the role of planner is mostly ‘mediating among stakeholders’ and the focus of planning is more on the ‘process’ rather than only on ‘outcome’. This model is a response to imposing planning from the experts and from top to down, and is not based on ‘scientific justification as a rationale for its views’, rather on ‘consensus with stakeholders and interest groups in planning through debate, negotiation and discourse’.

Bottom-up planning aims to show the ineffectiveness of top-down planning. This approach argues that the hierarchical decision-making by itself is no longer sufficient to resolve urban problems. Many of the urban planning theorists defend necessity of changes in the planning paradigm, which to them rational (top-down) planning is an insufficient tool to handle and protect the efficiency of urban activities (Fainstein, 2000; Friedmann, 1987; Healey, 1997; Abbott, 1996).

In top-down planning approach, decisions are made and taken by a small group of people including planners, mayors, local authorities and politicians, while the projects of the development plans affect all of the people. However, realising the process of the bottom-up planning is not easy, because these issues are related to power structure and this structure is the central element of planning paradigm’s change.

Generally speaking, both of these approaches have their own potentials and limits. While top-down planning emphasises on governmental authority, bottom-up planning pays special attention to the local communities as the main actors.
2.2. Theory of Communicative Action and Rationality

The communicative model draws on two philosophical approaches—American pragmatism developed by John Dewey and Richard Rorty, and the other is theory of communicative rationality and communicative action as worked out by Jürgen Habermas (Fainstein, 2000). Two approaches are somewhat different in methodology. While neo-pragmatists tend towards empirical methods and try to generalize the experiences of best practices, communicative rationality starts instead with an abstract idea. As Healey (1996) states, “A communicative conception of rationality ... replaces[s] that of the self-conscious autonomous subject using principles of logic and scientifically formulated empirical knowledge to guide actions. This new conception of reasoning arrived at by an inter-subjective effort at mutual understanding. This refocuses the practices of planning to enable purposes to be communicatively discovered”. Pragmatism and communicative rationality roots from different philosophical traditions. While Dewey’s thought emerges from British philosophical realism and empiricism, Habermas’s works come out from Hegelian idealism and Marxist critical analysis and then later to Wittgenstein’s scrutiny of language. The following diagram shows roots and relationships of each above-mentioned philosophical tradition (Fainstein, 2000).

The basis of theory of communicative rationality is the work of German philosopher and sociologist—Jürgen Habermas, who wrote ‘Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns, Band I: Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung’ in 1981, translated as ‘The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society’ in 1984. Habermas examines the concept of rationality and its relations with action, inter-subjective communication, problems of social action, and social and political changes. Habermas’s basic argument is that the emancipation of modernity project should not be abandoned. He argues that three cultural scopes of the Enlightenment including science, morality and art are dominated by instrumental rationality which itself is a product of capitalism. Moreover, these three spheres have increasingly distanced themselves from ‘life-world’ because of increasingly dominance of experts (Habermas, 1984).

Habermas presents his communicative rationality to counteract the invasion of the life-world by experts and the system instrumentality, to which, as in post-structuralism, language and search for undistorted communication as a basis for consensus and action have central and basic roles. In his ideal situation for speech, communication will no longer be distorted by power structures and self-interests. However, he states that the basis of this approach is democratic context in which anyone can question the claims of others. It is useful to mention that Habermas recognized three other sociological actions along with communicative action: teleological, normatively regulated, and dramaturgical actions (Habermas, 1984).

- Teleological Action: Teleological action which has been developed by ‘von Neumann and Morgenstern’ occurs when an actor achieve an aim and ends or provides the occurrence of a desired situation by choosing the appropriate means to deliver the success. In planning field, if planner has a hand in decisions through interference of his or her personal ideas that learned in several years of education, is an example of teleological action.
Figure (2-1): Relationship between Communicative Model and Two Philosophical Traditions

- **Normatively Regulated Action**: Developed by Durkheim and Parsons, explains how members of a social group orient their actions according to pre-defined common values. Here, the individuals have a close relation with their group’s norms. In planning field, for example, trying to protect and achieve the wants and interests of employer by actor—a planning consultant or representative of environmental protection groups—is a normatively regulated action.

- **Dramaturgical Action**: In dramaturgical action, developed by Goffman, incorporation of a strategic behavior is possible in which the actor may hide her or his real aims and uses deceptive means to achieve desired outcome.

• **Communicative Action**: In communicative action, in contrast with three other actions, Habermas (1984) claims that an interaction occurs at least between two actors who can establish interpersonal relations. They try to understand the situation and their plans of actions and coordinate their plans through consensus and agreement. The essential point in Habermas’s communicative action is that the problems and abuses which occur in three other actions, do not exist in communicative action or decreases to the least possible amount. Therefore, Habermas recognizes communicative action as the best kind of action and develops in detail within ‘Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns’.

Planning theorists have developed Habermas’s theory in the field of urban planning and founded ‘theory of communicative planning’. John Friedmann in ‘Planning in Public Domain’, 1987; John Forester in ‘Planning in the Face of Power’, 1989; Tore Sager in ‘Theory of Communicative Planning’, 1994; Patsy Healey in ‘Collaborative Planning; Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies’, 1997; and Judith e. Innes in an article under the title of ‘Planning Theory’s Emerging Paradigm’, in 1995, discussed theory of communicative planning based on the concept of Habermas’s theory of communicative action and introduced a new paradigm in urban planning. They are the main proponents of the theory and have published several books and articles on this subject in recent years.

2.3. Theory of Communicative Planning

Since 1990, several terms such as ‘communicative planning’, ‘collaborative planning’, ‘argumentative planning’, ‘communicative pragmatic approach’, ‘planning through debate’, and ‘consensus building’ have been entered into the planning scope to transfer and describe Habermas’s concepts in planning philosophy. These terms are somewhat alike and have a strong relationship with each other, among which the term ‘communicative planning’ has more extensively been used in recent years. Richardson (1996) summarized characteristics of communicative planning in following categories:

- It attempts to develop a new unified planning theory;
- It is adaptable with modernism;
- It searches for a new kind of rationality in a communicative way;
- Planner or policy analyst is the central actor; and
- It needs a pluralist political system.

Although Richardson clarifies some aspects and characteristics of the communicative planning, Patsy Healey (1992) who is one of the main proponents and developers of the theory, summarized the essential components of a communicative rational approach to planning under the following conditions:

1. Planning is an interactive and interpretive process, focusing on ‘deciding and acting’ within a range of specialized allocative and authoritative systems but drawing on the multidimensionality of ‘life-worlds’ or ‘practical sense’, rather than a single formalized dimension (for example, urban morphology or scientific rationalism). Formal techniques of analysis and design in planning processes are but one form of discourse. Planning processes should be enriched by discussion of moral dilemmas and aesthetic experience.
2. Planning is undertaken among diverse, fluid and overlapping discourse communities, each with its own meaning system, knowledge forms and ways of reasoning and valuing. Searching for achievable levels of mutual understanding for the purposes in hand is the focus of communicative action.

3. Respectful intercultural and interpersonal discussion is the necessity of such interaction’s method. It involves recognizing, valuing, listening, and searching for transitive possibility between different discourse communities.

4. Such interaction involves invention on the ‘arenas of struggle’ where public discussion occurs and where problems, strategies, tactics, and values are identified, discussed, evaluated, and where conflicts are mediated.

5. In the communicative processes, there are multi-dimensional forms of knowing, understanding, appreciating, experiencing, and judging. Nothing is inadmissible, except the claim that some things are ‘off-agenda’ and can not be discussed and all claims merit the reply.

6. Using the Habermasian claims of comprehensibility, integrity, legitimacy, and truth, a reflective and critical capacity should be developed. That enables the participants to evaluate and reevaluate specific actions being invented through the communicative process, not to criticize the discourses of the different participative communities.

7. Discourses include all interested parties, and because of interest overlap and conflict, morality is an important point.

8. Interaction involves mutually reconstructing what constitutes the interests of the various participants, and the participants not only gain knowledge of other participants, but also involve in a process of mutual learning through mutually searching to understand.

9. Participants have the potential to change the existing conditions through increasing understanding, continuous effort to critique, creating well-grounded arguments for alternative analysis and perceptions, and through actively constructing new understandings.

10. In this intercommunicative planning, finding ways of practically achieving the planning desires is the task of participants, not simply to agree and list their objectives. The participants can not know where this will take them. But they can act with hope and ambition to achieve further possibilities.

Although paradigm of communicative planning has entered planning literature since 1990s and its creation and development was due to insufficiency of previous approaches like ‘top-down planning’ or ‘scientific rationality’, some planning theorists criticized and questioned this paradigm, to which there have been no convincing answers yet. In the followings, the theory will be criticized based on the opinions of opponents and proponents.

2.4. Critical view on ‘Communicative Action’ and ‘Communicative Planning’

Theorists like M. Tewdwr-Jones, P. Allmendinger, S. Fainstein, B. Flyvbjerg, O. Yiftachel and some other planning theorists have criticized communicative theories especially in planning field. Tewdwr-Jones, Allmendinger and Fainstein mainly criticized the theoretical and practical aspects of the communicative theory, but Flyvbjerg and Yiftachel, according to relations between planning and power structures and undesirable effects of power and power holders on planning decisions, questioned the theoretical bases of communicative planning. To criticize the theory
more precisely, this section is divided into three categories: theoretical critiques, critiques in practice, and critiques regarding the relations between power and planning.

2.4.1. Theoretical Critiques

Susan Fainstein (2000) believes that: “The communicative theorists make the role of the planner the central element of discussion. Both the context in which planners work and the outcome of planning fade from view. Unlike the rational modelers, the communicative theorists have found a subject, but like them, they lack an object. Whereas in legal theory the object of analysis is the relationship between the legal system and society and in medical theory the concern is with the human body, in communicative planning theory the spotlight is on the planner. Instead of asking what is to be done about cities and regions, communicative planners typically ask what planners should be doing, and the answer is that they should be good (i.e., tell the truth, not be pushy about their own judgments).” Moreover, Fainstein states communicative theorists avoid dealing with the question “what to do when open processes produce unjust results.” She believes that the communicative planning theorists have not answered this question yet.

It should be acknowledged that Patsy Healey (1997) in ‘collaborative planning; shaping places in fragmented societies’ tried to answer this question. Using the term ‘right of appeal’ in a collaborative exercise, Healey stated that individual stakeholders who feel aggrieved by decisions taken against their own—even minority—desires would be afforded an opportunity to be heard at a later time. Healey’s answer to the above mentioned question by Fainstein, surprised the other critics—Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger. Referring to the ‘right of appeal’ in a collaborative exercise, Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger stated “to enact any right of appeal is to suggest that the agreed view developed from the discourse arena could be overturned in favor of other more pertinent considerations expressed by stakeholders either later in the process or by stakeholders who decided not to participate in the original collaborative exercises.” They continued “We have been surprised, therefore, to read in Healey’s latest work (1997) of the recognition of the need for an appeals arbitration process within a collaborative technique, as a form of “backstop formal arrangement” (page 330) when breakdown in agreement occurs” (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998).

As Healey (1993) stated in this theory, planning is being considered as a democratic enterprise aiming at promoting social justice and environmental sustainability. Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) criticized this view on planning and stated it should itself contain clear prejudices towards a certain view or set of values. They added “To accept Habermas’s work there has to be a corresponding ‘world view’ of values. At a crude level, communicative rationality is about undistorted communication, openness and a lack of oppression.” But this assumption also contains prejudice. Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger believe that participatory democracy, upon which communicative planning depends, can not be considered ‘without any problem’, and is not a value acceptable for everyone, even the proponents of the theory acknowledged its limits and problems emphasizing on local rather than national concerns. He asked what happens when the two meet? Moreover, the assumption that ‘citizen involvement in democratic processes brings more participation’ is also open to the question. Held (1987) wrote it is at least questionable whether participation by itself leads to desirable and consistent political outcomes, while there can be possible tensions between individual liberty, distributional questions—social justice—and democratic decisions.

Another point that Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger focused on, is the ‘ability of reaching consensus’ as one of the basic assumptions of communicative rationality. Tewdwr-Jones and
Allmendinger (1998) stated that although Habermas accepts this might not always be the case, however, there are at least two unanswered questions; the first aspect is ‘what to do and how to mediate when this consensus is not reached?’ It is clear that attempts to mediate disagreement involve not only an acceptance of anti-logical difference but also a desire to unify it. Reaching agreement through open discourse is then accompanied with the treat of imposition. The second aspect is that ‘should we reach consensus at all?’ Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger believe that the opponents of communicative rationality accept the idea of post-modernism as epoch, as demonstrated by the associated importance attached to difference and the post-structuralist concern with the relativity of language, but at the point where you think that acceptance of post-modern difference undermine or at least question Habermas’s modernism and his search for consensus, the communicative rationalists pull back and answer: “we are living in a world of increasing difference, with the death of overarching assumptions and theories which makes it even more important to create a shared basis for living together”.

It seems that at least part of reasons to formation of theory of communicative rationality refers to this ‘difference’ and ‘language relativity’. This theory helps consensus among individuals and group members and Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger’s critique of the theory regarding difference and language relativity has no strong logic. On the contrary, using the critics’ reasons, the bases of Habermas’s theory will be supported and reinforced.

Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) in another critique of the theory stated: “there is the question raised by Rorty regarding instrumental rationality—the bogeyman of communicative rationality. Is it all bad? Of course not.” They referred to the benefits of modernism and instrumental rationality and asked: “Although we must not forget that not everyone has benefited from this in equal measures and huge disparities exist, can we really say that instrumental rationality has (1) been crucial to people’s ‘voice’, and (2) made a significant detrimental difference to their ability to express that voice when other avenues are open to them? We think not.

I believe that Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger are right when they stated that in scientific and instrumental rationality, the situation was not too bad to hear the people’s voice and there were no other methods open to them, but the important question is that do the opponents of communicative planning and rationality theories deny the whole scientific and instrumental rationality? And do they question all the aspects of scientific rationality and introduce it as a bogeyman? According to the writings of opponents of communicative rationality, the answer is ‘No’. At least I do not think so. In most writings about communicative rationality and planning, the opponents have clearly mentioned the scientific and instrumental rationality is a way that should help the communicative planning. Where Healey (1993) describing essential components of communicative theory stated: “Planning is an interactive and interpretive process, focusing on “deciding and acting” within a range of specialized allocative and authoritative systems but drawing on the multi-dimensionality of “life-worlds” or “practical sense,” rather than a single formalized dimension (for example, urban morphology or scientific rationalism). Formal techniques of analysis and design in planning processes are but one form of discourse. Planning processes should be enriched by discussion of moral dilemmas and aesthetic experience, using a range of presentational forms, from telling stories to aesthetic illustrations of experiences.” Therefore, it can be seen that the opponents of communicative theory have not rejected and denied the whole scientific and instrumental rationality.
2.4.2. Critiques in Practice

Theories do not always appear in practice as theorists expect. That is the case especially in sciences which are more related to the human being—of course, planning is one of them. In other words, some components of a theory will be seriously challenged in practice and the created insufficiencies welcome the critics. There are some practical insufficiencies in communicative planning theory and the opponents of the theory are sometimes disable facing with some of the problems, shortages and insufficiencies, despite of their answering to many of the questions and ambiguities. It is clear that based on essence of communicative planning, to which citizens and stakeholders involvement is central, the process is not easy to realize. The difficulties of the process include many of issues and subjects, but I will focus on the important ones.

The gap between theory and action is one of these problems. Fainstein (2000) referring to this problem stated that the participants in planning process have no ‘real power’ and if they have real power, however, agreement by participants to a document does not necessarily mean that anything will happen. To support her claims, she relied on providing and executing of two plans in South Africa15 and stated that according to her studies, both of these plans have been failed.

Regarding the above critique, an important point should be mentioned that the opponents of communicative planning theory especially John Forester (2001) have frequently warned that success or failure of one or more plans in a certain time and place should not be easily generalized to the whole theory, rather it should be mentioned that, this method because of some reasons, has been successful or failed in a certain time and place. This point will be discussed more in following pages. Moreover, Fainstein’s claim referring to ‘the participants in planning process have no real power’, may not allow us to deny the theory, but leads us to improve the participatory methods, and to give ‘real power’ to the participants in planning process. Fainstein believes “agreement by participants to a document does not necessarily mean that anything will happen”. This refers not only to the need for improvement and reform of methods and institutions, but also to the ‘power structure’ which will be discussed separately in the following section.

Fainstein (2000) relying to the provided plans in South Africa, criticized the communicative planning theory in practice. She stated that another practical problem of communicative planning is “the lengthy time required for such participatory processes, leading to burnout among citizen participants and disillusion as nothing ever seems to get accomplished. Cynical South Africans referred to the various policy forums as ‘talking shops’.” Although communicative planning is a time-consuming process, it should be paid appropriate attention in two points: first, by passing time, and by practicing participatory method, the needed time would be decreased. The second point is that although the participatory process is time-consuming, but if this process leads to easier acceptance and execution of the plan by citizens who have benefits there, and do not obstruct for the plans’ execution, the needed time to the whole process of planning can be somewhat decreased. It is also the case when the number of frequent revisions decreased due to drawing citizens’ agreement—however, it should be acknowledged that the needed time for the participatory process is more than non-participatory one.

The other critique refers to the framing alternatives and the quality of participants. Fainstein (2000) expressed during communicative planning, sometimes, the planners have no direct intervention to present alternatives and only facilitate the process. They would intervene when they have been asked. In these cases—South Africa—only in neighborhoods in which middle-class professionals live, they have reached creative solutions. She wrote that “another issue arises

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15 Housing Plan and Economic Development Plan
from the difficulties involved in framing alternatives when planners desist from agenda setting. Thus, for example, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, the city established a neighborhood planning process whereby residents formulated five-year plans for their neighborhoods and were allocated fairly substantial sums of money to spend. Planners assigned to facilitate the process were committed to a nondirective role and therefore only proposed actions when asked. The result was that some neighborhoods reached active solutions, especially when participants were middle-class professionals, but others floundered in attempting to rank priorities and to come up with specific projects, sometimes taking as many as three years to determine a vague and hard-to-implement plan.”

Fainstein acknowledged that “in neighborhoods in which, middle-class professionals live, they have reached creative solutions”. I would like to add that both Habermas who developed theory of communicative action, and the theorists who developed this theory in planning field like Forester, Healey and the others all believe that the process of participation or communicative planning can not be institutionalized in a short period. That is to say, that the focus of the discussion is on the citizens—including citizens who have low professional ability to participate—who can and must be trained frequently during participatory process, and have been given requisite information and they, in turn, transfer their information to or exchange with other participants on a certain issue. Therefore, it is expected that lower-class dwellers of some neighborhoods achieve acceptable abilities to participate in planning process.

Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) criticized other aspects of the communicative planning theory in practice. They question, above all, some assumptions of the theory. They believe: “‘The assumption that all stakeholders within the communicative discourse arena are striving for enhanced democracy for communities is a value judgment and one that does not hold water; the stakeholders present within the arena of discourse will possess different aims and values and professional agendas. There is also difficulty in questioning how far values are held in common, and what assumptions can be made about this. The ethic assumes that all those who present themselves into the discourse arena would share the same desire to make sense together. This assumption does not relate to the nature of the human psyche; why should consensus among all those attending be regarded as a positive attribute when clearly different agendas and different objectives form the very essence of the planning argumentation process?’” Citing a sentence from John Forester (1989) “making sense together while living differently”; Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger stated “It does not suggest that the purpose of communicative planning is to ensure that everyone agrees, or that everyone will accept a shared understanding of multifarious position on the same contentious issue”.

Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger added communicative rationality assumes that all sections of the community can participate in the process of collaborative planning discourse, however, this theory has not enough answers to the questions like how should this be achieved? How the stakeholders can be identified and by whom?

Focusing on the process instead of outcomes has also been challenged by Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger. They stated that the theory of communicative planning and rationality emphasizes on the process instead of the outcomes. They believe that participation of citizens, stakeholders and interest groups in planning process is acceptable and reasonable, but it is unacceptable to focus only on the planning process as the final aim, without reaching the outcomes. The participants would like to be aware of final decisions and outcomes, otherwise we will have only talking shops. They relied on the experience from South Africa and added the studies in South Africa show that the organizers of communicative planning have been faced several problems because of strong emphasis on the process and lack of attention to the outcomes and practical
processes (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998). Although the communicative planning theorists do not discuss only the planning process, and the outcome of the planning has also been discussed by them, however, like Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger I believe that the opponents of the communicative planning have not paid enough and sufficient attention—at least until the present—to the planning outcomes.

Professional position of planners is another issue of critique in writings of opponents. As Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) stated, theorists of communicative planning deny the professional and coordinating role of planners and that is the planner who is under the power and political influence of administrational elites. Healey (1997) supports stronger mutual relations between experts and the interest groups and stakeholders who are being consulted by the experts. She recognizes planners as the mediators of knowledge. And Forester recognizes the planner as a critic friend. Citing the above ideas, Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger ask where is the place of personal judgments of the planning experts? If neutralized professional judgment should be taken in account, then, what would be the purpose of planning as a professional and specialized institution? After asking the above questions, Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger concluded that encouragement and development of a form of Habermasian communicative planning which emphasizes on more communication and discourse, leads to non-professionalization of planning as a set of educational skills.

As mentioned in previous pages, developing his theory of communicative action, Habermas identified four different social actions and considered the communicative action as an alternative to the other three actions (Habermas, 1984), while Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) argue that communicative action is not separate from the other three. As they stated, “We wish to argue at this point that communicative action is not an independent theory to sociological concepts of teleological action, normatively regulated action, or dramaturgical action. Aspects of these other theories of social action are actually inherent within (emphasis in original) communicative action, not independent from communicative action.”

Based on their statements, an actor within a communicative planning discourse, can intentionally use strategies and tactics to reach his or her desired aims. It is possible that a participant tends to act teleologically, despite acceptance of an open, honest, and trustworthy discursive style of argumentation.

There is also possibility of an occurrence of normatively regulated action within the communicative discourse arena. When members of a group (for example, members of an environmental lobbying group, paid employees or shareholders of a property development company, or professional planning representatives of a local planning authority) participate in a communicative planning discourse, maybe have common values and shared agendas to ensure their viewpoints affect the negotiation and support their clients’ interests, despite of their signing up of honesty and trustworthiness in the debate.

Moreover, occurrence of dramaturgical action is not impossible in an arena of collaborative planning discourse. As Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger stated, “Individual stakeholders within the discourse arena might attempt to constitute a particular image of the self in presenting viewpoints, either to evoke an acceptable image to the audience, or to present a completely false position to minimize argumentation and debate.” They added, despite of Forester’s work (1989), this point has been absent in Healey’s works. Here, the participants may employ deceiving ways to reach desired outcomes. Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger believe that communicative planning is founded on the rationale that “individuals will decide ‘morally’, and that negotiative processes within collaborative discourse arenas are founded on truth, openness, honesty, legitimacy, and integrity. It fails to include the possibility that individuals can deliberately
obfuscate the facts and judgments for their own benefits, and for the benefit of their own arguments.” That is to say, the idea that “the individuals change their behavior and personality as soon as they take part in a communicative planning process” is an utopian and unrealistic expectation in practice. As it has been previously mentioned, John Forester (1989) discussed this point systematically, but Habermas and communicative planning theorists have not paid enough and appropriate attention to this point.

The familiar NIMBYism\(^{16}\) that has been referred by Fainstein (2000), confirms this problem. This famous English idiom in planning literature denotes that participants in communicative discourses try to achieve the most amounts of benefits and bear the least amounts of costs to reach consensus in communicative planning processes. They usually agree with the projects and decisions which impose them the least costs. NIMBYism, despite the expectation of the planners, appears mostly in small municipalities.

Referring to the above mentioned problems, Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) concluded that a really successful process of communicative planning is impossible as long as power and political action are the dominant factors. In other words, in a severe political field like planning, reaching to consensus is completely utopian and unrealistic. There are always winners and losers and it can hardly be imagined all participants behave neutrally and impartially and relinquish their own interests and political positions forever.

John Forester (1996) and Patsy Healey (1997) claimed that to proceed a communicative planning process only a minimum degree of commitment, trust, and confidence is required. On the other hand, Twedwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) believe that consensus can be successful among stakeholders but only on a particular strategy, particular issue, and in a particular day. It does not mean that the same stakeholders and interest groups can reach consensus on the other strategy or issue in the future. Moreover, it is not realistic to expect that the individual who posses a divergent opinion from the consensus, after discourse, would easily abandon his or her opinion on the benefit of the consensus building and does not lobby by other means to achieve desired outcomes.

Democratic behavior of planners is another issue of critique in the domain of communicative planning model. Allmendinger (1996) and Tewdwr-Jones (1996) claimed that recent researches in some of the countries showed the planners have no obligation to act democratically. Even in a country like Great Britain, planners doubt in ‘social justice’, and do not believe that planners are responsible for such an issue. And more interesting, some planners have little tendency to involve citizens in planning process, because it decreases potentially planners’ professional independence and treats their professional judgment. Planners can participate, they can even promote mutual understandings in discourses, but simultaneously, they are not ready to abandon completely their beliefs and professional values and change their values on the benefit of other stakeholders and interest groups. Moreover, participants in this process have primary knowledge and expectations from both process and outcome. Communicative planning is not able to guarantee that the primary knowledge of the participants can completely be reformed, replaced, or abandoned on the benefit of more appropriate viewpoints.

The statements of Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones primarily seem acceptable, but they show only part of the truth. The other part of the truth is that there are also several planning theorists—some of whom mentioned in previous pages as the opponents of the communicative planning— and planners who agree with the communicative process due to reaching positive

\(^{16}\) NIMBYism: Not In My Back Yard; It refers to a person who claims to be in favor of a new development or project, but objects if it is too near their home and will disturb them in some way.
outcomes. The undeniable point is that the communicative process and method is going to be developed and has attracted more planners’ attention during the time.

Critics of communicative rationality questioned some other assumptions of the theory and doubted the reality of the theory. Criticizing the theory, Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) believe that the following assumptions of the theory do not happen in reality:

- “Individual stakeholders participating within the discourse arena should possess either the same knowledge about issues to be discussed, or else perfect knowledge, to enable debate to occur with honesty and integrity;
- Individual stakeholders possess the required skills to enable effective participation within the discourse arena; and
- Individuals, by acting openly and honestly, will be prepared to see their values subjected to scrutiny, criticized by stakeholders, and would then admit ‘defeat’ in the face of competing arguments.”

Another applicable critique regarding the communicative theory is that communicative planners, despite of their claims, could not prove that they have no program for planning practice. As a matter of fact, their styles of debate and analyzing have encouraged analysts to attempt to prepare a program for collaborative planning. Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) believe that the essence of communicative planning—which is identified by the process of citizens and stakeholders participation—would be questioned as soon as preparing a program. Critics stated that although the title of ‘planning agenda or program’ is deliberately absent in the writings of opponents, however, it can be seen in Healey’s works.

2.4.3. Critiques regarding the Relations between Power and Planning

There is no doubt that planning has a political nature and relates often to the power structures. The effect of centralized power on planning process is not always positive and sometimes it leads to undesirable outcomes that are not compatible with social and moral criteria. To go out of this situation—negative effects of power on planning—or to transfer of power in this field, there are two viewpoints. The proponents of communicative planning like John Forester (1989) and Patsy Healey (1997) recognized the political and value-laden nature of planning profession. They acknowledged the ability of planning to present values and transfer power and argue that a part of planning profession which relates to the power, can be transformed through reformation of social relations and processes in certain conditions.

The critics of communicative planning disagree with the above argument, as Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) wrote: “The distribution of power between individual stakeholders is recognized, but communicative rationalists suggest that, by building up trust and confidence across these fissures in interpersonal relations, new relations of collaboration and trust ...[will] shift power bases (Healey, 1997, page 263). To say that this is optimistic would be an understatement. The theorists are advocating a redesigning of institutions to foster collaborative social learning processes; they are arguing for the replacement of existing power structures with inclusionary argumentative governance, and this is the weakness of the theory. The planning theorists, even Habermas himself, argue for communicative rationality to foster an alternative to existing power structures. By simply changing the institutional framework of governance, it is argued that a more open discursive style of governance can develop. This, however, displays little
regard for individual perception and motivation. It tackles only the institutional aspect of power structures, and denies the existence of power inherent within the individual.”

Susan Fainstein (2000) in a viewpoint similar to the views of Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger criticizes Healey’s statement that “people have not constant and unchangeable interests, so it is possible to reach mutual interests with consensus and negotiation.” Fainstein believes that the problem of ‘different perceptions of interest’ can not be solved ‘only’ within discussion and view exchanges. Essential changes in ‘different perceptions of interest’ require restructuration which, in turn, follows usually a crisis or a social movement. It is beyond negotiation and consensus among interest groups and stakeholders. Fainstein continued; “Marx and Engels (1947), in their critique of the Hegelians, asserted that the world was changed through struggle, not the force of ideas. They did not mean, as they are often misinterpreted, that economic structures automatically determine outcomes and that human agency is helpless to affect them. But they did mean that words will not prevail if unsupported by a social force carrying with it a treat of disruption. To put this in another way, the power of words depends on the power of speakers.”

Bent Flyvbjerg is one of the main critics of communicative planning theory, especially in the scope of relations between planning and power. In ‘rationality and power’ (1998), Flyvbjerg discussed the relations between power and rationality—emphasizing on communicative planning. In this book, Flyvbjerg examined the planning project of redesigning Aalborg’s17 central area. Aalborg’s central area plan was provided based on the best rational principles and methods and enjoyed wide citizen participation. But during the process of approval and execution, most of the plan’s rational aspects were weakened and the plan’s best ideas and intentions were distorted and maimed (Yiftachel, 2001).

Flyvbjerg (1998) concluded that rationality is under influence of power and even determined by power, and not by enlightenment ideals of reasons, democracy, and public utility. Flyvbjerg added when we understand the power, we find out that we can not count on ‘rationality-based democracy’ alone to solve our problems.

Based on Flyvbjerg’s argument, Yiftachel (2001) stated that; “if, as Flyvbjerg shows, ‘rationality is determined by power’, and if Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ and Foucault’s ‘rationality as rationalization’ are core behavioural principles of many planners and decision-makers, then we may need to reconceptualize (that is, retheorize) planning as a ‘double-edged sword’.” However, in a moderate statement, he added: “one can still appreciate and advocate the power of rationality, democracy, education, science, state neutrality, professionalism and planning, but conduct a probing examination of the impact and consequences of the institutions which bear these ideals as their public trademark.”

Yiftachel (2001) brings up two major critiques on Flyvbjerg’s research. First, rationality is considered as a ‘utopian ideal’ in this book, but can we expect actors’ rationality to differ and separate from their interests? Second, this book strangely ignores planning theories. Yiftachel believes that Flyvbjerg did not employ the works of Friedman, Faludi, Alexander, Castells, Harvey, Sandercock, and many other theorists who have useful works in this scope. Despite the above critiques, concluding Flyvbjerg’s book, Yitachel states that: “it is a highly skilled challenge to the way most planners and planning theorists perceive planning, or approach their work. It strengthens the foundation of critical planning inquiry, and tells us loudly and clearly that the days in which planners and planning were widely regarded as rational and progressive agents of change are well and truly over.”

17 A medium-sized Danish city
In addition to Flyvbjerg and Yiftachel, other theorists have also presented their viewpoints about ‘relations between power and planning and rationality’ and especially criticized Flyvbjerg’s research, among them, Forester (2001), Lisa Peattie (2001), and Faludi & Van Der Valk (2001) can be mentioned.

John Forester (2001), whose critiques of Flyvbjerg’s book are more serious and stronger than others, wrote: Flyvbjerg propounded the case study well and the contents of the book are clearly written and all too plausible. However, he could not suitably conclude his research especially in theoretical aspects and he generalizes improperly the results of the research. Forester added: Flyvbjerg claims that rationality is under influence of power and even is defined by power, then it can be concluded that Flyvbjerg’s analysis is at war with itself. That is to say, if we believe that he was right, it means that the theorist’s—Flyvbjerg’s—rational knowledge was also bounded with power and was influenced by it. If flyvbjerg’s theory that power corrupts rationality was right, then “not only would his case study be suspect as merely a rationalized story told for manipulatory rhetorical purposes, but indeed the very theoretical chapter itself would become suspect as a rhetorical power play—since it could not (by its own argument) trump power.” Forester mentioned the important point is that if our analysis of controlling, misinforming, and dark side of planning is based on rational knowledge of real cases like the Aalborg experience, we should distinguish when and how such rational analyses of power are possible and when and how this condition is not provided.

Forester, like Yiftachel, shows us the important point that Flyvbjerg in his theoretical analysis paid no attention to the analyses related to the power and rationality in planning literature. In this regard, Yiftachel (2001) believes that the positioning of the researcher outside the internal discourse of planning helped Flyvbjerg to judge far from preferred and current beliefs of planning ideological apparatus. On the contrary, Forester (2001) considered this point as a serious challenge in Flyvbjerg’s theory. In other words, Forester referring to the two kinds of Flyvbjerg’s analysis mentioned that he presents these analyses without integrating them. These two kinds of analysis are: “(1) a critical-hermeneutic ‘inside’ analysis, that tells us a story of real actions in the actors’ own languages of projects and projections and costs and benefits and plans and pros and cons; and (2) a presumably ‘explanatory’ theoretical analysis about ‘rationality’ and realrationalität and ‘power’ and their influences from ‘the outside’ (as Oren Yiftachel suggests).”

Dallmayr and McCarthy (1977) argued long ago, the risk of explanatory positivism from ‘the outside’ is that the explainers have little possibility to account real and practical actions (quoted in Forester, 2001). Referring to Wittgenstein (1953), Forester provided an example for this argument. He wrote: “Wittgenstein (1953) asked us to think of a picture of a man walking up a hill, and then he asked, roughly, “How do we know he’s not sliding down backwards?” We need more than the descriptive picture of outcomes from the presumed ‘outside’; We need accounts of outcomes linked to actions—announcing forecasts, revising a demand projection, justifying a change of plan—whether the intentions of those actions are achieved or not, are romantic or ideological, naive or wise and so on.”

Forester (2001) believes that Flyvbjerg has so connected his concept of power and rationality with planning practice that we can not distinguish ‘planning that supports established power’ from ‘planning that resists it’, and ‘planning that rationalizes elites’ decisions’ from ‘planning that rationally criticizes those decisions’. Forester added: if we can recognize principled similarities of the case studies (for example, the power game which treats people’s dignity, autonomy or claims to respect), then we can not only recognize similarities (a deception pattern, a

18 It refers to the planning project of redesigning Aalborg’s central area.
using of power pattern, or a pattern of self-aggrandizement dressed up as professional knowledge), but also we can and should theorize linking the current case to other case studies in planning and transportation literature.

Instead of assuming that ‘planners always lie or misinform or they always tell the truth’, it is better that we consider actual cases. If Flyvbjerg can give us right knowledge from his case without being simply an instrument of power and does not manipulate, influence and mislead us, then planners or other policy analysts might do the same too. In a political world, we can expect that planners misuse information, adapt the process of consensus building with their purposes and desires, or be under pressure to influence and mislead people, but our job as planners is to clarify and determine ‘how do they do that’. Simultaneously planners, theorists, and authors have choices. They can lie, bluff, mislead, misinform and influence the audience more or less (Forester, 2001). Forester continued: in Aalborg central area project, both planners and Flyvbjerg have made such choices. Planners tried not to articulate the information that weakens their cases. Flyvbjerg, in a selective way, has also ignored several studies to choose his social theory. It shows clearly that how planners and public officials can systematically shape the truth in other forms.

John Forester (2001) believes that if we understand when planners exaggerate or bluff, we have a key to understand when they do not do that, then we are able to distinguish exaggerated data from less exaggerated or more true data. Therefore, rationality or truth can not be wholly controlled by the power within which exaggeration, bluff or misinforming might be inherent. This argument is also true concerning controlling on and influence of data, deception, strategical misinforming and so on. If power were so influential and effective, Flyvbjerg could never have known and shown us. If planners do not do what they should do, we should blame their choices and the political power which force them, instead of blaming abstract rationality. If somebody gives us bad news, surely, we may not blame the messenger. If we lack theoretical and practical means to do case study researches and distinguish more true claims from false or less true ones, then we will never be able to differentiate more exaggeration, deception, posturing, and manipulation from less exaggeration, deception, posturing and manipulation and so on.

2.5. Summary

Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action has been basis of communicative planning theory. Communicative planning concentrates on bottom-up approach and real citizen participation in decision-making.

Both of the two ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ planning approaches have been faced with certain limits and potentials. While top-down planning emphasizes on governmental authority, bottom-up planning pays particular attention to local communities as main actors in planning process.

Similar to many other theories, communicative planning theory has also been widely criticized. These critiques can be divided into three main categories—theoretical critiques, critiques in practice, and critiques regarding the relations between power and planning—among which, I believe that critiques concerned with power is more important due to strong and mutual relations between power and planning and their mutual effects on each other.

It is clear that power ‘can’ mislead, corrupt or limit planning rationality in practice, but it only ‘can’. The question is that under which condition? In fact, it should be mentioned that there are different forms of power and rationality which appear within different political and institutional situations. There are conditions under which rational critiques of existent and
dominant power is possible. Moreover, we should distinguish the power which detriments people from the power which may help people and leads to educate them.

Finally, comparing with other models, communicative planning as a new paradigm of urban planning has proved its abilities, but to make it more applicable, we should recognize the obstacles and limits by doing theoretical and practical researches and several case studies and continue to enrich this paradigm.
Chapter Three

Historical Characteristics of Citizen Participation in Urban Planning and Management in Iran
3.1. Introduction

Urban development planning system in Iran is relatively young. Despite its inexperience, this system had to confront many challenges of rapid urban development problems. The task was enormous and management structure was not fully developed. Centralized administrative structure of the central government produced centralized urban planning and development system. Municipalities were created to implement central governments concerns for urban problems. From the beginning, municipalities were treated as the extent of the government administrative arm.

Since the central government administration structures, ministries and agencies worked on sectoral basis, it became a norm for urban development planning and management system to work on that basis, that is to say, sectorally and from top to bottom. Hence, here, there are two of the main problems of the development planning system: Sectorally fragmented system, and no considerable presence of citizen participation in the planning and management process.

This mechanism could go on as long as cities were small and problems were not so complex. But with the flow of migrants to the cities and increasing pace of urbanization with its associated socio-economic and environmental problems, dimensions of the problem was enlarged, the problem itself became more complex and with the rise and fall of oil prices, revolution and imposed war, and the socio-economic environment became more uncertain and dynamic.

To confront the new complex, uncertain and dynamic situation, the centralized urban planning could no longer be the answer. The planning and management system needed to take all these new factors in to account in order to restructure itself accordingly. It was no longer possible to tackle the urban problems with short term localized actions and attitudes.

Other countries’ solutions to these challenges have been the introduction of new management system, decentralization, strengthening local governments and citizen participation. These are the concepts that other countries in recent years have used to confront the changing, complex and uncertain urban problems.

In this chapter, at first the urban development planning and management system in Iran will be studied and then the role of citizen participation in urban planning and management in recent one hundred year period will be discussed.

3.2. The Present Situation of Urban Development Planning and Management in Iran

3.2.1. Urbanization Process in Iran

Urbanization process in Iran, as some other countries in Asia and the Middle East, have been faced with a rapid growth during the last four decades. It was due to a high rate of population increase on the one hand and wide migration of rural population to the cities and increasing the number of cities on the other hand. While total population of Iran has increased from 25.7 Millions in 1966 to 70.4 Millions in 2006, the urbanization ratio has increased from 38 percent in 1966 to 68.5 percent in 1996. Moreover, the number of Iranian cities has increased from 199 cities in 1956 to 1012 cities in 2006. In other words, the total numbers of Iranian cities have increased more than five times during last fifty years.
Table (3-1): Indicators for the urbanization process in Iran (1966-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population (Millions)</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population (Millions)</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization Percentage</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Urban Settlements</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>1012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cities with more than 500,000 Population</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rate of Population Increase in Urban Areas</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The increasing number of large cities in Iran is the important point that creates some problems which with old and simple managerial methods can not be confronted. The tables (3-1) and (3-2) show the urbanization process and the number of cities in terms of population categories respectively.

Table (3-2): Number of Cities in Terms of Population Categories (1956-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000 000 and over</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 000 to 1000 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 000 to 500 000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 000 to 250 000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 000 to 100 000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 000 to 50 000</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 000 to 25 000</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 000 and lower</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (Iran)</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>1012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Majedi, 1998; Statistical Centre of Iran, National Census of 2006.

3.2.2. Characteristics of Administrative System in Iran in Relation to Urban Development Management

The followings are the main characteristics of the administrative system in Iran in relation to urban management (Hanachi and Moradi Massihi, 2001):
1. The power to pass laws in Iran is only vested in the central government.
2. Central government has the authority to form administrative recruitment organizations or dismiss government officials.
3. Country’s budget is regulated by the central government. Furthermore, the account of properties, assets and public buildings is maintained by the central organization.
Examination of income and expenditure of government organizations including auditing function is undertaken centrally.

4. Directives and decrees issued by the central organizations to local organizations are binding.

5. Centralized and hierarchic administrative system of Iran slows down the process of decision-making and causes delays and inefficiency.

6. Central governments’ administration apparatus has grown unproportionally too large, became bureaucratic, causing inconveniences for the clients.

7. Centralized administrative system in Iran throughout history up until establishment of city and village Islamic councils has only gone through the phases of decentralization in the form of the delegation of some functions.

8. Due to unified system of administration in Iran, provincial and local government units in every aspect are legally subordinate to the absolute sovereignty of central government.

9. In centralized administrative system of Iran, decisions concerning local issues are taken in the political centre of the country (Tehran) or in the centre of the province. Hence central organizations have power and authority to administer and implement.

10. People do not have much role and participation in planning and decision making process.

11. In the macro planning of the central government enough attention is not being paid to the local needs of the people.

12. Generally, in the election of local authorities and directors, people do not have much role and say (except in the elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and newly established City and Village Islamic Councils).

13. In Iran urban management has three national, regional and local levels. At National level, there are the ministries, and the government organization which operates at country level, but have the authority to take decisions for urban management. For example, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, and High Council for Urban Planning and Architecture. At regional level there is no independent organization responsible for urban management. The existing organizations are provincial branches of the ministries and organizations whose domains are province, and have influence upon urban management. The most important organization at this level is the provincial government. And finally, at local level there are the municipalities, Islamic council, prefecture and other official organizations such as political, social and guild groupings.

14. All local organizations' authority is derived from the central government except the City and Rural Islamic Councils which have an ambiguous position. From one side they get their authority straight from the constitution, and from the other hand they are not completely autonomous, and are constantly supervised by the Ministry of the Interior. That is also true for the case of municipalities, which are under political, organizational, financial and technical control of the Ministry of Interior.

15. The administration system in Iran is centralized and hierarchic. Lower level organizations have minimum legal autonomy and authority (Figure 3-1).
3.2.3. The Structure of Urban Development Management System in Iran

In Iran, the local organizations are mainly in charge of urban development and management consists of the municipality and the Islamic City Council. Municipality is from one hand under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, and on the other, it is under the supervision and control of the city council (at least theoretically).

City council is supposed to be independent of other government administrative arms, namely the executive, the judiciary and the legislative. The municipalities and the city councils are the most important local organizations involved in urban development and management, and comprise the core of the local government in Iran.

Local government, together with other agencies involved in urban affairs namely government organizations, public sector, and non-governmental organizations can be considered as a system. The most important players in this system can be categorized as the local government (Municipality and City Councils), government inter-sectoral organizations (Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Management and Planning Organization, High Council for Urban Planning and Architecture, Organization for Employment and Administrative Affairs); government sectoral organizations (Ministry of Education, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Industries, Ministry of Commerce, and so on), and non-governmental organizations (Society of Urban Planners, Consultancy Engineers, Iranian Construction Engineers Organization and so on).

The operation of the above agencies concerning decision-making, policy-making, management, supervision and implementation, affects the whole system. This system is supposed to operate with a united objective and in harmony. But this system lacks coherency, and is fragmented.

3.2.4. Urban Development Planning System in Iran

---

19 With the Persian equivalent of Shahrestan
20 With the Persian equivalent of Bakhsh
21 With the Persian equivalent of Dehestan
In the beginning of the 20th century, with the establishment of modern central government in Iran, following the model of French and Belgian administrative system, a haphazard modern bureaucratic administrative structure was established, which as a result took the responsibility of urban developments. In 1931 and 1941, with the establishment of a Bureau inside the Ministry of the Interior, and the recruitment of some western engineers and architects, the first steps in the development activities of the cities were taken.

During the country's Second Development Plan (1955-1962), the first development planning activities in its modern form took place. Foreign experts prepared master plans for some Iranian cities, such as Isfahan, Sanandaj and Bijar. Preparation of the plans, in its present form actually started during the country's third Development Plan, but in practice it was during the Fourth Development Plan (1968-1972), and specifically in 1966 with the ‘Municipality Act’ amendment, and the ‘establishment of the High Council for Urban Planning and Architecture’ that development planning took off. In year 2000 out of 726 cities in Iran, 679 had either adopted plans or they were under preparation, 211 cities had Comprehensive or Detailed Plans either already adopted or they were under preparation. 486 cities had Guide Plans either already adopted or they were under preparation. There were only 47 cities which had no plans.

3.2.4.1. Urban Development Planning in Iran

Urban planning and management in Iran dates back to the enactment of the ‘Urban Renewal and Development Act’ which was passed by the parliament in 1968. This law was mainly dealing with town planning and street modification and extension, and the Ministry of Interior was responsible to implement this regulation through municipal government.

The Ministry of Development and Housing was established in 1965. This Ministry was responsible to supervise the preparation and implementation of Comprehensive (Master) Plans for major cities of Iran. It was the first time that, such master plans were prepared for the cities in the country.

The ‘High Council for Urban Planning and Architecture’, which is composed of 11 ministers and heads of organizations and is chaired by the Minister of Housing and Urban Development, was established in 1973, to coordinate urban planning activities for the purpose of improving living environment of citizens and also promoting traditional architecture of Iran.

In July 1974, the name of the Ministry of Development and Housing was changed to the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development by a new enactment. That was the first time that by law, the necessity of preparation of National Spatial (Comprehensive) Plan for the whole country, comprehensive (master) plans and detailed plans for major cities and guide Plans for small cities and towns was identified.

As mentioned earlier, one of the main responsibilities of this new ministry is the preparation of comprehensive (master) and detailed plans for major cities in Iran and supervising the implementation of those plans by the local governments. Preparation of master and detailed plans dates back to the last years of the Third National Development Plan (1962-1967) before revolution, but in practice the main action for preparation and approval of such plans was taken during the Fourth National Development Plan (1968-1973), and is continuing to the present time.
3.2.4.2. Hierarchy of Spatial Planning in Iran

Currently spatial planning in Iran takes place at four national, regional, sub-regional and local levels. Figure (3-2) shows the hierarchy of spatial planning in Iran. As it was mentioned, this system has four levels, the 3rd level—county/sub-regional level—recently has been installed. The Figure shows that presently the structure for all four levels exists, but this does not mean that it operates as a system. Since at any level there is a time lag for the preparation of them, so they cannot serve to provide a framework for the next level, therefore these levels have weak links with each other. As following some of the more important plans will be discussed.

- **City Comprehensive (Master) Plans**
  A city comprehensive (master) plan is a long-term plan, which specifies general land use, zoning of residential, industrial, commercial, administrative, and other zones, urban installations, facilities, equipment, and other public utilities, street network, terminals, airports, ports, urban renewal and improvement areas and their respective priorities, rules and regulations concerning all mentioned items, and also criteria related to the protection of historical monuments and sites, as well as the environment and natural landscapes. The city comprehensive plans are prepared by consulting engineers under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development. Figure (3-3) shows the process of the preparation, examination, adoption, and implementation of urban comprehensive plans in Iran.

- **Urban Guide Plans**
  A guide plan which is prepared for small towns (towns with a population of 50,000 or less) identifies the future development or expansion direction of the town and different land uses and suggests effective short-term solutions for crucial and urgent problems of towns that do not have a city comprehensive plan. The guide plans are prepared by Ministry of the Interior, through technical offices of the provincial government and approved at a provincial committee called ‘The Committee for Approval and Review of the Guide Plans’.

- **Detailed Plans**
  After preparation and approval of a city comprehensive plan, a detailed plan, which is a plan on the basis of the city comprehensive plan, should be prepared. This plan determines the use of land at the level of different boroughs of the city, and exact location and area of land. This plan also provides detailed condition of street networks and population density in urban units. The priorities concerning renewal, improvement, expansion, and the resolution of the urban problems and the condition of all the various urban elements will be determined in the plan. The detailed plans are prepared by consulting engineers under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development through the Housing and Urban Development Organizations for Provinces. Based on general framework which are given by the comprehensive plans, the detailed maps of districts and boroughs provides the city in terms of street network in a small scales, detailed land use map with determining the exact location of housing areas and urban services, including the population and building densities, some examples for urban design of public space and urban environment, and the regulations for land subdivision, building construction, expansions, public squares and so on. The detailed plans are then approved and reviewed by a provincial committee and forwarded to municipalities for implementation.
Figure (3-2): Hierarchy of Spatial Planning System in Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Five-year Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National Physical Plan of Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Spatial Plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Acts of parliament and government circulars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sectoral National Plans such as national agricultural plans, ports, airports and so on</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional/ Sub-national Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Sub-national Physical Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Regional and Provincial Plans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County/ Sub-regional Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• County Structure Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Development Plans of Metropolitan Areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• City Comprehensive (Master) Plans (for large and medium cities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Detailed Plans (for large and medium Cities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Guide Plans (for cities with less than 50,000 population)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rural Guide Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• New Towns Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provision of Site and Services Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reconstruction and Innovation Plans for Old City Fabrics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
Weak structure and links
Strong structure and links

Figure (3-3): The Process of Preparation, Examination, Adoption, and Implementation of Comprehensive Urban Plans in Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Application stage</td>
<td>• POHTP applies for the preparation of comprehensive plans for the cities with problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Preliminary examination and determination of priorities of applications by HCUPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securing the financial resources, signing of the contract, and Preparation of the plan stage</td>
<td>• To survey the geographic, climatic, cultural, social, historical, economic, transport and land use situation on regional level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Examination of urban problems, analysis and constraints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Preparation of final plan and proposal according to the contract type 12 of MPO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPO secures the necessary funds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of consulting engineers</td>
<td>responsibility for preparation of the plan in coordination with MHUD and MPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permission for signing the contract is granted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notification to the relevant departments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract is signed with the consulting engineers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision over the preparation of the plan by PHOHTP through PCTP and the formation of article 5 committee for cities over 200,000 population.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.4.3. Evaluation of Development Plans in Iran

A comprehensive and documented study carried out under auspices of Plan and Budget Organization (currently called as Management and Planning Organization) in 1993, under the name of ‘The Evaluation of the City Comprehensive Plans in Iran’ reveals, that implementation of those plans in general could not actualize their objectives. One of the reasons for the lack of efficiency of those plans put forward by the study has been the inflexibility of the plans such that no choice has been upheld for the citizens. Another was that the plans were unrealistic and not feasible from the financial point of view. There have been large discrepancies between the predicted and the actual financial and budgetary muscles of the municipalities. Those plans were suggesting expenditures 70 times of the actual total urban budgets, and 6 times of the total budget allocated for the government buildings and development purposes.

Not having neglected the theoretical aspect and the methods of the preparation of the plans in Iran which is still basically comprehensive plans, and very little strategic planning has been officially carried out, those plans remain inflexible, not realistic and finally not feasible. Because they have bureaucratic, top-down and uncoordinated management and planning structure, which undermine the role of citizens and the NGOs participation, private sector participation and lacks a coherent and coordinated management system.
3.2.4.4. Points of Strength of the Urban Planning System in Iran

The following points can be considered as the points of strength of urban planning system in Iran (Hanachi and Moradi Massih, 2001):

1. Relative improvement in the financial and technical capabilities of the municipalities as the main organizations responsible for the provision of urban services and facilities.
2. Relative strengthening of the provincial organizations in regards to urban development and allocation of resources at planning and policy making levels.
3. Increase of budgets allocated to urban studies.
4. Development and extent of urban researches and studies by creation of new research and educational centres.
5. The main bulk of revenues are provided by municipalities themselves, which can serve the further strengthening, independence and self-reliance of the local governments.
6. Increase in the level of expertise and professionals in the municipalities.
7. Decrease in the annual growth rate of population relative to the previous decades.
8. Creation of headquarter units at national, regional, county and local levels in order to guide, supervise and standardize the municipalities activities.
9. Increasing participation of research centres and universities in the urban studies.
10. Increase of the authorities of the provincial urban planning committees, in the preparation and approval of development plans.
11. Increasing participation of non-government finances and banks in the provision and improvement of urban services.
12. The government’s general positive attitude towards decentralization and strengthening of local governments presented in the Five-year Economic Development Plans.
13. Carrying out elections of Islamic City Councils and establishment of those structures, after years of absence.

3.2.4.5. Problems and Constraints of the Urban Planning System in Iran

The problems and constraints of the urban planning system in Iran can be categorized to four groups as: legal, organizational-functional and implementation problems and also problems with the content of the plans.

- Legal Problems

1. There are contradictions, uncertainty, multiplicity and discrepancy in the laws concerning urban planning and management system in Iran. These laws have generally evolved as a reaction to certain aspects of urban problems and are not integrated and systemized.
2. Urban planning laws, rules and regulations are inefficient and are not comprehensive.
• **Organizational and Functional Problems**

1. The urban planning and management system in Iran is a closed one. Macro socio-economic changes are not reflected in the objectives and operations of the system.
2. Multiplicity of organizations is involved in urban planning and management. There is a diversity of policies and interpretations with no proper coordinating mechanism.
3. An integrated planning-management level in the urban management system is absent.
4. Municipalities and city councils who are in charge of urban management in the first place, are generally inefficient, weak organizations, with legally, organizationally and financially dependent and inflexible structures.
5. The urban management system is not legally considered as an independent and comprehensive administrative system. Authorities, duties, responsibilities and functions within this system do not form a totality. Functions are divided, overlapped and even isolated.
6. Urban management and planning system in Iran lacks a coherent, integrated structure, and a unified objective.
7. The status of the municipalities within the whole urban management system is not clear. This is due to confusion between the policy-making, organizational-administrative and operational levels of the management system.
8. Whereas urban management system in Iran has policy-making and technical-operational levels of management (although confused), but it lacks strategic planning and inter-organizational relationship levels.
9. There is no proper hierarchy of national, regional and urban plans. Generally, regional plans are not active, and if they are, they do not establish proper links with the national or urban plans. The status of the urban plans is not quite clear within the hierarchy of planning in Iran.
10. The decision-making mechanism in the urban management and planning is from top to bottom, and do not properly include NGOs and citizen participation, except the election of city councils, which here again they are not elected in terms of localities and districts. They are elected for the whole cities.
11. There is no proper coordination between the different organizations—governmental or non-governmental—and the municipalities. Therefore it is difficult to assess, evaluate and monitor the real impact of the projects on improvement and solutions of urban problems.
12. Whereas urban problems are complex and require over-sectoral attitude and performance, the urban management and planning system in Iran makes policies and executes them on sectoral basis.
13. The increasing expenditures of the municipalities do not correspond with their increase in income earning and the generation of newer revenue sources.
14. There are numerous old quarters in the majority of the cities, which urgently need rehabilitation and urban services. These problems on top of the migrations, are putting a tremendous pressure upon planning and management system for provision of services and facilities.
15. There is a lack of coordination between the agents responsible for the plan preparation, supervision and implementation.
16. A great bulk of urban planning and management activities regarding the provision of services, facilities and infrastructure are executed by the government sector.
17. Organizational structure of the agents involved in the urban affairs, do not correspond with their undertaking responsibilities.
18. An integrated information system needed for planning and management is absent.
19. Enough importance is not given to the organizational requirements of inter-sectoral nature of planning.
20. There is a shortage of creative, capable and efficient managers responsible for the urban planning and management. There is not sufficient job security for the high ranking managers.
21. Urban organizations in charge of urban affairs generally have bureaucratic, top to bottom and non elected, inflexible structures.
22. Charisma and personalities have the upper hand over the organizational rules and regulations.
23. Management and planning system in Iran is based on sectoral divisions of functions, with absence of proper organizational or legal mechanism to guarantee coordination. Urban issues by the complexity of its nature require multi-sectoral and over-sectoral planning and management.
24. Due to social and cultural factors urban management is not well accepted and received by citizens, causing difficulty in the smooth functioning of the system.
25. Government structures in general show two contradictory tendencies. Whereas they are inclined to reduce their financial burdens regarding the municipalities, on the other hand they continue direct control of local governments by legal, organizational and political means.
26. The content and job description of the urban, regional and national plans do not properly consider the impact of social and economic factors upon development planning.
27. Lack of coordination between urban development programmes, development plans and renewal programmes and provision of site and services programmes.
28. Urban affairs are monopolized by the government.
29. In the last two decades municipality’s revenue generation capabilities have not increased with the accelerating growth of the cities.

- **Implementation Problems**

1. There are shortages of necessary machineries and equipments for technical activities.
2. There are shortages of sufficient finance and revenue sources for the implementation of the programmes at hand. Not enough new revenue sources are created.
3. Low productivity and inefficiency in the execution of programmes.
4. There is a knowledge division between the ones who prepare the development plans and the ones who implement them.
5. The role and position of new towns within the framework of urban, regional and national planning is not clear.
6. Existence of parallel functions and responsibilities within different organizations and even inside one single organization involved in urban development planning and management.
7. Not sufficient funds are allocated to new town projects.
8. Due to absence of regional spatial planning there is a tendency towards unbalanced growth of cities and villages.
9. Not enough attention is being paid to the environmental standards in the urban areas.

- **Problems with the content of the plans**

1. Urban development plans are adopted regardless of programmes and objectives of other sectoral organizations, as well as operational, technical and financial capabilities of the municipalities.
2. Urban development plans do not establish proper links between economic and sociological aspects of urban problems and their physical aspects. In practice, they remain basically physical plans.
3. Plans are prepared regardless of the needs and aspirations of NGOs and pressure groups.
4. Plans prepared are generally unrealistic, abstract and static.
5. Urban plans are directly or indirectly influenced by the political and land market pressures.
6. Urban plans are reduced to a set of technical documents not to be accessible to the ordinary people.
7. There exist a division between the housing planning and urban development planning.

### 3.3. Citizen Participation in Urban Planning and Management

Citizen participation in urban planning and management in Iran can be divided into two traditional and new patterns;

Traditional participation emerges on the basis of religion, traditions, habits, and customs and is formed spontaneously. This kind of participation was formed within centuries from the earlier times and has been continued from one generation to another. In this kind of participation, government has no role in conducting and organizing affairs, and all of the affairs are committed by the people. In new form of participation, there is usually a motive by governmental and/or non-governmental organizations that encourages the individuals to participate in a particular issue (Alavitabar, 2000).

In Iran, there has been traditional participation from earlier times, and despite the huge changes and transformations within the last hundred years in the society, this kind of participation can still be seen in the majority of the Iranian cities. Religious mourning in special months and days and building mosques are some of the examples of traditional participation in Iran. The experiences of traditional participation in rural settlements show that most of these participatory activities have been done based on economic reasons. In these settlements, due to small size and limited roles, a simple division of works is appeared to do and facilitate production process that without individuals’ cooperation and participation is not possible. The traditional agriculture and animal husbandry are based on the participation of the small groups of individuals, and this participation made the public affairs and hand works feasible.
This status could be partly seen in Iranian cities, that is to say, the townspeople mostly participated in affairs with relation to economic production such as agriculture and animal husbandry. Therefore, there was no pattern for the citizens to participate in city administration. Nevertheless, citizen participation was considerable in religious activities. According to the importance of religious mourning in Iran, townspeople and especially the inhabitants of the neighborhoods prepare a place for these ceremonies. Moreover, mosques have been the other religious centres that were being built with the cooperation and participation of the community dwellers. The mosques are even presently administrated by the local inhabitants. Most of the mosques especially the ones with local importance have trustees that administrate the mosques.

Public baths are the other centres that can be referred as the places which have been previously built with citizen participation. In each community, one or more benevolent and charitable persons, mostly rich, pioneer to build public bath. At the end of the building process, they were being administrated by participation of all community inhabitants. Nowadays, due to changes in living habits, public baths are seldom being built.

3.3.1. Historical Study of Citizen Participation Regarding Municipal Laws Approved in Different Political, Social, Economic, and Cultural Backgrounds

Historically, the new participatory patterns of urban administration in Iran, has begun since Constitutional Revolution of 1906. In fact, establishment of the first parliament after the revolution, and approval of the Constitution can be regarded as the first participatory experience, which regarding the constant dictatorship of Iranian political system, was new and unprecedented.

The new patterns of citizen participation in urban fields in Iran can be viewed within three stages; before the Constitutional Revolution, between the Constitutional and Islamic Revolution, and after Islamic Revolution.

3.3.1.1. Urban Administration before the Constitutional Revolution (1906)

Until the end of the nineteenth century, in Iran as elsewhere in the Middle East, the executive head of the town was a prince or, more often, a military man appointed by him as the governor, with unrestricted duties and prerogative except sitting in judgement in the religious court. Most of the town business, however, was passed on to the governor’s assistants, qadi and muhtasib, whom he had the privilege to appoint. The office of legal secretary to the governor developed to be the theoretically independent office of qadi as one of the most vigorous institutions in Islamic society. Nevertheless, he did not control the criminal justice, police, and taxation. The qadi was the trustee of the pious foundations who provided the maintenance of mosques, seminaries, and miscellaneous public services such as fountains or hospitals, and could become the actual regent of the town (Madanipour, 1998).

3.3.1.2. Urban Management between Two Revolutions (1906-1979)

This stage can also be divided to four periods as follow;

First period (1906-1925): The Idealism of the Constitutional Revolutionaries

Although acquaintance of the Iranian people with western culture and civilization dates back to the Safavid dynasty (1502-1736), but the most important effects and changes due to contact
between Iranian society and western culture and civilization, took place during Qajar era and after them, among which, the Constitutional Revolution, formation of the parliament, and approval of the Constitution are more considerable than the others. Before the Constitutional Revolution, the governing system did not give the people the opportunity to participate in political administration of the country, and the country was being dictatorially governed and administrated by Shah and his relatives. Therefore, the parliament after Constitutional Revolution can be regarded as the first new pattern of participation that took place with the aspiration of changes in European countries such as France.

In fact, for the first time Shah found a mechanism beside himself that its members were elected by people, and they could make all of decisions, and Shah could only accept their opinions and decisions (Alavitabar, 2000). With regard to Constitution Decree in 1906, the government accepted the participation of all of the people in country’s administration as a ‘right for them’, and ‘the right of participation in the election of parliament’s members’ are given to all of the country’s people (Ahsan, 1994).

The constitutional revolutionaries were eager to establish the rule of law in the country. That is why in 1907, the first parliament after the revolution passed a ‘Baladiyeh Act’ for the establishment of modern municipalities. According to this Act, cities were to be run by a municipality under the control of a council of elected representatives. The council members were to be elected for four years and their leader, who carried the traditional title of kalantar, now the equivalent of a mayor, was also in charge of the municipality. The mayor and three others appointed by the council were the main members of the municipal organization. The main aim of parliament in the establishment of municipalities was ‘to protect the interests of cities and to respond to the needs of the citizens’ (Madanipour, 1998).

In this Act, municipality was treated as a legal body, and Baladieh Assembly had the right of passing and approval of the laws and by-laws. The organisation of Baladieh consisted of Baladieh Assembly, Baladieh office, and the police office. Characteristics of urban administration in this period were as follow (Hanachi and Moradi Massihi, 2001);

- An entire independence of Baladieh organization;
- Elective basis of urban management system; and
- Accountability of mayor to the Baladieh Assembly, and not central government

Despite some critiques to this law such as disregarding the women rights, this law was advanced and creative according to the social and political status of Iranian society in that time (Imani Jajermi, 2000).

Baladieh Act, despite the prediction of citizen participation in urban management in the form of Baladieh Assembly, due to lack of coordination between this Act and characteristics of Iranian society of those days, confronted with a failure. At that time, only less than 20 percent of the country people were city dwellers, majority of them were illiterate and were not aware of their responsibilities and rights. Moreover, on the one hand, the local influential persons intervened in the elections, and on the other hand, the governmental officials had no experience to realize and actualize this law. Following these problems, the parliament permitted the government to dissolve all of the Baladieh Assemblies and to review the relevant laws, and the government immediately dissolved the assemblies (Alavitabar, 2001).
Second Period (1925-1941): Loss of Baladieh Law

In 1925, with the accession to the throne of Reza Shah, essential changes in the structure of Iranian society occurred such as formation of the new army, modernization of educational system, construction of industrial factories, establishment of Tehran University, modernization of judicial system, expansion of urbanization together with severe political centralization (Alavitabar, 2000). In 1930, this municipal Act was replaced by another which eroded the relative autonomy of municipalities and turned them into local agencies of central government. From these early stages, the Ministry of the Interior became the main actor in establishing municipalities, by appointing their management personals, and in controlling their affairs. The first attempt to create an autonomous urban government was therefore only partly implemented. With the accession to the throne of Reza Shah, who suppressed political freedom and built up a strong central government, a new municipal law was devised. Now the municipality was an institution entirely dependent on central government. Mayors were installed by the Ministry of the Interior and the city councils found the role of advisory groups whose main decisions had to be approved by the ministry. Town people could elect five times the required number of representatives, from whom the government would choose and appoint the members of the council (Madanipour, 1998).

Regarding this law, the organization of Baladieh composed of Baladieh Assembly and Baladieh office. Baladieh Assembly consisted of 6 to 12 people (decrease in Assembly members in comparison with the previous law), that were to be elected by three classes of people including landlords, businessmen and merchants. Also, the manager from the Baladieh office was directly appointed by the Ministry of the Interior (Taheri, 1995). According to this law, city administration was based on both centralization and decentralization. The Baladieh organization lacked any authority and independence, and the community inhabitants did not intervene in their communities’ administration (Shakiba Moqadam, 1995). The attachment of municipalities to the central government was a part of Reza Shah’s drive to centralize political power.

Third period (1941-1953): Struggles to Achieve Liberty and Democracy

After Reza Shah’s demise in the Second World War, which led to a renaissance of democratic forces, municipalities once again became the focus of attention. The third municipal Act was approved in 1949, which returned to the municipalities a degree of legal autonomy (Madanipour, 1998; Alavitabar, 2000). City councils were to be elected by citizens for a period of four years and had wide-ranging power in the management of the city. The mayor was to be appointed by the Ministry of the Interior from three candidates put forward by the city council. The councils had the right to legislate, devise local taxes, engage in a degree of urban management, and become relatively independent from the Ministry of the Interior (Bulletin No. 19, 1993). The number of representatives was different in terms of the population of each city from 6 to 25 and in Tehran 30 members. In this law considerable differences can be seen in comparison with the Baladieh law (Alavitabar, 2000). The most important differences between the laws of 1930 and 1949 can be summarised in the following table;
With these changes, the City Assembly could represent a wider range of citizens and could enjoy more authority and power. Moreover, the communities’ inhabitants could object the Assembly’s decisions and a corresponding way was predicted to present the objections and examine and answer them (Bulletin No. 19, 1993).

Three years later under the premiership of Dr. Mossadegh, this law was amended to provide municipalities with more independence and limit their relationship with the Ministry of the Interior. According to this law, the municipalities were being established in the cities with the population of 5000 or more and also the members of City Assembly were to be elected for four years (Bulletin No. 19, 1993).

The members of the city councils—30 in Tehran, were elected from the city wards to have more direct relationship with their constituencies. The councillors could appoint or sack the mayor, and were allowed to have control over municipalities’ financial and administrative affairs. The municipal duties remained much the same as the 1949 Act had defined. With these changes, the 1952 Act, with its later amendments in 1955, 1966, and 1976, have formed the basis of the current municipal practices. The current municipal law is in fact based on the frameworks devised in 1952 and the 1976 provisions (Madanipour, 1998).

This law had some advantages and disadvantages. According to this law, the membership of the City Assembly was voluntary and without salary, therefore social responsibility of the members to the city and citizens increased. The disadvantage of this law in comparison with the first Baladieh Act of the constitution was that the government could dissolve the Assembly. This permission to government caused that Assemblies were always facing with the danger of dissolving in case of objection with the government, the issue that increased the danger of conservative spirit and avoidance of innovation (Imani Jajermi, 2000).

Mossadegh’s government did not have enough time to implement municipal Act of 1952. The discrepancies and disputes among the members of national party, the actions of monarchist officers, and the change of American diplomacy to support United Kingdom, resulted in 28th
Mordad Coup (1953) and demise of Dr. Mossadegh’s government. This law, such as other laws, was abolished after the demise of Dr. Mossadegh’s government.

Fourth Period (1953-1979): Relative Failure of City Assemblies

Two years after the 1953 monarchist coup which brought Mohammad Reza Shah back to power, a watered-down version of the 1952 law was confirmed as the Municipality Act. The city councils were granted more power in the selection of the mayor. However, the influence of central government in local affairs was reasserted and expanded through financial and administrative controls. Furthermore, council members no longer represented city wards (Madanipour, 1998).

According to this law, the council members were salaried employees, whereas according to the previous law, the membership of city assembly was voluntary and without salary (Imani Jajermi, 2000). According to this law, in each settlement with at least 5000 people, a municipality should be established. The Ministry of the Interior, could also establish municipality in settlements with less than 5000 people regarding their local importance and situation (Shakiba Mogadam, 1995). It was provided that the organization of the urban management—municipality—should be divided to two departments; the department of policy-making, planning, and decision-making that its responsibilities were given to city assemblies, and the department of implementation that its responsibilities was granted to the mayor (Imani Jajermi, 2000). In this period, city assemblies once again failed to achieve their goals, and often they had not enough efficiency due to people disregarding and intervention of the influential governors. Failure of the city assemblies were due to two essential factors as follow;

1- Weakness of the people’s knowledge and lack of political and social maturity to elect competent councilors; and
2- Intervention of governmental officials in city council elections (Bulletin No. 19, 1993).

Comparing causes of failure of the city assemblies and the Baladieh assemblies, it can be concluded that despite the 50 years distance between these two periods, the fundamental reasons of the failure of citizen participation in urban administration are the same, although the intervention of governmental officials had a more prominent role in the former.

In the ‘municipal law amendment’ approved in 1966, once again, the severity of intervention and authority of the Ministry of the Interior was decreased, and the right of mayor election (for four years) was granted to the city assembly.

With major amendments in 1966, this law has continued to form the legal basis of municipalities even after the Islamic revolution of 1979. According to the 1966 amendments, members of the city council could not become mayor. On the other hand, the amendments made the government’s rights to dissolve the city councils conditional upon the approval of a legislative-executive committee. Inability of a city council to elect a mayor could lead to dissolution of the council (Madanipour, 1998).

From the premiership of Dr Mossadegh until Islamic Revolution, the municipal Act has frequently changed. In all these stages of legal provision and change, the struggle to establish a democratically elected local government distinctive from the central power can be clearly seen. The debate was also centred on the relationship between city council, the mayor, and the municipality as the constituent parts of the municipal government. What has remained outside the discussion, however, has been the limited range of issues in which a municipal government is
allowed to engage. In all these pieces of legislation, the duties of the local government are limited to mostly physical development and provision of urban utilities (Madanipour, 1998).

### 3.3.1.3. Democratic Government after the Islamic Revolution (1979)

In 1979, with the victory of Islamic Revolution, the environment was ready for further citizen participation in the urban affairs. One of the main features of the revolution was the neighborhood-level mobilization of citizens in their challenge to the outgoing regime. Neighborhood groups organized themselves to protect their areas and later, during the war with Iraq, to ensure a fair supply of food. It would be natural to expect such grassroots level of public participation in urban affairs to develop into a genuine local democracy (Madanipour, 1998).

In 1979, following a decree by the Imam Khomeini, the first steps were taken in the formation of the local councils. In the same year, election for 156 city councils took place, but due to lack of coordination and citizen participation this experience failed, and the city councils were dissolved (Hanachi and Moradi Massihi, 2001).

Table (3-4): The Approved Laws Regarding Citizen Participation in Urban Management within Recent One Hundred Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Changes of Laws and/or Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Constitutional Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>The first Baladieh Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>The second Baladieh Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>The third Municipal Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>The fourth Municipal Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>New Amendments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>New Amendments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>New Amendments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Islamic Revolution-Approval of Local Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Formation of Islamic Councils Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>New Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>New Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Organization, Responsibilities, and Authorities of Islamic Councils Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The first Islamic City Councils’ Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>The second Islamic City Councils’ Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>The third Islamic City Councils’ Election</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1982, the first post-revolutionary parliament devised a system of democratic councils for the country. With enthusiasm similar to that of the constitutional revolutionaries before them, the Islamic revolutionaries proposed a complete set of Islamic councils at all levels: from villages and rural districts to towns, cities, counties, and regions. With similar fate, the councils have mostly remained on paper up to 1999. The Act was amended in 1986, 1991, and 1996. The fourth parliament rejected councils above the level of cities, i.e. county councils and regional councils (Madanipour, 1998).
In 1996, after subsequent amendments to the law ‘Formation of Islamic Councils Act’, a law under the name of ‘Organization, Responsibilities, and Authorities of Islamic Councils Act’ was ratified, which laid the foundation of the 1999 Islamic councils elections.

Finally, in 1999, the elections of city councils are being successfully held, and after the election, the city councils have had more considerable roles in controlling urban development. The aims of the Islamic councils are described in article 100 of the Constitution as: ‘In order to expedite public health, and social, economic, cultural, educational and development programmes and facilitate other public welfare affairs through the people’s participation and in accordance with the local needs, the administration of each village, division, city, town, and province will be supervised by a local council which will be known as village, division, city, town, or provincial council. The members of every council will be elected by its respective population’. In the followings, functions, responsibilities, and characteristics of Islamic City Councils will be mentioned.

3.3.2. The Role of the Islamic City Councils and Municipalities in Citizen Participation

3.3.2.1. Functions and Responsibilities of Islamic City Councils

Article 70 of the ‘organization, responsibilities and authorities of Islamic councils Act’ lists the responsibilities of the councils which can be categorized in the following five groups;

1. **Consultative functions**: It included such functions as consultation and examination of local constituency issues with higher level councils or authorities, as well as the examination of front line organization proposals and programmes on social, economic and development questions.

2. **Supervisory functions**: To supervise the activities of those government agencies which are involved in the local issues. Of course the supervision lack mandatory enforcement, and is limited to informing the higher authorities about the shortcomings and difficulties.

3. **Planning functions**: Councils are entitled to plan for promotion of citizen participation in the urban affairs such as social, economic and development, in coordination with relevant agencies.

4. **Execution functions**: According to the request of authorities, councils can undertake such tasks as the distribution of energy, foodstuff, collecting statistics, and conducting local researches.

5. **Ratification of laws, rules, regulations and by-laws**: These functions include ratification of municipality by-laws, municipality and related organizations budget, municipality proposed loans, business transactions, and levying the local taxes. Of course, some of these functions require the approval of the Ministry of the Interior as well.

In addition to the above responsibilities, in other enactments some further functions such as approval of the five year plan of urban renewal and development and approval of water fee rate in the cities are envisaged for the city councils. In the ‘Establishment of High Council for Urban Development Planning and Architecture Act’ ratified in 1972, it is predicted that during the examination and modification of urban comprehensive and detailed plans, the views of the city councils and the mayor also should be taken into account.
3.3.2.2. Characteristics of Islamic City Councils

The following points can be considered as the most important characteristics of Islamic City Councils (Hanachi and Moradi Massihi, 2001):

- The formation of Islamic Councils represents a form of citizen participation in local affairs, and therefore a kind of decentralization. The central government instead of being responsible for all the duties and functions at the local level, legally delegates some of its authority and responsibilities to the councils.
- Councils within their legal jurisdiction are rather autonomous. They are considered legally independent bodies, which could independently take legal proceedings against someone or some organizations, and vice versa. But in the 1996 Act of Islamic Councils, there is no mention of this right for the councils.
- The councils’ budget was supposed to be independent of the government budget. The councils are supposed to have their own revenue sources and expenditures. According to article 22 of the previous Islamic Councils Act, the councils budget was generated through the local revenues, donations and (if necessary) through charging for the provision of local services. In case of budget deficits, with the request of the High Council of Provinces, the central government would fill the gap allocating funds from the government general incomes. But according to article 75 of recent Islamic Councils Act, the financial requirements of the city councils must be provided from the municipalities’ budget.
- In order to execute their duties, councils have moveable and immoveable assets at their disposal. These assets belong to their locality and should not be confused with government assets. Furthermore, these assets and properties contrary to government assets are not bound to public Auditing Act.
- Councils are considered to be independent organizational units which are not subordinate to central government’s administrative hierarchy. Councils as elected local bodies, supervise over the functioning of institutions and agencies. Councils according to the ‘organization of Islamic Councils Act’ are subordinate to the councils’ further top on the hierarchy. At the utmost top level, the Islamic consultative Assembly supervises over the High Council of the provinces. Therefore, the authority of the councils is not absolute. The central government supervises over their activities and has the power to dissolve them, If serious diversions from legal responsibilities are observed.
- Councils are elected for four years. The city councils have the right to appoint or dismiss the mayor.
- Comparing the legal authority of the councils predicted in the constitution with the ‘Organization of Islamic Council’s Act’ of 1996, the authority of the councils concerning policy-making and decision-making has diminished and restricted only to the municipalities. Regarding other agencies involved in urban affairs, city councils have only consultative role, and in many cases they are over shadowed by the central government sectoral or inter-sectoral agencies.
- The Islamic city council has very wide authority for decision-making regarding the municipality. The link between the council and the municipality is effective, but quite indirect. For example, according to the article 74 of 1996 Act, the council has no authority to intervene in the appointment or dismissal or giving orders to the municipality employees. Whereas in article 73 of the same act, the council is authorized to cross
examine or reprimand the mayor. Hence, the link between the municipality organizational apparatus and the city council is indirect and through the channel of the mayor.

- The supervisory responsibility of the city council varies from mandatory to consultative. Regarding government sectoral or inter-sectoral agencies involved in urban affairs, council’s supervision is consultative, whereas concerning the supervision of the council over municipalities is of mandatory type. For example, over municipalities’ revenues, expenditure, financial by-laws and so on.

- Due to complexity and diversity of city council’s duties and responsibilities, city councils have started creating working committees such as public affairs committee (social, cultural, educational, health, welfare), urban development committees (technical, engineering, architectural and urban planning), plan and budget, legal affairs, administrative affairs, traffic and transportation, and finally finance and economic affairs committees. Meanwhile, the Ministry of the Interior together with the State Organization for Employment and Administrative Affair and some councillors are preparing the organizational chart for the Islamic City Councils.

In recent years, city councils and municipalities perceived the important necessity of citizen participation in urban management. Therefore, after Islamic Revolution, a number of ideas and projects are presented from municipalities and city councils to involve citizens in urban administration. These activities can be divided to two municipalities and city councils activities.

### 3.3.2.3. The City Councils’ Activities in Citizen Participation

Although establishment of city councils in Iran was a real and serious step towards indirect citizen participation, these councils have tried to do complementary activities and to implement some plans and programs in order to realize and deepen direct citizen participation. The first of these plans was the ‘Act of independence plan, and the local affairs’ assistants system’ prepared by the Ministry of the Interior, and aimed at municipalities’ independence through citizen cooperation and participation.

The second plan, under the title of ‘administrative helping out Jihad (urban services institution)’, was presented by the State Organization for Employment and Administrative Affairs within the proposed Act of Administration System and Organization. An overview to this plan shows that its aim was formation of a new organization to administrate urban affairs instead of municipalities. As these plans have never been implemented, the exact evaluation of them is not possible (Bagherian, 1992).

Despite the above mentioned facts, the establishment of Islamic city councils, as a popular institution and relative non-governmental one, which acts as a local parliament, shows indirect citizen participation in decisions of urban management and planning. On the other hand, the Islamic city council’s law provides one of the twelve duties of the Islamic city councils as planning to involve citizens in social, economical, and physical services and to encourage them to develop cultural, sport, and recreational centres, and to establish social, guide, and relief institutions and assemblies and also establishment of production, distribution and consumption cooperation. Moreover, a number of Islamic city councils in Iran like Tehran and Shiraz city
councils have established community and neighbourhood councils—councils for city wards—to deepen citizen participation.

In article ‘one’ of the approved plan of community councils’ formation is provided that; ‘The community councils of Tehran city, depending on Tehran city council, are established to realize and implement council’s law and to improve the Tehranis participation as much as possible to organize different urban affairs and to involve their real cooperation to improve their life quality’. This non-governmental, decentralized, non-political, voluntary, participatory and economically independent council will be active in neighborhood level in Tehran city. The people of each neighborhood will elect the representatives and members of community council in their own wards including seven main members and three utility members. Examination of physical conditions, environmental issues, socio-cultural activities, determination and protection of historical places of the neighborhoods, the alley nominalization, and supervising local libraries are some of the authorities and responsibilities that are delegated to the citizens and inhabitants of each neighborhood by Islamic city council to have close relationship and more participation in urban affairs (Hanachi and Moradi Massihi, 2001).

3.3.2.4. The Municipalities’ Activities in Citizen Participation

The functions of the municipalities can be categorized in four groups: planning and development, services, supervision, and social welfare. The 1995 municipality’s Act had assigned 53 functions to the municipalities, presently less than 39 percent of those tasks are carried out by the municipality. The rests are taken away from the municipality by other organizations. Furthermore since 1968 by the approval of urban renewal and rehabilitation Act, some development planning functions have been added to the responsibilities of the municipalities (Hanachi and Moradi Massihi, 2001).

Municipalities have also had major role in citizen participation process concerning urban planning and management. Recently, numerous projects and plans have been prepared by the municipalities especially by Tehran municipality that each of them can improve citizen participation. Some of these projects are implemented in a wide scope and are supported by international organizations among which the ‘Healthy City Project’ can be referred to. Although in all of these projects and plans, the municipalities have intervened, but it is necessary to mention that in some of these participatory projects, beside the municipalities, some of ministries and governmental organizations and also local institutions have had considerable roles. The followings are the most important projects;

The Healthy City Project 23

The Healthy City Project is one of the World Health Organization (WHO) projects that is recommended to the members of world organization in 1986 to achieve the least level of body and spirit health, as well as society welfare. Presently, this project is being implemented in more than 1000 cities of the world especially in European countries that have had successful experiences to implement this project.

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22 In Iran these councils are known under various names in different cities. While these community councils are called ‘Yavarane Shora’ in Shiraz city, they are called ‘Shorayaran’ in Tehran. However, their aims, duties, and authorities are relatively the same in different cities.

23 This project is known as ‘Tarhe Shahre Salem’ in Persian language.
The healthy city movement was formed based on two key and essential principles of inter-sectoral cooperation of organizations at national and local levels on the one hand, and the direct and constant participation of citizens in decision-making and implementation of comprehensive healthy plans of urban life on the other hand (Alavitabar, 2000).

The first symposium of healthy city in Iran, with the participation of the Ministry of Health and Medical Education, and the World Health Organization was held in Tehran in 1991. Then, with the participation of the Ministry of Health and Medical Education and Tehran municipality, the Tehran healthy city headquarter is established, and Shahre Rey area within district 20 of Tehran municipality was selected to implement healthy city project. After the first studies, regarding the wide range of existing problems of Sizdahe Aban neighbourhood, this neighborhood was selected as the first area to implement the healthy city project.

At the moment, seven committees including ‘health, education, urban services, employment and income, mental health, sport, and citizen participation’ are active in this project and the members of each committee have at least one public meeting in a week in which the members examine and analyse the problems, and adopt the proposals. The committee members voluntarily present numerous research projects concerning scientific, social, cultural, and artistic fields (Alavitabar, 2000). Some of the research projects of the committee are as follow;

- Construction of the buildings, to which priority must be given in Sizdahe Aban area
- Construction of scientific, technical, cultural and sport centres with citizen participation
- The professional and comprehensive research proposals
- Formation of research, public planning and evaluation groups

Although the functions of the healthy city project in Iran requires constant and clear examination and critiques, but it seems it is the first time that in this project the citizen participation in urban planning and management goes beyond the informing, consultation and passive participatory levels and acts in upper rungs of citizen participation ladder such as partnership. Here, citizens have the opportunity to discuss and debate a plan or even have collaborative decision-making power. Of course, it should be mentioned that the problems and shortages of this kind of participations are lack of legal, obligatory, systematic and comprehensive features from the responsible local organizations, so that, when the local authorities wish, they can disregard the voice of citizens, and even dissolve these organizations.

**The Mayor-School Project**

This project pays special attention to the young people and aims at the followings (Development of Cultural Centres Co., 1995);

- To give prestige and personality to students in order to create behavioural and mental balance;
- To give the spirit of voluntary participation of the students in their family, school, and city; and
- Recognition of city and school affairs, and teaching the students how to administer them in order to create responsibility to the relevant surroundings.

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24 This neighborhood is laid in south of Tehran.
25 This project is known as ‘Tarhe Shahrdar-Madrese’ in Persian language.
Furthermore, this project beside the above mentioned aims, planned to create and promote the skills of ‘effective social participation’ among the students in the following fields:

- Safety issues (in emergencies, and how to confront with disasters such as earthquake, flood, conflagration and the other natural and unexpected disasters);
- Urban traffic and transportation issues;
- Environmental issues (public sanitation, environmental polluters such as air, water, and sound polluters, and so on);
- Social issues (attention to the people rights especially the patients, elderly and the disabled);
- Cultural issues (libraries, cultural centres, historical buildings, and so on); and
- Sport and physical education issues.

This plan is prepared with the viewpoint that a society consists of some inter-related institutions. The administration of the school is not separate from the other institutions of the society. School is an institution that has its own organization; simultaneously it is a kind of society. That is to say, the student during his or her school should learn and be informed that the society is here and now, not anything in the future or inaccessible. In other words, school is not a separate element of the society.

This project has a central headquarter consisting of experts, researchers and experienced people who are specialist in different fields like educational sciences, psychology, sociology, arts, religious issues, social issues, planning, and so on. The project executive recommends the specialists and they are appointed by the manager of development of cultural centres cooperation. This headquarter has the role of planning, research, education, guidance, coordination, control and supervision, implementation and evaluation of the plans, and enjoys a special organization that corresponds with the planning aims, that is to say, it realizes the aims. Generally speaking, the main aim of this plan is education of students—and/or future adult citizens—in urban fields.

**The Pioneers of Green Space Project**

This project is actualized in district 14 of Tehran municipality in order to encourage the citizens to develop green spaces. In this project, the citizens who are interested in expansion and protection of green spaces, are selected as pioneers of green space, and a number of them establish local centres of green space. In these centres, a number of pioneer students and teachers in green space take part. People guidance to protect green spaces, presence in utility centres, and answer to the citizen questions are some of duties and responsibilities of green space centres (Bulletin No. 12, 1993).

**The Healthy Community Project**

Regarding the continuous, active and successful role of communities to regulate citizen relationship, the healthy community project was taken into consideration by Tehran municipality and tried to enjoy the participation and cooperation of community inhabitants. This project was

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26 This project is known as ‘Tarhe Pishgamane Fazaye Sabz’ in Persian language.
27 This project is known as ‘Tarhe Mahaleye Salem’ in Persian language.
implemented in district 9 of Tehran municipality. The aim of this project is to give municipal services to the citizens as well as possible and to educate the citizens about their rights and duties. In this project, citizen participation is taken into consideration in regular sanitary garbage gathering, community cleaning and protection of beauty and cleanliness in community environment (Bulletin No. 21, 1993).

The Spring Reception Project 28

The spring reception project has various functions, some of which are encouragement of citizens to clean their houses and communities, to solve their problems, and to help them to continue this tradition. Concerning this project, the merited citizen was selected. He was the person who had an active participation in different parts of this project (Feizi, 1995).

Beside the above mentioned projects, other activities can be referred that they try to involve citizens in urban management, some of which are as follow;

- Establishment of public participation Bureau in the district 7 municipality of Tehran.
- Establishment of the society of local trustees and ‘Imams of the Friday Prayers’ in the district municipalities of Tehran.
- Monthly meeting of the district mayors with the local people

There are also some other participatory experiences such as ‘Navab Project’ and ‘Chain Stores Project’, but since these projects and the ones like them are more a kind of private sector investment, and the common people can seldom take part in these projects, hence these projects can not be categorized in the concept of citizen participation and can only be seen from the financial point of view. The participatory projects in Iran and the kind of participation are summarized in table (3-5).

3.3.3. Citizen Participation in the Urban Development Plans

Citizen participation in the urban development plans can be studied in five categories including provision of funds, selection of consulting engineers, preparation of development plans, examination and adoption of the plans, and finally plan implementation (Hanachi and Moradi Massihi, 2001).

3.3.3.1. Provision of Funds

During the last four decades, central government has always provided the necessary funds for the preparation of development plans. Whereas in the preparation of the Comprehensive and Detailed Plans it is the Management and Planning Organization which has the main role in allocation of the budget, in Guide Plans it is the Ministry of the Interior which provides the necessary funds out of its annual budget. In the provision of Site and Services projects about half of the finance is provided by the government organizations (National Organization of Housing and Land), whereas the other half is generated through selling the infrastructural ready lands to people. Therefore in the provision of necessary funds for urban development plans, central

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28 This project is known as ‘Tarhe Esteghbal az Bahar’ in Persian language.
government is the main player. Municipalities have virtually no role, whereas people participation is only restricted to the provision of Site and Services Projects.

Table (3-5): The Participatory Projects Implemented in Iran, in Terms of Kind of Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Projects</th>
<th>Kind of Participation</th>
<th>Participation in Decision-Making and Management</th>
<th>Participation in Decision-Making (only Consultation)</th>
<th>Participation in Human Staff</th>
<th>Financial Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Healthy City</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mayor-School</td>
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<td>Spring Reception</td>
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<td>Pioneers of Green Space</td>
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<tr>
<td>Healthy Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation Bureau</td>
<td>* *</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Trustees</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Monthly Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navab Project</td>
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<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chain Stores</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Lower participation  * * Deeper participation

3.3.3.2. Selection of Consulting Engineers

Selection of consulting engineers has always been a responsibility of the central government organizations. In the early years, this was done by the Management and Planning Organization, whereas later this responsibility was assigned to the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (Comprehensive, Detailed, New Towns, and Site and Services Plans), and Ministry of the Interior (Guide Plans). In recent years with the aim of decentralization, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development and the Ministry of the Interior have delegated some of those responsibilities to their provincial units and governments.

Although consulting engineers basically come from private sector, but since most of the consulting engineers are selected centrally and from the capital, therefore, in practice local people have no part in the preparation of those plans.

3.3.3.3. Preparation of the Development Plans

The responsibility for the preparation of urban development plans is virtually with the government agencies namely Ministry of Housing and Urban Development and Ministry of the Interior. Municipalities and the citizens have little role in this process. Sometimes consulting engineers involve people and local organizations for the collection of information and statistics about the existing situation of the city and its problems. This involvement should not be
considered as a serious case of citizen and non-governmental organizations’ participation in the process of the preparation of the development plans.

### 3.3.3.4. Examination and Adoption of the Plans

The responsibility for the examination and adoption of the plans in the beginning was that of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (Comprehensive and Detailed Plans), and Ministry of the Interior (Guide Plans). In 1976 this responsibility was delegated to the provincial subordinate units, having decentralization objectives in mind. But due to lack of coordination, it was not a successful experience.

In 1979, according to a parliament legislation this responsibility for examination of comprehensive plans was delegated to the provincial council for urban development, but again it did not work, and again they had to send the plans to the High Council for Urban Planning and Architecture for final approval and adoption (this mechanism is still at work).

In 1980, according to High Council’s enactment, the responsibility for examination and adoption of the plans again was delegated to the provinces. Some of the turning points in that enactment were to get the municipality involved in the examination and adoption of the plans, getting the views of the city council, to present the plan to the public, establishing committees for the examination and adoption of the plans with mayor and the municipality at its head, and obliging the consulting engineers to make necessary modifications to the plan based on people’s, municipality’s, and the council’s views. These directives of the High Council, due to absence of city council never materialized until formation of city councils in 1999.

According to another enactment of the High Council in 1992, it was decided that the examination and approval of the plans for cities under 200,000 population to be carried out at the Provincial Urban Development Council, whereas for cities over 200,000 population, after proceeding the preliminary stage in the Provincial Urban Development Council, it will finally be examined and adopted at the High Council. This last enactment again undermines the role of people, the municipality and the council in this process.

Consequently today in the process of examination and adoption of the plans, municipality role varies according to the type of the plans. In case of Guide Plans, which is under the responsibility of Ministry of the Interior, the municipality is widely active and involved, whereas in the case of Comprehensive Plans, the municipality’s role is very marginal. This to a certain extent could explain the reasons for the relative success of Guide Plans to the Comprehensive Plans.

### 3.3.3.5. Implementation of the Plans

When the plans are adopted, they are referred to the municipality for implementation. Execution of the projects and plans is the primary task of the municipality. In practice, municipality is the main player in the implementation activities of the city. These activities include construction of roads, public parks, water networks, slaughter houses, launderettes, public water closet, public baths, children playgrounds, low cost housing, workshop complexes, graveyards, fire station, libraries, cultural centres, as well as rehabilitation of city old fabrics, issuing building permits, and acquisition of urban reserved lands.

In Iran people do not have effective role in the process of preparation, examination, and adoption of the plans. But, on the other hand, in the implementation stage, people play a vital role to the extent that materialization of some land uses such as residential, commercial, industrial,
and some services such as educational, religious and health will not be possible without people’s participation. In fact, nearly much of the costs for urban development projects are paid by people.

It should be pointed out that according to the job description of urban development plans, consulting engineers are duty bound to study the possibility of citizen participation in generating funds and revenues for the implementation of the plans. But, in practice this issue has not been given due considerations. Even the municipality itself does not sufficiently exploit possibilities to promote private sector and NGOs’ participation in the plan implementations.

3.3.4. The Existing Constraints, Limitations, Problems, and Capacities for Public Participation in Urban Affairs

The following items are the essential limits, problems and capacities of citizen involvement in different processes and steps in urban planning and management in Iran. To solve the problems and to address the obstacles, there is no unique nation-wide solution. Besides the general conditions, the particular situations in different regions, cities and neighborhoods should be taken into consideration as well.

3.3.4.1. Constraints and Limitations for Public Participation in Urban Affairs

The main constraints and limitations are as follow;

- Indifference of people towards involvement in urban affairs beyond their immediate family needs.
- Relative ignorance regarding citizen rights.
- Continuation of economic hardship, which absorbs people energies.
- Absence of integrated and systematic civil laws regarding the citizen rights.
- Absence of local papers, which could reflect urban life to local people (although one TV channel and city newspapers have positive role on city-wide level).
- Apathy of the personnel of municipalities towards raising public awareness and promotion of public participation.
- Presenting urban issue in ambiguous and unfamiliar terms to people.
- The relative absence of NGOs in the urban management processes.
- Lack of clarity regarding the legal and organizational status of the public participation in urban management affairs.
- Not sufficient use of published materials by municipalities with the aim of giving information to the public.

3.3.4.2. General Problems Concerning Public Participation in Urban Affairs

- People are generally not involved in the day to day running of long-term urban management decision-making process. The only institution which according to the law enables the citizen participation in urban management is the City Islamic Councils.
- Absence of proper organizational and communicational channels for the participation of NGOs in the urban management.
- Private sector is generally viewed by the municipality authorities with suspicion.
- Municipalities’ organizational structure is not designed to attract the citizen participation.
- People are not well acquainted with the functions and duties of the municipalities.
• Indifferent attitude of municipality staff towards citizens.
• There is no organizational network to involve structurally the NGOs and citizen participation in the planning, supervision, and implementation processes.
• People with their specific needs are absent in the preparation of the plans.
• People do not identify with their cities and its management system.
• Urban management system due to social and cultural factors is not well accepted and received by the citizens.
• During the preparation of the plans, people’s needs are not taken into account.
• People are not acquainted with the content of the plans.
• People disregard municipal rules and regulations.
• There is a low level of urban culture for the use of urban services and facilities.

3.3.4.3. The Existing Capacities for the Public Participation

In recent years, new capacities are added to some traditional ones for citizen participation in urban planning and management. Some of these capacities are mentioned in the followings;
• The growing tendency towards formation of several relevant NGOs and civil society
• The existing community and neighborhood relationship, coordination and links
• Presence of the local trustees and the informal local leaders who are being trusted by local people
• Formation of Islamic City Councils
• Increase in the number of experts in construction and urban issues
• The non-governmental financial participation increase in giving urban services
• The positive view of government concerning decentralization and public participation issues that were taken into consideration in 5-year development plans
• Existence of clear and strengthened laws concerning city councils in the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran.
• Existence of religious traditions that require public participation and cooperation as precedence of participation.

3.3.4.4. The Real Citizen Capacities to Accept Responsibilities

The real citizen capacities to accept responsibilities in urban planning and management, are different from one city to another, but generally, the followings can be mentioned;
• The selected members of Islamic city councils have not enough experiences in urban issues, and need education and consultation. Cooperation between different cities’ councils and different municipalities can be a beginning to this tendency.
• In metropolitan and big cities, there are enough experts in urban issues as the people’s representatives concerning municipalities and city councils, in order to participate in urban planning and management affairs.
• Regarding insufficient experiences of citizens in urban planning and management, public participation can be taken place with the help of experts of official institutions, as presently this form of participation can be seen in the districts 7 and 20 of the municipality of Tehran.
In metropolitan and big cities, there exist planning feasibilities and capabilities at urban level. Since, at the moment, the presence of professional and specialized organizations, private sector and NGOs in an organized form can be seen, the involving of these organizations and institutions in urban planning and management affairs is thoroughly genuine and realistic.

3.3.5. The Private Sector Participation in Urban Planning and Management in Iran

In recent years, despite the lack of tendency, the local authorities have gradually understood the role and importance of private sector in urban services delivery. Although in some western countries, it is a long time that the private sector participates in urban activities, but what recently has come under consideration as a new happening, is an increase in the scope and depth in the function of private sector concerning urban activities.

In past decades, the participation of private sector in urban planning and management has also been usual in Iran. The consulting engineers take part in preparation of urban development plans through a contract with relevant organization and giving consulting services. Moreover, the private sector contractors participate in the executive activities of urban planning. On the other hand, Tehran municipality has gradually committed some of the activities of the organizations related to municipality to the private sector within the framework of ‘contractual management’. These organizations include; recycling, information and computer services, graveyard (Beheshte Zahra), fire fighting, fruit and vegetable markets, terminals and transportation organizations, and slaughterhouse.

Although recently, private sector participation has been developed from pure construction activities to urban services activities, but this participation has not exactly been evaluated and has not been generalized throughout the country. Moreover, the private sector participation in urban planning and management includes mostly the executive aspects and seldom the planning and decision-making processes. Furthermore, it involves short-term executive aspects and excludes the long-term urban development. In this regard, lack of participation of private banks in urban development affairs is obvious (Hanachi and Moradi Massihi, 2001).

There are also some problems and constraints of private sector participation in urban planning and management as follow;

- Most consulting engineers are concentrated in Tehran, and the exact knowledge of the problems and different region’s culture is not possible for them.
- In order to preparation of urban development plans, their framework—under which the plans are prepared—regardless of the position of the cities in region and country, their size, area, population and functions are the same, and there are similar contracts to prepare urban development plans in different cities.
- The consulting engineers take part only in preparation of the urban development plans, and after the end of the preparation phase, they have no constant contact with the responsible governmental institutions concerning the plan implementation.
- Lack of legal obligation and suitable payment for consulting engineers to involve citizens and NGOs in the process of urban development plan preparation.
- Lack of direct participation of private sector in decision-making process and determination of strategies in urban management and planning.
- Centralization of numerous activities in the hands of municipalities, while it is possible that some of the activities are committed to the private sector, and the municipalities supervise the quality and quantity of their activities.
- Lack of active participation of private banks in urban development.
• Lack of active participation of private sector in long-term investigation in urban development
• Lack of evaluation and supervision on community urban services activities to private sector from governmental institutions.
• Lack of presence and investigation of private sector in urban infrastructures such as electricity, gas, water, and so on.

3.4. Summary

Urbanization process in Iran, have been faced with a rapid growth during the last four decades. It was due to high rate of population increase on the one hand, and wide migration of rural population to the cities and increase in the number of cities, on the other hand. The increasing number of big cities in Iran is an important point that creates some problems which, with old and simple manageral methods can not be confronted.

In Iran the local organizations mainly in charge of urban development and management consists of the municipality and the Islamic City Council. Municipality is, on the one hand, under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, and on the other hand, it is under the supervision and control of the city council.

Spatial planning system in Iran has a hierarchy in four national, regional, sub-regional, and local levels. Although this hierarchy is defined and recognized, there is a gap between national and local levels. In other words, in regional and sub-regional, the system does not work appropriately. However, urban development planning is mainly conducted through urban plans like comprehensive, detailed and guide plans.

Historically, the new participatory patterns of urban administration in Iran, has begun since Constitutional Revolution of 1906. In fact, establishment of the first parliament after the revolution, and approval of the Constitution can be regarded as the first participatory experience, which regarding the constant dictatorship of Iranian political system, was new and unprecedented.

The new patterns of citizen participation in urban fields in Iran can be viewed within three stages; before the Constitutional Revolution, between the Constitutional and Islamic Revolution, and after Islamic Revolution. During recent one hundred years, city councils have experienced strong fluctuations in their authorities and rights. However, the general direction of urban governance provided more citizen participation. In 1999, the election of Islamic City Councils held in all of the Iranian cities. Moreover, community councils are going to be popular in numerous cities.

In urban development plans, which are provided by consulting engineers, the process of citizen participation has not been clearly defined and citizen involvement is not an obligatory process. Furthermore, the probable citizen participation in urban development plans is limited mainly to implementation process.

Some participatory projects have been conducted by the municipality of big cities like The Healthy City Project, The Mayor-School Project, The Pioneers of Green Space Project, The Healthy Community Project, and The Spring Reception Project, and in some of them the citizens participated in decision-making process. But these projects were not systematic and are not generalized to other municipalities.

Generally speaking, urban development planning and management systems in Iran is faced with numerous legal, organizational, functional and implementation problems, but simultaneously, there are considerable potentials and possibilities that should be given enough attention.
CHAPTER FOUR

CASE STUDY;

SAADI COMMUNITY
AS
AN INFORMAL SETTLEMENT
4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I try to introduce the case study—Saadi Community in Shiraz city—which is an informal settlement. Therefore, at first the geographical, Social and demographical, economical and political structures of Iran will be introduced. Regarding the informality of Saadi Community, the previous and current strategies and professional discussions concerning informal settlements in Iran will be discussed. As it will be analysed in this chapter, the previous strategies have not been successful dealing with informal settlements, and a new document under the title of ‘Document of Enabling Informal Settlements’ was recently approved in the cabinet. This document will also be introduced. Then, I will try to discuss the historical periods of formation and physical development of Saadi Community. Afterward, the current situation of this community including physical, social and demographical, economic, and environmental conditions will be introduced. Finally I will study the problems and issues of the community from the viewpoints of local dwellers and planning experts.

4.2. Geographical, Social, Political, and Economic Structures of Iran

4.2.1. Geographical Structure

Iran, known as Persia until 1935, comprises a land area of 1,648,195 km² in the Middle East. It lies in the northern part of the temperate zone, between latitudes 25° 03’ to 39° 47’ north and longitudes 44° 14’ to 63° 20’ east. It is bordered on the north by Azerbaijan (759 km), Armenia (48 km), Turkmenistan (1205 km), and the Caspian Sea (765 km); on the east by Afghanistan (945 km) and Pakistan (978 km); and on the south by the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, the Strait of Hormuz (2045 km); and on the west by Iraq (1609 km) and Turkey (511 km). Total (land and water) boundaries of Iran are 8865 km (Shayan et al., 2007).

Iran’s climate is mostly arid or semi-arid, and also subtropical along Caspian coast. The elevation extremes range -28 m in Caspian Sea (lowest point) to 5,671 m in Damavand Mountain (highest point). Natural resources include petroleum, natural gas, coal, chromium, copper, iron ore, lead, manganese, zinc, and sulphur. From the viewpoint of natural hazards, Iran is under threats of periodic droughts, floods, dust storms, sandstorms, and earthquakes, from which, earthquake is the most serious threat. In recent years, Iran experienced two earthquakes in Bam city (in south) and Rudbar city (in north), in which, thousands of people were killed in each city.

The map of Iran (figure 4-1) shows the location of main cities in Iran including national borders and Iran's terrain. As the figure shows, Shiraz city—in which Saadi Community, the case of this study is laid—is located in the south-west of Iran.
Figure (4-1): Iran and its neighbors, Main Cities, and Situation of Shiraz City in Iran

Source: Detailed Map of Iran, 2007.
4.2.2. Population and Social Structure

According to the latest national census of population in 2006, Iran’s population was 70,495,782, from which 35,866,362 were male and 34,629,420 were female. That is to say, the sex ratio was 104. Population growth rate was 1.61 percent, however, this rate was different in rural and urban areas. While the population growth rate was 2.74 percent in urban areas, the rate was -0.44 percent in rural areas. Although comparing with several developed and developing countries, the population growth rate is relatively high, this rate has decreased during the last decades (Statistical Center of Iran, 2006).

Table (4-1): Population Changes of Iran in Terms of Population Growth Rate in Urban and Rural Areas (1956-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Total Population Growth Rate</th>
<th>Urban Population Growth Rate</th>
<th>Rural Population Growth Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>18,954,704</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>25,788,722</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>33,708,744</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>49,445,010</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>55,837,163</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>60,055,488</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>70,495,782</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Center of Iran, 2006.

According to the 2006 national census, 17,495,951 households live in Iran, considering total population (70,495,782), the number of each household is four persons. They hope to live 74 years, that is to say, life expectancy at birth is 74 years for every Iranian. Studying of other criteria of population and social structure shows the following results (Statistical Center of Iran, 2006):

*Age Structure*: in Iran, 25.08 percent of people are in the age range of zero to 14 years, 69.74 percent in the range of 15 to 64 years, and only 5.19 percent in the range of 65 years and over.

*Ethnic groups*: majority of Iranians are Persian, however, other ethnic groups such as Azeri, Gilaki and Mazandarani, Kurd, Arab, Lur, Balouch, Turkmen—respectively according to the population share—live in Iran.

*Language*: Persian (Farsi) is the most widely spoken and official language in Iran. Azeri is spoken in the northwest in Azerbaijan and Ardebil provinces. Arabic is spoken in Khuzestan in the southwest, and Kurdish in the west in Kurdistan province. Turkmeni, Luri, Mazandarani, Gilaki, Balouchi are other languages and dialects that are spoken in Iran.

*Religions*: Muslims have an absolute majority in Iran. 99.43 percent of Iranians (70,071,169 population) are Muslim. The rest of the people are Christian (0.16 percent, 109,403 population), Jewish (0.01 percent, 9,253 population), and Zoroastrian (0.03 percent, 19,822 population). 0.37 percent of people have other religions or their religions are not mentioned.

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29 In Iran, national census of population has been done every ten years since 1956.
**Literacy:** according to Statistical Center of Iran (2006), literate is the person with age 6 and over who can read and write. The ratio of literacy is 84.6 percent in total population, from which, 88.7 percent of male and 80.3 percent of female population are literate (Statistical Center of Iran, 2006).

### 4.2.3. Government and Political Structure

*Islamic Republic of Iran* has been the government type in Iran since 1979 (after Islamic Revolution), whose capital city is Tehran. According to the newest administrative and political divisions, there are 30 provinces.

The politics and government of Iran takes place in the framework of the Islamic republic. The December 1979 Constitution, and its 1989 amendment, define the political, economic, and social order of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

**Supreme Leader**

In keeping with the Islamic principles of governance (Velayat - al - amr), the Constitution provides for the establishment of leadership by a Faqih (Jurisprudent) possessing the following necessary qualifications: scholarship, piety, political and social perspicacity, courage, determination, and the necessary administrative abilities for leadership. Thus the Vali-e-Faqih (Supreme Jurisprudent) is one who supervises and correlates Government policies with divine decrees. The Assembly of Experts elects and dismisses the Supreme Leader on the basis of qualifications and popular esteem. The Assembly of Experts is responsible for supervising the Supreme Leader in the performance of legal duties (Mansour, 2004).

**Guardian Council**

The Council is composed of six theologians appointed by the Leader, and six jurists qualified in Law nominated by the Judiciary for approval by the Parliament. The Council reviews the laws passed by the Parliament so as to determine whether they are in conformity with Islamic Religious Law (the Sharia) and the provisions of the Constitution. If they are not, the Council has the authority to veto them. Decisions as to whether a given law is constitutional are to be made by a consensus comprising of all 12 Council members whereas the question of conformity with Islamic Sharia is decided via a majority vote of the theologians. The Council also oversees presidential and parliamentary elections as well as plebiscites. In the case of conflicting interpretations in the clauses of the Constitution, the Council is empowered to give a binding ruling on what it considers to be the correct interpretation (Mansour, 2004; Iran Trade Point Network, 2008).

**Expediency Council**

The Expediency Council (Majma-e-Tashkhis-e-Maslehat-e-Nezam) was established via Article 112 of the Constitution with the aim of mediating issues pertaining to the interpretation of Law in case of differences of opinion between the Parliament and the Guardians Council. The members of the Expediency Council are appointed directly by the Leader, and serve as an advisory body to the Supreme Leader (Mansour, 2004; Iran Trade Point Network, 2008).

**Assembly of Experts**

The Assembly of Experts, which meets for at least two days, twice annually, comprises 86 member body elected by popular vote for eight-year terms. Its members comprise of the nation's leading jurists and scholars of Islamic jurisprudence. Having originally drafted the Islamic
Republic's Constitution, the Assembly carries the mandate of filling any vacancy in the post of Velayat Faqih. The Assembly elects the Supreme Leader and has the constitutional authority to remove the Supreme Leader from power at any time (Mansour, 2004; Iran Trade Point Network, 2008).

**City and Village Councils**

The newest feature of the Iranian political system has been the formation of City and Village Councils. Article 7 of the Iranian Constitution declares participation by the citizens in decision-making as the most important condition for the establishment of a participatory system and identifies several types of popularly elected consultative councils as the means for ensuring mass participation. As such, February 26 1999 marked the first national election for city, town and counties and many pundits have the view that this date will go down in Iranian history as the date of one of the most important socio-political events. These Councils will serve as agents of transparency as their functions are broad-based and encompass an amalgamation of responsibilities including inter alia: the supervision and audit of the income and expenditures of the municipalities; approval of loans to and from the Municipalities; endorsement or rejection of Articles of Associations and other legal matters of companies and institutions affiliated to the Municipalities, election of mayors; study of social, cultural, educational, health, economic, and welfare requirements of their constituencies; the planning and coordination of national participation in the implementation of social, economic, constructive, cultural, educational and other welfare affairs. The position and role of the City Councils in the urban planning and management structure was discussed in chapter three and will be analyzed in chapter five of the dissertation (Mansour, 2004).

**The Three Sovereign Branches of Government**

The Iranian Constitution affirms the division of power into Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches. These divisions are structured within the following framework (Mansour, 2004; Iran Trade Point Network, 2008):

**Executive Branch**

The Constitution defines the President as the highest state authority after the Supreme Leader. The President of the Islamic Republic is elected by a direct vote of the nation for a four year term and is eligible for a second four year term. Presidential candidates must be Iranian nationals ‘enterprising of a good background and be pious and honest’. The Constitution assigns the President as the Head of the Council of Ministers and charges him with direct responsibility for planning and budgetary affairs, although each of these duties may be delegated at the President's discretion. The cabinet comprises of some twenty one Ministers. Members of the Cabinet must to be approved individually by the Parliament and are accountable for their actions. The Parliament may censure each Minister and call for dismissal of any number of Ministers at any time.

**Legislative Branch**

The Parliament of Iran, better known as the Islamic Consultative Assembly, (Majlis-Shora-e-Islami) is composed of 290 elected deputies representing various constituencies. The Majlis drafts legislation, ratifies international treaties, and approves the national budget. The Constitution provides for an increase in the number of Majlis seats every 10 years based on "demographic, political, geographical and similar factors" and limits the number of new seats to a maximum of 20 every 10 years. Elections to the Majlis are held every four years and sessions are
run by a governing board comprised of a Speaker, a First and Second Deputy Speaker, a Secretary and two Board Members. There are 22 permanent committees that oversee all aspects of governmental, socio-legal affairs, accounting and public petitions.

**Judicial branch**

The Judiciary in Iran is completely independent of the executive and legislative branches. The Minister of Justice acts merely as a liaison between the Judiciary and the other two branches. Instead, the Judiciary is headed by an individual appointed by the Leader for a five year tenure. According to the Constitution, the Head of the Judiciary must be ‘a just jurisprudent, well versed in judicial affairs, resourceful and possessing managerial skills’.

Figure (4-2): The Political System of the Islamic Republic Of Iran

![The Political System of the Islamic Republic](source)

**4.2.4. Economic Structure**

The economy of Iran is a transition economy where the government faces a continuing strong labor force with the number of 23.5 million people in 2007. According to experts, annual economic growth above five percent would be needed to keep pace with the 900,000 new labor force entrants each year. Indeed, the economic growth rate was 6.7 percent in 2007 (Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2008).

Iran’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP-Current $) was $US168 billion in 2007, and GDP (PPP) was $US 481 billion in this year. Petroleum constitutes the bulk of Iran's exports, valued at $51.3
billion in 2007. Iran is the 2nd Producer of oil and gas in the world. Iran’s non-oil exports stood at $16.3 billion in the year ending March 20, 2007, a rise of 47.2 percent from the previous year. In other words, 76.1 percent of Iran’s export was crude oil and gas, and 23.9 percent was non-oil export in 2007. However, the government is attempting to diversify away from oil by investing revenues in other areas of the economy, including, artisan goods, petrochemicals, car manufacturing, agriculture, food processing (particularly sugar refining and vegetable), utilities, telecom, pharmaceuticals, textiles, cement and other construction materials, construction, metal fabrication, armaments, and electronics. Industrial commodities make up about 70 percent of non-oil export (Trade Promotion Organization of Iran, 2008).

Iran has a great potential for development in mining, tourism, information and communication technology (ICT). Iran holds the 7th standing in tourist attractions, however, has little share in the trade of world tourism. Moreover, Iran produces agricultural products such as wheat, rice, other grains, sugar beets, fruits, nuts, cotton, dairy products, wool, caviar and so on. Iran ranks fourth on diversity of agricultural products in the world (Trade Promotion Organization of Iran, 2008).

Iran’s import was $US 41.1 billion in 2007, and its structure consists of 19 percent capital, 62 percent intermediate, and 19 percent consumer goods. Iran's major commercial partners are United Arab Emirates, China, Germany, South Korea, Japan, France, Russia and Italy. Since the mid 90’s, Iran has increased its economic cooperation with other developing countries including Syria, India, China, South Africa, Cuba and Venezuela. Iran is expanding its trade ties with Turkey and Pakistan and shares with its partners the common objective for the creation of a single economic market in West and Central Asia called ECO. Iran is also a member of OPEC and WTO (only as an observer member). In 2007, Iran’s main partners in export were Japan, China, Turkey, Italy, South Korea, and Netherlands. However, the partners of Iran’s non-oil export are UAE, Iraq, China, India, Japan, Italy, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and others. In this year, UAE, Germany, China, France, Switzerland, Italy, South Korea, and Russia were Iran’s main partners in import (Trade Promotion Organization of Iran, 2008).

According to the Statistical Center of Iran (2006), the unemployment rate was 11.2 percent in 2006, the rate that decreased compared with recent years. However, the inflation rate has been increased in recent years to 14.2 percent in 2007 (Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2008).
4.3. Informal Settlements in Iran

As mentioned in chapter one, According to Sheikhi (2002) and Sarrafi (2002a), an informal settlement in Iran is an area that combines to various extents the following characteristics:

- Spontaneous formation of the settlement and its development based on dwellers’ motivation and possibilities;
- Lack of supervision and control of governmental formal management and public institutions and rapid growth at least during the first decade of their appearance;
- Formation and development based on social and cultural structures of the dwellers, not authorized and planned land development;
- Inadequate access to basic urban services and infrastructures and overcrowding;
- Poor structural quality of housing;
- Insecure tenure: land ownership, occupation, and use and providing services occurred out of usual, formal and legal framework and buildings constructed without ‘permit to construct’.

4.3.1. Negative Prejudices concerned with Informal Settlements in Iran

What should be added here, is that there are some negative prejudices against the informal settlements that should be verified. In other words, there are some characteristics that informal settlements are unjustly known as followings:

- **Informal settlements are origin of social deviations**: there is no doubt that situation of informal settlements are appropriate to hide social deviations, but majority of the dwellers of these settlements are respectable and hard-working people and generalizing social deviations to all of the inhabitants is unfair. More over, can it be claimed that there is no social deviations in other formal parts of cities? If we expect involvement of the citizens of the informal settlements in urban planning and management, at first, we should avoid accusing them as social deviators (Piran, 2003; Habibi et al., 2003; Aghabakhshi, 2002; Sarrafi, 2002a).

- **Informal settlements should be considered as physical, social and cultural problems**: this unfair and untrue perception is generalized among authorities, experts and urban managers and planners. Although the formation and physical development of these settlements should not be viewed positively, however, these settlements are replacing many other serious social and political problems, especially in undeveloped and developing countries.

- **Dwellers of informal settlements are rural migrants**: although majority of inhabitants of informal settlements were migrants, but it should also be mentioned that the number of people who come from the formal parts of cities to the informal settlements, have been increasing day to day, and the ethnic, social and economic variety of these settlements is severely increased.

- **Formation of informal settlements effected by Land Reforms (in the sixties) in Iran**: the first informal settlement was formed many years before Land Reforms. More over, rapid physical development of informal settlements happened in the seventies.
• *Informal settlements have been formed in the periphery of the cities:* it is clear that there are more free lands for occupation in the periphery of the cities, but the informal settlements have been formed everywhere that there was enough and appropriate land for occupation. Several informal settlements have been created and developed in different parts of (and not necessarily in the periphery of) Tehran city, although some of them were destructed in recent years. More over the concept of ‘periphery of city’ is a transient concept. That is to say, an area that is presently laid in the periphery of a city, maybe in ten or twenty years that area will become a part of the city.30

• *Dwellers of informal settlements are completely employed in parasitic and informal section of the economy:* it is true that the share of informal and parasitic employment in informal settlements is more than other formal parts of the cities, however, majority of inhabitants of these settlements are working in *formal* economic section. It is interesting to know that the first creators of informal settlements in Iran were the workers (employees) of Tehran Municipality (Piran, 2003).

Generally speaking, before any intervention in order to involve the dwellers of informal settlements in urban planning and management in Iran, some unfair prejudices that are generalized among authorities, experts, and urban planners and managers should be verified and changed.

4.3.2. History of Formation of Informal Settlements in Iran

Living in low-quality neighborhoods and settlements in Iran holds a long history. One hundred forty years ago, in 1868, the first population census of Tehran—conducted by Abdolghaffar Najmolmolk—shows that ten percent of the Tehran population (17,000 out of 170,000 in that time) was living in unordinary neighborhoods. Speaking about the social groups and their jobs, peddlers, retailers, beggars, minstrels, the poor migrants and other similar groups were living in these neighborhoods (Habibi et al., 2003).

After Second World War and especially after 1954, and simultaneous with implementation of physical development projects based on oil-exporting income and concentration on industrial projects, marginal role of agriculture section and rural population had become more serious. It lead to a considerable decrease in the role of agriculture section in national economy, and severe stagnation of rural economy that, in turn, lead to emigration of rural population to big cities. As a result, informal settlements appeared as a serious social, urban, and structural problem (Haj Yousefi, 2002).

In 1963, and before beginning of urban planning in Iran, Javadiye neighborhood was a sample of unordinary urban area. In a seminar concerned with problems of Tehran city, held by Research Institute of Social Science, the mayor of Javadiye neighborhood claimed: “during ten years, the population of this neighborhood increased to 70,000”. In that time, Javadiye lacked electricity and drinking water and the mayor described this urban area as a neighborhood that its dwellers were strongly under pressure to access the least necessary services for their life. (Habibi et al., 2003).

In the sixties and seventies, depending on oil incomes, role of cities have changed to the main axis of transitions in the society. According to this change, formation of informal

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30 As it will be discussed in the following pages, Saadi Community was a settlement out of legal district of Shiraz city, while it is presently an urban area in district 3 of Shiraz Municipality.
settlements continued and several informal settlements have appeared in and/or at the periphery of the big cities. In that time, informal settlements lacked the least living services. As Haj Yousefi (2002) stated, informal settlements were mostly in the form of slums, ghettos, and squatters, in areas that were very poor, the living conditions were very bad, and the houses were dirty and with very low quality—an area that lacked drinking water, electricity, telephone, drainage system and a dirty area full of illness and environmental pollutions.

After Islamic Revolution, and in the eighties and nineties, the economic role of big cities on the one hand, and rapid emigration of rural population on the other hand, helped the continuance of formation of informal settlements and the population of informal settlements has been increased.

After the nineties, although the rate of emigration of rural population to the big cities decreased, the development of informal settlements has not stopped. It is currently estimated that about one eight of urban population (about four and half million people) in Iran live in informal settlements. A proportion which may increase to a quarter within the next decade representing a doubling in numbers (Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, 2004).

However, the Iranian situation is not as dramatic as many developing countries. With economic globalization and increasing urbanization of poverty, this gap may get narrow and failing to address the situation shall lead to ever increasing expansion of such settlements, widening the gap between expectations and realities and increasing danger of turning these settlements into places of social malaise and rebellions. Thus the important issue is unsustainable urban development described as the spatial reflection of poverty in informal settlements which could neither be left alone to resolve itself, nor could be addressed with piece meal efforts here and there. Further there is a worry that unmeasured intervention may encourage such tendencies and lead to a remedial set of action rather than preventative (preventing the formation of sub-standard settlements) or guidance and control processes (Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, 2004).

In summary, although living in unordinary settlements in Iran goes back to 1868, and living in informal settlements goes back to the forties, the quality, forms and aspects of living in informal settlements have experienced reasonable changes in recent years. While at the beginning of formation of unordinary or informal settlements (mostly slums and ghettos), they had very bad physical conditions and lacked the least necessary services, and only very poor people were living in these communities, nowadays, comparing with previous informal settlements, majority of dwellers of these areas enjoyed basic services such as drinking water, electricity, telephone and even necessary furniture for standard living. In recent years, the authorities and urban managers, enjoying the help of experts and urban planners, have tried to improve the physical conditions of these settlements. However, informality and living of low income groups have been the common characteristics of these settlements.

4.3.3. Reasons of Formation of Informal Settlements in Iran

According to the experiences of western countries, the process of modernity consisted of three basic elements; industrialization, urbanization, and political democracy. Regarding to the urbanization, it is claimed that the process of urbanization in the third world countries is the same as the process of urbanization in the western countries, and the only difference is the epochal delay in the process. But in reality, the urbanization process has been experienced basically and essentially different in these two parts of the world. Urbanization in the third world happened due to the dramatic growth of the third economic section (services). The economic section that has
been strongly controlled in developed countries until the end of the Second World War and the wandering capitals of the society were conducted to the productive sections through various ways (Piran, 2003).

The growth of the third economic section (services), from the viewpoint of spatial distribution, in underdeveloped and developing countries happened heterogeneously. That is to say, the capital cities of the third world countries, creating huge work markets in third section and important commercial and administrative centers (in Iran and some other countries), gave life to the parasitic employments. On the one hand, due to the improvement of health criteria (infant death, death of children under five years, death of pregnant mothers, death due to contagious illness and so on), the population of third world countries has been rapidly increased, and on the other hand, in the first and second sections of the economy (industry and agriculture) there is no possibility to attract the surplus population. Therefore, the numerous population moves towards capital and other big cities to find a job mostly in informal section of the economy. In this way, the huge cities in the third world countries have appeared (Piran, 2003).

Together with developing of third economic section, misuse of land and housing market begins. A part of urban population—due to natural growth of population in cities or majority of migrants from rural areas and small cities—are not able to find housing in formal market of land and housing. Gradually, and regarding absence of powerful civil society, disrespect of laws, and lack of strong urban management, informal market of land and housing appears. In this situation, the urban poor and rural migrants settled in cities, try hardly to exclude housing rent from their household’s expenditure basket. Therefore, parts of the above mentioned groups are attracted towards informal market of land and housing market (Piran, 2003).

Followings are the most important steps of formation of these settlements in Iran. In a primary division, they can be categorized into two macro and micro levels (Ardeshiri and Kabgani, 2003; Habibi et al., 2003; Piran, 2003; Sarrafi, 2002a, 2002b):

Factors at macro level:

- Growth of capitalism
- Improvement of public health in villages and cities
- High rate of population growth
- Rapid growth of third economic section (services), especially in underdeveloped and developing countries
- Lack of regional balances and preference of big cities (such as Tehran, Tabriz, Bandar Abbas, and so on)
- Migration of rural population to Iranian big cities, and Rapid urbanisation in Iran particularly after Islamic Revolution (after 1979)
- Attraction of rural population to the services section of national economy around big cities
- Increasingly demand for Housing and urban services
- Limits of production capacities responding to the new migrants
- Increase in housing prices, decrease in housing reservations, inadequacy of urban services, and saturation of infrastructure
- Decrease in accessibility of low-income and partly middle-income groups to housing
- Inefficiency of formal markets of land and housing to respond the housing needs of low-income groups—majority of the rural population and urban low-income groups are not able to use formal markets.
• Misuse of such conditions (of land and housing) by opportunist, and finally formation of informal market of land and housing.

Factors at micro level:

• Weakness of effective sectoral plans to respond to the needs of low-income groups in an appropriate geographical distribution
• Absence of forecasting enough housing land use appropriate for low-income groups in urban development plans and partly high level urban planning and design standards in cities out of the abilities of these groups
• Inadequate accessibility of low-income groups to the formal credit system and loans of Housing Bank particularly for the people employed in informal sector of the economy
• Weak supervision, insufficient control and disability of governmental units on construction
• Lack of a certain plan for equipment and gathering resources of low-income groups
• Provision of growing Potential of informal housing construction

4.3.4. Potentials of Informal Settlements in Iran

When ‘informal settlements in Iran’ is the title of the discussions, ‘threats’ and ‘obstacles’ are the words that are being used by authorities, experts, urban planners and managers. However, there are hidden potentials in informal settlements that are often ignored in the society.

The most important hidden potential of these urban areas, is the presence of young and abundant human resources that can be changed to human capital by achievement of necessary skills and education. Moreover, there is valuable social capital that, due to legal conflicts has been appeared negatively, but with laying the ground works and appropriate planning, these potentials can be used in participatory regularizing. Indeed, this social capital should be considered as a part of new resources by which, several problems can be addressed (Sarrafi, 2002a).

In addition to social and human capitals, hidden financial resources are also considerable in informal settlements in Iran. For example, if we pay attention to the expenditures of several services (such as drinking water, transportation and health services) that are paid by dwellers of these settlements—which are cheap or free services for the dwellers of other formal parts of cities—we will find out the hidden financial abilities in these communities. Comparing payment for construction materials in informal settlements in Iran with other ‘southern’ countries, the disability of authorities, planners, managers, and experts to plan and equip appropriately the existent financial resources would be clear (Sarrafi, 2002a).

Generally speaking, the above mentioned potentials are some of the essential common capabilities among most of informal settlements in Iran in order to regularization of these communities. However, there are various hidden potentials in different informal settlements which can be discovered by field studies and monographs.
4.3.5. How to Deal with Informal Settlements in Iran

**Main Approaches:** to face informal settlements, main strategies and approaches can be categorized into four conservative, liberal, radical, and reformist approaches (Sarrafi, 2002a).

The Conservative approach believes that the existing informal settlements should be destroyed. In other words, this approach pays no attention to the possibility of physical movement of these settlements. As a natural result, motivation for the resistance of the local dwellers will be increased. In Iran, this approach was dominant for decades especially before Islamic Revolution which have been appeared in the following forms in different times and places (Ardeshiri, 2003):

1. Absolute destruction (without giving any right to the dwellers)
2. Destruction and causing to migrate to the previous living or birth place
3. Destruction after allocation of cheap land
4. Destruction after allocation of cheap land and cheap housing materials
5. Destruction after allocation of cheap land and free housing materials
6. Buying and destruction
7. Destruction after transfer of dwellers into the low-price housings especially into small apartments

The second strategy, with Liberal approach, using historical simulation of development processes of western and third world countries, considers the informal settlements as a transient and mortal phenomenon. Therefore, wants to ignore this happening and expect that after development of societies, these settlements will be disappeared. Regarding continuation of formation and physical development of these settlements, the mistake of historical simulation of development process for ‘southern’ countries is clear. Moreover, ignorance to the millions of people during decades with the hope of automatically solution of their problems is not acceptable from the viewpoint of human morality. In Iran, ignorance with control of future development and absolutely connivance were two forms of this approach that have been experienced in last decades.

The third strategy, with Radical approach, tries to find out essential solutions and to change fundamentally the social and political structures. It is believed that the micro systems can not be reformed without any reform in macro systems. Therefore, the proponents of this approach do not challenge with the improvement of informal settlements, instead, they rely and focus on social organization for political movements. Similar to the second approach, they ignore these settlements until disappearing of unjust relations and mechanisms in the society.

The fourth strategy, Reformist approach, although accepts the long-term solutions of third approach, but simultaneously, tries to present medium and short term solutions to improve the informal settlements. Instead of insisting on sudden change at macro level, this approach recognizes gradual transitions at micro level. Therefore, paying attention to the structural strategies should not cost ignorance to suffering of the dwellers of informal settlements. In this framework, the Enabling solution has been considered as the best strategy that has been accepted by the last world documents and several experiences (Sarrafi, 2002a).

This new strategy requires a new form of urban management—urban governance—which should involve inhabitants of informal settlements with all of their human, social, and financial resources and capitals. In this strategy, instead of engineering solutions, social processes are
designed to activate local communities. The government role is only supportive and it should be considered as facilitator. The above mentioned approaches are summarized in table (4-2).

### Table (4-2): Classification of Strategies Dealing with Informal Settlements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Approaches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We should eradicate the existing informal settlements</td>
<td>With the Conservative approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should ignore the existing informal settlements</td>
<td>With the Liberal approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should solve the problem of the informal settlements basically</td>
<td>With the Radical approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should reform the conditions of the informal settlements</td>
<td>With the Reformist approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sarrafi, 2002a.

**Doubts and Dilemmas:** Despite popularity of enabling strategy, there are some doubts and questions about the efficiency of this solution. The first problem is that, acceptance of informal settlements leads to physical development of existing informal communities and formation of new ones. It should be answered that if we stay without any action, what will happen? Furthermore, informal settlements are effects, and not causes. Some researchers believe that we should pay attention to the main causes of formation of informal settlements—migration of rural population. Although paying enough attention to rural development is acceptable, from the viewpoint of national development, migration of rural population to cities is an unavoidable necessity. In addition, the rural population is not the only dwellers of informal settlements. In recent years, majority of immigrants to these communities are the urban poor. Another challenge is that, this strategy may be perceived as prizes for the people who ignore the laws. It depends strongly to the methods and process of enabling and regularizing. However, it should be mentioned that this strategy would not formalize ‘what it is’ and ‘where it is’ (Sarrafi, 2003).

**Solutions:** In recent years, various strategies and solutions have been discussed among authorities, urban planners and managers, and other related experts in Iran. Finally, they achieved an agreement on reformist approach and enabling and regularizing strategies. Furthermore, they have tried to present some effective solutions dealing with informal settlements.

Formalization of settlement and providing security of tenure for the dwellers in informal communities are the first steps that should be paid serious attention. In this regard, recognizing certain mechanisms to solve the controversies over housing and residence right against public and private tenure right and also about negotiations and agreements about probable physical movement due to regularization of informal settlements can help to attain these objectives (Habibi et al., 2003; Sarrafi, 2002b, 2003).

Local organizations play a major role in enabling of the dwellers in informal settlements. In this regard, supporting formation of local NGOs, especially to give technical support to the dwellers, capacity building for managerial institutions in order to give power of decision-making to the inhabitants to manage their communities, and paying particular attention to women and
youths and their activation in the communities should be focused. Without formation of such organizations and institutions which can help somewhat to power mechanisms in the community and the city, citizen participation will be limited to only presenting needs and necessities, increase in demands, and somewhat financial participation (Habibi et al., 2003; Khatam, 2003; Sarrafi, 2002b).

The inhabitants of informal settlements have the same citizen rights as the other citizens. Thus, public facilities and services such as educational, health, sport, and cultural centers, should be provided in these communities. Cooperation with the dwellers to build and promote infrastructure and underground networks should not be ignored. Furthermore, standards of urban development plans should become more flexible to respond the needs and abilities of poor households. These standards can be promoted according to the gradual improvement of households’ financial abilities (Habibi et al., 2003; Sarrafi, 2002a,b).

The most important point is that the condition for realization of the values of urban planning and management is ‘urban governance’. Regularizing of the informal settlements with the enabling approach requires participation of all of actors of urban area in a public action. Therefore, it is essential to promote the characteristics of urban governance in Iranian cities. To reach this aim, the authorities and urban managers should prepare the opportunities for contribution of citizens in the process of urban planning and management. In this regard, it is necessary to change the process of urban planning and design to encompassing involvement of local citizens from the first steps—priority of necessities—to the last steps—implementation and protection (Habibi et al., 2003; Khatam, 2003; Sarrafi, 2002b).

In addition to the above solutions, paying attention to the policies of preventing formation of informal settlements and their physical development is important as well. Planning for improvement of the financial abilities of the low-income groups, encouraging public and private sectors to invest for low-price housings, and providing easier access to credits and loans especially for the dwellers of these communities who are employed in informal economic sector are some of these policies (Habibi et al., 2003; Sarrafi, 2002b).

Considering the above discussions, it was necessary to prepare a national strategy to deal with informal settlements in Iran in order to:

- Prepare an integrated and comprehensive plan in Iran;
- Create a political and national willpower;
- Obligate related sections to coordinate with the plans;
- Make transparent and legal the rights and duties of the dwellers of informal settlements; and finally to
- Prevent and control of physical development of informal settlement in the future and to make efforts to promotion of regional balance.

However, implementation of such an integrated and comprehensive strategy faces serious challenges regarding current administrative structure of the country. That is to say, the existent sectoral structure often coordinates its plans and programs in an internal vertical hierarchy. Therefore, because of weakness of horizontal mechanisms, disorganization and inefficiency are expectable. To address this problem, formation of local tasks to coordinate sectoral actions is recognized as an acceptable solution (Sarrafi, 2003).
4.4. Document of ‘Strategies for Enabling and Regularizing Informal Settlements’

As it is discussed in previous sections, implementation of most previous strategies and programmes not only could not address the housing problems of low-income citizens, but also resulted in expansion of informal settlements in other parts of big cities in Iran. Failure of governments in providing housing for low-income groups resulted in acceptance of renovation and reconstruction approach based on ‘enabling’ informal sector and inhabitants of informal settlements in recent years. Regularization of informal settlements based on enabling approach focuses on all encompassing participation of inhabitants. To realize this approach, the document of ‘Strategies for Enabling and Regularizing Informal Settlements’ was approved in 2004 by the cabinet.

The need for this document, on the one hand, is due to the lack of a coherent program addressing informal settlements in Iran and on the other hand, due to the weakness of inter-sectoral coordination. This document formed the back bone for strategic sectoral policy principles within the 3rd five year development plan (FYDP) and shall help future laws, regulations and action plans which need to be drafted for the future FYDPs in order to secure implementation of those policies.

The present document indeed firmly believes that eradication of informal settlements and prevention of their complete permanency must be sought through eradication of poverty and regional equilibrium, none the less makes it strategic recommendations in the light of current and expanding realities whose expansion has to be stopped but which need to be addressed urgently. In other words, informal settlements could neither be forgotten nor would they wither away of their own accord. Considering their ever increasing dimensions, solutions must be found urgently, indicating the manner and nature of multi sectoral intervention and co-ordination needed by public/governmental sector. Here, macro goals, guiding principles, and principal strategies and policies of this national document will be addressed (Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, 2004).

4.4.1. Macro Goals

With a belief that no real development could occur while a large population live in unsuitable conditions of poverty and discrimination, the main objectives in regularizing informal settlements according to this document should incorporate the followings:

- Provision of a safe and healthy living and working environment securing human dignity and faith and social participation, in an inclusive and sustainable manner, based upon a suitable platform for formation of dynamic institutions created from within these communities empowering them to respond to their needs.
- Provision of accessible and affordable infrastructure and basic services for all so as to reduce differences in the quality of life in these settlements and the rest of the city, with a view to future expanding demands.
- In preparation of entitlement to urban facilities, deepening urban culture through an all encompassing participation of residents of these settlements in decision-making and local operations.
4.4.2. Guiding Principles

- Revision of current policies and provision of a planned urban space for low-income groups;
- Government as facilitator and guide;
- Using resources within these neighbourhoods supporting and guiding self-help;
- Security of tenure and civic responsibilities;
- Shelter and employment as preserver of family and social bond;
- Comprehensive and replicable with foresight; and
- Support the roles and duties of local city management in enabling and regularization process.

4.4.3. Principal Strategies and Policies

In order to meet macro goals of the document, the following strategies and policies are being set forth according to each macro goal;

To meet the first macro goal, the followings should be set;

- Support locally elected institutions in informal settlements as the focal forum for all negotiations and planning of collective action so as to support local capacity building, social capital, and civil society.
- Facilitate co-operation and exchanges between public sector and residents at local, regional and national levels.
- Good governance incorporating participation and consensus building amongst all stakeholders in support of comprehensive and sustainable development paying due attention to women, youths, and disenfranchised people.
- Encourage professional NGOs to respond effectively to the needs and demands of informal settlements particularly through training and transfer of know-how in civic rights and environment.
- Achieve resettlement through a participatory process of negotiation in order to avoid natural hazards, or appropriate land for public goods or services.
- Identify and use participatory processes for infrastructural service provision, and building renovation such as land readjustment.

To meet the second macro goal, the followings should be set;

- Support self-build and self-help and encourage local building constructors through provision of material and services within the informal settlements such as apartment blocks for low-income groups.
- Encouraging local level participation and sustainability, basic service provision for neighbourhoods may be initially sub-standard, in order to be affordable, but most have the possibility of upgrading in future to city standards.
- Create and support regularization plans with the participation of locally elected bodies under the guidance of regularization committees in a city wide and enabling context.
To meet the third macro goal, the followings should be set;

- Creation of a housing and employment fund, micro credit units with financial participation of local people plus other public and private resources.
- Encourage effective participation through award of formal credits, facilities and status based on quality and continuity of collective participation, through intermediary organisations.

According to the macro goals, guiding principles, and principal policies and strategies of this document, it can be concluded that the essential focus of the document lies on inhabitants’ self-help, enabling, and empowering, in other words, ‘helping people to help themselves’; emphasis on participation of local dwellers, representatives, instructors, and organisations; and emphasis on use of local resources and potentials.

4.5. Questions that should be answered concerned with Informal Settlements in Iran

Various researches and studies concerning failure of local projects show the reality that top-down planning in informal settlements have been faced with resistance of local dwellers. It leads to dispute between planners and authorities on the one hand, and the local residents on the other hand and finally, failure of the plans and projects. Therefore, as the social engineering model believes, to involve inhabitants of informal settlements in the process of urban planning and management, at first the following questions should be addressed (Aghabakhshi, 2002):

- How did the historical formation and appearance of the community occur?
- What are the characteristics and nature of the community?
- What are the possibilities, capabilities, obstacles and limits of the community?
- Which formal and informal organizations are active in the community and region?
- Which influential groups are there and who are the trustees of the community?
- How do they think about the problems of their region and their community?
- Which issues have priority in the community and region from the viewpoint of the local dwellers?
- Which actions (especially participatory actions) have been done by the local dwellers to control their problems?
- Which experiences do they have to face with a larger society?

There are also other similar questions that should be answered. In the following sections, I will try to address some of the above questions. The remaining questions would be answered in chapter five of the dissertation.
4.6. Saadi Community in Shiraz City

Saadi Community is located at the north-east of Shiraz city and has been developed at two sides of Shiraz-Qarameh road. This urban area is distinguished from the other districts of Shiraz city with two major particular characteristics. At first, Saadi Tomb—the Iranian famous poet—is located at the centre of this area. Saadi Tomb is one of the most important touristic places of Shiraz city and attracts thousands of national and international tourists every year.

Despite the touristic importance of this urban area, Saadi is an informal community. That is to say, majority of the buildings, particularly houses, are built without permit to construct and the dwellers have not followed the formal processes of construction. Therefore majority of the dwellers have no formal deed of sale (document of ownership) for their houses. In this community, the number of low-income groups, migrants, and social deviations are higher than other parts of Shiraz city. Moreover, there are several physical difficulties concerning housing, road network, physical fabric and similar issues that will be discussed in the following sections. However, as it has been discussed in section ‘4.3.1.negative prejudices concerned with informal settlements in Iran’, only comparing with other parts of the city, it can be claimed that the situation in Saadi Community is more inappropriate.

As figure (4-3) shows, Shiraz city is divided into eight districts and Saadi Community is located in the eastern part of district three.

Figure (4-3): Shiraz City Districts and Situation of Saadi Community in District 3

4.6.1. Historical Analysis of Saadi Community’s Physical Development

Appearance and formation of Saadi Community has a long history. According to Ardeshiri and Kabgani (2003), formation and appearance of this settlement goes back in time before Islam. That is to say, Saadi settlement has a history of, at least, 1400 years, however, it was only a village until 1966 and has experienced gradual and slow physical development such as the other villages in Iran. Rapid physical development of the community began after 1966 and continued till the present time, although the speed and intensity of Physical development of Saadi Community has been different due to various factors affecting its development. Therefore, the history of formation and expansion of saadi community can be categorised in four different historical periods as follow:

- Appearance of ‘Saadi Village’; The Primary Core of the Community (By the time of formation until 1921)
- Formation of secondary core (1921-1966)
- First period of physical development (1966-1979)
- Second period of physical development (after Islamic Revolution-1979)

Regarding the above categories, each period has its particular conditions and characteristics which are discussed here together with the factors affecting on formation and/or rapid physical development of the community (Ardeshiri and Kabgani, 2003; Maab Consulting Engineers, 2003):

4.6.1.1. Formation of ‘Saadi Village’; The Primary Core of the Community (from beginning until 1921)

‘Saadi Village’ has been the primary core of current Saadi Community. With more than 1400 years precedence of residency, Saadi village was formed before Islam. In Iran, majority of informal settlements had been formed rapidly during a decade, or even one year or less. However, Saadi community was not among so-called ‘one-night built’ settlements. Several natural and geographical factors affected the primary formation of Saadi Community, among them accessibility to water resources (subterranean canal with the Persian name of Ghanat), natural topography, and fertile agricultural land can be mentioned. Moreover, location on the intercity road of Shiraz-Qarameh was another reason to the formation of Saadi Community.

During this period, the community experienced natural and limited physical development. In other words, together with natural growth of population, this village has been expanded. However, it should not be forgotten, that living and resting of Saadi—the Iranian famous poet—at the centre of this district not only helped continuous life in this settlement, but also it has been one of the affecting factors on physical development of the community.

4.6.1.2. Formation of Secondary Core (1921-1966)

The secondary core of Saadi Community was formed during 1921 to 1966. In this period, like the first period, gradual physical development happened due to natural growth of population. The community did not experience emigration, however easy accessibility to water resources and change in family form helped gradual expansion of the community. By change in family form, I mean before twenties, all of the great family including grandfather and grandmother, father and
mother and all of the children—even the married—were living together in one home. Afterward, the children had been living separately after marriage, although this process has not been completed yet.

Figure (4-4) shows the situation of central cores and their physical development in different periods. As the figure shows, secondary cores have been developed in two sides of primary core.

Figure (4-4): Central Cores and Historical Physical Development of Saadi Community


4.6.1.3. First Period of Physical Development (1966-1979)

This period can be characterized with some social and physical changes in Saadi Community. In this period, for the first time, urban and rural migrants from Shiraz and other rural and urban parts of the country came to this community and have been living together with local dwellers. Regarding the origin of migrants, an urban-rural community has been formed. However, the social integration of the migrants with local dwellers did not happen in this period.

In addition to the social changes, the community faced with considerable physical changes, among which, construction of a wide road between Saadi Community and Shiraz city was the most important one. This road has provided more opportunities for the citizens to have easy accessibilities and trips between these two settlements—Saadi Community and Shiraz city. Extensive construction of housing in gardens and agricultural lands due to high demand for housing was another physical change in the community. Moreover, in 1970, water pipe line has been provided in this urban area.
In summary, it can be claimed that Saadi Community experienced rapid and intense physical development during this period. The affecting factors on rapid and intense physical development can be categorized into two internal and external factors:

**Internal Factors**

- Saadi Tomb: although Saadi was rested in this community nearly eight centuries ago, but in this period, Saadi Tomb has become a more famous touristic place in regional, national and international levels due to governmental efforts in the one hand, and promotion of touristic culture at national and international level on the other hand. The fact that attracted more migrants from other urban areas.
- Changing of ‘Saadi Village’ to ‘Saadi Community’ as a part of Shiraz city: in a new division of city districts in this period, Saadi Community has been added to the Legal territory of Shiraz city, which could help physically development of this community. Afterward, the community had more potential for physical development, among which, construction of a new road between Saadi Community and Shiraz city is only one example.
- Land economy: characteristics of land economy in this urban area have been the most important factors that affected physical development of Saadi Community. Comparing with the relatively high land price in Shiraz city, the price in this region was very low, that is to say, it was the only remaining choice for the rural migrants and the urban poor to provide their home. Furthermore, possibility of illegal land ownership and housing construction without following the planning and design standards motivated more newcomers to this community. In such conditions, high housing demands of newcomers and lack of planning control resulted in prosperity of land market.
- Seasonal river: in Saadi community, a seasonal river played the role of an obstacle for physical development of this area, however, in this period, some parts of the river have been destructed and obstructed. Afterward, some new areas have been provided for construction of housing and other land uses.

**External factors**

- National changes: as it was discussed in previous sections, rapid urbanisation in Iran happened in sixties and seventies. In that time, land reform together with high price of oil resulted in migration of rural population to the cities particularly to megacities. Shiraz city was also a destination for the southern regions of Iran, however, in a hierarchical manner, the migrants have been attracted to the surrounding villages of Shiraz city at first, and then to Shiraz. In this hierarchical process of settlement, Saadi Community played a mediatory role between the surrounding villages and Shiraz city.
- Physical development of Shiraz city: simultaneous with population growth in Shiraz, the city expanded toward the outer sides and covered several villages and settlements including Saadi Community.
Figure (4-5): Physical Development of Saadi Community until 1966


Figure (4-6): Physical Development of Saadi Community until 1975

4.6.1.4. Second Period of Physical Development (after Islamic Revolution-1979)

The last period of physical development of Saadi Community occurred after Islamic Revolution. In this time, physical development of Saadi area continued and new neighborhoods have been formed, but comparing with the former period, the speed of expansion due to decrease in accessible land to construct, particularly area of housing lots became more slow and was limited. Islamic Revolution and intensification of migration toward big cities helped the continuity of physical development of the community. Moreover, migration of foreign (Afghan) and Iran-Iraq war migrants to the region and continuity of physical development of Shiraz city were other affecting factors on expansion of this area.

In this period, destruction of gardens and agricultural lands to construct housing has been continued. There is, in addition, one further point that housing informal market was active in recent decades. Presence of informal market in Saadi Community is a point that plays an important role in physical development of this community. More than 74 percent of housing units have no permit to construct, and 84 percent of landlords have no formal deed of sale.

Then, high price of land and housing in Shiraz, high planning and design standards and regulations, and presence of endowment land in Saadi are the most important factors affecting formation of informal market in Saadi Community. This situation resulted in insecurity of tenure and this, in turn, resulted in low quality of housing and fabric.

Figure (4-7): Physical Development of Saadi Community until 1983

Figure (4-8): Physical Development of Saadi Community until 1989


Figure (4-9): Physical Development of Saadi Community until 2003

Figure (4-10): Physical Development of Saadi Community from 1956 to 2003

4.6.2. Current Situation of Saadi Community

4.6.2.1. Physical and Morphological Structure

Saadi Community consists of five neighbourhoods including Fohandej, Saadi, Narenjestan, Bare Aftab, and Delgosha which are shown with numbers in figure (4-12). Although some differences can be seen among these neighborhoods, there are considerable similarities in these urban areas, among which, informality of housing is the most important one. It should be mentioned that, considering the control of local authorities and urban managers on housing construction in recent years, the informality of construction is going to be limited. Here, I will try to introduce housing condition, urban fabric and land use plan focusing on current services and facilities.

**Housing Condition**

The most important characteristic of housing in Saadi Community is the informality of construction. According to Ardeshiri and Kabgani, 74 percent of housing units have no permit to construct, and more strangely, nearly 84 percent of landlords have no formal deed of sale (document of ownership). This particularity of the community can seriously affect the participation of local dwellers in the planning and management processes. In other words, as a result of informality, the security of tenure will be decreased. This insecurity can, in turn, lead to lower tendency of participation. The effect of this characteristic will be discussed in chapter five of the dissertation.

Small area and size of housing is another characteristic of the community. Both area of housing lots and buildings are dramatically smaller than the housing area in other parts of Shiraz city. According to my field studies (2006), only the area of 8.1 percent of housings is more than 100 square meters. As table (4-3) shows, the area of 46.5 percent of housings is between 50 to 74 square meters and the area of 37.2 percent of housings is between 75 to 99 square meters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Housing</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 50 m²</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-74 m²</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-99 m²</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 m² and More</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: field Study in 2006.

If we look at the number of households in each housing unit, the problem will be more understandable. As figure (4-11) shows, more than one household live in 26 percent of housing units. According to Ardeshiri and Kabgani (2003), two households live in 21 percent of housing units, and even three households live in five percent of housing units.

31 The information is based on the results of 200 questionnaires filled out in the community.
Moreover, the number of each household is relatively high. According to my field studies (2006), 49 percent of households have more than four members. More precisely, 11 percent of households have one and two members, 40 percent have three and four members, 37.5 percent have five and six members, and 11.5 percent of households have more than seven members.

Figure (4-11): Number of Households in each Housing Unit

In addition to informality and small area and size of housing, low quality of buildings and housing materials is another characteristic of Saadi Community. On the one hand, the owners of these buildings are mostly the urban poor, and on the other hand, majority of low-quality buildings due to their informality have been constructed in a short time. Because of low quality, majority of these buildings have not only aesthetic problems, but also they face serious dangers amid any kind of natural disasters.
Figure (4-12): Situation of five Neiborhoods in Saadi Community


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbourhoods</th>
<th>Number of Neighbourhoods</th>
<th>Population (1996)</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Hectare</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Land Use</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Number of Houses</th>
<th>Hectare</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Residential Buildings</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Housing per capita (w)</th>
<th>Institutional Building</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fehamieh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11682</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>43.19</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>2220</td>
<td>23.89</td>
<td>19.75</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>22.10</td>
<td>23.44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saadi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8018</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>54.44</td>
<td>19.15</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1706</td>
<td>22.96</td>
<td>17.82</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>25.75</td>
<td>19.55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarmjestan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13568</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>2455</td>
<td>33.52</td>
<td>25.88</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>24.90</td>
<td>27.74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bare Afshab</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15255</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>36.47</td>
<td>12.88</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>2446</td>
<td>35.46</td>
<td>19.42</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>19.21</td>
<td>29.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalgosha</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4230</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>55.88</td>
<td>19.64</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>23.22</td>
<td>17.71</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>54.01</td>
<td>35.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>51553</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>254.53</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>181</strong></td>
<td><strong>9197</strong></td>
<td><strong>131.07</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.19</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.42</strong></td>
<td><strong>11480</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Maab Consulting Engineers (2005)
Urban Fabric

In Saadi Community, various urban fabrics can be distinguished. Regarding criteria such as size of lots (particularly housing lots), compactness of the fabric, and form of road networks (organic or regular networks), the fabric of Saadi Community can be divided into following five categories:

- Small lots, compacted fabric, and organic road networks
- Small lots, compacted fabric, and semi-regular road networks
- Small lots, semi-compacted fabric, and regular (geometric) road networks
- Medium lots, semi-compacted fabric, and regular (geometric) road networks
- Medium lots, non-compacted fabric, and regular (geometric) road networks

As the figure (4-13) shows, moving from district 1 to district 5, the size of housing lots become larger, the fabric becomes more open and non-compacted, and the form of road networks changes into regular and with geometric forms. This situation is strongly coordinated with the historical physical development of the community. In other words, the newly expanded districts of the community (districts 4 and 5) have the characteristics of medium-sized housing lots, semi or non-compacted fabric and regular (geometric) road networks.

Figure (4-13): Variety of Different Fabrics in Saadi Community

Figure (4-14): Current Situation of Land Use Plan in Saadi Community

Urban Services and Public Spaces

One of the particularities of Saadi Community is shortage of urban services and public spaces. As the figure (4-14) shows, the current area and per capita of majority of land uses, especially the public services and spaces, is not only dramatically lower than urban planning standards, but also they are lower than areas of land uses in other parts of Shiraz city. According to Maab Consulting Engineers (2005), despite location of two city-wide gardens in this area, the per capita parks and green spaces is only 1.2 square meters. The per capita health and sanitary is 0.06 m.², sport and leisure centers is 0.026 m.², and per capita public education is 0.92 square meters.

Comparing with other parts of Shiraz city, relatively all of the land uses and urban services face with serious shortage. However, as it can be seen in figure (4-14), the newly developed areas around the community enjoy better conditions.

4.6.2.2. Demographic and Social Characteristics

According to Ardeshiri and Kabgani (2003) and Maab Consulting Engineers (2003), total population of Saadi Community was approximately 52,00032 who were distributed in five neighborhoods. The gross population density was different from 180 to 360 in hectare in Saadi areas. The number of members of each household is relatively high and 89 percent of households have three or more members. As table (4-4) illustrates, nearly 50 percent of households have five or more members. In this situation, living of more than one household in each housing unit would be more considerable.

Table (4-4): Number of Members of Each Household in Saadi Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Members</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>one and two persons</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>three and four persons</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>five and six persons</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than seven persons</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: field Study in 2006.

Another demographical criterion studied in Saadi Community, is the sex ratio. This ratio is also relatively high (105) in the community. Migration is one of the important factors affecting on sex ratio in this community. Young and middle-age men are the groups who migrate more than other groups. Some married migrants leave their families to work in urban areas.

Study of age structure shows the dominance of young and middle-age people. This population hierarchy coordinates with the population structure at national level. During eighties, due to Iran-Iraq war, the population growth rate was dramatically high (3.9 percent) and the age groups born in that time compose the current young and middle-age groups. However, as mentioned above, migration of young people to Saadi can be considered as another factor.

32 The newest national census has been done in 2006. However, the population of cities in terms of districts and neighborhoods was not accessible until the time of writing up this chapter (2007).
As the table (4-16) illustrated, 23 percent of Saadi dwellers are illiterate. On the other hand, only four percent of Saadi dwellers have academic degrees. Several factors including poverty, low accessibility to educational centers (especially in last decades), and large number of migrants particularly with rural origin affected the level of education in Saadi Community.
Migrants contributed to the large number of population in Saadi Community. More than 15,000 Afghan together with other migrants (mostly Turkish) are living in Saadi Community with local dwellers (mostly Persian groups). The migrants could not formally integrate with the local society, and this situation resulted in social problems. The migrants are originated from different ethnic groups and speak to different languages. Majority of migrants come from rural areas, and this issue resulted in predominance of rural migrants, and in turn, rural culture.

According to Ardeshiri and Kabgani (2003) and Maab Consulting Engineers (2003), the ratio of criminal behaviour and social deviator groups in Saadi Community is more than other parts of Shiraz city. However, majority of the dwellers of Saadi Community are respectable and hard-working people and social deviations should not be generalized to all of the Saadi inhabitants.

Table (4-5): Duration of Living in Saadi Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of Living</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>under five years</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>five to nine years</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ten to fourteen years</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fifteen years and more</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: field Study in 2006.

As the table (4-5) shows, only 44.5 percent of responders to the questionnaires have been living in Saadi Community more than fifteen years. In other words, this table shows that majority of Saadi dwellers are migrants. There were several reasons for the migrants to come to the community, among which low price of land and housing is the most important one. As table (4-6) shows, 36.7 percent of migrants stated that low price of land and housing was the cause of their migration to Saadi Community. Furthermore, marriage (with Saadi dwellers), existence of more facilities and services (comparing with migrants’ previous living places), and low distance between Saadi Community and Shiraz city have been respectively stated as the most important causes of migration to Saadi area.

Table (4-6): Causes of Migration to Saadi Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes of Migration</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>low price of land, housing and rent</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marriage</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low distance between Saadi Community and Shiraz</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>existence of more facilities and services comparing with migrants’ previous living places</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other causes</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: field Study in 2006.

4.6.2.3. Economic Characteristics

Living of low-income groups is one of the characteristics of Saadi Community. However, as it is previously mentioned, comparing with dwellers of informal settlements in other underdeveloped and developing countries, inhabitants of Saadi enjoy better economic conditions. Results of questionnaires in Saadi show that 100 percent of housing units are equipped with water
pipe line, electricity, telephone, radio and television, refrigerator, air conditioner and radiator. Although the table (4-7) illustrates the details of infrastructure and equipments in housing units according to the answers of the sample society (200 interviewees), it shows that Saadi dwellers enjoy acceptable infrastructure and equipments.

Table (4-7): Facilities and Equipments in Housing Units in Saadi Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipments in Housing Units</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>water pipe line</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>electricity</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gas</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>telephone</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>radio</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>television</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>refrigerator</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>air conditioner</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heater</td>
<td>98.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>radiator</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mobile phone</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: field Study in 2006.

Study of employment structure in Saadi shows 21 percent of employed population work in public sector. Workers with 47 percent of employed population have a large contribution in employment structure. Majority of these workers find their job day to day, and it can lead to insecurity of employment. Moreover, some of Saadi dwellers work in informal sector of the economy. As figure (4-17) shows, unemployment ratio is 12 percent which is comparable with this ratio at national level (Ardeshiri and Kabgani, 2003).

Figure (4-17): Employment Structure in Terms of Various Jobs in Saadi Community

![Employment Structure Chart]

4.6.2.4. Environmental Situation

Due to the settlement of Saadi Community at the slope of mountains, this area has a large amount of environmental potentials. Beautiful landscape and existence of two large famous gardens—which are known citywide and even nationwide because of their beauty and precedence of formation—are some of the environmental potentials of this urban area. In addition, Saadi Tomb is another attractive place for national and international tourists that is located at the center of a historical garden.

Despite all these natural and historical attractions, Saadi area suffered from environmental problems. Existence and density of polluting services such as polluting working places, animal husbandry, and so on, seasonal river as a place of waste garbage disposal, and flowing housing waste water on the streets are only some of the important problems. These environmental problems have been recognized by both Saadi dwellers and urban planning experts and are being categorized together with other problems of the community in the following sections.

4.6.3. Priority of Issues

Realization of participatory plans and programs in an urban community, requires information regarding the problems of the community and more important, the **priority** of issues and problems. That is to say, it should be addressed how do the dwellers of a community think about the problems of their region and their neighborhoods? Which issues have priority in the community and region from the viewpoint of the local dwellers?

In Saadi Community, in addition to the viewpoints of inhabitants about their problems and their priorities, the experts’ studies have been considered to know the issues and problems of the community. Although there are some differences between opinions of dwellers of Saadi Community and urban planning experts about the problems and their priorities, the main items of problems and issues have been introduced in a rather similar way. Following two ways of introducing the problems will be discussed.

4.6.3.1. Issues and Their Priorities Introduced by Inhabitants of Saadi Community

According to the interview and questionnaire in Saadi Community, the priorities of the dwellers concerning problems and issues have been categorized in table (4-8). The important point concerning the priority is that Saadi dwellers have more tendencies to participate in issues which meet the essential problems of the community.

As table (4-8) shows, environmental and sanitation issues have the first position in this hierarchy. Waste water disposal (street and housing), waste garbage disposal, existence and density of polluting services (polluting working places, and so on), and seasonal river are the detailed problems which are respectively the most important ones in the community. In other words, among all of the issues, these are the problems that the dwellers have the highest degree of tendency to cooperate with authorities, urban planners and managers and the other experts to regularize the community. Regardless the level of citizen participation, the above mentioned issues are potentially more attractive for local dwellers to involve.

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33 I have conducted the interview and the questionnaires in a field study in 2006. The related details has been discussed in the methodology section of chapter one.
As implementation of some urban projects in Saadi Community shows, despite the importance of sanitation, environmental and social issues and problems from the viewpoint of Saadi dwellers, local authorities and urban managers have paid little attention to these issues during last decades. Instead, the authorities have mainly tried to address physical problems of Saadi Community such as shortage of urban services and facilities, poor accessibilities of road network, and poor physical condition. Although physical problems, such as shortage of sport and leisure centers, parks and green space, educational and healthy services, and also narrow streets and valleys, insufficient network, and low quality of housing are important enough to be taken into consideration, the prior issues from the viewpoint of the local dwellers should not be ignored. However, considering the huge amount of physical problems in the Community, it takes a long time to address all of these problems. Priority of issues and problems from the viewpoint of Saadi dwellers have been classified in table (4-8).

Table (4-8): Priority of Issues from the View Point of Saadi Dwellers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Main Issues</th>
<th>Detailed Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Environmental and Sanitation Issues</td>
<td>waste water disposal (street)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>waste water disposal (housing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>waste garbage disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>existence and density of polluting services (polluting working places, ..)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>seasonal river</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Criminal Behaviour, Social Malaise and Rebellion</td>
<td>existence of social deviator groups (hoodlums, drug peddlers, ..)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Shortage of Urban Services and Facilities</td>
<td>shortage of sport and leisure centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>shortage of parks and green space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>shortage of educational and healthy services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Poor Accessibilities and Their Unsuitable Situation</td>
<td>narrow streets and valleys, organic and insufficient network, and so on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Poor Physical Condition</td>
<td>referred to the form and structure of fabric and low quality of housing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Results of Interview and Questionnaire in Saadi Community, 2006.
4.6.3.2. Issues Introduced as the Essential Problems of Saadi Community by Experts

Several studies have been done to address the problems of Saadi Community in recent years, among which, the most important works were conducted by Ardeshiri and Kabgani in 2003\textsuperscript{34}, and Maab Consulting Engineers in 2003\textsuperscript{35}. Both of these studies tried to recognize the problems of Saadi Community that can be seen in table (4-9). As the table shows, the problems are classified into four physical, sanitation and environmental, social and economic categories. There are some similarities and differences between the issues referred in tables of (4-8) and (4-9). That is to say, the urban planning experts recognized some problems that they were not introduced by Saadi dwellers, or at least, they had no priority for them. Among physical problems, inefficient fabric of neighborhoods, insecure housing, and low housing per capita (25 m\textsuperscript{2}); among environmental problems, change in land use including intense and irregular destruction of gardens and agricultural lands (replacing with buildings); among social problems, existence of sub-cultures (Afghan, Persian, Turkish), migration from rural and urban parts of Fars and other provinces of Iran to Saadi Community, particularly Afghan and Turkish migrants who are not integrated with the local residents, and low social status of the dwellers are referred as the problems of Saadi Community by the urban planning experts. Moreover, economic issues such as informal employment (peddling, begging, and insecure Jobs), and predominance of informal housing ownership are other referred problems which have not been introduced by Saadi dwellers as the community problems.

While some of the referred problems like sub-cultures and migration can be considered as potentials of development in a community, due to disintegration of migrants and sub-culture groups with the local residents, they are referred as problems by experts in Saadi Community.

4.7. Summary

Although living in unordinary settlements in Iran dates back to 1868, and living in informal settlements goes back to the forties, the quality, forms and aspects of living in informal settlements have experienced reasonable changes in recent years. While at the beginning of formation of unordinary or informal settlements (mostly slums and ghettos), they had very poor physical conditions and lacked the least necessary services, and only very poor people were living in these communities, nowadays, comparing with previous informal settlements, majority of dwellers of these areas enjoyed basic services such as drinking water, electricity, telephone and even necessary furniture for standard living. In recent years, the authorities and urban managers, enjoying the help of experts and urban planners, have tried to improve the physical conditions of these settlements. However, formality and living of low income groups have been the common characteristics of these settlements.

Before any intervention in order to involve the dwellers of informal settlements in urban planning and management in Iran, some unfair prejudices—like informal settlements are origin of social deviations—like informal settlements are origin of social deviations and should be considered as physical, social and cultural problems; dwellers of informal settlements are rural migrants and are completely employed in parasitic and informal section of the economy; formation of informal settlements affected by Land Reforms (in the sixties) in Iran—that are generalized to all of informal settlements among authorities, experts, and urban planners and managers should be verified and changed and should not be exaggerated.

\textsuperscript{34} The title of this work was ‘Regularizing Plan of Saadi Community’.
\textsuperscript{35} ‘Detailed Plan of Shiraz City- District 3’ was the title of the work that Saadi Community as a part of district three of Shiraz city has been studied.
Table (4-9): Issues Introduced as the Essential Problems of Saadi Community by Experts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Main Problems</th>
<th>Detailed Problems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical Issues</td>
<td>Physical Fabric</td>
<td>inefficient fabric of the neighborhoods old and eroded fabric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>insecure housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Road Network</td>
<td>inefficient and organic road network narrow and insufficient streets and alleys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Services</td>
<td>shortage of urban services: sport and leisure centers (0.26 m²), parks and green space (1.3 m²), educational and health services (0.92 and 0.06 m²) per capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation and Environmental Issues</td>
<td>Sanitation</td>
<td>waste water disposal (street)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>waste water disposal (housing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>waste garbage disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>seasonal river</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land Use Change</td>
<td>intense and irregular destruction of gardens and agricultural lands (replacing with buildings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polluting Services</td>
<td>existence and density of polluting services (polluting working places, animal husbandry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Issues</td>
<td>Deviator Groups</td>
<td>(active hoodlums, drug peddlers, ...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-cultures</td>
<td>(Afghan, Persian, Turkish, …)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>(from rural and urban parts of Fars and other provinces of Iran, Afghan and Turkish migrants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Status</td>
<td>low social status of the dwellers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Issues</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>informal employment ( peddling, begging, insecure Jobs, …)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Housing Ownership</td>
<td>predominance of informal ownership system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, informal settlements in Iran have some particular characteristics that provide potentials for development among which, social and human capitals, and hidden financial resources can be mentioned.

During past decades several strategies have been examined by the government dealing with informal settlements. These strategies included absolute destruction of the settlement to destruction after transfer of dwellers into the low-price housings especially into small apartments. However, none of the previous strategies have been successful. In recent years, the Reformist approach has been widely accepted by experts and authorities, in which the Enabling solution has been considered as the best strategy. In the framework of this strategy, the document of enabling of Informal settlements was approved in recent years.

According to the macro goals, guiding principles, and principal policies and strategies of this document, it can be concluded that the essential focus of the document lies on inhabitants’ self-help, enabling, and empowering, in other words, ‘helping people to help themselves’; emphasis on participation of local dwellers, representatives, instructors, and organisations; and emphasis on use of local resources and potentials.

Saadi Community has a long history of residence that goes back to 1,400 years ago. However, rapid physical development of the community in recent decades due to migration of the urban poor and rural population created several physical, social and environmental problems in this area. This rapid expansion could not be coordinated with the development of urban services and appropriate urban spaces.

Although the community faces several problems, some of them have priority from the viewpoint of Saadi dwellers. The inhabitants have enough motivation to participate in planning and management process concerning the prior issues—such as waste water disposal, waste garbage disposal, presence and density of polluting services and so on. The possible level of citizen participation will be discussed in chapter five.
CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
5.1. Introduction

The focus of this chapter is on the analysis of documentary studies and data collected from field studies in Saadi Community. In chapters three and four, using documentary studies, the historical conditions of citizen participation in Iran and the current situation of Saadi Community have been discussed. In this chapter, using the results of field studies and documentary studies, I will try to analyse the related subjects and answer the research main questions. In doing so, the structure of urban planning and management in Iran will be discussed. In this section, the relationship among agencies related to urban planning and management, city councils, municipalities, and NGOs will be examined. Then, the role of the most important elements in planning and management system will be studied. In this section I will try to analyse the role of national, regional and community actors in Saadi Community.

This chapter will be continued with examining current and possible levels of citizen participation in Iran, and in turn, in Saadi Community. That is to say, this question will be answered that in which level it is possible to involve citizens in the community. Finally, the affecting factors on citizen participation in Iran will be analysed. To answer this question, the affecting factors both in Iranian cities and in Saadi Community as an informal settlement will be introduced and analysed.

5.2. Structure of Urban Planning and Management in Iran

A theoretical consideration of participatory planning is closely related to the concept of democracy. Direct (participatory) and indirect (representative) democracy are two separate democratic perspectives. Generally, people that are actively involved in planning situations have different conceptions about the function, necessity and range of participation within democratic decision-making. An important feature includes the directness of democracy. This feature—and other features which will not be discussed here—reflects different types of democracy (Held, 1996).

In direct democracy, citizens make decisions by themselves. The direct participation of all members of society is central to democracy types such as deliberative democracy and plebiscitary democracy. Indirect democracy, on the other hand, refers to a type of involvement by citizens and other groups where, eventually, representatives decide. Indirect participation matches with representative democracy. In representative democracy, delegates represent their people and use their skills to speak for people. Consensus democracy, for example, is a type of representative democracy, usually aiming at getting a broadly based consensus to support its decisions. It involves the participation of citizens via representatives or delegates. In indirect democracy, participation occurs by means of elections or via established interest groups (Woltjer, 2002).

According to the above literature review, citizen involvement through city and community councils should be considered as indirect (representative) participation.

In Iran the local organizations mainly in charge of urban development and management consist of the municipality, the Islamic City Council, and recent unofficial Community Councils, and comprise the core of the local government in Iran. Municipality is on the one hand under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, and on the other hand, it is under the supervision and control of the City Council (at least theoretically).

City council is supposed to be independent of other government administrative arms, namely the executive, the judiciary and the legislative. The formation of Islamic City Councils represents a form of citizen participation in local affairs, and therefore a kind of decentralization. The central government instead of being responsible for all the duties and functions at the local level,
legally delegates some of its authority and responsibilities to the councils. Councils are elected for four years. After Islamic Revolution and since 1999, two terms of City Councils have worked and the third term begun in 2006.

Despite City Councils, formation of Community (local) Councils has not already been widespread in the country. Presently, only in a few cities (including Tehran, Shiraz, …) Community Councils are working with City Councils and the remaining of Iranian cities lack local councils.

Local government, together with other agencies involved in urban affairs namely government organizations, public sector, and non-governmental organizations can be considered as a system. The most important players in this system can be categorized as the local government (Municipality, City Councils and somewhat Community Councils), government inter-sectoral organizations (Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Management and Planning Organization, High Council for Urban Planning and Architecture); government sectoral organizations (Ministry of Education, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Industries, Ministry of Commerce, and so on), and finally non-governmental organizations (Society of Urban Planners, Iranian Construction Engineers Organization and so on).

The following figures (5-1, 5-2 and 5-3) show briefly the structure of urban management and planning system in Iran. They illustrate the position of the most important local players and their mutual relationship especially the participatory bodies (City Councils, Community Councils, and non-governmental organizations) which will be separately discussed here.
As figure (5-1) shows, before formation of City Councils in 1999, municipalities were the only local government in urban affairs. In this structure, on the one hand, inter-sectoral and sectoral government agencies have unilateral influence on municipality, and on the other hand, municipality has one-sided influence on private sector.

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36 After Constitutional Revolution in 1906 and approval of the first ‘Baladieh Act’ in 1907, Iran experienced several local government systems and city councils that have been discussed in chapter three of my work under the title of ‘historical characteristics of citizen participation in urban planning and management in Iran’. Here, the current structure of urban planning and management after Islamic Revolution will be focussed.
The most influential agencies on local government (here only municipality) are inter-sectoral organizations and ministries including Ministry of the Interior (MI), Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MHUD), Management and Planning Organization (MPO), and High Council for Urban Planning and Architecture (HCUPA). Sectoral government agencies can be considered at the second level from the point of view of influence on local government. The authorities and functions of these organizations regarding municipality and urban affairs will be mentioned as following:

*Miningistry of the Interior* is concerned with issuing permission for the establishment of municipalities; dissolution of municipalities with populations less than 5000; ratification of municipal boundary and outside city limits; coordination, supervision and guidance of municipalities; supervision over the implementation of all municipal laws and regulations; supervision over organizational, financial and legal affairs of municipalities; technical guidance of municipalities, and preparation of Guiding Plans; macro-planning for municipalities as a whole and allocation of resources and credits; research on rehabilitation on safety issues, and training of municipality staff.

*Management and Planning Organization* is concerned with budget allocation to development plans and Urban Comprehensive, Detailed and Guide Plans. Supervision over the distribution of governmental credits and grants to municipalities and subordinate organizations is also covered by this organization.

*Ministry of Housing and Urban Development* is concerned with supervision over the preparation of comprehensive and detailed plans, over the execution of urban detailed plans, and over the implementation of urban planning and architectural rules and regulations; provision of sites and services and delivering land to customers; construction of buildings and urban utilities; and finally provision of land for construction of houses and facilities for urban services.

*High Council for Urban Planning and Architecture* is concerned with examining proposals concerning overall urban planning policies; study and approval of Master Plans at final stages, and examining and approval of planning rules, regulations and by-laws.

Among four mentioned ministries and organizations, the Ministry of the Interior has an essential role in relation with local government—in this case only municipality. As the authorities and functions of the Ministry of the Interior show, it has the most influence on local government, which with some changes is still flowing even after formation of Islamic City Councils.

In figure (5-2), that shows the structure of urban management and planning after formation of *Islamic City Councils* in 1999, non-governmental organizations and City Councils are added to the system. Since 1999, City councils together with municipalities are working as two bodies of the local government. In this structure, although City Councils have important role in local government and have essential influence on municipalities especially for decision-making, however, they have also been strongly influenced by sectoral and inter-sectoral government agencies. There are some reasons for this influence that will be mentioned separately in the section of City Councils.

There were active modern non-governmental organizations before 1999 and it is not easy to recognize a definite period that NGOs have been formed and worked. But it can be mentioned that the NGOs have been increasingly expanded in recent ten years especially the NGOs concerning with urban issues. As figure (5-2) illustrates, the bodies of local government have considerable influence on NGOs. The situation of NGOs and their roles and positions in urban development will be discussed in following pages.
After the formation of City Council, the members of this local body have faced with a deficiency regarding more deep relationship with their clients. Of course, this issue has been more important in big cities such as Tehran, Shiraz, and so on. Therefore, the city councillors together with local authorities and experts have tried to form Community (local) Councils. As figure (5-3) shows, Community Councils are working as a body of local government directly with City Councils and indirectly with municipality, NGOs, private and public sector. The figure also illustrates the strong influence of City Councils on Community Councils. The position and role of Community Council will be separately discussed in the following sections.
Figure (5-3): Structure of the Urban Management and Planning System in Iran after Formation of Community Councils (After 1999)

**Inter-sectoral Government Agencies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HCUPA</th>
<th>MHUD</th>
<th>MI</th>
<th>MPO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Legend**

- Direction of more influence
- Direction of less influence
- Only relationship

**Key**

- MOE
- MEF
- ME
- OPT
- MCIG
- OPE
- Etc.

**Non-governmental Organizations**

**NGOs**

**Private Sector**

- CE
- D
- Etc.
5.3. Position and Role of City Councils, Community (local) Councils and NGOs in Urban Planning and Management in Iran

5.3.1. Position and Role of City Councils in Urban Planning and Management

5.3.1.1. Authorities and Functions

All local organizations’ authority is derived from the central government except the City Council, which has an ambiguous position. On the one hand, it receives its authority directly from the constitution, and on the other hand it is not completely autonomous, and is constantly supervised by the Ministry of the Interior. That is also true for the case of the municipalities, which are under political, organizational, financial, and technical control of the Ministry of the Interior.

The authority of City Councils in relation to their shared urban activities with other governmental organizations is not clear. There are certain responsibilities assigned to City Councils which require the cooperation of other government organizations, whereas these organizations are not legally bound to cooperate and actualize the decisions of the city councils. Therefore, this part of the functions of the city councils is in practice not properly executed. Lack of clarity can also be seen about some laws which do not precisely determine and define authorities and functions. The laws concerning the authority of City Councils in the framework of general administrative structure of the country are only one example of these laws.

City Councils within their legal jurisdiction are rather autonomous. They are considered legally independent bodies, which could independently take legal proceedings against someone or some organizations, and vice versa. But in the 1996 Act of Islamic Councils, there is no mention of this right for the councils.

Councils are considered to be independent organizational units which are not subordinate to central government’s administrative hierarchy. Councils as elected local body, supervise over the functioning of institutions and agencies. Councils according to the ‘organization of Islamic Councils Act’ are subordinate to the councils’ further top on the hierarchy. At the utmost top level, the Islamic consultative Assembly supervises over the High Council of the provinces. Therefore, the authority of the councils is not absolute. The central government supervises over their activities and has the power to dissolve them, if serious diversions from legal responsibilities are observed.

Comparing the legal authority of the councils predicted in the constitution with the ‘1996 Organization of Islamic Council’s Act’, the authority of the councils concerning policy-making and decision-making has diminished and restricted only to the municipalities. Regarding other agencies involved in urban affairs, city councils have only consultative role, and in many cases they are overshadowed by the central government sectoral or inter-sectoral agencies.

Islamic City Council has very wide authority for decision-making regarding the municipality. The link between the council and the municipality is effective, but quite indirect. For example, according to the article 74 of 1996 Act, the council has no authority to intervene in the appointment or dismissal or giving orders to the municipality employee. Whereas, in article 73 of the same act, the council is authorized to cross examine or reprimand the mayor. Hence, the link between the municipality, organizational apparatus and the city council is indirect and through the channel of the mayor. *The city councils have also the right to appoint or dismiss the mayor.*

The supervisory responsibility of the city council varies from mandatory to consultative. Regarding government sectoral or inter-sectoral agencies involved in urban affairs, council’s
supervision is consultative, whereas concerning the supervision of the council over municipalities is of mandatory type. For example: over municipalities’ revenues, expenditure, financial by-laws.

Generally speaking, City Councils are powerful and with considerable authorities concerning municipality, but they have not already had enough authorities concerning local sectoral and inter-sectoral agencies. In other words, City Councils can be considered as ‘municipality councils’. The councils’ authorities become more questionable, when their financial dependency on the Ministry of the Interior is being considered.

5.3.1.2. Links and Communication

From the point of view of administrative relationship, there are deficiencies between relations of City Councils and other agencies. There is no proper communicational links between City Councils, municipalities, and the government sectoral organizations involved in urban affairs. There is also no coordinating management body to coordinate and harmonize the activities of sectoral government organizations on the one hand, and the municipalities and the City Councils on the other hand.

There is no specific mechanism to supervise and monitor the activities of the municipalities by the city councils. In other words, the organizational relationship between the municipality and the city council is not clear. There is also an overlap between the functions of the municipalities and the City Councils. City Councils are designed to undertake some operational duties which can only be performed by the municipalities.

The direct control of the Ministry of the Interior and its subordinate organizations over City Councils, results in relatively passive, weak and obedient City Councils. Governor General and Governors have as the representatives of the Interior Ministry wide powers over the local governments, specifically over the City Councils and Traffic Councils.

Beside the above mentioned problems and deficiencies, it should be added that since City Council is a new and fresh body in local government (after Islamic Revolution), the governmental agencies have not completely relied on it. It is also difficult for governmental agencies and officials to lose part of their authorities, especially for Mayors.

5.3.1.3. Financial Dependency

As previously mentioned, local governments (municipalities and City Councils) are financially dependent organizations. They legally are not allowed to collect local taxes. At present, all taxes are collected centrally by the Ministry of Economics and Finance and then through Ministry of the Interior some part of those taxes is distributed to the municipalities, and finally City Councils get their budgets from municipalities.

The councils’ budget was supposed to be independent of the government budget. The councils are supposed to have their own revenue sources and expenditures. According to article 22 of the previous Islamic Councils Act, the councils’ budget was generated through the local revenues, donations (if necessary) and through charging for the provision of local services. In case of budget deficits, with the request of the High Council of Provinces, the central government would fill the gap allocating funds from the government general incomes. But according to article 75 of recent Islamic Councils Act, the financial requirements of the City Councils must be provided from the municipalities’ budget—or precisely the Ministry of the Interior. The city councillors even receive their monthly salaries from the municipalities, and it can strongly affect the City Councils’ independence. However, in order to execute their duties, councils have
moveable and immoveable assets at their disposal. These assets belong to their locality and should not be confused with government assets.

5.3.1.4. Ongoing Activities

Due to complexity and diversity of City Council’s duties and responsibilities, City Councils have started creating working committees such as public affairs committee (social, cultural, educational, health, welfare), urban development committees (technical, engineering, architectural and urban planning), plan and budget, legal affairs, administrative affairs, traffic and transportation, and finally finance and economic affairs committees.

Since 1999 two terms of City Councils have finished and the third term begun in 2006. During these periods, City Councils have been concerned more with the urban problems and cities’ planning and management issues, instead of focusing on political issues. In long-term, it can help to attract the citizens’ trust and participation. Moreover, formation of Local Councils is another job that attracted the attention of city councillors, authorities and experts of urban planning.

5.3.2. Position and Role of Community (local) Councils in Urban Planning and Management

Although in Tehran and Shiraz cities, local councils have been formed since the first tenure of City Councils, but formation of these local councils has not been widespread. Presently, only in a few cities, Community Councils are working with City Councils and the rest of Iranian cities lack such local councils. It should be mentioned, that the idea of local councils under the Persian name of ‘Yavarane Shora or Shorayaran’ with the meaning of ‘council’s assistants’ is increasingly disseminating among the experts, city councillors, and the related governmental officials.

There is a structural relationship between Shiraz City Council and Saadi Community Council. The City Councils have formed ‘Committee of Community Council’ and three members of the committee—who are also city councillors—are responsible for planning meetings and sessions with members of local councils and governmental officials. Each neighborhood in Saadi Community is represented by three local councillors. All of 15 councillors of five neighborhoods are working with Shiraz City Council through common sessions and meetings. As the name and meaning of local council show, it works structurally only with City Council.

The role of Saadi Community Council is limited to inform the community problems to the City Council. They also try to satisfy dwellers to help the implementation of some provided and approved plans. Convincing the authorities and haggling with them to attract some budgets for the community is another task of Saadi Community Council. Sometimes, the authorities and the consulting engineers consult with them to know their opinions about the community problems and their needs.

One of the Shiraz councillors in an interview states generously, ‘regarding the open communicational atmosphere among citizens, Saadi Community Council and Shiraz City Council, there is no obstacle for citizens and members of Community Council to transfer their ideas to us (members of City Council)’. The other city councillor (interviewee) repeats the same claim with other words: ‘If citizens and community councils have any valuable ideas and opinions, they would face no structural obstacles to express their opinions in the official sessions of City
Council’. As an example, he mentioned ‘the problem of waste disposal in a residential unit has been solved with the insisting and haggling of the Saadi Community Council’.

These statements from the side of city councillors who have the closest relationship and communication with Community Council are meaningful. On the one hand, they show that citizens and members of Community Councils have a part in City Council’s official sessions and meetings, but on the other hand, the level of their participation restricted to ‘information exchange’. The point on which, Saadi Councillors stressed and focussed in questionnaires. In other words, the members of Community Council instead of having a role in decision-making, they are considered as facilitators and ‘footboys’ of City Council.

Problems of Community Councils are not limited to their absence in decision-making. According to the results of interview and questionnaire, Saadi Community Council faces with external and internal problems.

- **External Problems**

Lack of an organizational position is one of the most important problems that the local councils are facing. They suffer from lack of definite and clear functions and authorities in related laws and regulations.

Although the Community Councils have no direct organizational relationship with municipalities, however, the municipality officials and authorities see them as ‘a thorn in their flesh’. The municipality officials believe that “they do not let us to do our job rapidly. They decelerate the process of plans’ execution and municipal programmes”. It is not surprising, because municipality authorities see even City Councils as the “obstacles for implementation of urban development plans”. It should be again repeated that the City Councils are almost new happening after Islamic Revolution and it is not easy for governmental agencies such as municipality to delegate part of their power of decision-making to City and Community Councils.

Figure (5-4): Possible Rungs of Political Promotion in Iran

It is also interesting to know that Saadi Community Council does not enjoy City Council’s support enough to have more active participation in decision-making. Although City Council is the main actor to form Community Councils, however, it is not eager to give ground to the Community Council. Some of the interviewees believe that the members of City Council are afraid of improvement of Community Council’s position. The interviewees argue that “If the position of Community Councillors improves, they will be serious potential competitors in next elections”. The Community Council can be considered as the lowest rung of ladder of political promotion. The other rungs are illustrated in figure (5-4).

In other words, if the Community Councillors are given suitable authorities and responsibilities, they can properly present themselves to their people, and in the election of City Councils they have more chance to be elected. And more importantly, if they do their job with the best as the city councillors, it will be more probable for them to be elected as the parliament members,
and that is the story occurred in Shiraz City during the last eight years. Two members out of the 11 City Council members have been Saadi Community Councillors and one of these two city councillor has been elected as a parliament member from Shiraz. So, that is why city councillors do not give enough ground to the Community Councils from the point of view of interviewees.

Beside the above mentioned problems, Top-down urban management system, replacement for authorities especially in municipality and governmental agencies, and finally lack of monitoring on Community Councils can affect their efficiency.

- **Internal Problem**

Most of Saadi Community Councillors are employed and membership of the local council is their secondary job. They do not receive appropriate salaries for doing their job and that is why they do not spend enough time for Community Council. Moreover, sometimes the behaviour of municipality, governmental agencies and even City Council discourage them to take part more actively in community issues.

As it is mentioned about City Councils, the Community Council is also newly established and fresh experiences leads sometimes to disorganization in their meetings, sessions, relationship among the members, and their relationship with others.

Generally speaking, despite all of these external and internal problems, the community councils could somewhat find their position and attract the attention of citizens, experts, and authorities. It is going to be more and more widespread around the country, because it is a necessity of today’s society and it has been perceived as an inevitable happening.

5.3.3. Position and Role of Non-governmental Organizations in Urban Planning and Management

Non-governmental organizations have been defined and considered differently, but it is possible to find some common characteristics among them. Voluntary, non-profitable, autonomy, and organizational independence from government are characteristics of non-governmental organizations (Namazi, 2002; Saidi, 2003). More over, participatory management, non-political, tax exemption, accountability to the society’s needs, and legal entity should be added to the above characteristics in Iran (Namazi, 2002; Saidi, 2003). Therefore, non-governmental organization is an independent and non-political organization that is directed by humanist and benevolent members who have common goals in order to present voluntarily and non-profitably special services to the target groups. The NGO members should be accountable and responsible to the members and target groups.

5.3.3.1. Informal and formal NGOs

NGOs can be divided into two categories in Iran. Informal or traditional NGOs pay more attention to charity and emergent affairs and services. But the formal and/or modern NGOs emphasize more on development affairs. The characteristics of informal and formal NGOs are summarized in table (5-1).

Although the traditional NGOs can be considered as development assistants and help the modern NGOs, however, there is no constructive relationship between these two kinds of NGOs. On the one hand, the modern organizations ignore the important role of the traditional organizations in development process. So, the modern organizations deprive themselves from the
benefits of traditional organizations such as strong relationship with people, public knowledge, and so on. On the other hand, the informal NGOs are deprived from update information, experience exchange in national and international levels, and participation in international conferences and gatherings.

Table (5-1): Characteristics of Informal and Formal NGOs in Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of NGOs</th>
<th>Informal (Traditional) NGOs</th>
<th>Formal (Modern) NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with People</td>
<td>Increasing gradually</td>
<td>Increasing rapidly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of Independence</td>
<td>Highly related to the people and their needs</td>
<td>Less related to the grass roots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Ability and Knowledge</td>
<td>Highly independent from Government and its bodies</td>
<td>Some of them are dependent on governmental organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Ability</td>
<td>Mostly with low ability and knowledge</td>
<td>Comparing with traditional NGOs benefits from more technical ability and knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination with International Trends</td>
<td>Strongly independent from government, but dependent somewhat on the rich</td>
<td>Mostly have financial problems and some of them receive financial help from government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention to the People’s needs</td>
<td>They have no relationship with international NGOs</td>
<td>Some of them have relationship with international NGOs and some others are familiar with international trends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precedence of Appearance</td>
<td>Pay attention to the emergent and essential needs of the people</td>
<td>They are mostly concerned with developmental issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance against Difficulties</td>
<td>Very old (some of them more than 2000 years old)</td>
<td>New and modern (mostly established in recent 15 years)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5.3.3.2. Problems and Obstacles

Non-governmental organizations suffer from internal and external problems and obstacles. Most of the difficulties are concerned with modern organizations, however, some of them can also be seen in traditional organizations (Interview with experts, 2006; Namazi, 2002; Saidi, 2003).
• External Problems

- Legal problems: ambiguity in laws and regulations regarding registration, activities, criticism of government’s activities, specialized scope, and national and international relationships.
- Bureaucratic and administrative problems: separation of duties between governmental and non-governmental organizations, cooperation between these two sections, and NGO’s acceptance by governmental organizations was not successful.
- Level of control: some of the NGOs are under high control of governmental organizations. The pessimistic view of government on NGOs limits their activities and discourages them so that in some cases they will be dissolved.
- Parts of people and parts of governmental organizations and authorities have not comprehensive understanding and recognition of the role of non-governmental and popular organizations. In this regard, education and notification of people can help the process of NGOs’ expansion.
- Concentration of NGOs in Tehran and in a few big cities and paying more attention to semi-public NGOs in these cities.
- Less attention to the potential and huge role of traditional NGOs.
- Poor experience of the society regarding NGOs’ activities.

• Internal Problems

- Weakness in financial abilities: Most of non-governmental organizations have financial problems. Although low income of the members play an important role, but more important is the culture of NGO membership. That is to say, parts of the members do not believe to pay for their membership. Some of the NGOs expect financial help from governmental organizations, however, in this case, NGOs should respond the expectations of governmental organizations.
- Unsuitable and insufficient relationship between NGOs and governmental organizations. In other words, NGOs have a weak say in governmental organizations. It is not only because of the disability of NGOs to present themselves appropriately, but also the attitude and confrontation of governmental organizations towards NGOs.
- Lack of enough and close relationship with people
- Lack of relationship between traditional and modern NGOs
- Insufficient open and participatory management
- Low level of technical and specialized skills
- Insufficient transparency and accountability
- Low number of (modern) NGOs in the society and members in each organization
- Discouragement of NGOs mainly due to the external problems

5.3.3.3. Potentials and capacities

Apart from the above mentioned obstacles and problems regarding NGOs, there are also potentials that in case of appropriate use can help more rapid expansion of NGOs. These potentials are as follow:
An old precedent of participation in the form of traditional NGOs that in some issues exceeds 2000 years.
Existence of a huge number of traditional NGOs
Increasing number of modern NGOs despite their slow expansion especially in the field of urban development
Increasing number of specialists and experts in the field of urban development

5.3.3.4. NGOs Concerned with Saadi Community

The non-governmental organizations and influential groups concerned with Saadi community can be divided into two regional and community categories. Regional NGOs are active in Fars province territory and all of them are modern and concerned with urban development and environmental issues. But the community NGOs and influential groups are mostly traditional and selected groups, active in Saadi community, and most of them are not directly involved in urban development issues. Some of the most important regional and community NGOs and influential groups will be introduced here:

- Regional NGOs

  - Support of Citizens’ Civil Right Association: This association consists of several commissions, some of which are concerned with urban development such as civil engineering and urban planning, crisis management, and so on.
  - Society of Urban Planners (branch of Fars province): This society is a provincial branch of Iranian Society of Urban Planners and is concerned only with the urban planning, design and management issues.
  - Construction Engineers Organization (branch of Fars province): This organization is a provincial branch of Iranian Construction Engineers Organization and is mainly concerned with civil engineering and urban development.
  - Society of ‘Parse’ Architects: The aim of this society is to help protection of historical and central parts of the cities of the Fars province.
  - Society of Young Architects: The society is active in architectural issues of Shiraz city. It was successful for four years, but in recent years, it was not active because of some of the above mentioned problems. The members are trying to activate it again.
  - Environmental NGOs: In addition to the above mentioned organizations, several environmental organizations are also active in the territory of Fars province. The main objective of these organizations is to protect the natural and man-made environment in Shiraz or other cities of the province. These NGOs include Society of Fars Environment Lovers, Green Researchers, Fars Environment Lovers, Green Population, Women Population for Fighting the Environmental Pollution, Population of Nature and Wild Life Revival, Society of Zagros Breeding and Recognition and so on.

- Community NGOs and Influential Groups

Non-governmental organizations and influential groups in Saadi community can be divided into three categories including modern NGOs, traditional NGOs, and other influential groups. Despite the regional NGOs, most of the following organizations are not directly concerned with
urban development issues. However, because of their locality, and familiarity with the community problems, some of them can potentially have an effective role in planning and management of the community. The most important NGOs and influential groups in the community are as follow:

- Modern NGOs: Youth Club, Community Poem Society, Sport and Cultural Councils, Cooperatives.
- Traditional NGOs: Religious Corps, Mosque’s Board of Trustees, Gharzolhasaneh Saving Fund, Charity Institutions, Trustees and Patriarchies.
- Other Influential Groups: Community (local) Council, Basij Resistance Group, Clergymen, and other groups.

Because of the importance of Saadi community (local) council and its position in current and future situation, it was discussed separately, but it should be noted that in spite of low level of experienced participation in the community, this council has had the highest role in Saadi planning and management.

Figure (5-5) shows the community NGOs and influential groups according to the number of members. Higher rungs of the hierarchy devoted to Youth Clubs, Basij Resistance Group, and Religious Corps. On the other hand, Clergymen, Cooperatives and Charity Institutions have occupied the lowest rungs of the hierarchy.

Figure (5-6) illustrates the ‘more trusted’ NGOs and groups. Among them, as the figure shows, the elected bodies could attract the people’s trust more than others. They include Saadi Community Council, Community Trustees, and Shiraz City Council. Although the latter works in the territory of the city, however, to study the popularity of city council, it has also been included among the list of NGOs and influential groups. Non-governmental organizations and groups concerned with religion including Religious Corps, Basij Resistance Group, Mosque’s Board of Trustees, and Clergymen could achieve the second position after elected bodies. Other formal and informal NGOs could occupy the third and fourth position in the hierarchy of Saadi dweller’s trust. That is to say, the elected bodies, religious NGOs, and other formal and informal NGOs, respectively, have more potential to be considered as the dwellers’ representatives or to equip dwellers for participatory programmes.
Figure (5-5): Membership of Saadi Dwellers in Influential NGOs and Groups According to the Number of Members (Top-down)

**Increasing:**
- number of members

Source: Field studies; Interview and Questionnaire
Figure (5-6): More Trusted NGOs and Groups in Saadi Community

Increasing:
Trust of Saadi residents on community NGOs & CBOs as representatives for participatory programmes

Source: Field studies; Interview and Questionnaire
As previously mentioned, non-governmental organizations are faced with numerous problems, but the legal problems play more important role than the others to limit NGOs participation in urban planning and management. Legal problems are not limited to only ambiguity in laws and regulations, but regarding urban planning and management, the role and the position of NGOs and their relationship with other governmental organizations, city councils, municipality, and any other related bodies have not already been defined and recognized. That is to say, even if the above mentioned regional NGOs have tendency to take part in the planning and management processes, the organizer and facilitator of the participation, level of their participation, and other related issues are not defined.

Most of community NGOs and influential groups are not directly involved with urban development issues, however, comparing with regional modern NGOs, have had more role and a higher position in planning and management of Saadi community. It should be mentioned that the role of different NGOs and groups is not the same. There is a relationship between trust of people to the NGOs and groups, and the role of these groups. The more people trust the NGOs and groups, the higher role they have in planning and management of Saadi community. In other words, the elected bodies, the religious groups and other formal and informal NGOs, respectively, involve themselves more in the community development.

5.4. Current and Possible levels of Citizen Participation in Iran

In the planning literature, there have been many attempts to develop a typology of citizen participation. The best known example is the ‘Ladder of Participation’ presented by Sherry Arnstein in 1969. Although this ladder is an old one, it is one of the most powerful models for thinking about how much influence people have in public programs, and the concepts used in the ladder are still mostly unknown by people around the world. Many planners, architects, project managers and authorities still dress all variety of manipulations up as ‘citizen participation’, ‘consultation’ or other shades of technobabble.

Arnstein’s typology distinguishes ‘true citizen participation’ from ‘citizen participation games’. Message of her model is simple, but radical: citizen participation without the redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless. Arnstein (1969) believes that “citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power. It is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future”.

As figure (5-7) shows, this ladder has eight rungs, distinguished by degrees or levels of participation, some of which are qualified as meaningful participation. Arnstein’s ladder of participation distinguishes eight steps of citizen involvement. The first two rungs are manipulation and therapy, defined as non-participation. Levels three to five (informing, consultation and placation) represent symbolic values of participation. Here, the planning agency creates an opportunity for individual citizens to hear of a planning issue or submit an oral or written reaction. Within the steps three and four, participants are allowed to hear and have a voice, but their voice is disregarded by the powerful. In rung five participants advise, but the power holders have the right to decide. The Highest levels (partnership, delegated power and citizen control) signify ‘real’ participation. Here, citizens have the opportunity also to discuss and debate a plan or even have collaborative decision-making power. In these levels especially rungs seven and eight, the participants obtain the majority of decision-making seats or full managerial power.

Attention should be paid to the point that in the real world of people and programs, there might be more than eight rungs with less ‘sharp’ and ‘pure’ distinctions among them.
Furthermore, some of the characteristics used to illustrate each of the eight types might be applicable to other rungs.

Moreover, from the viewpoint of power distribution, although it can be claimed that ‘the higher up the ladder, the better’, different levels can be considered appropriate at different times to meet the expectations of different interests. In other words, when the purpose of a program is citizen participation in decision-making, the rungs of the ladder are significant and applicable. But in some programs with different purposes, sometimes consultation on fixed options would be appropriate, sometimes a partnership among stakeholders, and sometimes support for key interests.

5.4.1. Current Levels of Citizen Participation

In recent years, bodies of local government (municipalities, City Councils, and Community Councils) have had roles in urban planning and management or could help citizen involvement in urban affairs and programs. Some projects and programs have been prepared by the municipalities especially Tehran’s municipality that each of them improve citizen participation. Some of these projects are implemented in a wide scope and are supported by international organization among which the ‘Healthy City Project’ can be referred.

Figure (5-7): Ladder of Citizen Participation

Source: Adapted from Sherry Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation (1969)
Although, in all of these projects and plans the municipalities have intervened, it should be mentioned that in some of these participatory projects, beside the municipalities, some of other ministries and governmental organizations and also local institutions have had roles. The followings are the most important projects;

As table (5-2) shows, levels of some projects include consultation and placation, but it is important to mention that this kind of participation is not systematic and organized. Some of municipalities—usually in big cities—in a certain period of time decide to involve citizens in urban affairs and some of them may not be continued. Moreover none of these projects were in informal settlements.

Indirect participation of citizens through City Councils, Community Councils, and also NGOs has been experienced in the lowest degrees of the ladder. As mentioned in previous sections, the level of participation for community councillors restricted to ‘information exchange’. The point on which, Saadi Councillors stressed and focussed in questionnaires. In other words, the members of Community Council instead of having a role in decision-making, they are considered as facilitators and ‘footboys’ of City Council.

As mentioned in previous pages, the situation for NGOs is worse than the other mentioned actors. Although some representatives of people or NGO’s are present in some commissions and councils irregularly, but they do not have real voting power, or decision-making authority. In other words, the representatives of NGOs can only hear the discussions or say their opinions about the plans and programs. So, this type of public participation is not effective and real and it can be considered as a kind of manipulation or in an optimistic view, kind of information exchange. Moreover, this low level of NGOs’ participation is limited to only approval stage of urban plans. Before and after the approval of urban development plans, such as provision, examination, and implementation, the representatives of NGOs have no role at all.

Concerning with saadi community, several plans have been provided, approved, and some of them have been implemented. However, these regional NGOs have had no role in different stages of the community planning. Even in the processes of approval and examination of the development plans, it is difficult to find any sign of regional NGOs.

Most of community NGOs and influential groups are not directly involved with urban development issues, however, comparing with regional modern NGOs, have had more role and a higher position in planning and management of Saadi community.

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37 Detailed Plan of Shiraz City, district 3; Regularizing Plan of Saadi Community; and Regularizing and Enabling Plan of Saadi Community are some examples of these plans.
Table (5-2): The Participatory Projects Implemented in Iran, in Terms of Kind of Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Projects</th>
<th>Kind of Participation</th>
<th>Participation in Decision-Making and Management</th>
<th>Participation in Decision-Making (only Consultation)</th>
<th>Participation in Human Staff</th>
<th>Financial Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Healthy City</td>
<td>* *</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mayor-School</td>
<td>* *</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Spring Reception</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pioneers of Green Space</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy Community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation Bureau</td>
<td>* *</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Trustees</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Meeting</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Navab Project</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chain Stores</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Lower participation  * * Deeper participation

Although a hierarchy of involvement can be found in Saadi community, it should also be noted that the level of participation among local groups is very low. Participation of Saadi (Local) Council and Community Trustees and Patriarchies as the most active local groups limited only to information level. They also try to satisfy dwellers to help the implementation of some provided and approved plans (therapy). Convincing the authorities and haggling with them to attract some budgets for the community is another task of these groups. Sometimes, the authorities and the consulting engineers consult with them to know their opinions about the community problems and their needs.

5.4.2. Possible Levels of Citizen Participation

Current degrees of citizen participation in Saadi Community do not exceed ‘information exchange’. To examine the possible degrees of participation, and concerning concepts of direct and indirect participation, Saadi dwellers and community councillors have been studied separately. Finding surprising results, there is a huge difference between the attitudes of Saadi dwellers and councillors regarding concept, meaning and degrees of citizen participation. While the councillors suffer from their low level of involvement in community planning and management, majority of the dwellers do not expect higher levels of participation. On the contrary, they understand only lower levels of participation.

As table (5-3) and figure (5-8) illustrate, when we move from lower level of the ladder (information giving) towards upper level (partnership), the agreement and expectation of Saadi inhabitants will be decreased. If the numbers of ‘agreed’ and ‘fairly agreed’ options are summed, 69 percent of dwellers agreed with and expect ‘information giving’ level. While only 32.5
percent of dwellers agreed with and expect ‘partnership’ level. Table (5-3) also shows that when the participation degree becomes more active and real, the number of option ‘no opinion’ increases. In other words, 55 percent of Saadi residents have no idea about concept of ‘partnership’.

From the side of Saadi councillors, the situation is absolutely different. As it was being expected, the community councillors suffer strongly from low involvement in the process of planning and management of their settlement. On the contrary of dwellers, Saadi councillors agree and expect higher levels of participation. As table (5-4) and figure (5-9) show, moving from ‘information giving’ towards ‘placation’, the number of agreed responder increases from 80 percent (information giving) to 100 percent (placation). However, from this point, the number suddenly decreases to 80 percent on ‘partnership’. In other words, although the community councillors expect higher levels of participation, when a degree of real participation in decision-making is proposed, 20 percent of the responders oppose with this level.

Table (5-3): Attitudes of Saadi Dwellers towards Levels of Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ladder of Participation</th>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Agreed (%)</th>
<th>Fairly Agreed (%)</th>
<th>Opposed (%)</th>
<th>Completely Opposed (%)</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information giving (A)</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information exchange (B)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placation</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure (5-8): Attitudes of Saadi Dwellers towards Levels of Participation
Table (5-4): Attitudes of Saadi Councillors towards Levels of Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ladder of Participation</th>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Agreed</th>
<th>Fairly Agreed</th>
<th>Opposed</th>
<th>Completely Opposed</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>46.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information exchange (B)</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placation</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure (5-9): Attitudes of Saadi Councillors towards Levels of Participation

Figure (5-10) illustrates the difference between attitudes of Saadi dwellers and councillors more clearly. In this figure, these two groups of citizens and councillors were compared. Comparing these two groups shows that the community is relatively ready to higher levels of involvement through its representatives (indirect participation). However, before experiencing delegated power and citizen control, degrees such as consultation and placation should be practiced. At the present, higher levels of involvement can hardly be achieved through direct citizen participation. Regarding the realities of the informal settlements (including low levels of economic, social, cultural and other factors), promotion of citizen involvement to higher degrees through direct participation would challenge a lot of problems.
5.5. Affecting Factors on Citizen Participation in Iran

5.5.1. Affecting Factors on Citizen Participation in Iranian Cities

There have been some experiences of citizen participation in urban planning and management in Iran that was discussed in chapter three. However, they were not enough to examine the affecting factors on participation. Moreover, these few programs were not experienced in Informal Settlements. Due to this study, affecting factors on ‘Tendency to Participation’ has been examined.

Results of the study of ‘Awareness, Tendency and Behaviour of Citizens Regarding Participation’ in Iranian cities (samples of Shiraz, Hamedan and Gorgan) show that two categories of ‘mediatory’ and ‘independent’ variables affect on the tendency to participation in Iranian cities (Alavitabar, 2001).

Feeling of Powerlessness and Cost-benefit Evaluation of Participation are two mediatory variables that affect directly the tendency to participation. Independent variables including Level of Education, Age, Ethnic Groups, Language, Employment, Relationships among Neighbors and finally Size of City affect directly and indirectly (through the mediatory variables) on tendency to participation.

Figure (5-11) shows the correlation among independent, mediatory and dependent variables in Iranian cities. I will try to explain the relationships among variables using the following statements:
5.5.1.1. Mediatory variables

1. Feeling of Powerlessness: Decrease in ‘feeling of powerlessness’ results in increase in tendency to participation.
2. Cost-benefit Evaluation: The more the citizens evaluate the benefits of participation and the less its costs, the more they will be encouraged to participate.
3. The citizens who have more ‘feeling of powerlessness’, will evaluate the costs of all levels of participation more than its benefits.

5.5.1.2. Independent Variables

4. Education: Increase in education will considerably decrease feeling of powerlessness. The citizens enjoying higher levels of education evaluate the interests of participation more than its costs.
5. Age: Increase in age decreases feeling of powerlessness, but it will again increase among old citizens. In other words, the middle-age citizens have the lowest amount of feeling of powerlessness.
6. Ethnic Groups: Feeling of powerlessness among non-persian ethnics is a little bit more than Persian ethnics. Belonging to the culture of majority (Persian ethnics) decreases feeling of powerlessness.
7. Language: The citizens whose mother language is non-persian, but speak Farsi, have nearly a more positive image of themselves, comparing with the citizens who both their mother language and their speaking language is Farsi. In other words, combination with majority’s culture results in decrease in feeling of powerlessness.
8. Employment: Labour force in public sector evaluate the benefits of participation more than the others, therefore, they have less feeling of powerlessness comparing with the other labour forces.
9. Size of the City: It seems that tendency to participation decreases in big cities.
10. Relationships among Neighbors: Increase in traditional and sentimental relationships among neighbors increases tendency to participation.

5.5.2. Affecting Factors on Citizen Participation in Saadi Community (As an Informal Settlement)

In Saadi Community (as an informal settlement), regarding legal, physical, cultural, economic and social characteristics of informal settlements in Iran\(^{38}\), the affecting factors on tendency to participation is more or less different. On the one hand, the importance of some factors that have strong correlation with tendency to participation in Iranian cities, decreases in Saadi Community, and from the other hand, other factors become very significant in informal settlements.

\(^{38}\) Current situation of Saadi Community has been adequately discussed in chapter four of the dissertation. In this community (and also in majority of other informal settlements), more than 70 percent of housing units have been constructed without ‘permit to construct’ and the term ‘informal’ especially refers to this point. Moreover, standards of living are very low in this community. Saadi dwellers suffer from low level of income, education, and also low level of social criteria. This situation distinguishes Saadi dwellers from citizens in other parts of Shiraz City from the point of view of tendency to participation.
The affecting factors in Saadi Community can also be divided into independent and mediatory variables. Kind of Ownership Document, Duration of Living in the Community, Household’s Income, Household’s Supervisor, Marital Status, and Sexual Status are six other independent variables that together with the above-mentioned variables affect the tendency to participation in Saadi Community. Membership in NGOs and other Influential Groups, Attitude towards Citizen Participation in the Community, and Expectation of Higher Levels of Participation are also other mediatory variables that have been founded in Saadi Community. In figure (5-12), the affecting factors in Iranian cities and informal settlements are compared. It should be mentioned that all of the affecting independent and mediatory factors in Iranian cities except ‘Size of City’ are also applicable to Saadi Community. In the following, relationships among variables in Saadi Community will be briefly explained:

39 According to the definition of Statistical Center of Iran, Household’s supervisor is one of the household’s members who is known with this title among the household members. The household’s supervisor usually pays the living expenditure of the family.

40 Since there was only one case in this study (Saadi Community), the variable ‘Size of City’ could not be examined.
5.5.2.1. Mediatory Variables

1. Membership in NGOs and other Influential Groups: The citizens who are members of formal or informal NGOs, have more tendency to participation.
2. Attitude towards Citizen Participation in the Community: The citizens who trust more the local authorities and have positive attitude towards citizen participation, have more tendency to participation.
3. Expectation of Higher Levels of Participation: The citizens who expect higher level of participation, it is more possible to participate in urban development programmes.

5.5.2.2. Independent Variables

4. Independent variables affect on tendency to participate both directly and indirectly through the above-mentioned mediatory variables.
5. Kind of Ownership Document: The citizens who posses full document of ownership, have more tendency to participation. This factor is one of the most important factors affecting on tendency to participation in Saadi Community. The factor that is not significant in other parts of Shiraz city.
6. Duration of Living in the Community: There is a strong correlation between duration of living in Saadi and tendency to participation. The vernacular and the citizens with longer term of residence in the community have more tendency to participation.
7. Household’s Income: This variable is also an important factor in Saadi Community, because majority of Saadi dwellers are poor people and they should spend much of their life time to work. Therefore, they have not usually enough time to take part in community programs.
8. Household’s Supervisor: The person who is household’s supervisor is more eager to participate. The households’ supervisors are usually middle-aged and more powerful for decision-making in household.
9. Marital Status: Married citizens have more tendency to participation comparing with the singles.
10. Sexual Status: Men are more probable to take part in community programs than women.

Figure (5-13) shows all of the independent and mediatory factors affecting tendency to participation in Saadi Community (Informal Settlements). Twelve independent and five mediatory variables have role on citizens’ participation, some of which (showed in bold) are more important than the others in informal settlements. Regarding the conditions of such a dwelling, Kind of Ownership Document, Duration of Living in the Community, Household’s Income, Level of Combination with Majority’s Culture, Belonging to Majority’s Culture & Ethnic Groups, and Age (Middle-aging) are more important factors. On the contrary, Level of education that has an important role in Iranian cities, has not a strong relationship with tendency to participation in Saadi Community, because a significant majority of the dwellers have a low level of education.
Affecting Factors on Citizen Participation in Iran

**Independent Variables**
- Level of Education (Higher)
- Increase in Traditional Relationship with Neighbors
- Level of Combination with Majority’s Culture
- Size of City (Small)
- Belonging to Majority’s Culture & Ethnic Groups
- Employment (in Public Sector)
- Age (Middle-aging)

**Mediatory Variables**
- Decrease in Feeling of Powerlessness
- Evaluation the Benefits of Participation more than its Costs

**Dependent Variable**
- Tendency to Participation

**Affecting Factors in Iranian Cities**
- Expectation of Higher Levels of Participation
- Membership in NGOs and other Influential Groups
- Attitude towards Citizen Participation in the Community

**Affecting Factors in Informal Settlements**
- Kind of Ownership Document (Full Ownership Document)
- Duration of Living in the Community (Old Residency)
- Household’s Income (Higher Income)
- Household’s Supervisor
- Marital Status (Married)
- Sexual Status (Male)
Figure (5-13): Affecting Factors on Citizen Participation in Informal Settlements

**Independent Variables**
- Level of Combination with Majority’s Culture
- Belonging to Majority’s Culture & Ethnic Groups
- Age (Middle-aging)
- Increase in Traditional Relationship with Neighbors
- Employment (in Public Sector)
- Level of Education (Higher)
- Kind of Ownership Document (Full Ownership Document)
- Duration of Living in the Community (Old Residency)
- Household’s Income (Higher Income)
- Household’s Supervisor
- Marital Status (Married)
- Sexual Status (Male)

**Mediatory Variables**
- Decrease in Feeling of Powerlessness
- Evaluation the Benefits of Participation more than its Costs
- Expectation of Higher Levels of Participation
- Membership in NGOs, and other Influential Groups
- Attitude towards Citizen Participation in the Community

**Dependent Variable**
- Tendency to Participation
5.6. Summary

Prior to the formation of City Councils in 1999, municipalities were the only local government in urban affairs. In this structure, on one hand, inter-sectoral and sectoral government agencies had unilateral influence on municipality, and on the other, municipality had one-sided influence on private sector. After the formation of City Council, the members of this local body have faced with a deficiency regarding more deep relationship with their clients. Therefore, the city councillors, together with local authorities and experts have tried to form Community (local) Councils. These councils are working as a body of local government directly with City Councils and indirectly with municipality, NGOs, private and public sectors. This new structure, focussing on community councils, is going to be nationally widespread and can be considered as an appropriate base to promote citizen participation.

Traditional and modern NGOs and influential groups are actors concerning with Saadi Community, some of whom are regional and some others are community based. Among these influential groups and NGOs, the elected groups are the most trusted and can play essential role, if any participatory programs is going to be conducted.

Current levels of participation in Iran are limited to information exchange and in some cases consultation. The possible and expectable levels of participation are different among citizens and community (local) councillors. While the community councillors suffer from lack of proper level of participation and expect higher level of involvement, the majority of community dwellers have no tendency to participate in decision-making. However, the highest expectable levels of participation for local councillors are consultation and placation. Partnership is also an acceptable level that can be practised in participatory programs.

Feeling of Powerlessness and Cost-benefit Evaluation of Participation are two mediatory variables that affect directly the tendency to participation in Iranian cities. Independent variables including Level of Education, Age, Ethnic Groups, Language, Employment, Relationships among Neighbors and finally Size of City affect directly and indirectly (through the mediatory variables) on tendency to participation.

In informal settlements, twelve independent and five mediatory variables played a role on citizens’ participation. Regarding conditions of such a dwelling, Kind of Ownership Document, Duration of Living in the Community, Household’s Income, Level of Combination with Majority’s Culture, Belonging to Majority’s Culture & Ethnic Groups, and Age (Middle-aging) are more important factors. On the contrary, Level of Education that has an important role in Iranian cities, has not a strong relationship with tendency to participation in Saadi Community, because a significant majority of the dwellers have a low level of education.
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ABSTRACT

In economic and political conditions before 1960, urban planning was taken into consideration by governments, especially on its economic and management aspects, so it had imperative and top-down characteristics. On the other hand, growing trend of industrialisation and urbanisation caused the domination of scientific and technocratic elites especially engineers and architects in this scope.

From 1960 and later, vast critical reactions happened against this situation and this caused urban planning change from imperative and technocratic to participatory and democratic. Sustainable development, rapid growth of democracy and human rights, development concepts of civil society and nowadays cultural reactions put urban planning in critical situation and a type of theoretical and practical difficulties. In order to release from this critical situation, urban planning starts with democratic methods, searching justice and human aims. In fact, urban planning and design in the beginning of 21st century goes to a revolution in duties, aims and methods.

Some researchers and specialists believe that we ought to speak about ‘planning through debate’ and ‘communicative turn’ in planning theory. Most practical and theoretical efforts that have been done in this field are based on combination of methods and principles of planning to democracy, public and private sector participation, defence of needy and poor people and protection of cultural values and providing justice and social welfare (Campbell, 1997).

As some studies (Ministry of Interior, Centre for Urban Planning Studies, Vol. 2, 2000 & Vol. 3, 2001; Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, 2004) show, lack or poor level of citizen participation in both providing urban development plans and addressing the problem of informal settlements leads to failure of urban development plans and extend of informal settlements in Iran.

General aim of this research is to analyse the most important and influential factors to involve citizens in urban planning and management in Iran. The objectives are as follow:

- To find obstacles and potentials of citizen participation in urban planning and management in Iran
- To find obstacles and potentials of citizen participation in urban planning and management in informal settlements especially in ‘Saadi Community’.

The following key questions have been addressed in this research:

- Do the urban planning and management structures in Iran have the necessary conditions to expect active citizen participation?
- Which roles do the city and community councils and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have concerning citizen participation?
- According to the Arnstein’s so-called ‘ladder of participation’, what kind and which level of participation is possible and can be expected regarding the current social, cultural, political, economical, and legal structures of Iran (focused on informal settlements)?
- Which factors affect citizen participation (focused on informal settlements)?
To answer the research questions, three methods including documentary studies, interview, and questionnaire (citizens and councillors questionnaires) have been used. Documentary studies have been done in both national and local levels. The authorities and experts in Fars Province and the councillors and dwellers of Saadi Community have respectively been interviewed and filled out the questionnaires.

**Documentary Studies:** To study the history of citizen participation, the previous and current structures of urban planning and management, city councils, NGOs and CBOs, and some other related issues, the nation-wide documentary studies have been done. Moreover, to have a better recognition of Saadi Community, I have studied Fars Province (in which Saadi is located) and current situation of Saadi community. I have also added photos, films, and observation to my field studies and I reviewed previous urban plans of the community. Therefore, documentary studies have been done in both national and local levels. Overall, the documentary studies helped me to address partly the first and second questions of the research related to the capacity of urban planning and management structures in Iran to expect citizen participation from one hand, and the role of city and community councils and NGOs in citizen involvement on the other hand. There is, in addition, one further use of documentary studies to address the affecting factors on citizen participation in Iranian cities.

**Interview:** Saadi Community is a part of Shiraz city and Shiraz is located in Fars province. According to the national administrative division, Fars is one of the 30 provinces of Iran and is located in south of Iran. As the authorities and experts of the organizations related to urban planning and management in Fars province are directly engaged with the planning and administration of Saadi Community, I interviewed 20 people as the representatives of the related organizations.

The interview with authorities and experts in Fars province opened me new ways to understand local possibilities and limits regarding citizen involvement especially in informal settlements. However, to complete the research and to be more familiar with the possibility of citizen participation and its conditions in an informal settlement, it was necessary to connect with the dwellers of Saadi community themselves, and the job has been done by questionnaires.

**Questionnaire:** After preparing primary questionnaire, to do pilot and pre-test studies, 20 people of Saadi dwellers from 20 different blocks were interviewed. Afterwards, the questionnaire was corrected to prepare the final questionnaire. An approximate population of 52000 are living in five neighbourhoods of Saadi Community, from which almost 11000 are living in Fohandej neighbourhood.

Regarding the significant difference between the saadi councillors and the citizens from the point of view of attitudes to participation and in somehow their economic and social status, two different questionnaires have been prepared, filled out, and analysed in different methods. Here these two kinds of questionnaires will be discussed in more detail:

**Councillors Questionnaire:** Each neighbourhood in Saadi Community is represented by three councillors. All of 15 councillors of five neighbourhoods are being asked to fill out the mailed questionnaire. The answers showed that because of their familiarity with the participation terminology, the councillors did not face with significant problems to fill out the questions.

**Citizens Questionnaire:** 200 dwellers of Fohandej neighbourhood responded personally (fact to face) to the questionnaires. This sample was selected from the population of 11000. In other words, nearly two percent of the population filled out the questionnaires. The neighbourhood was divided up equally in to twenty blocks and using “Systematic Random Sampling”, 10 responders
have been selected from each block. As it was being expected, some of selected responders (in housing units) were not at home at the time of survey, in these cases the next housing units (their neighbours) have been selected to fill out the questionnaires.

The collected data had to be analysed. I employed documentary studies, interview and questionnaires. The qualitative information and data including documentary studies, interviews and some parts of questionnaires related to the opened questions have been analysed using qualitative methods. The quantitative data—the closed questions in questionnaires—have been analysed using SPSS programme.

Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action has been basis of communicative planning theory. Communicative planning concentrates on bottom-up approach and real citizen participation in decision-making.

Both of two ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ planning approaches have been faced with certain limits and potentials. While top-down planning emphasizes on governmental authority, bottom-up planning pays particular attention to local communities as main actors in planning process.

Similar to many other theories, communicative planning theory has also been widely criticized. These critiques can be divided into three main categories—theoretical critiques, critiques in practice, and critiques regarding the relations between power and planning—among which, I believe that critiques concerned with power is more important due to strong and mutual relations between power and planning and their mutual effects on each other.

It is clear that power ‘can’ mislead, corrupt or limit planning rationality in practice, but it only ‘can’. The question is that under which condition? In fact, it should be mentioned that there are different forms of power and rationality which appear within different political and institutional situations. There are conditions under which rational critiques of existent and dominant power is possible. Moreover, we should distinguish the power which detriments people from the power which may help people and leads to educate them.

Comparing with other models, communicative planning as a new paradigm of urban planning has proved its abilities, but to make it more applicable, we should recognize the obstacles and limits by doing theoretical and practical researches and several case studies and continue to enrich this paradigm.

Urbanization process in Iran, have been faced with a rapid growth during last four decades. It was due to high rate of population increase on the one hand, and widely migration of rural population to the cities and increase in the number of cities, on the other hand. The increasing number of big cities in Iran is the important point that creates some problems which with old and simple managerial methods can not be confronted.

In Iran the local organizations mainly in charge of urban development and management consists of the municipality and the Islamic City Council. Municipality is, on the one hand, under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, and on the other hand, it is under the supervision and control of the city council.

Spatial planning system in Iran has a hierarchy in four national, regional, sub-regional, and local levels. Although this hierarchy is defined and recognized, there is a gap between national and local levels. In other words, in regional and sub-regional, the system does not work appropriately. However, urban development planning is mainly conducted through urban plans like comprehensive, detailed and guide plans.

Historically, the new participatory patterns of urban administration in Iran, has begun since Constitutional Revolution of 1906. In fact, establishment of the first parliament after the
revolution, and approval of the Constitution can be regarded as the first participatory experience, which regarding the constant dictatorship of Iranian political system, was new and unprecedented.

The new patterns of citizen participation in urban fields in Iran can be viewed within three stages; before the Constitutional Revolution, between the Constitutional and Islamic Revolution, and after Islamic Revolution. During recent hundred years, city councils have experienced strong fluctuations in their authorities and rights. However, the general direction of urban governance provided more citizen participation. In 1999, the election of Islamic City Councils held in all of the Iranian cities. Moreover, community councils are going to be popular in numerous cities.

In urban development plans, which are provided by consulting engineers, the process of citizen participation has not been clearly defined and citizen involvement is not an obligatory process. Furthermore, the probable citizen participation in urban development plans is limited mainly to implementation process.

Some participatory projects have been conducted by the municipality of big cities like The Healthy City Project, The Mayor-School Project, The Pioneers of Green Space Project, The Healthy Community Project, and The Spring Reception Project, and in some of them the citizens participated in decision-making process. But these projects were not systematic and are not generalized to other municipalities.

Urban development planning and management systems in Iran challenge with numerous legal, organizational, functional and implementation problems, but simultaneously, there are considerable potentials and possibilities that should be paid enough attention.

Saadi Community as the case study of this research is located at the north-east of Shiraz city and has been developed at two sides of Shiraz-Qarameh road. This urban area is distinguished from the other districts of Shiraz city with two major particular characteristics. At first, Saadi Tomb—the Iranian national famous poet—is located at the centre of this area. Saadi Tomb is one of the most important touristic places of Shiraz city and attracts several national and international tourists every year.

Despite the touristic importance of this urban area, Saadi is an informal community. That is to say, majority of the buildings, particularly houses, are built without permit to construct and the dwellers have not followed the formal processes of construction. Therefore majority of the dwellers have no formal deed of sale (document of ownership) for their houses. In this community, the number of low-income groups, migrants, and social deviations are higher than other parts of Shiraz city. Moreover, there are several physical difficulties concerning housing, road network, physical fabric and similar issues. However, only comparing with other parts of the city, it can be claimed that the situation in Saadi Community is more inappropriate.

Before formation of City Councils in 1999, municipalities were the only local government in urban affairs. In this structure, on the one hand, inter-sectoral and sectoral government agencies had unilateral influence on municipality, and on the other hand, municipality had one-sided influence on private sector. After formation of City Council, the members of this local body have faced with a deficiency regarding more deeply relationship with their clients. Therefore, the city councillors together with local authorities and experts have tried to form Community (local) Councils. These councils are working as a body of local government directly with City Councils and indirectly with municipality, NGOs, private and public sectors. This new structure, focussing on community councils, is going to be nation-wide and can be considered as an appropriate base to promote citizen participation.
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Current levels of participation in Iran are limited to information exchange and in some cases consultation. The possible and expectable levels of participation are different between citizens and community (local) councillors. While the community councillors suffer from lack of proper level of participation and expect higher level of involvement, majority of community dwellers have no tendency to participate in decision-making. However, the highest expectable levels of participation for local councillors are consultation and placation. Partnership is also an acceptable level that can be practised in participatory programs.

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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG


Einige Fachleute vertreten die Ansicht, dass man die "Planung durch Debatte" und "kommunikativen tun" in der Planungstheorie Beachtung schenken sollte.

Die meisten praktischen und theoretischen Anstrengungen, die in diesem Bereich durchgeführt wurden, basieren auf die Kombination von Methoden und Prinzipien der Planung unter Demokratie, Beteiligung der öffentlichen und privaten Sektoren, der Verteidigung der Bedürftigen und Armen, sowie dem Schutz der kulturellen Werte und der Bereitstellung der Gerechtigkeit und sozialen Fürsorge. (Campbell Basis, 1997).


Allgemeines Ziel dieser Forschung ist es, die wichtigsten und einflussreichsten Faktoren zur Beteiligung der Bürger in der Stadtplanung und -management im Iran zu analysieren.

Die Ziele sind folgende:
- Hindernisse und Möglichkeiten der Bürgerbeteiligung in der Stadtplanung und -management im Iran zu finden,
Folgende Fragen wurden in dieser Studie behandelt:

- Haben Stadtplanungs- und Verwaltungsstrukturen im Iran die notwendigen Voraussetzungen, einer aktiven Beteiligung der Bürger?
- Welche Rolle spielen die Stadt- und Gemeinderäte und nichtstaatlichen Organisationen (NGOs) in Hinblick auf eine Beteiligung der Bürger?
- Anlehnend an Arnsteins sogenannte "Leiter der Beteiligung" besteht die Frage: Welche Art und welcher Grad der Beteiligung im Bezug auf die aktuellen gesellschaftlichen, kulturellen, politischen, wirtschaftlichen und rechtlichen Strukturen des Irans generell möglich sind (Konzentration auf illegale Siedlungen);
- Welche Faktoren beeinflussen die Beteiligung der Bürger (Konzentration auf illegale Siedlungen)

Um diese Forschungsfragen zu beantworten, wurden drei Methoden – Dokumentarstudien, Interviews und Fragebogen (Fragebögen an die Bürger und den Gemeinderat) – verwendet. Dokumentarstudien wurden sowohl auf nationaler, als auch auf lokaler Ebene durchgeführt. Die zuständigen Behörden und Fachleute in der Provinz Fars wurden interviewt und Fragebögen wurden von Gemeinderäten und von den Einwohnern der Saadi Gemeinde ausgefüllt.

**Dokumentarstudien:** Um die Historie der Beteiligung der Bürger, die früheren und derzeitigen Strukturen der Stadtplanung- und verwaltung, Stadträte, NGOs und CBOs und einige andere damit zusammenhängende Fragen zu studieren, sind landesweite Dokumentarstudien durchgeführt worden.

Außerdem sind Untersuchungen in der gesamten Provinz Fars sowie historische Entwicklungen der Saadi Gemeinde betrachtet worden, um heutige Stadtplanungen in der Saadi Gemeinde besser zu verstehen. Zudem habe ich Fotos, Filme und Beobachtungen aus meinen Fallstudien hinzugefügt.

Insgesamt konnten die dokumentarischen Studien mir die erste und zweite Frage meiner Forschung beantworten. Darüber hinaus dienen die Dokumentarstudien ebenso zur Analyse der Faktoren, die sich auf die Beteiligung der Bürger in den iranischen Städten auswirken.

**Interview:** Saadi Gemeinde ist ein Teil der Stadt Shiraz, die in der Provinz Fars liegt. Fars eine der 30 Provinzen des Landes Iran und befindet sich im Süden des Landes. Da sowohl Experten als auch Verantwortliche der Organisationen von Stadtplanung und -management in der Provinz Fars direkt in die Verwaltung der Saadi Gemeinde involviert sind, sind 20 Personen als Vertreter der entsprechenden Organisationen interviewt worden.
Das Interview mit den Experten und Verantwortlichen in der Provinz Fars eröffnete mir neue Wege, lokale Möglichkeiten und Einschränkungen, die Beteiligung der Bürger, vor allem in illegalen Siedlungen, zu verstehen. Um jedoch die Forschung zu vervollständigen und mehr Erkenntnisse über die Möglichkeiten der Beteiligung der Bürger und ihre Bedingungen in einer illegalen Siedlung zu gewinnen, war es notwendig, mit den Einwohnern der Saadi Gemeinde selbst in Verbindung zu treten. Dies wurde mittels Fragebogen durchgeführt.

**Fragebogen:** In der primär Phase der Studie wurde einen Fragebogen konzipiert und mit 20 Bewohnern der Saadigemeinde aus 20 verschiedenen Blöcke pilotiert. Danach wurde der Fragebogen überarbeitet und modifiziert. Im Hinblick auf die signifikanten Unterschied zwischen den Mitglieder der Saadi Gemeinderäte und die Bürger hinsichtlich der Einstellungen auf die Teilnahme und der wirtschaftlichen sowie sozialen Status, wurden zwei verschiedene Fragebögen erstellt, ausgefüllt und in verschiedenen Methoden analysiert. Im Folgenden werden diesen beiden Arten von Fragebögen im Detail erörtert:

**Fragebogen für den Gemeinderat:** Jedes Viertel in Saadi Gemeinde wird durch drei Mitgliedern im Gemeinderat vertreten. Der Fragebogen wurde an alle 15 Mitgliedern der fünf Viertel verteilt.

**Fragebogen für den Bürger:** Zirka 52.000 Personen wohnen in den fünf Vierteln von Saadi Gemeinde, davon sind fast 11.000 im Fohandej Viertel sesshaft. 200 Bewohner des Fohandej Viertel haben an der Studie teilgenommen und wurden persönlich befragt. Diese Teilnehmer sind wie folgt ausgewählt worden. Das Viertel wurde in zwanzig Blöcke aufgeteilt und aus jedem Block wurde per "Systematic Random Sampling" 10 Probanden ausgewählt. Die in den Dokumentarstudien, Interviews und Fragebögen gesammelten Daten wurden in der nächsten Phase der Studie aufbereitet, ausgewertet und analysiert. Die Auswertung erfolgte mittels qualitativer Verfahren und für die quantitativen Daten (die geschlossenen Fragen in Fragebogen) wurden mit einem SPSS-Programm gearbeitet.


Es ist offensichtlich, dass die Macht in der Praxis zur Irreführung, Korruption oder zur Limitierung der Planungsrationellität führen 'kann', aber die Frage ist, unter welchen Bedingungen? Es sollte noch erwähnt werden, dass es unterschiedliche Formen der Macht und Rationalität gibt, die in unterschiedlichen politischen und institutionellen Situationen auftreten. Es gibt Bedingungen, unter denen rationale Kritik der bestehenden und dominierenden Macht möglich ist. Darüber hinaus sollte man zwischen der Macht, die die Menschen manipuliert und der, die den Menschen hilft und sie ausbildet, differenzieren können.

Im Vergleich zu anderen Modellen hat die kommunikative Planung als neues Paradigma der Stadtplanung seine Fähigkeiten bewiesen, aber um es praktikabler zu gestalten, sollte man die Hindernisse und Grenzen durch theoretische und praktische Untersuchungen und mehrere Fallstudien erkennen und dieses Paradigma weiterhin bereichern.


Die lokalen Organisationen im Iran, die für die Stadtentwicklung und -management zuständig sind, bestehen aus der Stadtverwaltung und dem islamischen Stadtrat. Einerseits ist die Stadtverwaltung unter der Kontrolle des Innenministeriums, andererseits ist es unter der Aufsicht und Kontrolle des islamischen Stadtrates.

Das räumliche Planungssystem im Iran hat eine Hierarchie auf nationaler, regionaler, sub-regionaler und lokaler Ebene. Obwohl diese Hierarchie definiert ist und anerkannt wird, gibt es eine Lücke zwischen der nationalen und lokalen Ebene. Mit anderen Worten funktioniert das System in der regionalen und sub-regionalen Ebene nicht angemessen und reibungsfrei.

In diesem Rahmen ist der Stadtentwicklungsplan, die Stadterneuerung und -erweiterung überwiegend durch den Flächennutzungsplan bzw. den Bebauungsplan geleitet.
Historisch gesehen, begannen die neuen partizipativen Muster der Stadtverwaltung im Iran, seit der konstitutionellen Revolution im Jahre 1906. Genau genommen kann die Einrichtung des ersten Parlaments nach der Revolution und die Anerkennung der Verfassung als die erste partizipativen Erfahrung wahrgenommen werden.

Die neuen Formen der Beteiligung der Bürger im Bereich der Stadtplanung im Iran kann in drei Phasen untersucht werden:

- vor der konstitutionellen Revolution,
- zwischen der konstitutionellen Revolution und der islamischen Revolution und
- nach der Islamischen Revolution.

In den letzten hundert Jahren haben die Stadträte starke Veränderungen in Bezug auf ihre Rechte und Pflichten erfahren.

Jedoch sorgte die allgemeine Richtung der Stadtverwaltung für mehr Bürgerbeteiligung. 1999 fand die Wahl der islamischen Stadträte in allen iranischen Städten statt. Darüber hinaus breiten sich Gemeinderäte in zahlreichen Städten des Irans aus.

Im Bereich der Stadtentwicklungspläne, die von beratenden Ingenieuren vorgesehen sind, ist der Prozess der Beteiligung der Bürger weder eindeutig definiert, noch zwingend. Außerdem ist die wahrscheinliche Beteiligung der Bürger an den Stadtentwicklungsplänen auf den Umsetzungsprozess begrenzt.


Stadtentwicklungsplanung und Management-Systeme sind im Iran mit zahlreichen rechtlichen, organisatorischen und funktionalen Umsetzungsproblemen konfrontiert, aber zugleich gibt es erhebliche Potenziale und Möglichkeiten, denen man besondere Aufmerksamkeit schenken sollte.

Trotz der touristischen Bedeutung dieses städtischen Bereichs ist er eine illegale Siedlung. Das heißt, die meisten Gebäuden, vor allem Häuser, sind ohne Genehmigung gebaut worden und die Einwohner haben die formalen Prozesse der Baugenehmigung nicht befolgt. Daher verfügt die Mehrheit der Einwohner über keine Urkunden bezüglich ihres Wohneigentums.

In dieser Gemeinde ist die Anzahl der Migranten und Gruppen mit niedrigem Einkommen und sozialen Abweichungen höher als in anderen Teilen der Stadt Shiraz. Außerdem gibt es in Bezug auf Wohnraum, Straßennetz und ähnliches mehrere Schwierigkeiten. Jedoch nur im Vergleich zu anderen Teilen der Stadt kann man behaupten, dass die Umstände in der Saadi Gemeinde zum Leben ungeeignet sind.


Traditionelle, moderne NGOs und einflussreiche Gruppen sind Akteure der Saadi Gemeinde, von denen einige regional und einige andere lokal sind. Unter diesen einflussreichen Gruppen und NGOs, spielen die ausgewählten Gruppen, die am vertrauenswürdigsten sind, eine wesentliche Rolle, wenn es darum geht, ein partizipatives Programm durchzuführen.

Der derzeitige Grad der Beteiligung im Iran ist auf den Informationenaustausch und in einigen Fällen auf Beratung beschränkt. Der mögliche und zu erwartende Grad der Beteiligung zwischen den Bürgern und Mitgliedern des Gemeinderates sind unterschiedlich. Während die Gemeinderäte unter Mangel einer angemessenen Höhe der Beteiligung leiden und einen höheren Grad der Beteiligung erwarten, hat die Mehrheit der Einwohner keine Motivation, sich an der Entscheidungsfindung zu beteiligen. Wobei auch die Motivation der Gemeinderäte nicht signifikant höher ist. Partnerschaft ist ebenfalls eine akzeptable Ebene, die in den partizipativen Programmen ausgeübt werden kann.
Unabhängige Variable wie der Grad der Bildung, Alter, ethnischer Herkunft, Sprache, Beschäftigung, Beziehungen zwischen den Nachbarn und schließlich die Größe der Stadt beeinflusst direkt und indirekt (durch die vermittelnde Variablen) auch Absicht zur Teilnahme.

Das Gefühl der Schwäche der Einwohner und Kosten-Nutzen-Bewertung der Teilnahme sind zwei vermittelnde Variablen, die sich unmittelbar auf die Absicht zur Teilnahme in iranischen Städten auswirken.

In den illegalen Siedlungen haben zwölf unabhängige und fünf mittlere Variable eine vermittelnde Rolle für die Beteiligung der Bürger.
In Abhängigkeit der Lebenssituation (Eigentumsurkunde, Dauer der Zugehörigkeit in der Gemeinde, Haushaltseinkommen, und Integration hinsichtlich Kultur, Zugehörigkeit zur Mehrheit, zu ethnischen Gruppen und Alter) sind weitere wichtige Faktoren.

In den illegalen Siedlungen kommt der Grad der Bildung, der eine wesentliche Rolle in den iranischen Städten spielt, kaum zum tragen. Da die große Mehrheit der Bewohner ein niedriges Bildungsniveau aufweist.