Feminist and Critical Political Economy

Edited by
Prof. Dr. Brigitte Young, Universität Münster
Prof. Dr. Uta Ruppert, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität
Frankfurt am Main

Volume 3
Gender Knowledge and Knowledge Networks in International Political Economy
This book project is part of the EU-Network of Excellence GARNET, Global Governance, Regionalisation and Regulation: The Role of the EU (2005-2010), funded under the 6th Framework Programme for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration of the European Commission and gathering 42 leading European research centres. One of the seventeen subthemes of the Jointly Executed Research Activities focuses on Gender in International Political Economy (GIPE), coordinated by Prof. Brigitte Young, PhD, University of Münster, with about 20 members from different research centres in the Network. The aim of GIPE is to critically analyze the various International Political Economy (IPE) approaches from a gender perspective and suggest how we might theorize and address the absence and lack of fit between gender and IPE.

In this context, the role of knowledge production in policy making plays an important role, since this focus promises a shift beyond the by now rather traditional impact assessment of policies on gender relations by looking at the processes of gendered knowledge production and their capacities to structure the policy formation discourses. The first meeting, in conjunction with Prof. Dr. Christoph Scherrer, University of Kassel, was held at the Central European University in Budapest, 19-21 July 2007, entitled Gender Knowledge and Knowledge Networks in IPE. The edited papers in this volume are the result of drafts presented at this workshop. We want to express our appreciation to the individual contributors of the chapters for the stimulating discussions at the two-day workshop in Budapest, and submitting subsequently the innovative papers on knowledge production and knowledge networks.

A special note of appreciation goes to Dr. Violetta Zentai, Center for Policy Studies, CEU, who hosted the meeting in Budapest, as well as Agnes Batory and Suza Gabor for their support, and to Prof. Diane Stone, University of Warwick, who provided the initial contact to the Center for Policy Studies, CEU. We are grateful for the financial support we received from GARNET to invite members of the GIPE Working Group to Budapest. We also want to thank the Director of GARNET, Prof. Richard Higgott, University of Warwick, who not only attended the workshop in Budapest, but has strongly supported the research activities of Gender in Political Economy (GIPE) from the start. At the same time, we wish to acknowledge the financial support provided by Dr. Christiane Frantz, Office of Equality, University of Münster, for the publication.
Finally, we want to express our intellectual debt to the German social scientists, Dr. Sünne Andresen und Prof. Dr. Irene Dölling, who in their pioneering work provided the conceptual tools for gender knowledge (Geschlechterwissen) for analyzing and revealing the implicit and explicit gender assumptions in policies and for explaining the disjointedness between the commitment to gender equality at the policy level and the actual policy making. As portrayed in the various chapters of this book, the concept of gender knowledge and knowledge networks holds much promise for future research in IPE.

Brigitte Young and Christoph Scherrer
Contents

Introduction: Gender Knowledge and Knowledge Networks in International Political Economy
Brigitte Young and Christoph Scherrer
9

Gender Knowledge: A Review of Theory and Practice
Rosalind Cavaghan
18

Knowledge and Policy Networks in Global Governance
Diane Stone
36

Multiple Meanings of Gender Budgeting: Gender Knowledge and Economic Knowledge in the World Bank and UNDP
Gülay Çağlar
55

Flexicurity and Gender Mainstreaming: Deliberative Processes, Knowledge Networks and the European Labour Market
Rachel Kurian
75

Gender Knowledge in Migration Studies and in Practice
Pia Eberhardt, Helen Schwenken
94

Gendered Knowledge in the Postmodern State: The Case of Agricultural Trade Liberalization in Europe
Elisabeth Prügl
115

The Fragmented Hegemony of Sustainable Development – Gendered Policy Knowledge in Global Environmental Politics
Ulrich Brand
130

The Study of Global Finance in International Political Economy: Introducing Gender – a research agenda
Eleni Tsingou
150
Feminist Knowledge and Human Security: Bridging Rifts through the Epistemology of Care
Thanh-Dam Truong

Non-‘White’ Whites, Non-European Europeans and Gendered Non-Citizens: On A Possible Epistemic Strategy from the Semiperiphery of Europe
Marina Blagojevic

Notes on Authors and Editors
Introduction: Gender Knowledge and Knowledge Networks in International Political Economy

Brigitte Young and Christoph Scherrer

“Definitions belong to the definers – not the defined”
Toni Morrison quoted in Tickner 2006: 383

This volume explores the apparent gender neutrality of knowledge generation and dissemination through knowledge networks in various subfields of International Political Economy. That knowledge is power and that traditional knowledge has been constructed in the interests of the powerful has been a critique of contemporary feminist scholarship from the start. On the basis of this insight, Anne Tickner eloquently challenged the scientific claim about knowledge being universal and objective in her Presidential address at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in San Diego 2006. In reality, such knowledge is usually partial, created by men, and based on men’s lives (Tickner 2006). In a similar vein, feminist economists have argued that mainstream theories informing policy making in macroeconomics, trade, finance, migration and the environment are based on a very traditional understanding of gender roles. Most treatments of structural change harbour a ‘conceptual silence’, i.e., the failure to acknowledge explicitly or implicitly that global restructuring is occurring on a gendered terrain (Bakker 1994).

In contrast to the gender-insensitivity which underpins most of the policy discourse(s) and beliefs and normative assumptions of the policy community, we start from the premise that all knowledge is based upon a specific gender knowledge. The concept of gender knowledge (Geschlechterwissen) has been introduced by German sociologists, Sünne Andresen and Irene Dölling (2005; see also Rosalind Cavaghan, and Gülay Çağlar in this volume) which draws on the sociology of knowledge and focuses on the construction of gender and gender relations in the policy making process. The gender knowledge concept starts from the assumption that every form of knowledge – be it everyday knowledge, expert knowledge and popularized knowledge – is based upon a specific, often tacit and unconscious, form of gender knowledge. From Foucauldian discourse theory we know that discourses ‘produce’ the criteria for judging truth claims. This implies that it is not enough to inquire into how women are represented, but what is even more important is to understand what assumptions underpin scientific knowledge claims in policy processes. In contrast to the supposed gender-neutral assumptions of mainstream knowledge, the focus on gender knowledge allows us to pay systematic attention to the articulation of different knowledge forms in national discourses and how normative and cognitive claims intersect and how national policy makers might differ with regard to the ways they evaluate such claims (Kulawik 2009).
The novelty of the individual contributions in this book address not so much the gendered effects of different policies but rather to understand the imprint “gender knowledge” leaves both on the academic knowledge justifying and underpinning the policies and normative assumptions of the policy community. Both the chapters of Pia Eberhardt/Helen Schwenken and Eleni Tsingou (in this volume) demonstrate, for example, that in migration theories and in global finance a very traditional understanding of gender knowledge underlies the profession’s interpretation conceptualized as independent from areas such as society, history, and emotions. The same is true also in regard to the policy knowledge in global environmental politics. Ulrich Brand (in this volume) analyses how the gender-neutrality of the concept of sustainable development results in an andocentric concept of social domination of nature. These economic models fail to capture the actual reality of both sexes, but at the same time they inform much of current policies in migration, finance, and the environment.

But this is not the entire story. Increasingly feminists confront a mismatch between gender-sensitive commitments, declarations, laws, actions, which are often subsumed under the umbrella of gender mainstreaming, and the translation of such gender knowledge into policy. Angelika Wetterer (2003) has argued that even if progressive gender knowledge is integrated into policy commitments, it does not necessarily translate into gender sensitive policy outcomes. She illustrates that the traditional gender knowledge within institutions and the practice of individuals in such organizations can clash with the more gender-sensitive goal of increasing gender equality. Similarly the chapters by Elisabeth Prügl and Gülay Çağlar (in this volume) demonstrate how a gendered discourse can be subverted to serve neoliberal goals, or in the contribution by Rachel Kurian (in this volume) how the more political and transformative deliberations of gender mainstreaming were subsequently diluted in the EU-flexicurity policies.

Today, the struggle over ideas underpinning policy proposals is not restricted to academia or the state. It takes place via networks encompassing a range of actors. As Diane Stone (2000; 2005; and in this volume) has pointed out knowledge and ideas do not have independent power. They are closely related to social and political interests. Globalizing elites are at the forefront of funding and staffing think-tanks, foundations, and research institutions engaged in the production and dissemination of ideas. More importantly, these institutions impose a rationality that gives precedence to a particular conception of knowledge and are instrumental in restructuring the state-market relationship on a global scale. Deviations from these norms are vilified as unscientific, subjective and irrational and are interpreted as an improper digression from the accepted objective cognizance (Young/Schuberth 2010). Feminist scholars have tended to treat networks as a social technology for the advocacy of women’s right and for the diffusion of feminist ideas and norms. But networks are not just vehicles for feminist aspirations and causes but are central structures of global governance. These knowledge networks impact on developing ideas, concepts, research results, since they deliver the conceptual understanding of policy problems. The nature of the policy processes of knowledge networks present barriers not so much to the personal participation
of women as experts or as policy practitioners but to the inclusion of gendered knowledge, ideas and discourses (Young/Schuberth 2010; Stone 2005).

Many networks of knowledge-based experts are exclusionary male clubs equipped with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge. This is particularly evident in the financial governance regime. Financial experts hold a common set of causal beliefs and share notions of validity based on internally defined criteria for evaluation, common policy objectives, and shared normative commitments. Liberalized regulatory globalisation has operated through international networks of members of the state bureaucracies, independent regulatory agencies, representatives of the financial industry and most importantly, economic experts (Schuberth/Young 2010; Tsingou 2010). The particular conception of knowledge, which is largely codified, technocratic, secular, and quantitative, serves to create self-referential epistemic communities. The international diffusion of these regulatory models and practices has been facilitated by knowledge-based experts or groups in international fora. Participation is restricted and excludes alternative approaches of other social sciences as well as heterodox economics (Krugman 2009). Thus the policy battle over financial governance is largely circumscribed by a very limited set of ideas which tend to favour the interests of global finance. Thus not only the knowledge base that underpins the financial sector, but also the informal epistemic networks reinforce gender and class hierarchies which serves to create exclusion for broader social actors to be represented, and to have their interests included in the financial governance.

During the last decade, feminist scholars have analyzed the structural constraints and the asymmetric relations of power to understand the gendered workings of the global economy. However to unlock the nature of the relationship between expert knowledge, their networks (think tanks, foundations, regulatory bodies) and the coalitions with global government networks, in which it is never clear who is exercising power on behalf of whom (Slaughter 2004: 162) and which has provided certain people agency and authority while denying them to others, the research agenda of the following contributions in this volume shifts the focus to the role of gender knowledge in the policy making process. After all, the technocratic orientations of policy knowledge networks present not only a barrier to the participation of women, but also to the inclusion of gendered discourses. As a result, the existence of knowledge networks and epistemic communities is also a question about representation, accountability, and legitimacy (Stone 2005: 103).

Focusing on gender knowledge as a research agenda is all the more important, since at the Lisbon summit of the EU Council in 2000 it was agreed to make the European Union ‘globally the most competitive knowledge-based economy’ by 2010. According to this scenario, new scientific knowledge and technological innovation will be the driving force to achieve this end (Walby et al., 2007). However, the key question is: What is the epistemic and philosophical foundation of the knowledge economy and through what channels and networks is the scientific knowledge disseminated? Who decides what knowledge is, where the knowledge is produced, and who are the knowledge makers?
The first two contributions introduce the two main concepts of the book: gender knowledge and knowledge networks. In “Gender Knowledge: a Review of Theory and Practice” Rosalind Cavaghan highlights the new insights the gender knowledge concept promises to deliver. Her main point is that the gender knowledge concept helps us to understand not only how the meanings of gender sensitive policies are negotiated, but also the prevalent gap between the intentions of law makers and the policies’ actual implementation. Cavaghan begins her contribution with a very helpful introduction to the various levels and forms of gender knowledge as developed by Sünne Andresen and Irene Dölling. She illustrates the concept’s strengths with the example of gender mainstreaming, a policy area characterized by a mismatch between rhetorical commitment and implementation practices, as well as contradictions within policies themselves. The concept of gender knowledge helps to explain this mismatch by uncovering the superficial knowledge of gender inequality by those in charge of policy implementation. Their abstract commitments to gender equality are sidelined by their organizations’ ‘universal code’ which delegitimized the perception of gender difference. Cavaghan finds the concept not just useful for organizational studies of policy implementation but also for a general understanding of the gendered construction of expertise in policy fields. To illustrate her point she takes examples from research by authors in this volume: Çağlar and Eberhardt/Schwenken.

In her contribution “Knowledge and Policy Networks in Global Governance” Diane Stone distinguishes between different forms of transnational networks for the purpose of giving a nuanced answer to the question whether such networks provide new spaces for feminist analysis and critique. She rejects the claim that participation in the processes of global governance via transnational networks inhibits action against the status quo. Instead she argues that the type of network determines the prospects for gender perspectives to have influence on decision making agendas. According to her preliminary assessment ‘transnational advocacy networks’ (TANs) and subaltern ‘knowledge networks’ (KNET) are most conducive for activism and advocacy of feminist scholars and policy makers. While advocacy networks propose policies based on a relatively stable knowledge, the knowledge networks of coordinated research, study and graduate-level teaching are trying to create new knowledge and to diffuse it. Actual feminist networks frequently display a mixture of both, which works well in terms of awareness raising and agenda setting. However, decision making authority rests more with ‘transnational executive networks’ (TENs) and ‘global public policy networks’ (GPPNs), which are dominated by resourceful private enterprises and government officials. According to Stone, a network’s power to exclude and to coopt comes to bear in these networks more prominently. For feminists, therefore, participation in such networks is double-edged. While it may provide them with opportunities to inform policy debate, it may also estrange women from their grass-roots. The increasing appropriation of policy-making by transnational policy networks, however, leaves few
options but to move from inter-governmental ‘state feminism’ to ‘global policy feminism’.

The following contributions trace the role of gender knowledge for policy making in various policy fields. Gülay Çağlar’s contribution about the “Multiple Meanings of Gender Budgeting” investigates the interpretative struggles over what kind of policies gender budgeting implies. While feminist economists and policy advocates originally understood gender budgeting to include expansionary macroeconomic policies as well as a shift in the composition of public revenues and expenditures in favour of women, international organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) tend to focus only on the composition of the expenditure side. Çağlar explains this difference with reference to economic knowledge. Both international organizations subscribe to micro-economic approaches to macroeconomics and, therefore, are not receptive to Keynesian growth policy suggestions. The two organizations differ, however, in regard to how they conceptualize the relationship between economic development and gender, which reflects their specific economic and gender knowledge. UNDP regards gender issues as social issues and looks at the implications of macroeconomic developments for women. Therefore, UNDP advocates budget expenditures that ameliorate the living conditions of women. Gender budgeting serves the goal of supplementing macroeconomic policies with social compensatory measures. The World Bank takes the opposite view on the relationship between economic growth and gender issues. The Bank views discriminatory practices against women in the labour market as barriers for women to actively participate in the market economy. Gender budgeting should therefore contribute to the liberation of the economy from societal barriers such as gender inequality. Çağlar’s analysis is informed by a poststructuralist reading of the political science of knowledge which she outlines in detail.

Rachel Kurian’s contribution on “Flexicurity and Gender Mainstreaming” investigates the interaction between the European networks on “flexicurity”, a term for labour market policies attempting to meet flexibility and security concerns, and gender mainstreaming of labour markets. She starts with the observation that despite the European Commission’s commitment to gender equality, participants in the flexicurity discourse have largely ignored the knowledge production of the gender mainstreaming network. She explains this neglect with the help of Cameron and Ohja’s concept of deliberative processes in conditions of unequal relations of power and with Squires’ categorisations on gender mainstreaming. Kurian argues that a belief in the inevitability of economic globalisation informs the dominant doxa and habitus in both networks. More critical gender concerns in both networks are trounced by appeals to a common “rationality” and a focus on techno-bureaucratic “objectivities”.

In “Gender Knowledge in Migration Studies and in Practice” Pia Eberhardt and Helen Schwenken trace the specific ways, in which economic theories of migration perceive gender differences. Specifically they examine two neoclassical models for their explicit and implicit gender knowledge. They have chosen one of the most important models in the field of migration studies, the Roy-Borjas selection model, which
does not differentiate between men and women, and Jacob Mincer’s standard neo-classical family relocation model which makes this distinction. Both models reveal a very thin, traditional understanding of gender roles. Borjas’ allegedly gender-neutral categories like ‘migrant’ and ‘skilled worker’ carry a masculine connotation, which in turn suggests that women simply don’t move. In Mincer’s model women do move, but not independently. Gender differences are reduced to questions of labour market performance and are taken for granted. Eberhard and Schwenken contrast the models’ findings with the literature on the lived experiences of migrants. These economic models not only fail to capture the actual movements of women, but also the migration patterns of men. Men who do not match Mincer’s middle-class ideal of a male breadwinner with a care-taker wife are not considered in the model. Nevertheless, according to the authors, these economic models inform much of current migration policies.

Elisabeth Prügl traces in her chapter on “Gendered Knowledge in the Postmodern State” the impact of neoliberal inspired reforms on the gender regime in Western European agriculture from a feminist, neo-Marxist, and post-structuralist perspective. The focus of postwar European agricultural policies, the family farm, had a decidedly masculinist constitution through the interaction of inheritance rules and patriarchal welfare state benefits. Women farmers saw their economic status reduced to flexible labour and to small scale farming. The neoliberal strategies as well as its assumptions about gender roles have led to changes in the gender status quo in agriculture. The emphasis on markets led to a shift in state support for agriculture. Gradually agricultural subsidies were decoupled from the price mechanism and in their stead funds were directly targeted towards rural development. The liberalization of markets reproduced the gendering of farming as masculine by favouring large farms and food processing conglomerates, typically run by men and based on the exploitation of women’s unpaid and low-paid labour. However, some women have found new opportunities in the flanking measures provided by the rural development funds. While the European Commission’s emphasis on gender mainstreaming did not reach market-making policies, the funds were thoroughly gender mainstreamed. As already suggested in Çağlar’s account of the World Bank’s gender mainstreaming policies, neoliberalism values women as economic actors. This shift has met the aspirations of some women in farming. They have started their own on-farm businesses, such as direct marketing on large farms or agro-tourism on small farms. In sum, Prügl suggests that the neoliberal process of “subjection” on the one hand empowers women to become economic agents, on the other it subjects them to a market order which favours the life experience of men over those of women with care responsibilities.

Ulrich Brand’s contribution “Gendered Policy Knowledge in Global Environmental Politics” builds on the premise that environmental problems do not exist objectively. Instead material or bio-physical dysfunctions are constructed and represented socially as problems. He shows how the hegemonic form of environmental policy knowledge – sustainable development – is gendered. By not questioning the valorisation paradigm, i.e. that nature has to be appropriated, an andocentric concept of societal domination of nature prevails. The emphasis on economic growth, for example, does not call into
question the patriarchal forms of the societal division of labour. Care work is neglected. Similarly, the strong held believe that social problems can be solved by technological means disregards the feminist critique of science, technology, and development. While there is reference to gender-mainstreaming, gender equity in the sense of equal access to and ownership over resources, but the responsibilities and benefits from the appropriation of nature are not on the agenda.

Eleni Tsingou explores in her contribution “Introducing Gender to the Study of Global Finance” the gendered nature of knowledge production in three areas of finance. First, she highlights the fact that the tightly knit transnational financial policy community is primarily male. It is preoccupied only with a narrow set of issues, neglecting issues of social and distributive justice. Second, Tsingou shows that anti-money laundering legislation has been enacted without concern for low-income migrant communities of which women are a major part. And finally she points out that in the life insurance industry traditional gender knowledge underlies the actuary profession’s interpretation of the socio-economic indicators which inform life expectancy tables.

Thanh-Dam Truong’s contribution “Feminist Knowledge and Human Security” breaks with the prevailing pattern of the book by looking at the knowledge base of feminism itself. Truong makes the claim that the different ways to conceptualize gender among feminists place limits on coalition building against the prevailing forms of domination. While a traditional understanding of gender as homogenous categories denies the multi-dimensional nature of social exclusion, a heterogeneous understanding of gender tends to overemphasize diversity of experience. To overcome this impasse Truong suggests an epistemology of care. It could open up an opportunity for mutual learning among different feminist strands, on the one hand, and among feminism and other epistemic communities critical of prevailing notions of security, on the other. Feminist scholars have not only highlighted the role of care in real lives, but have also made use of the values of care (attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness) in epistemic interactions. Two distinctive features of feminist knowledge – ‘situated knowledge’ and knowledge-making as ‘quilting’ rely on the appreciation of others. Quilting, according to Truong, requires a refashioning of ‘identity’ as unity of human beings whose lives and cultures depend on other life forms and ecosystems. Critical knowledge about ‘development’ and ‘security’ has been the outcome of ‘quilting’ among diverse communities of knowledge agents. The recognition of how the ‘self’ is to be found in ‘others’ and the ‘others’ in ‘self’ is for Truong a necessary precondition for a cognitive alliance against dominant meanings of security. She calls upon the knowledge networks in the field of care and security to be attentive to the values of openness, relationality, and epistemic humility.

Marina Blagojevic treats in her contribution “Non-‘White’ Whites, Non-European Europeans and Gendered Non-Citizens” the neglected experience of women who neit-
her belong to the dominant “West” nor to the subaltern “South”, i.e. women in the semiperiphery of Europe. Their experience has been silenced first by the prevalent assumption that ‘the transition’ will create a logical catching-up with democracies in the core. This assumption justifies the creation of knowledge in the core for the semiperiphery. Second the experience of Eastern European women has been overshadowed by post-colonial discourses on the identities of women in the periphery. Picking up on feminist standpoint theory, Blagojevic argues that the specificities of Eastern European transition countries with their painful experience of economic de-development and their particular gender regimes call for an epistemic strategy that is sensitive to these experiences. Such a strategy should construct the semiperiphery as a strategic standpoint for knowledge articulation and build a connection between the ontology and epistemology of gender. It would require deemphasizing the production of ‘The Theory’ in favour of the creation of an interactive and inclusive knowledge matrix which values contextual knowledge and the constructive communication of ideas.

References


Schuberth, Helene and Brigitte Young 2010: The Role of Gender in Financial Governance, in: Brigitte Young, Isabella Bakker and Diane Elson (eds.), Gender and Macroeconomic Governance (forthcoming).


Gender Knowledge: A Review of Theory and Practice

Rosalind Cavaghan

Introduction

Gender knowledge is an analytical concept that can be used as a framework to identify explicit and implicit assumptions or conceptions concerning gender and gender relations, and the norms which support them. It can be applied to the analysis of policy and practice. Existing literature using the gender knowledge concept however remains comparatively small and is fragmented across languages and disciplines. This chapter reviews work which has used and developed the concept of gender knowledge, to unpack how it can be used and what type of research questions it can help us answer. Throughout, I argue that the analytical concept of gender knowledge can function as a bridge between macro level, discursive, approaches to gender equality policy analysis and micro level investigations of implementation. In addition, the concept’s focus on the norms which govern our perception of evidence enables a deeper understanding of the processes which govern the negotiation and establishment of gender relations.

Firstly I introduce the concept of gender knowledge as developed by Andresen/Dölling (2005), elaborating on various dimensions of the concept including the categories of gender knowledge (forms and levels) which Andresen/Dölling devised. I then move to discuss the utility of the concept, specifically its potential to open new perspectives for research on implementation (problems) in gender equality policies. To illustrate this potential I focus on one of the most important recent examples of state sponsored gender equality policy: gender mainstreaming. Reviewing existing research on gender mainstreaming I identify two broad approaches and highlight the key problematics which emerge to structure the research agenda. Firstly, I highlight a strand of research which takes a macro perspective on gender mainstreaming. This strand conceptualizes policy in a broadly discursive or interpretative manner and focuses on meaning in written policy. Secondly, I highlight research which examines policy implementation, by looking at specific cases in detail and taking a more micro approach. I then sketch the key problematics which existing research has highlighted and the added value of bridging between them.

Next I present an elaboration of existing work which has used the gender knowledge concept in order to show the insights which its application has so far yielded. First of all I review Andresen/Dölling’s (2005) micro level investigation of gender mainstreaming implementation in a German bureaucracy, which focused on the negotiation of meaning within implementation practices. This example of research shows how the gender knowledge concept helps us understand policy construction within implementation. I show how, through reference to different forms and levels of knowledge, the gender knowledge concept helps us to understand not only how policy meanings are negotiated, but also the continued presence of contradictions between rhetoric and
practice. Thus the gender knowledge approach enables us to analyze meaning, previously only examined within macro level policy analysis, within implementation and practice.

I then explore two further examples of research which apply the gender knowledge concept on a macro level. These examples of research explore the evidential dimensions of the gender knowledge concept, i.e. how epistemic norms and values regarding the perception of evidence, enmesh to influence the way gender can be perceived and practiced. Çağlar (2008, this volume) shows how disciplinary rules shape gender knowledge, whilst Eberhardt/Schwenken (2008, this volume) show how gender knowledge can constitute some of the foundational assumptions of academic theories. Combined, these illustrate and elaborate the mutually constitutive relationship between gender knowledge and other forms of knowledge.

Introducing Gender Knowledge

Gender knowledge was first developed as an analytical device by the German sociologists Sünne Andresen and Irene Dölling (2005) and has enjoyed recent entry into gender research in the fields of sociology and political science (Andresen/Dölling 2005, Çağlar 2008; this volume, Dölling 2005, Eberhardt/Schwenken 2008, this volume, Schwenken 2008). The concept draws on the sociology of knowledge and enables a sharpened analysis of the construction and perception of gender and gender relations not only within policy, but also organizations and in practice. Part of this added value comes from the fact that the concept of gender knowledge not only captures implicit and explicit representations of, or beliefs about the sexes, and normative positions on the justification or appropriateness of relationships between the sexes; it also encompasses perceived evidence of these gender differences. Thus Andresen/Dölling define the concept as follows “‘[Gender knowledge is] knowledge … about the difference between the sexes, the reasoning of the self-evidence and evidence [of these differences], [and] the prevailing normative ideas about the ‘correct’ gender relations and divisions of labor between women and men’” (Andresen/Dölling 2005:175, own translation). The term gender knowledge thus refers in the broadest sense to how gender relations are perceived and on what grounds. Applying a gender knowledge analysis to policy and governance can therefore help researchers to gain a deeper understanding of the normative and epistemic barriers to the successful application of gender equality policies, as well as the mechanisms through which gender inequality is maintained.

Levels and Forms of Gender Knowledge

At any point multiple competing gender knowledges can be present and available in a society. For instance, individuals hold an awareness of their own gender and practice in their day to day life. The perception and operation of gender relations also varies
however between organizations (Acker 1992, Connell 2002, Savage/Witz 1992). To help organize and understand the various competing gender knowledges which can be present in a society, Andersen/Dölling distinguish between two ‘levels’ of gender knowledge: collectively held or ‘objective’ gender knowledge; and ‘subjective’ gender knowledge (2005:50). The former refers to ideas or notions concerning and related to gender, which are commonly accessible. The latter refers to individuals’ own subjective knowledge of their gender and position in society (Çağlar 2008:7).

Building on this distinction between subjective and objective gender knowledge, Dölling differentiates objective, collectively held, gender knowledge into three ‘forms’. These forms draw on existing classifications used in the sociology of knowledge (2005:50) and are as follows:

- Practice, everyday knowledge. This knowledge is predominantly unreflected and tacit. It may be dominated by cultural stereotypes.
- Institutionally produced knowledge (such as that in religion, academic disciplines or law). This form of knowledge is distanced from practice and is more abstract.
- Popular knowledge found in journalistic features, consultants, unions, social movements. This is an important intermediary between expert and everyday knowledge (Schwenken 2008:3, Dölling 2005:51).

Each of these forms may understand gender quite differently, constructing the meaning of gender wholly differently in terms of depth, evidence, applicability, normativity and so on. In our everyday practice gender may be something we recognize very unreflexively in each others’ appearance or attach to particular occupational statuses (without noticing). Institutional knowledge in the discipline of law may see gender as a dichotomous variable relating to citizens. On the other hand, feminist sociology might construe gender as a socially constructed, hierarchical relationship which structures roles and outcomes. Popular knowledge again might propagate the notion that sex-related pay differentials exist, but lack explanation as to how these come about, or it might include the assumption that sex discrimination is illegitimate. All of these positions on gender are potential sources in the perception of gender differences and gender relations.

The differentiation of gender knowledge into different levels (objective/subjective) and forms aims to help us identify the multiple interpretative frameworks which might be used to inform understandings of gender. Gender knowledge can be composed both by subjective perceptions and individual doxic knowledge concerning ourselves; by institutional interpretative frameworks which may operate locally within organizations or within disciplinary fields; as well as by interpretative frameworks circulating in popular knowledge.

Encompassing all these levels and forms, Andersen and Dölling describe gender knowledge as “the general biographically accumulated store of interpretative frameworks which are structured and composed by different kinds of knowledge... These interpretative frameworks enable the perception, evaluation, legitimation and justifi-
cation of sex differences and inform understanding [of these differences] as self-explanatory quasi natural facts” (Dölling 2005:49, own translation, my emphasis).

Gender knowledge therefore presents a new approach to the analysis of the construction of gender in situ and affords an improved degree of analytical precision, because it encompasses how gender is perceived on various different levels and how these perceptions are formed. As I will argue in the next section this greater clarity of analysis bridges between two existing strands of research in the analysis of gender mainstreaming: discursive approaches and the examination of implementation. Each of these has yielded significant insights into policy outcomes. Without the concept of gender knowledge it is difficult however to combine and operationalize their insights.

Gender Mainstreaming: Existing Research

Gender Mainstreaming: Diffusion and Implementation

Following many years of international feminist mobilization within non-governmental organizations and transnational advocacy networks (Keck/Sikkink 1999), the gender mainstreaming policy was placed centrally in the United Nations ‘Platform for Action’ following the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995). The Beijing Platform for Action did not define gender mainstreaming clearly but spoke repeatedly of mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policy development and implementation.

Gender mainstreaming subsequently enjoyed high levels of adoption by supranational organizations and subsequently states, so that early research on gender mainstreaming policy asked what factors drove its ‘diffusion’ (True/Mintrom 2001, Carney 2002, Hafner-Burton/Pollack 2002). Authors such as True/Mintrom (2001) and Keck/Sikkink (1999) focused on the pivotal role of feminist NGOs and knowledge networks in driving the policy’s adoption and asked whether this success implied the establishment of new, international norms of gender equality.

Later research however began to show a disjuncture between widespread rhetorical commitment to the achievement of gender equality on the one hand and disappointing policy action on the other (Hafner-Burton/Pollack 2002, Mackay/Waylen 2009). Research also found that ‘gender mainstreaming’ could denote highly variable practices, many of which fell short of feminists’ expectations (Beveridge/Nott 2002, Daly 2005, Rees 2002, Squires 2005, Verloo 2005). Practices deemed ‘gender mainstreaming’ included actions such as widening the scope of pre-existing equal opportunities policy into new policy areas; collecting more gender disaggregated data (Daly 2005); and closing ‘specific’ gender equality units (Verloo 2001). Integration of gender considerations into a broad range of policy planning remained rare and restricted to states such as Sweden where gender equality policies already enjoyed fairly high levels of political support. The variation in gender mainstreaming policies therefore stimulated a research agenda structured around the examination of variations in ‘gender mainstreaming’ policy. One strand of this research examines the construction of gender equality as a
policy problem in written policies, whilst the other examines the actual implementation of gender mainstreaming.

Analyzing the Construction of Gender Equality Policy Problems

The MAGEEQ project is a key example of the discursive/interpretative examination of gender mainstreaming policy. MAGEEQ drew on Carol Bacchi’s ‘what’s the problem?’ approach (1999, 2005) which examines the construction of policy problems using techniques drawn from discourse analysis. Through this analysis Bacchi highlights the central importance of how policy problems are depicted. Her work demonstrated how descriptions of policy problems can construct them either as worthy of policy action and amenable to solution, or in a manner which forecloses intervention as inappropriate (1999:3). This kind of analysis encourages us to unpack various aspects of how policy problems are represented, such as the reasons an issue is considered a problem (or not), the causes of the problem, who is affected by it, who is responsible to solve it and so on, and helps us to understand why a problem is deemed worthy of action by the state. The MAGEEQ project developed this technique further, combining it with additional aspects of gender and social movement theory to create a ‘critical frame analysis’ tool. This was consistently used to analyze the content of gender mainstreaming policies in six European states (Verloo 2004:9)1 and to undertake comparison between them.

MAGEEQ’s key findings2 yielded several useful insights. Firstly, they provided a detailed analysis of the substance of variations in how gender equality and gender mainstreaming is constructed in different states. Their findings also elaborated various dimensions of policy, which provide useful sensitizing questions for any analysis of gender equality policies. These included a full range of differences in content, such as why gender inequality is deemed a problem, what the problem is, who it affects, who is responsible for solving it and what the causes are (Verloo 2005:14). This indicates that instability in the meaning of ‘gender equality’ and ‘gender mainstreaming’ is a key issue and a fruitful target for analysis of gender mainstreaming policy.

A further key finding to emerge from the MAGEEQ project was the frequent presence of inconsistencies within policies. For instance, diagnosis of the causes of the gender inequality problem and planned ameliorative action might not logically fit with one another. Thus where Hafner-Burton/Pollack (2002) found disjuncture between rhetorical commitments to gender equality and practical action, MAGEEQ found disjunctures within policy articulations.

This kind of analysis, which focuses on policy construction, has therefore managed to depict some of the confusing characteristics which manifest themselves in gender

1 For a full explanation of the categories and sensitizing questions used by MAGEEQ see Verloo (2007).
2 The MAGEEQ critical frame analysis conducted a very detailed frame analysis far beyond the sophistication indicated here, for further details see Verloo (2007).
mainstreaming’s implementation. The critical frame analysis method does not however attempt a detailed investigation of the processes through which particular constructions come to dominate. Drawing on documentary sources MAGEEQ’s findings indicated that the ‘feminist’ policy suggestions articulated by the women’s movement were not present in state policy (Verloo 2005:2, Lombardo/Meier 2008). Their analysis excludes implementation activities however, and is restricted to macro level policy construction without questioning the relationship between macro level policy and practical implementation, nor the processes leading to particular discursive outcomes. Whilst macro level policy construction is key and illuminates a substantial and important part of the gender mainstreaming ‘story’, analyzing how policy is implemented surely constitutes an important step in the policy process; particularly in view of existing research which has highlighted a mis-match between rhetorical policy and implementation.

Analyzing Implementation and Context

Analyses of implementation focus on the institutional context where gender mainstreaming is undertaken, moving away from analyzing the content of macro level policy or its construction. These approaches have focused on opportunities, mechanisms and situations within organizations implementing gender equality policies, as explanatory factors for policy outcomes.

For example Hafner-Burton/Pollack (2002) used the core concepts of social movement theory: political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures and strategic framing, to explain disjuncture between rhetorical commitment to gender equality and policy outcomes. Dividing opportunity structures into ‘input structures’, those access points where social movements can seek political access, and ‘output structures’, the mechanisms through which organizations can implement policy, Hafner-Burton/Pollack conclude that weak implementation structures account for the weak implementation of rhetorical commitments. They also argue that the ability of social movements to construct resonance between gender mainstreaming and pre-existing organizational aims, heavily affects whether gender mainstreaming will be taken up.

This approach therefore turns our attention to internal factors within organizations including local, organizational aims. It does not, however, consider what the impact of instances of ‘strategic framing’ might be, because it does not consider the impact of policy content in terms of construction. The power of existing organizational aims to co-opt gender mainstreaming into the service of aims other than gender equality has been extensively evidenced by other researchers (Bruno/Jacquot/Mandin 2006, Bretherton 2001, Stratigaki 2004) however. A variety of ‘mainstream’ theoretical concepts have been tabled to structure analysis of this phenomenon. These include policy paradigms (Stratigaki 2004:32, Mazey 2000:336) institutional frames (Mazey 2000:339) and norms (Chappel 2006). Each of these emphasize the effect of ideational and normative factors within organizations on the possibilities for gender equality policies.
As mainstream concepts of policy analysis however these approaches require ‘gendering’. The burgeoning field of feminist new institutionalism (Chappel 2006, Kenny/Mackay 2009, Kenny/Paantjens 2006) represents an attempt to do just that. Feminist new institutionalism focuses on ideational and normative aspects of organizations ‘logic of appropriateness’ and fuses it with the insights of foundational feminist theorists such as Acker (1992) Halford and Leonard (2001) and Savage and Witz (1992). These scholars showed how gender shapes organizations (Chapel 2006) in multiple practices ranging from job typing, hours of work, formal and informal rules. Combining these two approaches feminist new institutionalism aims to show the ideational factors affecting gender relations within organizations, which enable or constrain gender mainstreaming policies.

The Research Agenda

I have sketched out recent research on gender mainstreaming highlighting two phenomena which constitute interesting puzzles. Firstly, research has uncovered mismatch between rhetorical commitment to gender mainstreaming and implementation practices, as well as contradictions within policies themselves. Discursive approaches which focus on the construction and meaning of gender mainstreaming policy have highlighted that instability in the meaning of gender mainstreaming policy and the gender equality policy problem must be considered to fully understand gender mainstreaming outcomes. Research focusing on implementation on the other hand, looks at the influence of local factors on policy practices and outcomes and have shown that normative or ideational characteristics affect policy implementation. I argue that an approach which helps enable an analysis of policy construction in implementation and the processes which constitute it, would help us tackle the continuing puzzles of gender mainstreaming’s implementation. The concept of gender knowledge provides such a bridge and is a useful additional tool which might be applied in conjunction with feminist new institutionalism and/or discursive or interpretative analysis. It facilitates consideration of the interplay between policy construction at the macro level and implementation at the micro level, as well as the processes involved in policy construction. I now provide examples of how the gender knowledge concept has been applied to fully illustrate and elaborate.

Using Gender Knowledge to Understand Construction in Policy Implementation

Andresen/Dölling (2005) developed the concept of gender knowledge during their examination of gender mainstreaming implementation in a German bureaucracy. Their research questions were premised on two theoretical assumptions. Firstly they understood social structures within professional fields and organizations as locally specific and reproduced through practice (Bourdieu/Wacant 1996). Secondly they drew on fe-
minist theories of organization (Acker 1990, Britton 2000, Witz 2001) in assuming that these organizational practices also constitute gender through a wide variety of practices including sex composition, gender typing, hierarchical classifications etc. Their analysis therefore sought to examine whether new management practices and standards promoted by the reform process and gender mainstreaming would continue to reproduce hierarchy and gender in the same ways as before.

Rhetorical Commitments and Weak Implementation

To analyze this they interviewed high-ranking managers to ascertain how they perceived gender relations and differences in the work place. Their initial results indicated contradictions within interview data. On the one hand most interviewees expressed strongly held views against gender discrimination and stereotypes: but they did not perceive the implementation of gender mainstreaming in their workplace as relevant. Interviewees also described workplace practices and experiences, which researchers recognized as gendered and disadvantageous to women, without voicing any criticism. Interviewees also used explicit and implicit gender stereotypes during discussions.

Seeking a way to analyze the co-existence of these contradictions Andresen/Dölling conducted a deeper analysis of how interviewees thought about gender. Examining interviewees’ explicit and implicit perceptions of the sexes, the evidence they referred to to support these and their normative ideas about gender relations, Andresen/Dölling formulated the concept of gender knowledge to structure their analysis. Applying the concept to their analysis they identified a mismatch between interviewees’ experiences and practices of gender relations, which were grounded in everyday practice and the commitments to gender equality which they articulated when asked to reflect. This prompted the research team to elaborate different ‘forms’ of gender knowledge. These forms and levels of knowledge helped them to conceptualize the mismatch and contradictions within the ways interviewees spoke about gender. It also allowed them to identify how particular gender knowledge, drawn from particular forms of knowledge, dominated over others.

Analyzing Levels of Gender Knowledge

Andresen/Dölling argue that all the management staff they interviewed would, as a result of their employment, be aware of the popular debate in Germany on inequality and gender which has taken place in the last 30 years. This popular debate led to a widespread awareness, present in both popular knowledge and political institutions, of gender discrimination and the disadvantages which women experience. In turn, laws and procedures which aimed to overcome gender disadvantage and gender inequality were subsequently negotiated in the political realm. After these political and social developments, gender discrimination and sexism were rendered illegitimate. Staff wi-
thin this German bureaucracy would therefore have been exposed to and aware of these political and social ideas concerning gender, or, to describe it another way, of this gender knowledge.

When questioned however, interviewees described gender primarily in terms of practice. They perceived some differences between men and women and female interviewees did tend to describe gender-differentiated outcomes within the organization. Some noticed that the clustering of men or women in particular areas of the organization was not coincidental but a result of cultural norms. East German women in particular also spoke of highly conflictual debates within their own families over the division of childcare responsibilities. Some also noted a discrepancy between rhetorically articulated commitments to gender equality and actual gender practices.

These aspects of gender knowledge might have led to an interpretation of gender mainstreaming aimed at tackling the disadvantageous outcomes of cultural norms, or to the vigorous practice of gender equality commitments. Despite their professional contact with gender equality legislation and requirements however, interviewees indicated almost no such reflective knowledge of gender in the organization. They described gender differences, without critical reflection, in terms of practice, and could not explain the relevance of gender to their work or workplace.

Interpretative Repertoires: the ‘Universal Code’

Building on their assumptions that organizational practices constitute gender, Andersen/Dölling sought to reconstruct the habitualized perceptions and interpretations which were ‘common sense’ within the organization and which structured interaction and practice. They found that organizational knowledge constructed people in a minimalistic, individualized and abstracted fashion and strictly forbade discrimination on the grounds of sex. Equality was understood as valuing all employees as ‘humans’ (Menschen). Secondly they found that the criteria used to ascribe merit and judge performance denoted individual results as the sole legitimate and just basis of employee evaluation, financial remuneration and opportunities for promotion. ‘Results’ were construed in business administrative terms such as costs and yields. The consideration of social management skills, adaptability, qualifications, time-served or other criteria of merit were excluded.

Thus, within the interpretative frameworks, which structured organizational practice, gender was only understood as the presence of men and women. Gender could not be understood in terms of a social factor existing in society or interaction, or as cultural norms. Contemplation of individuals’ circumstances was seen as outside of the organizations’ objectives and to do so clashed with the existing understandings of ‘people’ and practices of ascribing merit. The values, categories and concepts which structured organizational practice therefore precluded the perception of gender inequality as a structural factor which replicated unequal outcomes. The shared understandings which constituted ‘common sense’ within the organization, only facilitated
the understanding of gender inequality as direct discrimination and obscured the concept of structural disadvantage.

Andresen/Dölling thus argue that the meaning assigned to ‘gender mainstreaming’ within the bureaucracy and subsequently articulated by interviewees, was constructed using the categories and values of institutional knowledge. Organizational values and categories dominated as the mutually understood meanings which could be successfully deployed during the implementation of gender mainstreaming. Andresen/Dölling characterize these implementation processes as micro political struggles where the ‘correct’ or ‘legitimate’ interpretation of gender mainstreaming is negotiated amongst bureaucratic parties. Thus, although interviews showed that individuals did practice gendered attitudes and gender did exert social consequences, the organization’s ‘universal code’ foreclosed articulation and discussion of gendered ‘particularities’. Abstract commitments to gender equality, which circulated in political/institutional gender knowledge, were thus trumped by the perceptions and ideas which constituted organizational practice and which delegitimized the perception of gender difference or social situation.

This illustrates how, when a reformative policy like gender mainstreaming is introduced, it may fail to enjoy successful practical implementation. The gender knowledge required to understand and implement gender mainstreaming in a transformative way, may not be present. Instead local practices, categories and values may render gender and the gender mainstreaming policy unintelligible. The concept of gender knowledge therefore helps gender researchers identify the structures which affect how gender mainstreaming will be practiced and interpreted in rhetoric and implementation. It also provides a more detailed insight into the disjuncture between rhetorical commitments to gender equality and weak implementation practices.

**Gender Knowledge in Macro Level Analysis: Epistemic Norms**

 Çağlar’s (2008, and this volume) and Eberhardt/Schwenken’s (2008, and this volume) application of the gender knowledge concept shifts the focus away from micro level processes of negotiation in organizations. Instead they focus on policy construction at a macro level using techniques derived from discourse analysis. Building on Andresen/Dölling, Çağlar (2008, this volume) investigates the epistemic mechanisms at play within institutionally produced knowledge. Through her exploration of the discipline of macro economics she shows how epistemic mechanisms function within a discipline. Çağlar argues that ‘boundary work’ is a key epistemic mechanism in knowledge formation processes. The concept ‘boundary work’ describes those moments in a debate which define whether gender can be perceived as a relevant factor within disciplinary and political knowledge. Attention to these mechanisms elucidates how disciplinary or institutional factors construct gender knowledge and how these disciplinary rules exclude particular types of knowledge. They also construct the knower who may legitimately participate in policy development processes. Eberhardt/Schwenken (2008,
this volume) also explore institutionally produced knowledge; however their research examines how women and men are represented within migration studies and policy. In contrast to Andresen/Dölling and Çağlar, who show how institutionally produced knowledge shapes gender knowledge, Eberhardt/Schwenken focus on how gender knowledge can function as foundational assumptions, upon which, academic theories are built.

Combined, these observations illustrate the mutually constitutive relationship between gender knowledge and other forms of knowledge. In this recursive relationship, categories or epistemologies shape how gender can be perceived whilst gender assumptions are also incorporated uncritically into academic theories as foundational assumptions.

Boundary Work

Çağlar’s analysis of macroeconomic policy demonstrates some dynamics similar to Andresen/Dölling’s examination of gender mainstreaming. Çağlar uses discourse analysis techniques to focus on how gender is constructed as an object of policy intervention in macroeconomic policy. Her analysis shows how perceptions of gender and its discussion in macroeconomic policy are affected by normative and epistemic practices of the field, and that an analysis of the process is boosted by attention to the construction not only of the objects of policy intervention but also of the subject, the knower.

Boundary work (Gottweis 1998) is one of the key dynamics in knowledge creation which Çağlar captures. The concept of ‘boundary work’ describes ongoing processes of negotiation which demark the boundaries of disciplinary relevance. Analyzing the ‘engendering’ of macroeconomic policy, Çağlar noted that the demarcation of an issue as either a social or economic phenomenon heavily influenced how gender would be constructed as an object of policy intervention. Comparing feminist economists’ attempts to engender macroeconomic theory and its practical implementation in multilateral organizations, Çağlar shows how differing assumptions about the correct content of economic policy affected whether gender would be accepted as a legitimate object of policy intervention in the field of macroeconomics, or deemed an external factor for attention elsewhere.

‘Engendering’ Macroeconomic Policy

Throughout the 80s and 90s, feminist economists sought to reveal the gendered impacts of macroeconomic policies of structural adjustment. They evidenced extensively that welfare retrenchment was absorbed by women’s unpaid labor, thereby creating social
outcomes which were not gender neutral. Traditional macroeconomic models\(^3\) however only include \textit{marketized} activities and define non-marketized services or activities as ‘non-economic’. Moving the costs for social reproduction (health care, child care etc), out of the state-funded realm, therefore gave the appearance within traditional macroeconomic models of actually reducing the costs of social reproduction. Feminist economists argued however that these modeling practices simply moved these costs outside the realm of \textit{economic theorizing}. Rendering these gendered outcomes and impacts ‘economic’ therefore constituted a key hurdle for feminist economists seeking to incorporate gender and gendered outcomes in the field.

Çağlar identifies modeling, with its associated formalism and mathematical rigor, as a constitutive practice in the field of economics, which identifies and differentiates it from other fields. To gain an audience within the field, it was therefore essential to express gender within economic models. Feminists could only be identified as economists and therefore gain ‘legitimate’ access to economic debates through the adoption of this epistemic practice. As a result they expressed their critiques through adjusted macroeconomic models.\(^4\) These models incorporated non-marketized inputs, such as reproductive and caring work, into calculations of national (marketized and non-marketized) income. This brings women’s work into the economic realm as an input, so that the effects of any welfare retrenchment are incorporated into the economic model, rather than being externalized.

\`{E}ngendering' Macroeconomic Policy: Gender Budgeting

Through their use of modeling, feminist economists thus express gendered effects in terms of economic goods, abstracted concepts of inputs and outputs, and marketized and non-marketized services. Where previous feminist analyses considered gendered \textit{outcomes} of macroeconomic policy, engendering brings gendered inputs and outcomes \textit{into} macroeconomic models. In doing so feminists adopted the interpretative repertoires of the economic discipline, ‘engendered’ macroeconomics and developed the policy tool of gender budgeting.

Within mainstream economics, fiscal policy, that is decisions on the size of the public budget and how it is spent, is regarded as an essential tool for macroeconomic management. The policy tool of gender budgeting, as devised by feminist economists, therefore builds recognition of social reproduction inputs and costs into macroeconomic policy. It bears similarities to gender mainstreaming in that it does not focus on women or on outcomes, rather it inserts awareness of gender into macroeconomic policymaking.

\(^3\) On the simplest level macroeconomic models depict inputs into a national economy and expenditures out of it. Macroeconomic policies usually therefore seek to achieve a balance between monetarized inputs and outputs (see Elson 1994 for further elaboration).

\(^4\) For further details on the details of these models see Çağlar (this volume).
Gender budgeting and ‘engendering’ of macroeconomic policy have however, been interpreted very differently when put into practice by institutions of governance. Çağlar’s analysis shows how multilateral organizations reinterpret the concept of gender budgeting so that ‘gender’ once again becomes a social issue, rather than an economic factor. Analyzing the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, Çağlar finds that both interpret the policy problem of gender in macroeconomic policy, not by including non-monetarized production, but rather by reference to the post hoc implications of macroeconomic policy for women and the care economy. Rather than construing the care economy as an economic good or factor these are deemed part of the ‘social’ sphere. Policies based on this interpretation of gender only seek therefore to ameliorate the negative consequences of macroeconomic policy for women through social compensatory policies external of macroeconomic planning. Gender is once again rendered a non-economic policy issue.

Rather than focusing on differing levels of knowledge then, Çağlar’s analysis shows how in the case of gender budgeting, re-interpretations of the policy are just as important as they have been found to be in gender mainstreaming. Her analytical framework focuses more however on epistemic mechanisms, specifically boundary work, within the discipline of macro economics. In common with Andresen/Dölling, Çağlar’s analysis shows that existing forms of knowledge include ways of knowing and categories of interpretation which affect how gender issues are interpreted. Whilst Andresen/Dölling’s work show the epistemic constrains within practice, Çağlar’s analysis illustrates them within institutionally produced knowledge.

The Constitutive Role of Gender Knowledge in Migration Studies

Eberhardt/Schwenken’s analysis on the other hand shows another side of the relationship between knowledge and gender, illustrating how gender knowledge can itself be a constitutive part of ‘mainstream’ knowledge. Eberhardt/Schwenken analyzed two economic theories of migration which seek to explain why families migrate. Their analysis considered how gender differences were explained/presented and what relevance they were ascribed in generating explanations. Rather than referring to levels or forms of knowledge, Eberhardt/Schwenken structured their analysis simply around the implicit/explicit binary to identify what gender knowledge was present within economic theories of migration. They found that theory which was explicitly presented as gender neutral was in fact premised upon gender knowledge.

Critiquing Borjas’ model of migration (1987), Eberhardt/Schwenken found no explicit reference to gender differences in migration choices at all. Analyzing Mincer (1978) however they identified gender knowledges which did self-consciously and explicitly portray gender differences in behavior and experience. Mincer’s theory of family migration, argues that migratory behavior is family welfare maximization behavior. Within this theory women are explicitly constructed as tied movers or stayers, and men are explicitly constructed as independent movers or stayers. Mincer evidences
these premises using empirical findings which indicate sex-differentiated labor market power, where women’s wages are lower than men’s and their labor market participation is discontinuous. On this empirical evidence, Mincer’s theory extrapolates that men stand to gain or lose more from migration, on account of their higher wages. For women on the other hand, their gains or losses will be comparatively smaller on account of their pre-determined, lower, labor market power. These comparative differences in gains and losses, therefore lead Mincer to conclude that migration decisions of families will be based on men’s gains/losses, with women more frequently acting as the tied partner.

Eberhardt/Schwenken’s further analysis of Mincer’s theory makes it evident that implicit and unevidenced, gender knowledge is also constitutive of Mincer’s ideas. For instance his theory assumes a heteronormative construction of family relationships. Referring to empirical findings which indicate that women’s employment and wages drop on migration, Mincer argues that women’s individual losses are off-set by family welfare maximization. This conclusion is dependent however upon an assumption that women and men live in harmonious, complementary, family relationships where decisions and division of gains are undertaken consensually and altruistically.

Mincer’s explanation for females’ lower earnings after migration are also based upon assumptions of male and female roles – specifically, stereotypically gendered divisions of labor within a harmonious, consensual, environment. Mincer assumes women withdraw from the labor market upon migration because of “a temporary increase in family demand for non-market activity necessitated by setting up a new household in a new environment” (Mincer 1978:66). Men’s potential to respond to this demand is simply not considered and neither are the reasons why women usually fulfill this need. This shows how in Mincer’s research, the meaning of empirical evidence, in this case women’s higher wage losses, is interpreted through reference to an authors pre-existing gender knowledge.

Eberhardt and Schwenken point out what competing gender knowledges Mincer and Borjas’ models do not consider. Both focus only on the labor market as the sole motivation for migration so that gender is incorporated only through aspects of labor market motivations. This ignores families’ reproductive considerations and by extension the reproductive labor necessary in migration. Mincer and Borjas’ models also do not consider the impact of social roles, gendered power relations or gender discriminatory immigration policies as factors in migration behavior. Mincer’s theory nonetheless relies on reference to heteronormative gender roles and traditional gender divisions of labor, to derive explanations of migration choices and behavior.

Construction of the Migrant

Eberhardt/Schwenken further assert that within both Borjas and Mincer’s theories ‘the immigrant’ outside the family is modeled on ‘homo oeconomicus’, the rational, self-interested, individual. Eberhardt/Schwenken point out this immigrant is in fact, the
prototypical image of a man. They argue that this immigrant is dependent on personal freedom from caring, organizational and reproductive labor. In turn, this implies the presence of a spouse who fulfills these obligations. As a result Eberhardt/Schwenken argue that Mincer and Bojas’ theories of individual immigrant behavior are based upon a male immigrant, constructed with a deeply implicit, unconscious gender knowledge. Eberhardt/Schwenken’s findings therefore show that whilst gender might not be considered critically within theory or policy, gender knowledge is constitutive of explanations for migration in both explicit constructions of men and women, as well as implicitly in the construction of a ‘normal’ immigrant and families.

**Conclusion**

This chapter began with a synopsis of existing approaches to the analysis of gender mainstreaming where discursive/interpretative analysis and organizational approaches were illustrated and their utility was reviewed. Discursive/frame analysis approaches which concentrate on the construction of gender and gender mainstreaming, have shown the importance of meaning when researching gender equality policy. The wide variety of practices referred to as gender mainstreaming mean researchers must grasp the details of what exactly ‘gender mainstreaming’ (or any gender equality policy) really is in any particular instance and that any analysis must also cope with confusing contradictions within policies themselves. The resulting research agenda asks how these variations come about.

Research seeking to tackle these questions has most often looked at organizational characteristics in specific cases, to examine how implementation outcomes come about. They have not tended however to incorporate an analysis of meaning.

The gender knowledge concept embodies an approach which asserts that we must understand how gender is understood and known in order to understand gender outcomes. It provides an alternative to critical frame analysis or discursive analysis, which nonetheless focuses on the construction of gender. Most usefully it extends the potential field of analysis into practice, enabling examination of micro level processes which were previously hard to capture using discursive analysis. Gender knowledge thus bridges organizational and discursive approaches so that insights from both can be applied. By recreating common sense interpretative repertoires in an organization/bureaucracy, we can understand implementation processes and the negotiation mechanisms which they involve, in greater depth. Levels and forms of knowledge also allow us to understand contradictions in/between rhetoric and practice.

Existing work provides a number of theoretical ideas which supplement the underlying definition of gender knowledge “knowledge … about the difference between the sexes, the reasoning of the self-evidence and evidence [of these differences], [and] the prevailing normative ideas about the ‘correct’ gender relations and divisions of labor between women and men (Andresen and Dölling 2005:175, own translation). Differentiation between levels (objective/subjective) and forms of gender knowledge enable
the disentanglement of rhetorical commitments to gender equality and practical implementation. The epistemic dimension of gender knowledge however has the potential to stimulate particularly interesting insights into policy processes. Çağlar’s illustration of boundary work and the exclusion/inclusion of knowledge and knowers it involves, alerts us to processes and mechanisms in knowledge production which an analysis might use examining any instance of gender equality policy development. Eberhardt/Schwenken’s apparently simple implicit/explicit analysis on the other hand powerfully illustrates how gender knowledge shapes the expert knowledge which constructs policy knowledge.

Although the concept was originally developed with reference to the sociology of knowledge and organizational studies of implementation, Eberhardt/Schwenken and Çağlar have shown that use of the gender knowledge concept is equally suited to use within discourse analysis. Despite the sparse existing literature the concept of gender knowledge has already yielded fascinating theoretical developments and seems ripe for use in the analysis of gender mainstreaming and other aspects of feminist policy analysis.

References


Çağlar, Gülay (this volume) Multiple Meanings of Gender Budgeting: Gender Knowledge and Economic Knowledge in the World Bank and UNDP. In: Brigitte Young/Christoph Scherrer (Eds.) Gender Knowledge and Knowledge Networks in International Political Economy, Baden-Baden: Nomos


Knowledge and Policy Networks in Global Governance

_Diane Stone_

1. Introduction

Most contributors in this volume aim to analyze gendered knowledge embedded in economic theories and economic policy rules that inform and structure global governance. As is well known, feminists argue that every form of knowledge is based upon a specific knowledge of gender. Accordingly, “gender knowledge” pre-structures how problems are perceived and defined as well as the policy responses that result. Thus, a guiding question for the contributors concerns how the international political economy is constituted through this gendered knowledge and how this knowledge in turn is diffused and institutionalized through knowledge networks. This paper focuses on the social technology of networks as both agencies for transnational feminist networking and also as structures of often invisible, embedded codes of knowledge orders.

Liberal and democratic cosmopolitan thinkers see the rise of non-state actors as a progressive contribution to a global civil society and to a new and more democratic global ‘governance without government’ (Held, 2000). However, rather than organisational density and diversity disrupting hierarchies and dispersing power, global civil society can also help create new constellations of privatised power. Instead of being civil society manifestations of bottom-up, non-statist globalisation, networks and other formations may be viewed as ‘mutually implicated’ in the affairs of states and international organizations. Indeed, they have become one form of ‘governmentality’ (Sen ding & Neumann, 2006). For feminist scholarship such networks thus become an important domain for addressing issues of gender representation and inequalities as well as the perpetuation of patriarchy. The establishment of alternative or feminist networks is one strategy of critique and contestation. However, the discussion below will suggest that it is the policy character and political connections of networks that also determines how, when and if gender perspectives have influence on decision making agendas.

The following section introduces the idea of ‘global knowledge networks’ and how they connect to, but are different from, ‘transnational advocacy networks’ (TANs), ‘transnational executive networks’ (TENs) and ‘global public policy networks’ (GPPNs). It is followed by a short discussion on power and networks. The paper then discusses the relevance for assessing different network structures, arguing that transnational feminist advocacy of gender issues in the international political economy needs to be considered in conjunction with the network tool or mechanism. As a social technology, the network can be regarded as both organising structures and not only as agents or vehicles for advocacy. In other words, ‘which gendered knowledge is embedded in the global governance of economic theories and economic policy rules’ also entails looking at the different kinds of structures that embed and not only the issues and ideas that are researched, debated and advocated. As will be argued, transnational
networks are creating new public spaces that provide new scope for feminist analysis and critique.

2. Knowledge Networks/Policy Networks

Knowledge Networks (KNETS) do not exist in isolation from other kinds of networks. Indeed, a ‘knowledge network’ is an ideal type as are most other categories of policy network. Consequently, knowledge networks blur and overlap with other kinds of arrangements such as:

- TANS – transnational advocacy networks
- TENs – transnational executive networks
- GPPNs – global public policy networks

Other labels and categories abound in the literature. However, the four network types or species are used here for heuristic purposes to highlight the differing foundations of their organisation; that is, networks founded on the basis of shared norms, or public office and authority, or common policy interest, or scientific and knowledge concerns.

The first category are ‘transnational advocacy networks’ (TAN – Keck & Sikkink, 1998). TANs have the character of social movements. They characteristically accommodate a range of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and activists. They are bound together by shared values or ‘principled beliefs’ and a shared discourse where the dominant modality is information exchange. They are called advocacy networks because ‘advocates plead the causes of others or defend a cause or proposition’ (Keck & Sikkink, 1998: 8). Examples include the transnational campaigns surrounding issues like anti-slavery, debt relief and ‘blood diamonds’. TANs usually have a strong normative basis for moral judgement in seeking to shape the climate of public debate and influence global policy agendas. However, compared to other network species, they are not well integrated into policy making and operate more like ‘outsider groups’.

There are numerous examples of TANs with a gender orientation. The following list is merely illustrative of the diversity:

- African Women's Development and Communication Network – FEMNET;
- Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era – DAWN;
- Women Against Violence Europe: WAVE is a network of European women's non-governmental organisations working in the field of combating violence against women and children;
- Women in Development Europe: WIDE is a European feminist network of women’s organisations, development NGOs, gender specialists and women’s rights activists;
European Women’s Lobby which fosters coordination of women’s organisations at the European Union (EU) level facilitates communication with the Commission (Pudovska and Marx Ferree, 2004: 121);

Women Living Under Muslim Laws.

Many more examples could be given. The growth of transnational advocacy networks has been propelled by technological advances in transport and communications. All of the above, and others mentioned below, have a sophisticated web-presence (see Appendix 1).

As noted by True (2007: 378) of women’s transnational advocacy networking, ‘Women’s international NGOs have empowered the United Nations World conferences and in turn, the United Nations has opened spaces for their global influence, though not always with enthusiasm’. This has often had a ‘boomerang effect’ back into national policy contexts with re-definitions of state interests and identities as a result of transnational influence. This is an indirect, discursive or ideational impact on policy where ideas and language shape the way in which we think and shape policy.

The impact of feminist inspired TANs at the EU level has also been noted by Katherine Zippel in the issue area of sexual harassment (2004). In this supra-national context, ‘Administrative policy making relies more on transnational expertise than public opinion’ and the EU is relatively porous to the policy advocacy of feminist networks (Zippel, 2004: 64). Furthermore, the development of transnational feminist expertise helps subsequently to legitimize issues at a national level.

Quite clearly, feminist scholars and activists have had powerful impact in developing the ideas, concepts, research results and position papers, the language and symbols to give identity to the feminist movement and specific definition to gender issues. TANs challenging gender hierarchy have also been identified in relation to, inter alia, foot binding (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) or networking of Russian women activists (Sperling, et al. 2001) or advocacy of women’s networks around the 1992 Rio Earth Summit (Bretherton, 2003: 115). “By providing alternative discourses, TANs can help transform what are regarded as radical demands into concrete policy issues…” (Zippel, 2004: 64). In this regard they can also be interpreted as a ‘transnational discourse coalitions’ where the influence or impact of feminist norms or ideas can be addressed by the extent to which such coalitions achieve discourse structuration – and finally, institutionalisation in policy processes and public policy (Hajer, 1993).

Discourse coalitions seek to impose their ‘discourse’ in policy domains. If their discourse shapes the way in which society conceptualises the world or a particular problem, then the coalition has achieved ‘discourse structuration’ and agendas are likely to be restricted to a limited spectrum of possibilities. If a discourse becomes entrenched in the minds of many as the dominant mode of perception, it can become distilled in institutions and organisational practices as the conventional mode of reasoning or ‘global space characterized by regimes of truth’ (Prügl, 2004: 72). This latter process is ‘discourse institutionalisation’.

The framework captures how discourses are transformed in their articulation through the policy cycle. Notwithstanding the agenda-setting victories of feminist
scholars and activists, discourses are not stable or uncontested and can be transformed by the institutional context into which they are propelled.

The typical trajectory whenever significant changes in discourse occur is that critical research supported by activism first wages a major struggle to change old concepts and frameworks and introduce new ones. In the field of gender and development, many such struggles have been waged to gain acceptance and use for concepts such as ‘gender’, ‘empowerment’, ‘women’s human rights’, ‘reproductive and sexual health’ and ‘reproductive and sexual rights’. But such a struggle is not a once and for all event. As the new frameworks and concepts begin to be used, they are also interpreted and reinterpreted to suit the predilections of the user. In the process their meanings may become more fuzzy and multivalent with different people and institutions using the same terminology in very different ways. As Humpty Dumpty (sic) said to Alice, a word can come to mean whatever the user wants it to mean! (Sen, 2004: 12).

To understand the politics of discourse is to understand a key element of how knowledge in the form of research, professional codes and expert advice gets translated into policy.

The second kind of network is the ‘global public policy network’ (GPPN) that delivers or regulates global public goods (Reinicke & Deng, 2000). GPPNs are trisectoral in character; that is, they are alliances of government agencies alongside international organisations as well as corporations and elements of civil society. Official involvement of public actors bestowing governmental patronage or development assistance gives a quasi-public veneer and some ‘insider’ status to these networks. Stakeholders invest in these communities to pursue material interests but have in common a shared problem. Their interactions are shaped by resource dependencies and bargaining. They tend to cohere around international organisations and governments that have entered into a policy partnership for the delivery of global public goods.

The transnational character of policy problems establishes rationales for co-operation. These problems have led to new forms of ‘soft’ authority recognised in these networks. Examples include the Apparel Industry Partnership, the Global Gas Flaring Initiative, and the Global Environment Facility. There are, however, many more networks. Over time the network may become institutionalised with the creation of formal arrangements such as advisory committees, consultation procedures and recognition by state and multilateral agencies in the implementation of policies.

Compared to TANS, which tend to be generated by ‘bottom-up’ strategic initiatives with solid foundations in civil society or connected to wider social movements, there are few GPPNs recognisable as having a specific gender orientation.

1 See the working papers at: www.globalpublicpolicy.net/.
• Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) Gender and Diversity Program;
• The Gender Focal Point Network (GFPN) which provides a mechanism to integrate gender considerations into APEC activities.

This may reflect the institutional norms and values of the international organisations that tend to take the initiative in convening these multilateral policy partnerships.

The third kind is a ‘transnational executive network’. In this perspective, the state is not disappearing but it is becoming disaggregated and penetrated by horizontal networks existing between ‘high level official officials directly responsive to the national political process – the ministerial level – as well as between lower level national regulators’ (Slaughter, 2004: 19). These networks of judges, legislators or regulators such as utilities commissioners are intergovernmental in character and the state remains core. The actors who compose TENs are formally designated power holders and rule makers who derive their authority from their official positions within their nation-state. Terrorists, arms dealers, money launderers, drug cartels, and human traffickers operate through global networks. The underlying logic of TENs is that networked threats require networked responses. Examples of such networks include the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (INECE), the Basel Committee on banking standards, and the Financial Action Task Force on money laundering.

Of the four network species, TENs have greatest executive authority where government officials have a dual domestic and international function. Networks become tools for the maintenance of sovereignty where global problems are solved by ‘networked government’ responses. As mechanisms for the state to re-invent itself, transnational executive networks offer a system of ‘checks and balances’ to ensure accountability and public responsiveness (Slaughter, 2004: 29).

Again, compared to TANS, it is a less easy exercise to find TENs specifically structured around gender issues. However, the following examples may qualify:

• The World Bank External Gender Consultative Group;
• International Knowledge Network of Women in Politics. 3

While this paper does not pretend to provide a comprehensive map of feminist policy/advocacy networks, nevertheless the key organizing roles of international organisations and state agencies in creating and funding GPPNs and TENS (outlined below) point to the low prioritisation of gender issues in these issue specific and functionally oriented policy networks.

3 The International Knowledge Network of Women in Politics (iKNOW Politics) is an online workspace designed to serve the needs of elected officials, candidates, political party leaders and members, researchers, students and other practitioners interested in advancing women in politics. It is a joint project of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). It is what Anne-Marie Slaughter would describe as an informational sharing network.
Instead, rather than the formation of gender-oriented TENs, there is more evidence of institutionalisation of women’s policy concerns inside international organisation with formal structures such as The Commission on the Status of Women. The relative absence of feminist informed TENS, as opposed to the proliferation of advocacy networks, points to the divisions within the women’s movement on engagement with power and authority and the related pitfalls of cooption and dilution. “In her study of the World Health Organization and HIV/AIDS policy for Africa, Karen Booth (1998) found that feminist-oriented, international bureaucrats were ultimately accountable to member nation-states and not to women’s movements” (cited in True, 2007: 382). This dynamic is likely to be magnified in TENs. Inclusion as an actor in these networks is predefined by ones official position in a state agency or state sanctioned body.

There is on-going debate within the women’s movement that engagement with governments and international organisations via transnational networks, such as in the advocacy of gender mainstreaming at UN conferences, has distanced and estranged certain women’s organizations from the grass roots. For example, the view that “participation in transnational networks has generated a ‘proliferation of feminist apparatchiks who identify conference organizing with activism’” (Spivak quoted in Bretherton, 2003: 116). That is, the technocratic impulses behind UN international conferences and donor agencies and how they deploy knowledge and expertise on gender mainstreaming works “to institutionalise women’s equity, but through the depoliticisation of activism” (Gouws, 2007: 30-31). The fear is that women who are transnationally networked operate within the existing processes of global governance, and are advocating gender mainstreaming within existing power structures of the neoliberal framework. The critical content of feminist knowledge is ‘hollowed-out’ and used for symbolic purposes. By the same token, more radical groups are outside these transnational networks and instead moving through the anti-globalisation movement.

A KNET is a fourth type of network. One of the few definitions of ‘international knowledge network’ is that of ‘a system of coordinated research, study (and often graduate-level teaching), results dissemination and publication, intellectual exchange, and financing across national boundaries’ (Parmar, 2002:13). This definition places greater emphasis on co-ordination and the transnational dimensions of knowledge generation and dissemination. It is an elitist view of experts informing policy.

Knowledge networks incorporate professional bodies, academic research groups and scientific communities that organise around a special subject matter or issue. Individual or institutional inclusion in such networks is based upon professional or official recognition of expertise such as commitment to certain journals, conferences or other gatherings and organs that help bestow scholarly, ideological and scientific credibility. KNETs are often also practically engaged in ‘capacity building’; that is mobilising funds and other resources for scholarships and training, supporting insti-

---

4 The Commission, a functional commission of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), dedicated exclusively to gender equality and advancement of women. It is the principal global policy-making body. Forty-five Member States of the United Nations serve as members of the Commission at any one time.
tutional consolidation that facilitates both network regeneration and knowledge con-
struction. The primary motivation of such networks is to create and advance knowledge
as well as to share, spread and, in some cases, use that knowledge to inform policy and
apply it to practice. For instance, the International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN)
is composed of feminist gender specialists who provide technical information on gen-
der and trade issues to women's groups, NGOs, social movements and governments.
That is, it feeds in knowledge and technical advice to the broader women’s movement
and provides services and training such as to build economic literacy so that: “we
become better equipped to engage with those who make and implement trade and
economic policies”.5

Knowledge networks are essential for the international spread of knowledge, norms
and what is deemed international ‘best practice’ on matters such as privatisation, gen-
der mainstreaming or corporate social responsibility. International organisations and
other multilateral initiatives require policy analysis and research to support problem
definition, outline policy solutions, to monitor and evaluate existing policy as well as
to provide scholarly legitimation for policy development. They contract think tanks,
universities and consultant firms as sources of international policy analysis and advice.
In other words, knowledge is a key resource in global public policy development, and
KNETs a form of ‘governmentality’.

Many transnational knowledge networks can be classified by their issue orientation.
For example, the small-scale South Asian Research Network (SARN) on Gender, Law
and Governance is composed of feminist research groups from five countries (Rai,
2004). By contrast, the Evian Group conducts trade-related research and convenes high
level dialogues on the future role of the WTO.6 Often knowledge networks have a
strong ideological character, like the US based International Center for Economic
Growth (ICEG) whose member institutes adhere to liberal principles of economic and
political organisation.7 There are other distinctions between KNETs. At one extreme,
groups such as the Researchers Alliance for Development adopt an ‘open assembly’
organisational style given that involvement is open to interested stakeholders. By con-
trast, at the other extreme, Evian is more club-like. Examples of KNETS with a gender
focus include:

- The International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN);
- Global Gender Research Network (on line database);
- DAWN as above;
- Research Network on Gender Politics and the State;
- The ‘Gender in International Political Economy’ group that works in conjunction
  with (and beyond) the European commission funded Network of Excellence, GAR-
  NET.

5 IGTN Economic literacy: http://www.igtn.org/page/economic/.
6 Further information at: www.eviangroup.org.
7 Further information at: www.iceg.org.
Another distinction to be made is the degree of policy relevance of these networks. Some are focused primarily on knowledge creation and sharing. Others like IGTN operate with an agenda of using knowledge to inform policy and practice.

Reprise

As is also the case with the other network categories, KNET is not a pure type. Instead, knowledge networks blur and blend with other network types. More often than not, KNETs overlap with, or sometimes fold into, GPPNs and TANs in a ‘web’ of interactions that also intersect with official decision-making venues. Consequently, both DAWN and SARN have features of both a KNET but also in some degree, that of a TAN given its advocacy of women’s rights. DAWN’s statement about its global advocacy crystallises this combination:

DAWN’s research themes provide the focus for the network’s global advocacy efforts, which are aimed at influencing mainstream development thinking and policy, securing the gains made through the UN conferences, working for greater accountability and radical restructuring of international financial institutions, and mainstrea-ming gender analysis in progressive development organisation. http://www.dawn-net.org/GLOBAL_AD.HTML

CGIAR has features of both a GPPN and also a KNET given its research orientation. The European Womens Lobby is part funded by the European Commission and actively engaging with this regulatory structure (Pudrovska & Marx Ferree, 2004: 135).

Some TENs are strongly focused on information sharing. Consequently, these network species are fluid categories. And the policy engaged networks are founded on some form of ‘taken-for-granted’ knowledge and expertise entrenched in the way it approaches economic, political and social issues.

3. A Note on Network Power

At least three points on network power are worth consideration. First, there is normative and ideational power in the sense of networks as creators and broadcasters of ideas that inform perception and set agendas. Second, networks function as structures that exclude/include, co-opt/induct; legitimise/revoke or accept/deny perspectives and participants. Third, is the concept of authority and the manner in which it is disaggregated from the traditional Weberian understanding of a public sector bureaucracy and re-invented in semi-private or quasi-official policy networks in a part privatisation of global governance.

First, governments as well as international organisations require the creation and widespread acceptance of persuasive accounts ‘public policy problems’ as the basis of legitimate policy and just laws. Public institutions depend on groups of ‘experts’ whose views on such issues are considered authoritative. As would be expected there are
different theoretical accounts of how knowledge and norms impact upon and influence. For reasons of brevity, only two accounts can be touched upon here: (i) neo-marxist/Granscian ideas of ‘embedded knowledge networks; (ii) discourse accounts.

The ‘embedded knowledge network’ framework stresses the role of ideas being connected and subsidiary to interests (Sinclair, 2000). KNETs represent a means for sustaining the neo-liberal capitalist order through the reproduction of ideas supportive of it. That is, scientific expertise is used for ideological purposes of ‘paradigm maintenance’ and the normalisation of dominant discourses of power. Consequently, policy becomes a battle of ideas, networks the battlegrounds and knowledge a weapon in the service of material interests.

However, hegemony is incomplete and partial. The approach posits a degree of intentionality or purpose to knowledge agents and networks that is not necessarily the case. A grid-like complex of ideas shaping consciousness and dominating the global order gives little credence to alternative world-views and sites of intellectual resistance. Furthermore, internally, networks are often composed of contradictory knowledges. A related approach drawing upon subaltern studies and the critical feminist literature sees knowledge-makers as ‘those engaged in historical transmissions as well as those in defiance of dominant epistemological flows of power’. This perspective loosens the hegemonic grid-like power of the neo-Granscian approach. It also overlaps with discursive frameworks in that it draws upon Manuel Castells to speak of ‘communication codes’ that help integrate and expand networks into flows of power and globalising capitalism (Rai, 2004).

The ‘transnational discourse community’ perspective allows scope for ideas to have independent force and inherent power, diffusing into consciousness. Discourse is less directed or strategic. Transnational women’s networks can be readily analysed as discourse coalitions using symbols, policy narratives, story lines and language that imbue networks with strong advocacy roles. However, the policy networks that are the main focus of this paper, are cast in largely gender-neutral technocratic terms.

In ascertaining influence, the neo-Granscian frameworks help identify knowledge networks lacking political influence or choosing to challenge dominant policy discourses. WLUM or DAWN are subaltern KNETs. Notwithstanding their lack of policy or political influence, these networks perform wider societal roles of knowledge creation and capacity building. Networks that appear to have little policy impact or to be espousing unorthodox policy perspectives are neither completely ineffectual nor hopelessly marginalised. Instead, subaltern KNETs and the TANs they interact with are symptomatic of how dominated groups form identities through common language and understanding, and mobilize resources around alternative definitions of reality. Accordingly, this paper does not concur with the view that “networked women have learned to work within the existing processes of global governance . . . (where) inevitably this inhibits action intended to undermine dominant norms and practices” (Bretherton, 2003: 116). Instead, it is necessary to disentangle the different species of network to consider the type of network under consideration, as well as the motivations and aims of its constituents.
Second, networks do systematise the knowledge generated by diverse individual and organisational knowledge actors and impose a rationality that gives precedence to a particular conception of knowledge – usually of a codified, technocratic, secular, westernised and gendered variety. The expansion of knowledge networks as ‘sites of authority’ – and broader policy networks that utilise these sites of authority – potentially accelerates the ‘normalisation of the dominant discourses of power’. But as Elisabeth Prügl notes, it also brings some new opportunities.

While institutionalized feminism thus risks absorption into the language of technique, it also may give feminists access to expert languages. … In order to penetrate the barrier between feminism and economic liberalism, feminists within the World Bank have adopted economic expert language and made an argument for women’s equality based on the principles of institutional economics. This may be interpreted as a cooptation into neo-liberal “truths,” but also has gained feminist economists increased attention within the institution (Prügl, 2004: 79).

Inclusion is a double-edged sword. As noted above, it does come at the cost of some estrangement with grass-roots groups and activists not so well versed in the ‘communication codes’ and jargonised argot of neo-liberal agendas on matters as varied as PRSPS, GATS or GPGs.

Given that processes of knowledge formation and the institutionalization of expertise are in themselves political exercises, the Bank’s knowledge (whether internally developed or drawn through patronage of KNETs) shapes global governance. Knowledge networks not only provide expert interpretations and scientific narratives, they also create self-supporting structures of authority to incarnate as ‘neutral’ research brokers and advisors. The legitimacy and credibility of a knowledge network’s expertise is drawn through a circular process between the knowledge it produces and the audiences that use and thereby legitimize that knowledge. In sum, KNETs do not simply ‘crystallize around different sites and forms of power’ (Held, 2000: 19) for its products to be used by more powerful actors; instead, the network is one site and form of power in itself and its capacities to (re)produce knowledges and discourses that define fields of action.

More generally, the different varieties of networks that intersect and help compose public spaces can be a force for democratisation by creating a venue for representation of ‘stakeholder’ interests, a means for wider participation in modes of global governance and a venue for societal voices. In short, networks are ‘gateways’. However, these same networks can also be exclusive, elite and closed to deliberative decision-making. For instance, the discourse and techno-scientific language as well as professional credentials of those within networks can be a form of ‘gate keeping’. This is especially the case in policy networks that operate on the basis of specialised technical knowledge.

8 PRSPS – Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers; GATS – General Agreement on Trade in Services; GPGs – global public goods.
The barriers to participation in policy networks are not restricted to expert credentials or conformity to the norms or ideology of an international regime. Sustained participation across the myriad transnational regulatory ‘coalitions’ or ‘policy alliances’ is resource intensive. Accessing global public policy networks requires time, commitment and funds. Many developing countries, and most ordinary citizens, do not have sufficient resources to devote to national policy deliberations. When developing countries are stretched significantly to deliver adequate representation in official venues such as WTO negotiations or treaty discussions, effective strategies for engaging with the more informal global policy processes may remain elusive.

A third point on the power of networks revolves around their often ambiguous public or private status. It almost goes without saying that feminist scholars have been at the forefront of identifying and analysing the construction of public/private divisions in relation to the public world of work and the ‘private’ domain of the family and other social institutions. Notions of the separate (male) public sphere and (female) private domain have been comprehensively deconstructed for their gender biases.

Gender also matters in the IPE. Feminist inspired political economists have elaborated how the commodification and privatisation of public services is linked to the liberalization of trade and investment in services covered by GATS, reconfiguring gender relations in different regions of the world (see the sources in Schwenken and Basten, 2007: 3). But the neo-liberal regulatory framework is also accompanied by new forms of public action, belated and inadequate though that may be. Transnational ‘public spaces’ are evolving and expanding. The networks that populate the international political economy often have fluid and interchangeable characteristics; private but undertaking public action and vice versa. While TENs are at the most public, legalistic and delegated governmental end of official public action, GPPNs are more trisectoral and hybrid. That is, a mix of private and public. Likewise, TANs can also incorporate official actors but tend to have more of civil society location or home.

The activities of various transnational policy networks reveal the dual dynamics of new public spaces carved out in tandem with privatising modes of decision making. In other words, “globalization makes such publicness more problematic … reshaping multi-level governance around various ‘new architectures’ that will recreate the ‘public’ either at a higher level or through a more complex network structure” (Cerny, 2006: 105). This has also been noted by Tetyana Pedrovskia and Marx Ferree (2004: 122) who argue that global politics creates spaces – psychological, physical, organisational and virtual – that facilitates participation of national women activists in transnational discussions.

A new binary is being constructed where the re-creation of the ‘public’ in new global governance architectures is fundamentally different from the public spaces of civil society, the anti-globalisation movement or subaltern networks which some regard as the appropriate domain for women’s transnational discussions.

Opposing one category of the public to another, one realm against another, serves to mask the ways in which the professed functional differentiation of spheres associated
with civil society, the state and the economy is achieved through the workings of hegemonic power (McLaughlin, 2004: 163).  

In contrasting women’s activism in (global) civil society with an estrangement to professional or expert women engaging with institutions of global governance, the women’s movement itself can reinforce categories of gendered identity of different transnational public domains by a valorisation of cultural and group difference to the neglect of new political economy realities. The technocratic discourse and functional orientation of policy networks remains unchallenged.

Multi-level polycentric forms of public policy in which a plethora of global institutions and networks negotiate within and between international agreements and private regimes have emerged as pragmatic responses in the absence of international government. Whether proactively or reluctantly, governments are devolving aspects of public policy as well as delegating authority. This is a double devolution; first, to domains beyond the nation-state in global and regional domains; and second, a devolution of authority to private networks and non-state actors. Within this expansion and splintering of the transnational public sphere, feminist thinking and activism needs a "better understanding of how women’s lives are shaped in a context in which global spaces and places are increasingly integrated and deterritorialized, even as they remain stratified" (McLaughlin, 2004: 166).

Accordingly, as elaborated in the next section, the intention is to convey how global policy processes of the international political economy reflect restructured policy-making milieu and include/exclude actors via a ‘privatisation’ of global governance. Targeting the policy agendas of international organisations is insufficient to comprehend the scale and diversity of global governance structures and practices. The appropriation of policy-making by policy networks and the increasing complexity and autonomy of these institutions potentially make it difficult, particularly for developing economies, marginalized communities and women’s activists, to become fully embedded in these policy-making processes.

4. Transnational Networks and Feminist Engagement

Why is it relevant and useful to make distinction between the transnational policy network structures identified earlier? Such a distinction “… allows us to understand the ways in which gender relations are disturbed, and then reconstituted at different social levels within particular political economies” (Hoskyns & Rai: 14) Rather than political economy, this paper’s concern is with global public policy that brings a coordination and regulation of the international political economy via networks. Transnational policy networks are organizations created under new global regimes which, in the words of Elisabeth Prügl:

9 This can also be seen in the distinction between ‘globalisation from above’ and ‘globalisation from below’.
… can be understood as the agents of the regime, doing its business in the world to help spread its rules and adapt them to new challenges. The use of gender and other status categories in order to distribute rewards and produce loyalties make organizations a particularly pernicious reproducer of gender inequality (2004:75).

But no one network is alike. Where certain networks perpetuate gender inequality other types – like TANs – can help confront and combat it. There is a dual dynamic of counter-public spheres.

Val Moghadam’s (2000) study of transnational feminist networks provides an account of individuals and networks around the world that:

… paved the road to the 1990’s consensus on women’s human rights and the triumph at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993. … In fact, the world's women first mobilized precisely around economic development issues during the United Nations’ Decade on Women (1975-85), and several well-known and established transnational feminist networks remain focused on issues of development assistance, trade policy, and neo-liberal economic policies. These include the networks Women in Development Europe (WIDE) and Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN). Both networks monitor and criticize the European Union's development assistance and trade policies with Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and the newer World Trade Organization (Moghadam, 2000: 724).

Moghadam studies start with women initiated networks and how they have contributed to international agendas from their standpoint in global civil society. By contrast, the assumption here is that transnational policy networks are embedded in global governance, represent a new logic of “governmentality” and have been established to design, deliver and monitor global public goods. As will be discussed below, this shifts the focus of women’s interest in civil society to new spaces of delegated public authority and decision-making.

This paper is less optimistic than Jacqui True who has nevertheless, developed a more comprehensive concept of ‘global public policy’ than Moghadam. True has argued that: ‘Collaboration among feminist researchers, advocates and policy makers is making gender analysis part of the routine practices and institutions of global governance’ (2007: 368). Her position is that it is less a matter of concern for feminist scholars and activists of cooption by powerful institutions and a matter of greater concern of not being able to afford not to engage with such organisations. For True, ‘gender mainstreaming’ has become a global strategy and has been recognised by many national governments, regional associations and international organisations.

However, ‘global public policy’ is not necessarily as ‘public’ as the public sector organizations found in liberal democracies or established through inter-governmental treaty arrangements. Instead, global policy processes can be considerably more exclusive, closed, fluid, temporary, ad hoc, and privatised, hence more immune, opaque and unaccountable to sovereign authorities or civic critique. It is part of a more general “reordering of the private and the public and the greater fluidity between market

10 She describes them as ‘global civil society organizations, transnational advocacy networks, and transnational social movement organizations” (2005:4).
and non-market activities” that necessitates a reconceptualisation of basic categories (Hoskyns & Rai, 2005: 12).

In other words, there is much consideration to be given to the manner in which the notion of ‘public space’ is of a conceptually different order than has been understood within traditional Westphalian sovereign state structures. Private regimes such as IOSCO or TENS like the Basel Committee, soft law and self-regulation as well as public-private partnerships like the GAVI Alliance on vaccines and immunization change the dynamics of accountability and representation of interests. National public institutions no longer serve as the sole organizing center for policy. Instead, it is necessary to “look at the restructuring of the playing field itself” (Cerny, 2006: 97); that is, the historical and structural changes to the ‘state’ and ‘sovereignty’. And with it comes the merging and the blurring of the commercial and the public domains in global domain. These developments push out new public spaces beyond the inter-governmental community of sovereign states. “An attachment to the notion of the public sphere as a nation-centered (sic) arena is one reason for critics’ delayed recognition of the importance of understanding transnational public spaces” (McLaughlin, 2004: 162). Likewise, with women’s networking from civil society geared at targeting traditional institutions of an intergovernmental world – that is, international organizations and national agencies – feminist practice reinforce orthodox notions of the nation-state spaces of public authority.

Transnational policy networks represent new domains for the pursuit of gender mainstreaming, gender equality and other concerns as well as imply new pressures on feminist activists and scholars to keep pace with evolving policy practice. In other words, policy networks are also political spaces to re-invent the processes of policy design, implementation and evaluation by taking into account the gender-specific and often diverse interests and values of differently situated women and men. These developments “call for the deepening of analysis of institutions” in the international policy economy, rather than a shrinking away from them (Gouws, 2007: 33).

Feminist scholars have tended to treat networks as a social technology for the advocacy of women’s rights and for the diffusion feminist ideas and ideals. That is, the network as a means to an end to lobby traditional institutions of governance. However, networks are not just vehicles to drive forward feminist aspirations and causes, but have become structures of global governance. Depending on composition and issue focus, such networks vary in their degree of porosity to women’s participation and receptiveness to gender concerns. The speculative basis of this paper has been that the activism and advocacy of feminist scholars and policy makers has been most pronounced in TANs and subaltern KNETs. Feminist policy networks have been far less apparent in the form of TENS and GPPNs within which substantial material and political resources are mobilized. As these latter types of networks tend to be highly technical and legalistic in mode of operation, and ‘below the radar’ of public attention and pressures for accountability, they are over-looked as domains for the reproduction of gender inequality.
An admittedly superficial search on Google Scholar suggests that the TAN concept is also the preferred framework of analysis among feminist and other researchers for explaining and understanding transnational activism (see also Pudrovska & Marx Ferree, 2004: 122). In some respects, the adoption of the TAN framework has some semblance to the values and priorities of second wave feminism. An emphasis on solidarity and common awareness of oppression, activism through grass-roots groups, the development of processes for democratic communication, a suspicion of mainstream power of the 1970s were followed in the 1980s by greater formalisation of interactions with the institutionalisation of women’s networks post-Beijing. As noted earlier, criticisms of the professionalisation and cooption of women activists and scholars may have contributed to an aversion to the network arrangements that ‘embed’ women in the power structure. As post-colonial feminist scholars would indicate, while integrating women into development paradigm may have failed to empower women in much of the ‘Third World’, it has served the interests of western(ised) elite women. This criticism applies equally to transnational policy networks. Effective participation in such networks requires scarce resources: time and funds for international meetings, high educational attainment or professional experience and skilled mastery of communication codes and policy discourses.

The growth of transnational networks has resulted in the creation of new policy spaces. In turn this entails new arenas for alternative politics, new actors and audiences, and new kinds of strategising for women centred policy development. Networks also have impact on the spaces and opportunities for the agency of women and for women’s NGOs.

Just as the “state is not inherently patriarchal but an ongoing construction, erratic in its discourses and practices” (True, 2007: 382) so too networks can be transformed through a critical mass of women in network deliberations. But while there has been analysis of how ‘femocrats’ have ‘played the state’, such analyses of the influence of women in international organizations is growing but limited, and of their participation in the distinctive types of transnational policy regimes it is negligible.

Without a doubt, global civil society is characterised by a multiplicity of women’s networks. However, this does not necessarily mean that women are networked as a structural force in global policy making. Whether they are labelled ‘networks’, ‘policy partnerships’ ‘global funds’ or ‘alliances’, governance arrangements like the Partnership for Child Development, Cities Alliance, the International Tax Dialogue or the Global Forum for Health Research, to give a few further examples, are abounding in number and policy reach. They differ dramatically in the extent to which gender concerns are integrated or made invisible. To some degree, transnational policy networks fall outside the intergovernmental pattern of decision making dominated by international organisation and states. There is a dissonance between what can be decided, promoted and sometimes achieved within sovereign states and international conventions, and the semi-public private or informal networks fragmenting the global policy domain.
Just as in the domestic sphere, the scrutiny of, and public interventions of accountability into these partly privatised domains of policy making becomes intensely political. But first, such transnational policy domains have to be noticed. If gender issues are not on the agenda of the issue specific concerns of certain TENs or KNETs, given their technocratic orientations, then gender concerns are more easily deflected and/or referred either back to the national level or to the exclusive concern of women’s networks in civil society. The nature of the policy processes of these networks present barriers not to the individual participation of women – as experts, as state representatives or as policy professionals – but to the inclusion of gendered discourses. In the unfinished struggle against patriarchal attitudes and practices in traditional political arenas, it remains difficult to keep pace with new battle fronts emerging in new policy spaces of the transnational public sphere.

5. Conclusion

Global policy networks set in motion a structural dynamic that both excludes and opens up policy making to certain groups. In principle, policy networks are a flatter and more horizontal structure (compared to public sector hierarchies) that are porous to participation of private and civil society actors. Yet, networks also privatise decision-making. Policy debate is not taken out of the public domain but it is cordoned off from those not deemed to be so-called ‘stakeholders’ or those without mastery of the specialized communication code. Networks privatise knowledge as well as turn it into a public good. Network participation is double-edged and can have perverse consequences in promoting a professionalization that takes women away from their grass-roots and aspirations of participation whilst also providing access and opportunity to inform policy debate.

Networks are becoming a mode of governance whereby the patterns of linkages and interaction are the means through which joint policy is organised. In short, there is a functional interdependence between public and private actors whereby networks allow resources to be mobilised towards common policy objectives in domains delegated or de-linked from the hierarchical control of governments. Furthermore, the network logic itself is being diffused by international organisations with their advocacy of partnership and tripartite policy coalitions as method to deal with global problems.\textsuperscript{11} It promotes a flexibility and efficiency in dealing with relatively intractable cross-border policy issues.

But while these arrangements have become effective mechanisms of transnational policy coordination and partnership, they also fracture and fragment. These quasi-public policy networks are ‘under the radar’ and represent multiplicities of policy autonomy and mutated authority that makes them difficult to track, monitor, engage and reform. It is easier to target an international organisation like the World Bank and

\textsuperscript{11} See Footnote 2., above regarding the DGF financed programs.
criticise and lobby it on ‘women’s development’ and gender issues in structural adjustment than it is to chase the myriad of issue-specific, jargon-ridden, technically oriented policy networks.

For feminists, the project for gender equality is scattered amongst a widening field of networks which differ dramatically in their receptiveness to gender issues and concepts. This calls for professional feminist policy entrepreneurs who take gender issues beyond mainstream political forums of national bureaucracies and international organisations like the UN or the World Bank into new forums of policy making. The fragmentation of policy means that activism and policy advocacy on gender issues also must become multi-pronged. If the focus remains on traditional international organisations and international development assistance programs, then much will be missed. In other words, a move from inter-governmental ‘state feminism’ to ‘global policy feminism’ is imperative.

Engagement with policy networks returns us to “traditional divides within feminism between essentialism (separation) and incorporation (integration)” (Hoskyns & Rai, 2005: 20). Indeed, there is likely to be further cost of fracturing in the feminist movement. There is also a danger of fragmentation of feminist scholarship in pursuing these issue specific policy domains in disaggregating and disuniting the community, unpacking the mutually advantageous relationships among feminist researchers, activists and policymakers. New dividing lines emerge not only around disciplinary specialization and issue-area expertise but also between those ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the network.

Appendix 1. Network Acronyms and Websites

- DAWN: http://www.dawnnet.org/about.html
- European Women’s Lobby – EWL: http://www.womenlobby.org/
- The Gender Focal Point Network – GFPN: http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/som_special_task_groups/gender_focal_point_network.html
- Global Gender Research Network: http://www.globalgender.net/
- The International Gender and Trade Network – IGTN: http://www.igtn.org/
- International Knowledge Network of Women in Politics: http://www.iknowpolitics.org/en/node/220
- Research Network on Gender Politics and the State: http://libarts.wsu.edu/polisci/rns/
- Women in Development Europe – WIDE: http://wide.gloobal.net/

References


Schwenken, Helen and Basten, Anna (2007) Bibliography – Gender in International Political Economy, GARNET-Network of Excellence on Global Governance, Regionalisation and Regulation, University of Muenster, Germany


Multiple Meanings of Gender Budgeting: Gender Knowledge and Economic Knowledge in the World Bank and UNDP

Gülay Çağlar

1 Introduction

Over the past decade there has been a growing international interest in gender budgeting as a tool for gender-equitable economic governance. The idea of gender budgeting gained momentum in the context of increasing international discontent with structural adjustment policies introduced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank during the 1980’s. In the 1990’s, transnational women’s networks and feminist economists began directing attention to the gendered effects of economic restructuring and called for gender-equitable macroeconomic policies. In this context they referred to gender budgeting as an instrument for reformulating macroeconomic policies from a gender perspective. By intensively advocating for gender budgeting in the field of global economic governance, transnational women’s networks and feminist economists significantly contributed to the popularity of gender budgeting at the international level. In particular, feminist economists played a pivotal role in feminist policy advocacy in providing knowledge about why and how to implement gender budgeting.

Within the last decade, many international organizations have put gender budgeting on their policy agenda. They support gender budget initiatives in various countries of the Global South by providing funds as well as expertise on gender budgeting, i.e. in the form of training resources or capacity-building workshops for government officials, parliamentarians and civil society representatives. These activities notably contributed to the emergence of gender budget initiatives all over the world.

This article focuses on the ways in which the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have taken up the idea of gender budgeting. The reason why I have chosen these two organizations is that they are the most influential organizations of international development policy. Besides their annual publications, i.e. the World Development Report (World Bank) and the Human Development Report (UNDP), their manuals, strategy papers, etc. on issues of gender and economic development are usually widely acknowledged.

At first glance it seems that the engagement of the World Bank and UNDP in gender budgeting is based on a common sense of the objective of gender budgeting. However, upon closer examination there are considerable differences in what these organizations are targeting through gender budgeting. Differences can be detected in regard to two aspects: First, there are substantial differences in how these organizations conceptualize the linkages between gender and economic issues. Specifically, they diverge in the extent to which they regard gender issues as part of economic issues or rather as social issues. Second, differences exist concerning the notion of gender equality which
underlies gender budget projects at the UNDP and the World Bank. Consequently, the organizations try to solve different policy problems and, thus, assign different meanings to gender budgeting.

This chapter aims at explaining these differences by drawing on an interpretative policy analysis framework: I put forth the argument that international organizations construct the object of political intervention and, thus, of gender budgeting, depending on how they interpret the policy problem to be solved. I further argue that these interpretations are deeply rooted in the organizations’ background knowledge about the interrelationship between gender and economic issues. This background knowledge is both scientific and normative in nature. In my analysis I refer to so called “gender knowledge” (Andresen/Dölling 2005) and economic knowledge in order to explain how different meanings are assigned to gender budgeting. In the following I begin by illustrating the context within which the idea of gender budgeting has gained international popularity. I identify three factors that have promoted the spread of the idea in the 1990’s, namely a) knowledge-based feminist policy advocacy supported by feminist economists, b) the Fourth World Conference on Women of the United Nations (UN) held in Beijing and c) the discursive shift from the Washington Consensus to the Post-Washington Consensus. Secondly, I delineate what feminist economists, the UNDP and the World Bank mean when they refer to the idea of gender budgeting. I show that gender budgeting comprises different policy approaches, depending on which meaning is assigned to it. Thirdly, referring to the political science of knowledge (Nullmeier/Rüb 1993, Nullmeier 1993) and post-structural approaches to policy analysis (Gottweis 2003, Hajer 2006), I explain the reasons for the multiple meanings of gender budgeting.

2 Gender Budgeting: the spread of an idea

The idea of gender budgeting was initially introduced during the mid-1980’s in Australia. The so called Women’s Budget Initiative was coordinated by the women’s machinery within the social-democratic government (Budlender 2001). The name of the initiative is somewhat misleading, as it was actually not intended to establish separate budgets for women, but rather to analyze the composition of public expenditure from a gender perspective and propose a change in policy priorities from this perspective. A decade after its introduction in Australia, many international organizations and donor agencies enthusiastically established programmes and projects on gender budgeting. Specifically three factors facilitated the expeditious spread of gender budgeting during the 1990’s:

1) An important factor which has significantly contributed to the spread of gender budgeting is knowledge-based feminist policy advocacy in the field of global economics. It has particularly fostered the diffusion of the idea of gender budgeting as a macroeconomic policy instrument. Knowledge-based advocacy is characterized by a strategy of knowledge networking through which knowledge of the interrelationship
between gender and macroeconomic policies is generated and diffused. In this context, the feminist knowledge network “International Working Group on Gender, Macroeconomics and International Economics” (GEM-IWG) has proved to be very influential in providing the space for knowledge production and dissemination. This network was established by a group of feminist economists in 1994, who clearly identify themselves as heterodox economists (i.e. post-Keynesian or Marxist) and, thus, dissociate themselves from orthodox neoclassical economics. The members of the network have two objectives: Firstly, they seek to challenge mainstream neoclassical economics by developing gender-aware economic models and theories. In this regard, the network provides a supportive environment in which feminist economists develop and discuss feminist approaches to macroeconomic modelling. Secondly, their aim is to contribute to a gender-equitable formulation, or, as they call it, “engendering” of macroeconomic policies by translating their theoretical insights into political action and suggesting alternative policy ideas. Gender budgeting is one such policy idea which feminist economists brought into the field of global economic governance. Evidently, the network goes beyond being a purely scientific network. The members regard their activities of gender-sensitive macroeconomic modelling as a mode of political intervention. As Nilüfer Çağatay, one of the founding members emphasizes:

“[…] one political thing to do was to say for example in the context of modelling that gender matters and to us this was itself a political statement. That was a kind of politics that involved the process of knowledge production, because we were trying to fight the dominant paradigm and fight it through illustrating how gender matters.” (Interview Nilüfer Çağatay, 30.6.2003)

In addition to modelling, the network is particularly engaged in disseminating their knowledge on why and how to “engender” macroeconomic policies. In 2003, the network launched the so-called “Knowledge Networking Program on Gender, Macroeconomics and International Economics”, a capacity-building program for feminist activists as well as practitioners from UN institutions and national ministries (GEM-IWG 2006). By establishing this program, the feminist economists strengthened the political links between scholars, activists and practitioners in the field of global economic governance. The capacity-building workshops are usually organized on an annual basis and are an essential part of feminist policy advocacy which has been instrumental in spreading the idea of gender budgeting. Moreover, knowledge on gender budgeting has also been disseminated through a range of other channels, i.e. consultancy or temporary employment in UN institutions. The network has particularly strong ties to the UNDP and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) as some members commissioned several reports for these institutions (e.g. Çağatay 1998, Çağatay et al. 2000, UNIFEM 2000).

2) Another factor critical to the success of gender budgeting at the international level was the 4th World Conference on Women of the United Nations (UN) in 1995 held in Beijing. Many feminist scholars regard the UN-Conference as a success both in terms

---

1 Alison Woodward characterizes networks consisting of feminist bureaucrats, activists, and academics as a velvet triangle (Woodward 2003).
of its size and political achievements. Even the World Bank under President James Wolfensohn sent a delegation to the UN-Conference (Bedford 2008: 86). In Beijing governments and international organizations committed themselves to implement the Platform for Action which defines strategic objectives and proposes concrete actions for the advancement and empowerment of women. In fact, the Platform for Action provides guidelines for mainstreaming a gender perspective in policies, programmes and decision-making at all levels – local, regional, national and international. The aim of the Beijing conference was to go beyond mere political statements and to ensure that policies targeting the advancement of women are financially backed by governments and international organizations. Therefore, the Platform of Action emphasizes the need to integrate “a gender perspective in budgetary decisions on policies and programmes” (UN 1995: Chapter VI, §345). Governments as well as international organizations are urged to link the reformulation of policies with an adequate reallocation of resources. Shortly after the conference, “the entire United Nations system reconfirmed its commitments to implementing the PFA [Platform for Action] in all the system’s policies and programmes” (Pietilä 2002: 62). The UN played a vital role in popularizing gender budgeting as an important element of the gender mainstreaming strategy.

3) The third factor is a shift in the international discourse on economic development away from the “Washington Consensus” of the Bretton Woods institutions to a new line of thinking, namely the so-called “Post-Washington Consensus”. The principal tenet of the Washington Consensus was to achieve economic growth by protecting the market from distortions and by strengthening the forces of the free market. Accordingly, the Washington Consensus and the associated structural adjustment programs in the 1980’s pursued an approach “of decreasing state involvement in the economy through trade liberalizations, privatization and reduced public spending […]” (Önis/Senses 2003: 2). In contrast, the Post-Washington Consensus directs attention to issues of good governance and poverty reduction and, thus, brings the state back in. In fact, the Post-Washington Consensus emphasizes the need to redirect resources towards the poorest and holds the state accountable for eradicating poverty. In the 1990’s, the international donor community endorsed a debt relief initiative for highly indebted poor countries (HIPC), in order to free up fiscal resources for poverty reduction. Countries eligible for debt relief are obliged to produce so-called “Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers” (PRSP) in which they have to identify the causes of poverty and to spell out their poverty reduction strategy (Çağatay et al. 2000: 31ff.). They are expected to bring their macroeconomic policy framework in line with their poverty reduction strategy.2 It is exactly within this context, that the idea of gender budgeting received

---

2 However, it is a matter of contestation whether this really implies a paradigm shift in macroeconomic policy-making. The World Bank and IMF still insist that “prudent” macroeconomic policies are essential for achieving the goal of poverty reduction (e.g. IDA/IMF 2006, World Bank 2000: 21, cf. Elson/Çagatay 2000: 1351). As Diane Elson and Nilüfer Çağatay state, “there is a […] recognition of the need to integrate macroeconomic policy and social policy, but the mainstream approach is one of adding on social policy” (ibid.: 1347).
internationally a remarkable amount of attention as a tool to formulate gender-equitable and pro-poor macroeconomic policies.

Evidently, the 1990’s offered many avenues for feminist economists to bring the idea of gender budgeting into the international discourse of gender and economic development. Specifically, the Beijing conference opened notable opportunities for scholars to advocate for gender budgeting within the UN system and beyond. The need for their knowledge was promoted by the commitments made in Beijing. In addition, the discursive shift from the Washington Consensus to the Post-Washington Consensus brought gender budgeting to the agenda of international organizations as an important component of a holistic economic development framework.

The following section of this chapter illustrates what feminist economists exactly mean when they are referring to gender budgeting as a tool for gender-equitable macroeconomic policy-making. As will be shown, the UNDP and World Bank have divergent ideas of what the object of gender budgeting is, despite of the obvious influence of feminist economists in the international discourse.

3 Gender budgeting – a challenge to macroeconomic policy frameworks? Feminist visions and organizational realities

Feminist economists produced a substantial body of work that critically assesses the gendered impact of structural adjustment programs. They massively criticized the policies put forward in the context of economic restructuring, such as cuts in public spending or trade liberalization which aimed at improving efficiency by switching resources from the production of non-tradable to tradable goods (Çagatay 2003: 25f.). Their studies provide evidence that these policies were not gender neutral in their effects (e.g. Benería 1995, Elson 1995). One major result is that greater efficiency and lower costs in the formal economy correspond to a transfer of costs to the household level (Brodie 1994: 50). These studies emphasize that women “have acted as ‘shock-absorbers’ during adjustment by curtailing their own consumption and increasing their workload to compensate for household income loss” (ibid.). Additionally, due to reduced spending i.e. in the area of health services, women had to intensify their unpaid reproductive work. As national income accounts solely focus on the formal economy, the increasing costs of social reproduction at household level remained invisible. As Diane Elson points out, macroeconomic policies are “generally designed to bring the level of aggregate monetized demand in line with the level of aggregate monetized supply”, omitting the sphere of social reproduction (Elson 1994: 41).

Feminist economists of the knowledge network GEM-IWG basically criticize macroeconomic models for focusing on the stocks and flows of goods and services and for only analyzing how the sum of marketed activities influences national income (GNP), savings, investments balance of payments, etc. They point out that non-marketed activities such as reproductive work in the household are regarded as non-economic activities, which leads to the omission of the unpaid reproductive work in
macroeconomic models. Criticizing this exclusion, feminist economists put emphasis on acknowledging the care economy at the household level as an integral part of the formal economy and thereby accounting for the “social content of macroeconomic policies” (Elson/Çagatay 2000). The key argument here is that social reproduction and the maintenance of human beings is of ultimate importance for the formal economy.

Diane Elson substantiates this argument by revising the conventional circular flow model which describes the circulation of income between three sectors – the domestic sector, the private sector and the public sector (Elson 1998a). She demonstrates that the conventional circular flow model depicts the economy in terms of market-based interactions or monetized flows, respectively (ibid. 199). According to such a picture of the economy, the role of the domestic sector is confined to consuming goods and services, paying taxes and receiving income. In this model the (re)production of the labour force is taken for granted. Diane Elson revises the circular flow model in characterizing the relationship between the three sectors in terms of monetized and output flows (ibid. 201f.) (see chart 1). Accordingly, households are not merely conceptualized as units of consumption, but also as units of production that provide for the re-production and maintenance of human beings. Thus, according to this model, the production factor labour is no longer externally given, but produced and reproduced. The political significance of conceptualizing households as units of production is that it reveals the hidden costs of economic restructuring. Diane Elson argues that the burden put on the domestic sector by curtailing social welfare spending affects the entire economy, as it leads to the depletion of human capabilities and to “various kinds of personal, household and community disintegration” (ibid.). Consequently, according to feminist economists, the goal of ‘engendering’ macroeconomic models and policies means that unpaid care work has to be considered as an integral part of the economy.
Feminist economists stipulate that macroeconomic policies should be conceptualized in accordance with the goal of maintaining domestic care. In this context, gender budgeting has been recommended as an approach to meet this objective and to 'gender' macroeconomic policies. Budgets are regarded as an essential tool of macroeconomic policies – for understanding governments’ key policy priorities for achieving their economic as well as development goals: Budgets reflect whether governments stimulate economic growth through expansive fiscal and monetary policies or rather through austerity measures which primarily aim at curbing the rate of inflation. Gender budgeting has been identified as a tool for analyzing the aggregate macroeconomic strategy and the composition of public revenues as well as expenditures from a gender perspective and to change the policy priorities accordingly (Elson 1998b: 930). Particularly, Diane Elson and Nilüfer Çağatay highlight gender budgeting as not only important for the composition of public expenditures and revenues, but also highly rele-
vant for macroeconomic management in countering business cycle ups and downs. Thus, they view gender budgeting as a Keynesian (counter-cyclical) fiscal strategy (Elson 1998b, Elson/Çağatay 2000, Çağatay/Ertürk 2004).

A closer look at the UNDP’s and World Bank’s gender budget projects reveals differing understandings of gender budgeting. Both organizations focus only on the composition of the expenditure side, putting special emphasis on social and/or educational issues. This is puzzling insofar as feminist economists have been very influential at the international level in defining the object of gender budgeting. In addition, the topic of gender budgeting appears in both organizations under the heading of economic policy. This ultimately leads to the question of why the interpretations of gender budgeting differ so significantly despite the apparent influence of feminist economists. In order to answer this question, it is imperative to reflect upon the role of knowledge in policy-making. Aspiring to understand why a particular set of ideas influence the policy agenda and cause policy change, whereas another set of ideas remains to a large extent unimportant, I discuss how the relationship between knowledge and politics or power, respectively, is conceptualized in the literature. Thus, in the following section, I introduce different approaches to knowledge in policy analysis and scrutinize how they theorize the knowledge-politics interface.

4 Knowledge in policy analysis: accounting for the constitutive role of knowledge

In the 1990’s, scholars of policy analysis began directing attention to the ideational realm of policymaking and thereby induced a cognitive turn in political science. A growing body of literature emerged focusing on the role of ideational factors like beliefs, ideas and knowledge in (international) policy processes. Indeed, the role of knowledge and knowledge networks in policy processes are of particular interest (e.g. Adler/Bernstein 2005, Haas 1992, Nullmeier 1993, Singer 1993, Stone/Maxwell 2005). However, the cognitive literature is far from being uniform in its references to the notion of knowledge. The manner in which knowledge is put in relation to politics depends on the epistemological and ontological settings of the particular analysis. The approaches range from those which treat knowledge as an additional explanatory variable, focusing on the cause-effect relationship between knowledge and politics, to those approaches highlighting the constitutive role of knowledge in policy processes (cf. Nullmeier 1997). The so-called epistemic communities approach is a prominent example of the former strand of literature (e.g. Adler/Haas 1992, Adler 1992, Kapstein 1992, cf. Sebenius 1992). This approach deals with the question of how state actors identify their interest in specific issue-areas of international policymaking under conditions of uncertainty. Uncertainty, according to the authors, refers to the

---

3 The World Bank primarily supports gender budget initiatives of Finance Ministries by i.e. organizing capacity building workshops and providing methodological feasibility studies etc. (e.g. http://go.worldbank.org/DZS1A5D1Y0). The UNDP supports civil society driven gender budget initiatives and closely collaborates with UNIFEM.
increasingly technical nature of policy problems (e.g. macroeconomic problems) and complex political linkages at the international level (Haas 1992: 12). Due to these uncertainties, decision makers rely increasingly on expert knowledge: They need to consult specialists in order to comprehend current problems and to find effective solutions for them. According to Peter Haas, knowledge-based networks – epistemic communities – are pivotal in international policy processes as they provide knowledge of cause-effect relations of complicated policy issues and thereby help states to identify their interests and frame the issues (ibid.: 2, cf. Adler/Haas 1992: 379). Peter Haas and Emmanuel Adler conclude that “[t]he greater the extent to which epistemic communities are […] able to gain influence in their respective nation-states, the greater is the likelihood that these nations-states will in turn exert power on behalf of the values and practices promoted by the epistemic community and will thus help in their international institutionalization” (Adler/Haas 1992: 371f.). Thus, the authors regard control over knowledge as a principal dimension of power. James Sebenius (1992: 324) criticizes in this context that knowledge and power are “treated as […] analytically separable, rather than inherently bound together”. In addition, the notion of knowledge is merely confined to scientific knowledge, perceived as rational, valid and therefore true.

The epistemic communities approach provides insights for analyzing the important role of the feminist knowledge-network GEM-IWG in the field of global economic governance: Feminist economists as experts supply knowledge of cause-effect relations between gender and macroeconomic issues and, thus, exert influence on international organizations. However, the epistemic communities’ literature does not explain why a specific set of expert knowledge (and not another one) becomes influential in a policy field. Focusing on scientific knowledge as the only authoritative knowledge not only obscures the existence of interpretative struggles, but also the role of other forms of knowledge that might facilitate completely different policy approaches. Therefore, the following section highlights interpretative approaches which focus on how knowledge shapes the texture of the entire interpretative context within which policymaking takes place.

Constructivist approach to knowledge in policy-making

The German political scientists Frank Nullmeier and Friedbert Rüb have developed the so-called political science of knowledge (Wissenspolitologie) which puts interpretative struggles at the centre of its analysis (Nullmeier/Rüb 1993). Referring to the sociology of science, Nullmeier and Rüb argue that political reality is constructed by knowledgeable actors. According to the authors, political actors have a broad repertoire of knowledge, which is not just limited to scientific expert knowledge, but also includes

4 Peter Haas defines epistemic communities as „a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge” (Haas 1992: 3).
other forms of knowledge, namely descriptive knowledge and normative knowledge: First, with descriptive knowledge, the authors refer to knowledge about the ‘state of the world’. This kind of knowledge stems from both scientific and every-day observations and experiences of what is happening or what has happened in the world (ibid.: 25 and 47f.). Second, normative knowledge includes those elements of knowledge which are inseparably linked to collective identities and encompass (collective) views on what is right and what is wrong, on justice and on social and political necessities (ibid.: 49f). Thus, normative knowledge is knowledge about how things should be. This notion of knowledge allows for the incorporation of the gender dimension of knowledge (see below).

Nullmeier and Rüb argue that actors interpret the political situation against the background of their knowledge and assign meaning to the object of political intervention. Each action implies interpretative claims – claims about the correct interpretation of the situation. Because of competing interpretative claims, political actions are constantly subject to interpretative struggles. Nullmeier and Rüb developed an analytical framework which allows them to examine how a specific set of knowledge, and accordingly, an interpretative claim prevails over others. Drawing on concepts of market theory, the authors conceptualize interpretative struggles as market competition. They refer to the metaphor of “marketplace of knowledge” (Wissensmärkte), where actors compete for the acceptance of their knowledge and interpretation of a policy problem. According to the authors, the acceptance of a specific interpretation depends on the actor’s market position or market power, respectively (ibid.: 30f.). Those actors who possess both material resources (e.g. money for knowledge generation and consultation by experts) and interpretative resources (that is, for instance, the intellectual ability to convincingly argue) have a market advantage, and thus, are able to assert their interpretative claims. If no other interpretation exists, an actor has gained market monopoly (cf. Nullmeier 2001).

Although the advantage of this approach lies in its constructivist perspective on knowledge, it lacks theoretical consistency as it refers to the conceptual framework of market analysis: The reference to the “marketplace of knowledge” is problematic insofar as it implies the assumption that (rational and utility maximizing) individuals can freely compete on the market. The market occurs as a pre-given field of interaction which can be dominated by the most powerful competitor. Thus, the acceptance of a specific interpretation is conceptualized as simply a matter of market power. This conceptual framework is a contradiction to the constructivist perspective which the authors attempt to account for in policy analysis: On the one hand, they highlight that political reality is constructed through knowledge and acts of interpretation, whereby the political situation itself is regarded as a construction. Yet on the other hand, the authors refer to the “marketplace of knowledge” as a neutral field of competition which can be conquered by the most powerful market participant. This would imply that the market itself is not conceptualized as a construction. Furthermore, power and knowledge are again conceptually separated. Power is grasped as something that requires resources to impose one interpretation over the other. This view is related to beha-
viourism\footnote{That is, as Steven Lukes characterizes it “the study of overt, ‘actual behaviour’, of which ‘concrete decisions’ in situations of conflict are seen as paradigmatic” (Lukes 1974: 25).} in the sense that it concentrates on the strategic use of resources in order to exert power. It does not deny the role of material resources in bestowing power upon actors. It rather stresses the subtle ways in which power operates. The question of how knowledge enables or constrains a specific policy outcome implies the need to focus on the power effects of knowledge (see below).

Despite these weaknesses, the approach of Nullmeier and Rüb allows for an in-depth analysis of the role of knowledge in policy processes. The broad notion of knowledge provides an entry point for consideration of the gender dimension of knowledge. The German social scientists, Sünne Andresen and Irene Dölling (2005), developed the concept of “gender knowledge” (Geschlechterwissen), which is in line with the notion of normative knowledge as it refers to those kinds of knowledge “which exist in society regarding the difference between the sexes, the reasoning of its ‘self-evidence’ and evidence, the dominant normative ideas about the ‘correct’ gender relations and divisions of labour between men and women” (Andresen/Dölling 2005: 175, own translation). As Andresen and Dölling point out, gender knowledge can be explicit in the way that individuals strategically refer to and use it in their fields of action. But it can also be implicit: Gender knowledge implicitly underlies other kinds of knowledge, for instance, scientific or expert knowledge, and thus, induces gendered ways of knowing. This definition underlines the constitutive role of gender knowledge.

In summary, the concept of gender knowledge is pivotal for revealing the implicit and explicit gender assumptions in policies and for explaining why these policies support, reproduce or change existing hierarchical gender orders. Another kind of normative knowledge, important for the international discourse on gender budgeting, is economic knowledge. Economic knowledge refers to the background knowledge of international organizations about the interrelationship between the economic and social spheres and how development can be best achieved.

Hence, the political science of knowledge with its broad notion of knowledge provides the conceptual foundations for analyzing the role of knowledge in policy processes. However, theoretical inconsistencies need to be overcome. The following section turns to poststructuralist accounts of policy analysis as these approaches theorize the ‘making’ of a policy field.

Poststructuralist approaches to knowledge in policy-making

Akin to the political science of knowledge, poststructuralists do not regard political phenomena as facts (Fischer 2003, Gottweis 1998, Hajer 2003). Poststructuralist approaches refer to political phenomena “as the outcome of complicated processes of inscription, of re-presentation, rather than given structures, tendencies or situations” (Gottweis 2003: 249). It is not denied that “[a]ctors do things in politics and institutions...
shape policymaking” (Gottweis 2003: 254). However, drawing on the discourse-theoretical reasoning of Michel Foucault, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, poststructuralists stress that “these processes need to be understood within the discourse where actors are constituted and institutions framed as relevant in a given policy field” (ibid.). Thus, poststructuralists refer to the constitutive and productive role of discourse in policymaking.

Discourse – in a Foucauldian sense – can be defined as a set of statements and practices that produce both the subjects and objects of knowledge (Foucault 1973: 74, 1980: 117). The term discursive formation denotes a system of rules which facilitate a certain set of statements but not others, and thus, demarcate what is meaningful within a particular historical and socio-political context (cf. Fischer 2003, Hall 2001: 72f.). In other words, objects come into existence through discourse by assigning meaning to them. A discourse-theoretical perspective does not deny the material existence of an object, but emphasizes that the meaning of an object does not exist outside of discourse (Laclau/Mouffe 1991: 158). Furthermore, besides constituting the object of knowledge, discourse also constitutes the knowing subject. The rules of discursive formation define enunciative modalities – that is, the modalities determining who is able to speak and in which role one is enabled to speak (Foucault 1973: 75). Thus, actors are not regarded as autonomous and stable entities, but rather as subjects whose identities are produced within a discursive context.

Another important aspect of a discourse-theoretical perspective in a Foucauldian sense is the notion of power/knowledge: In his later work, Michel Foucault concentrated on the question of how knowledge of objects emerges and becomes ‘true’ through discourse. Thus, discourse sets the limits of what can be known and in doing so it also prescribes which actions are regarded as appropriate. Knowledge in interplay with power becomes true and regulates the conduct of others by drawing the boundaries of acceptable behaviour in a specific field of action (cf. Hall 2001: 74). The term power/knowledge denotes this interplay and highlights that “there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (Foucault 1977: 27).

Referring to Foucault, poststructuralist currents of policy analysis argue that the object of political intervention is produced through discourse. Whether or not a situation is perceived as politically problematic depends on which meaning is assigned to it. Accordingly, poststructuralists deem policy-making as a process in which actors struggle to fix the meaning of a policy issue. They sketch multiple ways of how a policy issue comes into existence and how it is made governable. Herbert Gottweis (1998), for instance, examines how genetic engineering in Europe and the United States gradually emerged as an issue of state intervention. His analysis accounts for the different historical contexts within which molecular biology came into existence as a field of knowledge and thereby as a field of politics. Gottweis delineates how a policy problem to be solved was constructed through constantly drawing the boundaries of natural, technological, social and economic phenomena. “Boundary work” – as Gottweis calls it – is a central element of policymaking in which meaning is assigned to the ob-
ject “gene” by demarcating whether issues of molecular biology are social, environmental or economic problems (e.g. molecular biology as a technology industry, molecular biology as an environmental risk, molecular biology as an expression of modern society or “bio society”). Depending on which meaning is assigned to the object “gene” and to molecular biology, the object of political intervention varies, and different types of politics occur accordingly. This aspect has also been at the centre of Marten Hajer’s (1995) analysis of the acid rain controversy. According to Hajer, meaning is constructed and fixed through “storylines” which are defined as “a sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena” (Hajer 1995: 56). Storylines have an ordering function as they “condense large amounts of factual information intermixed with the normative assumptions and value orientations that assign meaning to them” (Fischer 2003: 87).

Applying this discourse theoretical perspective, the focus of the analysis lies on the question of how meaning is assigned to the goal of ‘engendering’ macroeconomic policies, and thus, to the idea of gender budgeting. As will be shown, the meaning varies depending on how gender is situated in relation to social and economic phenomena and depending on how the boundary between social and economic policy problems is drawn. Combining the analytical concepts of boundary work and storylines with a broad notion of knowledge as outlined above, the analysis elucidates that knowledge is constitutive for gender politics in global economic governance.

5 Multiple meanings of gender budgeting

As mentioned above, neither the UNDP nor the World Bank refers to gender budgeting as a tool of macroeconomic management in a Keynesian sense. In fact, both focus on the expenditure side of the budget and aspire to increase public spending in the areas of health, education or social policies (e.g. World Bank 2007, UNDP 2009). Yet, both refer to gender budgeting as an instrument of economic governance. In order to understand why different meanings are assigned to gender budgeting, we need to understand how the organizations interpret the interrelationship between gender and macroeconomic issues: The organizations interpret the problem in regard to gender and macroeconomic policies by referring to the cause-effect relations – either to the implications of macroeconomic policies on women or to the implications of gender inequalities for the outcome of macroeconomic policies. Two storylines can be identified through which the actors construct the object of political intervention: If emphasis is put on the implications of macroeconomic policies for women (implications from the macro to the micro level), the collective situation of women and the care economy is put at the centre of gender budgeting. In that case, all policy measures are directed towards ameliorating the living conditions of women. Thus, ‘engendering’ or gender budgeting, respectively, encompasses social compensatory measures which mitigate the negative effects of macroeconomic policies. In this context, it is argued that the care economy has to be recognized as an essential part of the formal economy. The
The principal aim of gender budgeting is to support the care economy by implementing a few scattered social policies that are particularly targeted at women’s needs.

If, however, emphasis is put on the implications of gender inequalities at the household or institutional level for the outcome of macroeconomic policies (implications from the micro/meso to the macro level), gender budgeting embraces another meaning: Discriminatory practices within society as well as the traditional gendered division of labour are regarded as barriers for women to actively participate in the market economy. It is argued that these hindrances for women imply market distortions, and thus, inefficiency in the economy because a significant part of the labour force is not mobile. Consequently, the focus of ‘engendering’ lies on overcoming the barriers that women face at household or institutional levels. This implies the goal of liberating women from their reproductive responsibilities and from societal marginalization. Policy measures such as educational programs target women’s participation in the market economy – either as employees or as entrepreneurs.

Along these two storylines the “economic sphere” is abstracted from the “social sphere”: The gender perspective in the first storyline directs attention to the social component of economic policies, whereas the gender perspective in the second storyline highlights the economic value of gender equality. How the “economic sphere” and “social sphere” are defined and separated from each other varies according to the gender knowledge and the economic knowledge prevalent in the organizations.

Gender budgeting in the UNDP: A social compensatory measure for maintaining care

The analysis of UNDP documents reveals that UNDP-policies are based on a traditional (conservative) gender knowledge favouring a traditional gender division of labour, in which principally women are responsible for unpaid care work. The care economy is regarded as the emotional and social sphere which stabilizes the society. The UNDP emphasizes women’s important role for maintaining families and argues that their “vital social functions […] become only too visible when juvenile delinquency rates rise, the elderly are left to die alone or cultural traditions wither” (UNDP 1995: 98). The care economy is deemed as the core of the social fabric which is fundamental for human development. As the UNDP stresses, “[w]ithout genuine care and nurturing, children cannot develop capabilities, and adults have a hard time maintaining or expanding theirs” (UNDP 1999: 77).

The UNDP strictly differentiates human development from economic development. The latter, according to the UNDP, is confined to economic growth, which does not automatically lead to the welfare of human beings. Thus, economic growth is considered as a necessary, but not sufficient component of human development (UNDP 1996: 68). The UNDP attempts to broaden the notion of development to non-economic issues, which are issues of physical, psychological and social well-being. In this sense, the care economy is deemed as an integral part of the economy and it is argued that women’s unpaid work has to be valued. Nonetheless, the boundaries between the social
and economic spheres are drawn by simply adding the social to the economic. This becomes evident if one closely examines what the UNDP means by the valuation of women’s work. It advocates for the valuation of women’s reproductive work, however, “without advocating an exchange value for all non-monetized activities and without arguing for a radical shift in the way families organize their work” (UNDP 1995: 97). Hence, ‘engendering’ means that women’s reproductive work has to be valued by implementing a few social compensatory measures that support women’s unpaid work at the household level (UNDP 1995: 123, 1996: 69ff., 1999: 9).

The normative knowledge base is a specific combination of traditional gender knowledge and economic knowledge: On the one hand, the deeply underlying assumption that women are better at nurturing children and caring for family members means that the traditional division of labour between men and women should be maintained in order to enhance human development. On the other hand, critical economic knowledge strictly differentiates between economic and human development. Concurrently, the economic knowledge base within the UNDP is undetermined in the sense that the economic position of the UNDP cannot be easily assigned to a specific theoretical strand. It is on the grounds of this normative knowledge base that ‘engendering’ is constructed as a social issue. Hence, ‘engendering’ or gender budgeting, respectively, amount to nothing more than adding social policy measures to economic policies.

Gender budgeting in the World Bank: An investment strategy for economic growth

The World Bank assigns a completely different meaning to ‘engendering’ than the UNDP. The World Bank directs attention to women as mothers:

“The influence of a mother on her child begins in the womb and continues through preschool and later childhood. Poor health and nutrition can have devastating effects on her pregnancy and her ability to nurse her infant. In critical ways she determines her child’s early intellectual stimulation and physical development.” (World Bank 2002: 78)

However, in contrast to the UNDP, the World Bank simultaneously emphasizes the important role of women as healthy, well-educated and income-earning mothers. The underlying assumption is that mothers are much more concerned about the intellectual and physical development of their children than fathers are. Accordingly, the World Bank expects that women are willing to spend part of their own income for the education and health of their children. For the World Bank, investing in children is pivotal as they are deemed the “future workforce” (ibid. 83) of the economy.

In addition to the future workforce, the World Bank is also concerned with the smooth functioning of the economy. All constraints hindering market forces have to be overcome. Within that reasoning, the World Bank emphasizes the importance of investing in infrastructure facilities (e.g. medical care), which enable women to care efficiently for their children (World Bank 2001: 149, 2002: 7). According to the World
Bank, “improvements in infrastructure […] directly affect the efficiency of home production, reducing time spent in household work and releasing time for other activities” (World Bank 2002: 186). Thus, the objective is to increase the productivity of mothers in household work and their participation in the market economy. The World Bank constructs women’s identities as caring and working mothers. Thus, women are deemed as economic subjects, however, not in the sense of homo oeconomicus as women are presumed to be altruistic. The gender knowledge of the World Bank corresponds with an economic knowledge that is based on micro-foundational theories (e.g. Human Capital Theory or New Institutional Economics): Mothers who are able to invest in their children directly contribute to human capital accumulation and thus, to economic growth. Within this ideational context, a totally different meaning is assigned to the object of gender budgeting: It is regarded as an (economic) investment strategy in mothers for growth. It is no wonder then that gender budget exercises promoted by the World Bank predominantly focus on educational, health and income-generating measures (World Bank 2007).

6 Conclusion

Recent studies of policy analysis account for the important role of knowledge in policy processes. However, as this chapter has shown, it is important to apply a sophisticated notion of knowledge that goes beyond confining knowledge to pure academic expertise. By differentiating between normative gender knowledge and economic knowledge, I was able to detect different interpretations of what gender budgeting means. The analysis has shown that the object of political intervention varies depending on what meaning is assigned to gender budgeting: Firstly, if it is deemed as a policy solution to the negative implications of macroeconomic policies on women – as in the case of the UNDP – then gender budgeting serves the goal of supplementing macroeconomic policies with social compensatory measures. In that case, the problem is interpreted against the background of a gender knowledge which can be characterized as traditional in the sense that is emphatic about women’s reproductive role in the care economy. Moreover, within the UNDP, the notion of the economic is imbued with a negative connotation. The UNDP dissociates itself from policy approaches that focus on the formal economy and that aim to achieve development through accelerating economic growth. Thus, the normative economic knowledge of the UNDP is characterized by a rejection of economic policy approaches that put emphasis on economic development without considering human development as an end in itself. From this view, gender budgeting is not regarded an instrument of adding a social dimension to economic policies. Indeed, the meaning of gender budgeting is here fixed by defining gender issues as social issues. The boundaries between social and economic phenomena are drawn by repeatedly emphasizing the value of the social sphere, and thereby accepting the separation between the social and the economic.
Secondly, if gender budgeting is interpreted as a policy solution to the negative effects of gender inequality on the macroeconomic stabilization and on the smooth functioning of markets – as in the case of the World Bank – then the emphasis lies on liberating the economy from societal barriers such as gender inequality. It is not the care economy as such that is put at the centre, but women as mothers – however, in contrast to the UNDP, women as income-earning, healthy and efficient mothers. Hence, women are regarded as both mothers and economic subjects. Accordingly, the objective is to free them from their reproductive responsibilities and to endow them with skills for the labor market. Both the gender knowledge and the economic knowledge in the World Bank are characterized by a positive stance towards the market economy. From this perspective, gender budgeting is regarded as an instrument of economic governance which primarily focuses on expanding educational and income generating services. Gender budgeting is grasped as a policy solution which is functional to the economy. Thus, the boundaries between the social and the economic spheres are drawn by subjecting social issues to the logics of economic growth.

These results reveal that the object of political interventions, and thus, the type of gender politics, varies depending on how gender is situated in relation to the social and economic spheres. In this context, normative knowledge, gender knowledge in connection with economic knowledge, plays a constitutive role as it implies ideas about what is acceptable and appropriate and defines the connection between gender issues and social and economic phenomena.

References


Flexicurity and Gender Mainstreaming: Deliberative Processes, Knowledge Networks and the European Labour Market

Rachel Kurian

Flexicurity and Gender Mainstreaming: Converging Objectives for the European Labour Market?

Gender mainstreaming and flexicurity have been adopted as separate labour market objectives in the European Union since the mid-1990s. It is remarkable that there has been a virtual absence of gender concerns in the deliberations on flexicurity for over a decade. When gender concerns were introduced into the flexicurity deliberations in 2007, they were incorporated in the 6th principle of flexicurity which “should support gender equality by promoting equal access to quality employment for women and men, and by offering possibilities to reconcile work and family life” (European Union 2007:10). The basic assumption was that the objectives of flexicurity and gender mainstreaming were compatible and even mutually supportive.

Flexicurity – the labour market policy that claims to combine and enhances both flexibility and security in the labour market – emerged as an important concept in the mid-1990s and is currently viewed by the European Commission as key to the “EU’s dilemma of how to maintain and improve competitiveness whilst preserving the European social model” (European Commission 2007). Consultations were undertaken with trade unions in 2007 with member states, business interests, NGOs and the public, and an important Stakeholder Conference was held on Flexicurity (April 20th 2007), focusing on the ways of exploring new ways of enhancing common principles of flexicurity. In June 2007, Vladimír Špidla (EU Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities) indicated that, “Flexicurity is the best way to ensure that European citizens can enjoy a high level of employment security so they can find a good job at every stage of their active life in a rapidly changing economic environment” (EU News 91/2007–2007/06/27). In December 2007, the member states of the European Union adopted eight common principles of flexicurity that were meant to promote “more open and responsive labour markets and more productive workplaces” (European Commission 2007). The deliberations on flexicurity, which began in the mid-1990s, have moved centre stage, and now appear to form the basis of a new social contract for workers in the European Union.

Gender mainstreaming was endorsed as a Key Principle of Action at the fourth United Nations Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, and several European countries and the European Union subsequently took initiatives to promote this policy. The European Union formally declared its commitment to this policy in 1996 and began

1 I would like to thank John Cameron, Karin Siegmann and Thanh-Dam Truong for their valuable comments on this paper.
programmes and projects to integrate a gender perspective and gender expertise into all the policies of the European Union. The European Union 1997 review of this policy focused on the integration of gender mainstreaming in national policies. The EU Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 gave “a formal legal status to mainstreaming through articles 2 and 3, which accepted the promotion of equality and the elimination of inequality – two key aspects relating to the labour market” (European Commission 2000:9). Within this policy, particular attention is given to gender-based imbalances in the labour market with regard to unemployment, reconciliation of family and working life, gender gaps and desegregation of the labour market.

While these two objectives – i.e., flexicurity and gender mainstreaming – were deliberated and developed over the same period, there has been little or no interaction between the different actors and networks involved at the European level. This paper examines the deliberations on flexicurity and gender mainstreaming, and analyses how these deliberations have been captured by the doxa associated with the neo-liberal agenda which, in effect, led to the dilution of opposition and political deliberation on the two labour market objectives. The neglect of gender in the deliberations on flexicurity deserves attention in view of the fact that women are disproportionately represented in relatively insecure and flexible work. Logically, the promotion of gender equality could involve supportive and interventionist policies that go against the spirit of increased flexible labour market policies. However, such concerns were not seriously addressed in the deliberation on flexicurity, and on the whole, the promotion of gender equality – as part of gender mainstreaming – was viewed mainly to be consistent with the concept of flexicurity.

The paper uses a framework developed by Cameron and Ojha (2007) to understand deliberative processes as part of rational ethical discourses and their potential to (re)produce deliberative deficits and to silence deliberative challenges in the context of unequal power relations. These discourses are then used to study the deliberations on flexicurity. Using Squires’ three-fold typology of gender mainstreaming strategies at the European level (inclusion, reversal and displacement), the paper analyses the deliberations and gendered knowledge that have been produced in these different networks/fields. The paper argues that there is a resonance between the deliberations associated with the “inclusive” strategy of gender mainstreaming and the deliberations on flexicurity. In line with the views put forward by Cameron and Ohja, Squires warns that “once accepted as a norm that resonates with the dominant policy frame, mainstreaming will be adopted as a technocratic tool in policy-making, de-politicising the issue of gender equality” (2005:374). The paper suggests that these (mainstream) interpretations of flexicurity and gender mainstreaming allow the sidelining of deliberations that demand gender transformation, thus allowing the neo-liberal agenda (narrowly focussed on economic productivity) at the European level to prevail.
Deliberative processes and unequal power relations

The notion of collective deliberation, as developed by Cameron and Ojha (2007), provides a useful framework to analyse the particular type of gendered knowledge that is being institutionalised in the discussions on flexicurity in Europe and the implications this holds for unequal and gendered relations in society. In their paper on “A deliberative ethic for development” (2007) the authors – using the writings of Kant, Habermas, Dewey and Bourdieu – discuss the possibility of “centre-staging deliberative processes in development ethics”. They analyse the nature of ethical discourse, its enablement through deliberative processes, with the idealistic concerns being potentially subverted in the process of deliberation in situations of unequal power relations. The framework of analysis developed in this process throws light on improvements and deficits in the deliberation process, including the ways in which class, gender and other inequalities are treated as natural or inevitable, and as such not taken on board in the deliberation.

Developing the ideas on substantive ethics put forward by Kant and Habermas, Cameron and Ohja view deliberation to be “a conscious exercise of communicative competence by social beings to understand, negotiate and transform human relations and ethical norms” (2007:77). The authors use Bourdieu’s work – and in particular his concepts of doxa and habitus – to understand the limits placed on open deliberative processes. According to Bourdieu, the decisions of social agents are determined by their beliefs, values and assumptions – which he refers to as the doxa, which is secured in day-to-day practices, the habitus. The logic of doxa and the practice of habitus in social fields reflect differing power relations in society which place some people in a systematically advanced position over others in the process of deliberation (Cameron and Ohja 2007:69). At the same time, Bourdieu suggests that deliberative deficits are evident not only with regard to open coercion or submission but also with regard to two types of restrictions on high quality deliberation. The first type of restriction stems from the fact that the practice of deliberation is strategically oriented through rationally constructed existing interests even if the terminology of deliberation suggests disinterest. The second type refers to interests reflecting the largely unconscious functioning of doxa in historical patterns of habituses – the day-to-day practices that represent the norms of certain groups (as opposed to other groups) in society.

The following sections analyses the interaction between deliberations on flexicurity and gender mainstreaming using this framework, exploring how technocratic and bureaucratic norms in both fields have allowed the continuation of deliberative deficits.

The flexicurity field/network

Within the neo-liberal perspective, flexibility restores equilibrium in the labour market, including solving the problem of involuntary unemployment while improving productivity and profitability. This so-called “objective rationale” was promoted in the
1990s in Europe in spite of evidence from previous experiences with flexibility which showed that while some people benefited from better jobs in the high-tech sector, there was a growth of “poor” flexible work which consisted largely of “inferior, insecure contingent jobs and interrupted, discontinuous employment” often associated with female employment (Dickens 2004:595-596). While the concept of flexibility had previously emphasised numerical flexibility – workforce adjustment (Atkinson 1984; Atkinson & Meager 1986), – the European Union’s White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment in 1993 had focused on different types of flexibility, including increased wage flexibility, labour mobility, removal or reduction of welfare policy measures (flexible costs of production) and more localised collective bargaining regimes. The Extraordinary European Job Summit in Luxembourg in November 1997 – the so-called “Jobs Summit” – and the subsequent Employment Report of Europe 1998 also highlighted the need for improvements in “employability” and flexibility; the report underscored the importance of appropriate flexibility in working patterns, wages and salaries, geographical and occupational mobility. The prioritisation of global competitiveness was further underlined at the meeting of the European Council in Lisbon March 2000.

The challenge in the 1990s for European policy processes – which were in the main, as we have just seen, moving in favour of a more neo-liberal agenda – was to persuade workers, trade unions and women’s lobbies that an increase in flexibility did not automatically translate into lowering security; that on the contrary, flexibility and security could be attained simultaneously. Flexicurity appeared to play a critical role in realizing this win-win scenario.

Scholars and practitioners from the mid-1990s have interpreted the concept of flexicurity in different ways. The initial – and in some cases, continuing – concern has been to link flexible labour markets with the provision of security to weaker groups in society. Subsequent discussions have taken on a more abstract nature, generalising the form and nature of the concept, and the choices available with regard to different combinations of flexibility and security in a technical economic language. An example of this view is that of Wilthagen and Rogowski who speak of the “double character” of the concept, associating a typical form of flexibility and a typical form of security. In elucidating this theme Wilthagen and Tros have (re)defined the concept as follows:

Flexicurity is (1) a degree of job, employment, income and combination security that facilitates the labour market careers and biographies of workers with a relatively weak position and allows for enduring and high quality labour market participation and social inclusion, while at the same time providing (2) a degree of numerical (both external and internal), functional and wage flexibility that allows for labour markets’ (and individual companies’) timely and adequate adjustment to changing conditions in order to maintain and enhance competitiveness and productivity (Wilthagen and Tros 2004).

References suggest that the concept was initially introduced in 1995 by the sociologist Hans Adriaansens, member of the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) and who associated it essentially as a shift from job security to employment security, this concept being taken up and modified in 1998 by Wilthagen (1998a).
In many ways such a definition could be viewed as a good example of technocratic closure looking to bureaucratic action. In this definition, the term “relatively weak position” of workers is an even neutral interpretation of the existing segmentation in the labour market, which has resulted in involuntary unemployment, particularly of certain vulnerable categories of workers such as poor women, ethnic minorities and refugees. The promotion of “numerical, functional and wage flexibility” says very little about the content either of the job or about the quality of the employment that is being generated. An important conceptual change in labour market policy, however, was the replacement of specific, legal, job security by general, potential employment security. The basic idea was to get each member of the workforce to accept lower levels of security (safety) with regard to a particular job, in return for the increased possibility of an alternative job – these processes resulting in an overall high macro-aggregate but volatile micro-level employment.

But the language continued to take on a technocratic form, linked as we have discussed previously, with the Cameron and Ohja’s second level of decision-making practices (2007:71). The deliberative processes in this context attempt to sort out tensions and to subsume oppositional power relations, by using technical and rational language – moving between doxic rules and habitus pragmatics. In line with this logic, Wilthagen developed a matrix to analyse flexibility with security – a framework for analysing flexicurity policies. He identified four key areas of flexibility (functional flexibility, internal numerical flexibility, external numerical flexibility, and wage flexibility) and four domains of security (job security, employment security, income security, and ‘combination security’, or the work-life balance), resulting in 16 possible types of relations between flexibility and security. These relationships can be initiated and implemented by various national, regional, local industry or company level agencies. The agencies involved thus include state, regional and local government representatives, social partners, individual firms and individual employees, and the resulting strategies can be codified in laws, collective labour agreements, social pacts, social plans, individual contracts and HRM policies (Wilthagen 2004: 4).

The highly publicised report of the European Union Employment Task Force in 2003, entitled perhaps not surprisingly “Jobs, Jobs, Jobs; Creating More Employment in Europe,” also carried the same message. This was also the message of the more recent report “Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and better jobs through flexibility and security” (June 2007), where there are clear deliberative implications for attaining a mix of flexibility and security on the labour market. The four policy components of flexicurity policies were (a) flexible and reliable contractual arrangements, (b) comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, (c) effective active labour market policies, and (d) modern social security systems (European Union 2007:6). The basic argument put forward is that “good unemployment benefits, effective active labour market policies and dynamic labour markets increase people’s feeling of security” (European Union 2007:8).

A successful flexicurity strategy has to balance carefully the income insurance function of the unemployment benefit system with an appropriate “activation” strategy designed to facilitate transitions into
employment and boost career development. Empirical evidence suggests that workers feel better pro-
tected by adequate unemployment benefits than by strict protection against dismissal. Active labour
market policies, too, have appositive effects on the feeling of security among workers (European Union
2007:8).

There is a conspicuous absence of gender in most of the deliberations on flexicurity. Very recently the European Union has articulated the link between flexicurity and the promotion of gender equality, and has included it as one of the eight principles of flexicurity. As with the discussion on the other principles, there is an assumption that flexicurity is in line with the objectives of gender equality. The principle is stated as follows:

6. Flexicurity should support gender equality by promoting equal access to quality employment for
women and men, and by offering possibilities to reconcile work and family life (European Commission
2007:10).

As we shall see, this sentiment is echoed in the more integrationist and technocratic deliberations on the promotion of gender equality in the European Union.

The following sections study the ways in which the dominant production and net-
works of gender knowledge on gender mainstreaming have resonated with the thrust
of the flexicurity discussions in pursuing a more neo-liberal agenda through neutrali-
sing critical and political gender concerns, and disregarding the reality of low-income
groups (women, migrants, refugees, etc.) who struggle for security rather than deal
with the balancing of work and family life.

The political roots of the Gender Mainstreaming field in the European Union

While the importance of gender equality has been acknowledged by the European
Union since its inception, the focus of this policy in the Treaty of Rome in 1957 was
mainly through the promotion of Article 119 which dealt with the provision of equal
pay for equivalent work for women and men (Hoskyns 1996). Women, within this
framework, were viewed primarily as (passive) recipients of support and assistance,
and in charge of the caring and other responsibilities within the household. However,
the deliberations to promote gender equality in the 1970s and 1980s assumed a more
political momentum, challenging the basis of the labour market policies that existed,
and providing a broader platform for the promotion of gender equality and gender
rights, leading to the formal adoption of “gender mainstreaming” as a policy in the
European Union in 1996.

The formal adoption of an EU policy of gender mainstreaming was directly linked
to the political mobilisation associated with the Fourth UN World Conference on Wo-
men at Beijing in 1995, where gender mainstreaming was declared to be a key strategy
for the promotion of gender equality. According to the Beijing Platform:

Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men
of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is
a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality (United Nations 1997).

Such a perspective was the outcome of the deliberations undertaken over the previous two decades, and stimulated by the growing politicisation of the international women’s movement and the series of United Nations World Conferences on Women in Mexico (1975), Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi (1985) and 1995 (Beijing).³ While there were differences between participants in setting priorities at the conferences, they were important fora for deliberations, bringing together women and men with varying backgrounds and interests. They also performed an important function of sharing, informing and shaping opinions and policies on gender equality.⁴ The adoption of gender mainstreaming as a strategy for gender equality in the European Union also assumed this political momentum and saw the immediate setting up of five commissioners for the Equality Portfolio under the chairmanship of the President of European Union in 1996. Following this lead, the 1998 Council of Europe adopted a policy of gender mainstreaming defining it as:

(re)organisation, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making (Council of Europe 1999:4).

Gender mainstreaming from the mid 1990s

While the feminist politics of the period propelled the policy of gender mainstreaming in the European Union, the actual deliberations on gender mainstreaming in the sub-

³ The Mexican conference of 1975 (which took place at the same year as the International Women’s Year) took up the issue of equality, development and peace for women, and underscored the importance of viewing women as full and equal partners with men in relation to rights and resources, calling for “securing equal access for women to resources such as education, employment opportunities, political participation, health services, housing, nutrition and family planning.” Building on these concerns, the Copenhagen Conference called for equal access to education, employment opportunities and adequate health care services as needing particular attention. The Nairobi Conference in 1985 developed the Forward Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women to meet the goals put out in the Conferences in Mexico and Copenhagen. It also declared for the first time that all problems faced by humanity were disproportionately also problems for women, forwarding a legitimate right to participate in the decision-making process and in managing human affairs.

⁴ They were important inputs for the adoption in 1970 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) – often referred to as the Women’s Bill of Rights. This was followed in Vienna in 1993 at the World Conference which held that the “human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights. The full and equal participation of women in political, civil, economic, social and cultural life, at the national, regional and international levels, and the eradication of all forms of discrimination on grounds of sex are priority objectives of the international community” (United Nations 1993).
sequent period have assumed different approaches and priorities, as will shown below. Numerous authors have written on the gender mainstreaming policy in the European Union. Walby, for example, has theorised on the gender regime in the European Union which consists of different levels, forms and domains, giving rise to different moments of deliberation in the promotion of gender equality (Walby 2004:10-11). Rees has identified three approaches in the development of gender equality policies in the European Union, which she refers to as “tinkering”, “tailoring” and “transforming”. Rees associated these different approaches with the promotion of equal treatment in the 1970s, positive action in the 1980s, and gender mainstreaming in the 1990s, respectively (Rees 1998:28, 2002, 2000). From her point of view gender mainstreaming is a sequential strategy, built on and accompanied by policies of equal treatment legislation and positive action. Other authors have taken on a more critical approach. Some have argued that different approaches have, at times, led to a dilution of the political message leading some to conclude that the policy of gender mainstreaming has been only partially successful (Lombardo and Meier 2006). Woodward (2001) has maintained that with gender mainstreaming, the gender policy which had been the purview of a department, did not exist for long, and there was no guarantee that a similar perspective would be taken up in a similar manner by other policy departments. Furthermore there was a lack of knowledge at the highest levels of decision making on what gender mainstreaming implied (Woodward 2001:69, 74-75). Along the same line, Stratigaki (2005) has argued that de jure gender mainstreaming, when it is articulated in terms of expertise with regard to gender indicators, can be used de facto to neutralise positive action in favour of women in light of their enhanced political power as well as technical, human and financial resources.

For the purposes of our analysis, the framework adopted by Squires is particularly useful as it highlights the importance of deliberations in the development of strategies. Squires has argued that, in practice, the three approaches identified by Rees (tinkering, tailoring and transforming) co-exist at the policy level within gender mainstreaming and are associated with specific strategies which she groups as inclusion, reversal and displacement strategies. The following table indicates the different strategies and their associated actors, aims, indicators, strengths and weaknesses.
Mainstreaming Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mainstreaming Strategies</th>
<th>Inclusion</th>
<th>Reversal</th>
<th>Displacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Integrationist</td>
<td>Agenda-Setting</td>
<td>Transformative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>Identity groups</td>
<td>Political citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aims</td>
<td>Neutral policy-making</td>
<td>Recognising marginalised voices</td>
<td>Denaturalising and thereby politicising policy norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processes</td>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Deliberative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Policy instruments</td>
<td>Politics of presence</td>
<td>Cultural transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengths</td>
<td>Effective integration</td>
<td>Group perspectives recognised</td>
<td>Sensitive to diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weaknesses</td>
<td>Rhetorical entrapment</td>
<td>Reification of identities</td>
<td>Complexity, lack of specificity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Squires’ classification can be used to distinguish three equality approaches associated with distinct fields/networks of gendered knowledge production. The inclusion strategy, which uses an integrationist model, is characterised by the dominance of gender experts as key players, who evolve “effective” and gender neutral policies. This approach to gender mainstreaming aspires to objectivity, and views individuals as autonomous agents making decisions promoting the formal equality between the genders, a terrain and policy typically promoted by liberal feminists. The Reversal Strategy is linked with an interpretative methodology, and, while it recognises the voices of the marginalised, focuses on the concerns of women. Associated with more radical feminists, it tries to mainstream women’s voices and seeks recognition for female identity. The displacement strategy advocates diversity politics, and politicises policy norms. Mainstreaming within this perspective is a more open-ended deliberative project, which is concerned with deconstructing the discourse and transformation of diverse forms of marginalisation in society. The policies for gender equality therefore cannot be separated from other forms of inequality (Squires 2005:376). Squires argues for diversity mainstreaming as “an institutional manifestation of deliberative democracy” (ibid.: 367), indicating that the transformative model of mainstreaming is best suited to address the diversity agenda by making privileged norms visible.

In the sections below, the paper analyses the gendered knowledge and networks associated with the inclusion, reversal and displacement strategies with regard to gender mainstreaming, suggesting how the dominant doxa and habitus are aligned with the integrationist/inclusive strategy, which is in turn is closely linked to the neo-liberal agenda and the dominant interpretation of flexicurity policies.
Case I – The hegemonic neo-liberal ideology at the European Union, the pressures for increased and gendered flexibility and the decision making within the doxa

Gender equality is a fundamental right, a common value of the EU, and a necessary condition for the achievement of the EU objectives of growth, employment and social cohesion. One of the main challenges for the EU is to increase women’s employment, to improve women’s situation on the labour market and eliminate gender gaps (European Commission 2007: 2).

Women are often obliged to choose between having children or a career, due to the lack of care services, of flexible working arrangements, the persistence of gender stereotypes and an unequal share of family responsibilities with men. Progress made by women, including in key areas of the Lisbon Strategy such as education and research, are not fully reflected in women’s position on the labour market. This is a waste of human capital that the EU cannot afford (European Commission 2007:2).

These two quotes come from a Manual for Gender Mainstreaming of Employment policies (European Commission, July 2007) of the European Commission, which is based on the advice of the Expert Group on Gender, Social Inclusion and Employment (EGGSIE) which provides external expertise to the European Commission on gender issues. The quotes reflect the close link perceived between the needs for increased labour market flexibility and the women’s involvement in flexible work or part-time work. The particular form of gendered knowledge produced in this network/field promoting this “inclusive” strategy suggests the importance of getting the involvement and commitment of different stakeholders to encourage gender equality as “gender equality is argued to be better for both women and men, to improve productivity, and to facilitate better, more modern, government” (Squires 2005:374). Implicitly it is also acknowledged that there are economic costs entailed by discrimination and that it is important for efficiency reasons to promote gender equality.

5 While women’s employment in the European Union increased steadily from 45,951,000 in 1975 to 68,964,000 in 2001, this employment was mainly in the flexible part-time work.
mainstreaming, as we have seen, usually implies a position where gender equality is viewed to be better for women and men, and is in line with improving productivity and competitiveness, and a more modern government. However, this type of gendered knowledge, through the use of so-called expert and neutral policies, ignores critical and political concerns of gender mainstreaming and thus has limitations with regard to the potential of gender mainstreaming as a political or transformative strategy.

This demand to limit the scope of mainstreaming tools such that they fit easily within existing policy processes potentially delimits the potential of mainstreaming itself. It raises questions about the political accountability of experts, reduces the scope for wider consultation with “non-experts,” and so reduces the likelihood that the policy agenda will reflect the particular experiences and concerns of women that do not resonate with the pre-existing policy framework. Its strength lies in its ability to realize effective integration; its weakness lies in its tendency to fall into rhetorical entrapment (Squires 2005:374).

An illustration of this is seen in the abovementioned manual, which is concerned with how gender mainstreaming could improve the European Commission’s Roadmap for Equality between men and women (2006-2010) by prioritising the economic independence of women and reconciling work and family life. Efforts to stimulate progress in this direction included increasing the employment of women, promoting female entrepreneurship, stimulating member states to improve the care services. The manual proposes a four-step methodology (getting organised, learning about gender differences, assessing the policy impact and redesigning policy) for this purpose (European Commission July 2007:3).

It is interesting to note that, as we have seen in the previous discussions on flexicurity, gender concerns were not seriously considered within the framework of flexicurity. It was only in 2007 that gender mainstreaming discussions at the European level considered the impact of flexicurity on women. However, it was, in the first place, viewed as a novel approach by the Expert Group on Gender, Social Inclusion and Employment (EGGSIE).

It is important to note that flexicurity does not involve entirely new policy measures; rather its novelty lies in the combination of simultaneously introduced measures in the field of both flexibility and security (European Commission 2007:15).

The Expert group recognised the need to have a gender mainstreaming approach inform the flexicurity policies. It indicated that such an approach would “recognize the role of gender in reinforcing inequalities associated with flexible working and in shaping flexible working patterns; address the reconciliation needs of employees with care commitments while recognizing the risks of extending working hours or unsocial hours scheduling; support pathways out of non-standard work and working times to avoid the risks of long term traps and segmentation of women into disadvantaged employment forms” (European Commission 2007:15-16). To deal with these problems it suggested a check list on the gender mainstreaming of flexicurity policies. This is given below.
Gender mainstreaming of flexicurity policies

Step 1. Getting organized
• Are there any guidelines or targets set with regard to flexicurity policies?
• Are all relevant stakeholders aware of the gender equality issues?
• Is there a clear structure of responsibilities?
• Are training facilities in gender equality issues available and/or is it possible to make use of external expertise?

Step 2. Learning about gender differences
• Are all relevant statistics differentiated by gender?
• What is the gender division of typical and a-typical contract?
• What is the gender division of full-time and part-time working hours?
• What are the trends in this respect?

Step 3. Assessing the policy impact
• Are flexible time arrangements compatible with women's needs?
• Is the development of flexible working time compatible or incompatible with domestic care responsibilities?
• Are the programmes/policies aimed at men as well as women?
• Do those on flexible contracts have access to training?
• Are there measures to reduce the risk of segregation associated with flexible and part-time working (for example rights to return to full-time work)?
• Are adaptability policies compatible with promoting the closure of the gender gaps (including gender pay gaps)?

Step 4. Redesigning policy
• Given the results of step 1, 2 and 3 identify ways in which the policy could be redesigned to promote gender equality. Take into account that gender mainstreaming calls for a more joined up approach, which may involve more than one policy area or department.

Source: European Commission, July 2007:16

The language used in the above box, identifying the steps involved in the mainstreaming of flexicurity policies, suggests a technocratic solution and closure looking for bureaucratic action. While there is awareness that women are often disadvantaged in flexible work that they take, the underlying assumptions for such a division of labour are not addressed. The proposed checklist is reflective of the deficit in deliberative democracy both within and between the fields/networks of flexicurity and gender mainstreaming at the European level. In many ways, this technocratic approach invokes little proactive intervention. As the EU labour market is generally showing increased levels of female economic activity, partially associated with flexible jobs, policy intervention is often not a priority, except to counter some of the unequal relations on the labour market between men and women. The possibilities that an increased labour supply of women might imply lower wages, and that the working conditions associated with employment security might be problematic, are simply not seriously
deliberated but viewed rather as natural, inevitable and even rational. Essentially, such a perspective also depoliticises the issue of gender equality.

One could also argue that such an approach supports the doxa that allows policies to ignore the underlying constraints of labour market participation of women and men on an equal footing – a core element of which is the uneven distribution of reproductive responsibilities – fundamental to patriarchal power relations in society.

Case II: Challenging differing gender power relations on the labour market

The political message that stemmed from the historical roots of gender mainstreaming were taken up by several other gendered knowledge networks, who in turn took up associated approaches and strategies to promote gender equality. As previously noted the links between the doxa and the habitus in policy-making fields reflect differing power relations in society, placing some people in systematically advanced positions over others in the process of deliberation (Cameron and Ohja 2007:69). In this section we concentrate on the “reversal” strategy, which focuses on changing the male-domination in the gender power relations on the labour market. According to Squires’ typology, the reversal strategies are linked to those wishing to counter the disadvantages that women have historically experienced, and focus on the female gendered identity. The weakness of this strategy is that it obscures intra-group divisions (Squires 1999; 2005:370-375).

The focus of the deliberations within this gendered knowledge field is on trying to challenge the doxa with regard to part-time and flexible work, highlighting the ways in which women are disadvantaged with regard to certain types of flexible work in order to put forward “reversal” strategies to promote gender mainstreaming. Amongst the arguments put forward were that high participation rates of women in the industrialised countries did not automatically imply gender equality on the labour market. Occupational segregation as well as labour market segmentation (horizontal and vertical) have tended to disproportionately place women in the low-paying categories of work often associated with more vulnerable terms and conditions of work. As noted by the European Commission:

Gender discrimination remains a fundamental component pervading the labour market. New policies to desegregate the labour market are needed which bear on both supply and demand factors. Activities to promote labour market desegregation often consist of isolated and dispersed actions without a programmatic framework and which fail to achieve a substantial impact (European Commission, Equal Opportunities for Women and Men in the European Union, Annual Report 1997, p. 56).
Gender occupational segregation has resulted in women being disproportionately represented in certain categories of employment. Almost half the women in the European Union are employed in health and social services, retailing, education and public administration, four sectors that accounted for under a third of total employment. Studies have shown that typically women’s jobs are associated with low pay, precarious job status with poor working conditions, inadequate social coverage and limited possibilities for promotion and upward mobility. Women experience higher unemployment (12.4%) than men (9.4%) do (Rubery, Smith and Fagan 1996). There is some evidence to suggest that women tend to be in more transient jobs than men are. In contrast, men tend to have significantly higher permanent contracts than women, although once in the labour market on temporary contracts, they both stand equal chances of getting permanent contracts. Such flexible jobs are associated with lower earnings than permanent jobs, as well as job insecurity (Remery, van Doorne-Huiskes and Schippers 2002:491). Thus, while there has been an increase in the 1980s and the 1990s in women’s activity rates (the so-called feminisation of the labour force, represented by the increasing share of women in the labour force), this has not broken down the sexual division of labour and the associated gender segregation between and within occupations, across sectors and at all levels of work (Plantenga 1997:89). All these factors have given rise to the problem that women’s involvement in flexible and insecure work is, in many ways, a manifestation of their weaker labour market position in times of high unemployment, their largest share being in secondary jobs in the low-skilled occupations with women having higher rates of temporary work than men (de Grip, Hoevenberg and Willems 1997).

While these deliberations sought to criticise flexible policies through highlighting the experiences of women in the labour market, there was less emphasis on the differences between different groups of women (the class and ethnic factors) as well as on the implications that flexible policies hold for other vulnerable groups. The demand was for adequate policies to be put into place to ensure that policies promoting gender equality should counter the disadvantages that women had historically faced on the labour market. While this message was important in criticising the mainstream policies promoting flexibility on the labour market, it did not challenge the system.

---

6 Even the Nordic/Scandinavian countries – which have relatively high rates of female employment (75% in 1992) and where women occupy nearly 50% of the labour market – have gender-segmented labour markets, with women occupying the expanding services sector (clerical, commercial, health care and social work) and a continuance of the wage gap between men and women. Over 70% of women in Sweden in 1998 were employed in female-dominated occupations (60-100% women) while over 75% of men were in male-dominated jobs (0-40% women) (Nygberg 1998:15-16). A study in Britain of women’s female employment between 1981 and 1991 confirms that much of this increase has taken place in occupations where they were employed in 1981, with all the increase in part-time work for women being in these occupations (Bruegel and Perrons 1998).

7 A study of the British labour market in 1985 and 1990 suggests that around 25% of men and 41% of women are in jobs lasting less than five years. At the same time, 25% of men and 12% of women are likely to be in jobs which they will hold for over 30 years (Burgess and Rees 1997).
Case III: Challenging the Doxa through the “transformatory” approach and “displacement” strategy

The displacement strategy, most closely aligned with the Cameron-Ohja framework on deliberative democracy, is concerned with deconstructing the discursive regimes involved in the different deliberations (Squires 1999, 2005:370-375). Squires posits that it is necessary to link gender equality to other forms of equality – including those relating to sexual orientation, age, religion, race, and disability – through the promotion of inclusive deliberation. Under these circumstances, she, like Cameron and Ohja, argues for inclusive deliberation which “transforms mainstreaming from a technocratic tool into an institution manifestation of deliberative democracy” (Squires 2005:367).

These deliberations on gender mainstreaming were associated with gender knowledge and networks that continued the political message of the international women’s movement but took it beyond correcting the system while challenging its basis with regard to power and distribution. As we have seen, the deliberations and political contestations prior to and during the Beijing Conference recognised differences and disadvantages that exist between women and men, and pressured for positive and corrective action, including the combination of political opportunities, strategic framing and resource mobilization that have contributed to the promotion of the gender rights agenda in the European Union (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000). In many instances, pressures were placed at different levels by feminist movements in civil society, women representatives in parliament and government administrative bureaucracies (Vargas and Wieringa 1998). Deliberative claims pursued a more inclusive democratic form in the decision-making process. Labour market concerns within these deliberations on gender mainstreaming went beyond trying to reverse the situation but trying rather to transform the system, with the real potential of reversing what Bourdieu calls the doxic order.

In dealing with the labour market, the deliberations suggested that it was not sufficient to develop “reversal” and corrective strategies but to challenge the basis of the system itself. For example, they highlighted the role of the unpaid work in the households, communities and civil society in general, which was not recognised as a contribution to the economy in the GDP statistics and which gave rise to disadvantages and discrimination for women in the labour market. Under these circumstances, the promotion of labour market flexibility could shift more work to the unpaid labour segment as women continue to be largely responsible for the care work in the household. The promotion of flexicurity without addressing this issue could result in increased vulnerability for women in both the paid and unpaid sectors of work. The claims used economic language to question the basis of macro-economic policies and the implications that they held for men and women. As noted by the European Women’s Lobby:

It is rarely recognised that many cuts in public services and reductions of public expenditure, merely represent a shift in costs from the paid to the unpaid sector. Unpaid care and domestic work can in principle be done by men or women, but this work has been socially constituted as a responsibility of
women and often thought of as a social role rather than economic activity. Policy makers must make explicit their assumptions, which underpin macro-economic policies and must recognize the need to establish the costs of ignoring unpaid work and women’s time use in these activities (European Women’s Lobby (http://www.womenlobby.org/site/1abstract).

The associated deliberations on such claims also critically looked at the wider policies of the European Union. Standing has argued that increased involvement of women in the labour market during periods of recession in the industrialised countries was associated with the growth of income insecurity (Standing 1999:584). The latter has been partly the outcome of the targeting of state benefits, resulting in fewer people having entitlements with the more vulnerable categories undertaking precarious forms of work to earn their income. In addition, the governments often allowed the weakening of employment security regulations and the easing of downsizing of enterprises. Under these circumstances, employers often found it possible to dismiss (costly) full-time (male) workers and for cheaper (usually female and part-time) labour.

The transformatory approach and the displacement strategy also argued that flexible work could strengthen class divisions between women, as a minority of women find themselves in an advantaged labour segment working full time (Rubery, Smith and Fagan 1998). Flexibility in labour market policies promoted by governments to make the unemployed more “employable” could have the undesired consequence of increased inflexibility on choices of occupations for women due to their role in the unpaid care and domestic work. Such flexibility could therefore promote the feminisation of non-standard work, with the resulting lack of flexibility for women to take up the more lucrative flexible jobs (due to their care responsibilities in the household). These disadvantages were again brought up in the different political lobbies.

Part time work doesn’t provide sufficient income to have economic autonomy and provides less social security rights. It must also be acknowledged that many part-time women workers actually want to work full time. Part time work is also considered to be the solution for the reconciliation of work and family life, and is considered to be an issue that mainly concerns women. Such a view strongly limits women’s choices in the labour market and cements the unequal sharing of family responsibilities between women and men (European Women’s Lobby (http://www.womenlobby.org/site/1abstract).

Another concern questioned the very nature of labour market forces and whether they could function as corrective institution in dealing with the problems of gender inequality. Labour markets are, as argued by Elson (1999), not neutral arenas where buyers and sellers interact, but rather social institutions that are “bearers of gender”. Seen as operating at the intersection of productive and reproductive sectors of the economy, they reflect social norms and stereotypes, including associated masculine and feminine behaviour and patterns of work, as well as existing problems of gender domination and subordination. According to Elson,

The formal and informal rules which structure the operation of labour markets are instantiations of the gender relations of the society in which the labour market is embedded. They reflect existing problems of gender domination and subordination, and also the tensions, contradictions and potential for changes which is characteristic of any pattern of gender relations, no matter how unequally power is distributed (Elson 1999: 612).
As such, when women enter the labour market, they are confronted by a framework of
behaviour and division of work that reflects the predominant values in society. Within
her framework, Elson has argued that issues such as labour legislation, government
labour standards inspectorates, trade unions, professional and business networks, sys-
tem of job evaluation, systems of organisation of work, pay determination structures
all are bearers of gender even if there is no overt discourse on issues of gender equality
and differentiation. Thus, the ideology and its impact on the labour market can result
in women being unable to be on equal terms with men on the labour market resulting
in women’s “weak position in terms of earnings and potential” (Elson 1999:612). In
addition, flexibility can lead to the weakening of these institutions which do not imply
improvement of women’s positions in the labour market.

Underlying these deliberations is a fundamental confrontation with the doxa and
habitus which sustains patriarchal and class power relations in society through chal-
lenging the assumptions of the system itself from the viewpoint of gender equality.

Flexicurity: Containing the crisis through symbolic violence

We have seen that flexicurity is currently being promoted by the European Commission
as the key means of providing employment and security in a competitive global eco-
nomy through the promotion of more open and responsive labour markets and more
productive workplaces (European Commission 2007). At the same time, the normative
insertion of gender issues in the 6th principle of flexicurity suggests that such a policy
is beneficial to women workers, through providing greater scope for employment and
reconciling family and working life. Within this perspective, improvements in gender
equality (discrimination being considered a waste of human resources) are closely
linked with increased employment, productivity and efficiency. This “common ratio-
nality” between the objectives of flexicurity and the inclusive strategy of gender main-
streaming, manifested through “neutral” policies (and indicators) has imparted a degree
of objectivity to the deliberations, continuing deliberative deficits through its strategic
link with the neo-liberal agenda even if the terminology of deliberation suggests dis-
interest.

The coalescence and capturing of the deliberations in flexicurity and gender main-
streaming has allowed for the marginalisation and dilution of some of the more political
and transformatory deliberations with regard to both these policies. It also raises serious
questions on the potential of mainstreaming as a strategy, as it forces the framework
of action into a narrow field of interventions, while also limiting the scope for wider
consultations and the involvement of “non-experts”. In these ways, it is also possible
that the strategy is likely to be biased in favour of the experiences of women as un-
derstood by those involved in the policy-making structure.

One could further argue that the political challenges underpinning the reversal and
displacement strategies had the potential to lead to a “crisis” and destabilise the doxa.
Such a situation provoked the need for symbolic violence from those who dominate
the power relations on the labour market. This was not done through physical coercion. In many ways flexicurity is a solution if it can succeed in foreclosing any political and fundamental interrogation of the system. In addition, such a lack of deliberative democracy also supports another doxa – that which accepts the uneven distribution of reproductive responsibilities – the core of the patriarchal power relations in society.

References


Gender Knowledge in Migration Studies and in Practice¹

Pia Eberhardt, Helen Schwenken

Against the background of a feminist critique of supposedly universal knowledge (Tickner 2006; Braun/Stephan 2005), we will browse the field of migration studies and migration practices for their explicit and implicit gender knowledge. In other words, we will investigate the specific ways, in which the scholarly community and dominant theories in the field perceive, evaluate, reason and either legitimize and accept or challenge gender differences and the status quo of gender relations. And we will discuss whether this gender knowledge reflects and/or is reflected in the lived experiences of migrants.

We start with developing our conceptual framework of gender knowledge. The subsequent sections take a closer look at economic migration theories and examine two neoclassical models for their explicit and implicit gender knowledge – Jacob Mincer’s model of family migration and the Roy-Borjas selection model. We will show that the academic reasoning about migration is far from gender neutral or gender sensitive, but is instead informed by a rather traditional understanding of gender roles. The middle part of our paper then provides a brief survey of the history of migration studies, the role gender played in its evolution and of the varying degrees of openness towards gender issues in the different disciplines. Here, the implicit norm of the migrant as male has only recently been questioned and contrasted with gender-sensitive interpretations. In the final section, we raise the question whether migration practices challenge the more traditional gender knowledge identified in migration studies. The enormous body of literature on gender and migration shows that there is no clear answer to this question – migration practices can stabilize as well as destabilize traditional gender knowledge. We conclude the paper by summarizing our findings, reflecting upon our research approach and sketching perspectives for further research. We come to the conclusion that while it seems unlikely that the majority of migrants of both genders challenge existing gender orders, incremental changes and creative appropriations nevertheless adumbrate contingencies.

¹ We would like to acknowledge the research funding of the Hessian Ministry of Science and Arts for our project on “Economic gender knowledge in the Governance of Migration (funding scheme “Gender differences”, 2007/14, 2007-2008), the granting of a mobility fellowship by the Network of Excellence GARNET for Helen Schwenken at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague (8-10/2007), the discussions in GARNET’s group on Gender in International Economy (JERP 5.3.4) and insightful comments by ThanhDam Truong, Gülay Çağlar, Laura Roberts, the editors of the volume and the participants of the Columbia University Seminars, Women and Society, No. 545 at Columbia University and of the Development Research Seminars Series at the Institute of Social Studies. Shortcomings remain of course in the responsibility of the authors.
To analyze the gendered assumptions of migration studies and practices, we draw on the concept of ‘gender knowledge’ (“Geschlechterwissen”) introduced by German social scientists Irene Dölling and Sünne Andresen (Dölling, 2005; Andresen/Dölling 2005). Their central assumption is that every form of knowledge – be it everyday knowledge or the one produced in academia – is based upon a specific knowledge about gender. As knowledge is plural, different knowledges about gender, some of which are contradictory, co-exist in society. These different forms of gender knowledge can become strategic resources in struggles about practices and the construction of reality (Andresen/Dölling 2005: 175; Dölling, 2005: 50).

But what exactly is gender knowledge? Andresen and Dölling (2005: 175) distinguish two dimensions of the term: firstly, “the different types of collective knowledge, which exist in society regarding the differences between the sexes; the reasoning about its ‘self-evidence’ and evidence; the dominant normative concepts about the ‘correct’ relations and divisions of labour between men and women” (own translation). Secondly, gender knowledge encompasses individually appropriated forms of knowledge (ibid.; see also Dölling 2005: 50). Collective gender knowledge can itself be further differentiated into, first, everyday knowledge, which is dominated by cultural stereotypes and is rather tacit and unconscious, second, expert knowledge generated by institutions like religion, academia, or law and, third, popularized knowledge dispersed through the media, political parties, social movements etc., which is an important link between everyday knowledge and expert knowledge. In all three forms, gender knowledge can reaffirm a hierarchical gender order, openly question it or range somewhere in between these two poles (see the contribution of Cavaghan in this volume).

The differentiation into everyday, expert and popularized knowledge already suggests that gender knowledge can be either implicit – an incorporated knowledge of which one is not aware – or well reflected and explicitly referred to in discourse. With reference to gender mainstreaming, German sociologist Angelika Wetterer (2003) has illustrated that there can be a mismatch between both: Mushroooming gender-sensitive documents, declarations and actions, which reflect a more progressive discursive gender knowledge, often clash with the practice of individuals and institutions, which often reflect a more traditional incorporated conception or definition of gender knowledge. This shows that even if gender knowledge based on gender equality is integrated into policy documents or implementation plans, this does not necessarily lead to its sustainable implementation as long as it is not incorporated into the everyday actions of individuals and institutions.

Relating the concept of gender knowledge to the field of migration, we assume that migratory practice and the knowledge surrounding the causes and patterns of migration are based on explicit and/or implicit assumptions about gender. For analytical purposes, we will focus on three questions to trace these gendered assumptions: First, are gender differences in migration acknowledged and if so, how are they described? Second, are these differences explained and if so, how? And, finally, what relevance is
generally ascribed to gender in migration processes? In answering these questions, we aim to contribute to the analysis of the often invisible gendered codes of knowledge orders (Braun and Stephan, 2005) and the gendered forms of knowledge entering governance processes.

The relevance of economics in migration studies and policies

Starting an article about gender and migration with an in-depth analysis of two neoclassical economic models of migration might come as a bit of a surprise. Why bother with a field that is apparently so resilient to change that the feminist challenge to it “has barely caused a ripple within the increasingly conservative core of the profession” as Marianne A. Ferber and Julie A. Nelson (2003: 29) conclude in their documentation of the impact of a decade of feminist economics? This question is even more pressing as there is no unambiguous evidence about the relevance of migration economics for migration studies and policies. Economics seems to guide a lot of quantitative research conducted in the field and has a major impact on everyday assumptions about why people migrate, for example, through the theorem of wage differentials.

As far as migration policy is concerned, the evidence is contradictory. According to Caroline B. Brettel and James F. Hollifield (2000b: 6) “economists (and economic demographers) are often called upon (by those who formulate policy) to assess the fiscal and human capital costs and benefits of immigration” (see also Dodson/Crush 2004; McLaren/Dyck 2004, Urzúa, 2000: 428). On the other hand, the strong standing of security issues and the restrictive character of many migration policies suggest that economic rationality is not the only, and probably not even the dominant, logic in this policy field. Furthermore, more general studies on the role of expert knowledge in current migration policies suggest a primacy of politics in the nexus between politics and science: While science – and with it migration economics – can be an important currency in migration policy making, politics and the media tend to only selectively draw on the respective arguments to back up their claims and are cautious about relying too much on academia, which may be “reinforced by a general decline in the belief in scientific knowledge as a tool for rational problem-solving” (Timmermans/Scholten 2006: 1116; see also Boswell 2008).

Despite these ambiguities, we consider it worthwhile to analyze the gendered foundations of neoclassical theories of migration. Neoclassical economics seems to have an impact on the current debate about migration and development. The mushrooming reports by institutions such as the World Bank, the OECD or IOM draw on the neoclassical framework for predictions about the flows, costs and benefits of migration, even though some integrate other insights and most are silent on their theoretical underpinnings (e.g. IOM 2005, particularly section 2; World Bank 2006, particularly chap. 2-3; OECD 2007). This influence of economics is, first, reflected in the frequent use of formal, idealized models and econometric techniques, particularly in the studies that provide the empirical basis for their reports. Another indicator is the continuous
reference to the idea that regional wage differentials drive migration. Take the following statement from the IOM’s 2005 World Migration Report regarding the driving forces of migration as a representative example: “once per capita income differentials are reduced to about 4:1 or 5:1 […] the anticipation of continued economic improvement would keep most persons […] at home” (IOM 2005: 186). Finally, the commitment to the theorem of wage differentials hints at the adherence to three features, which Christina Boswell (2008: 552) has identified as the core of the economic literature on migration: a) methodological individualism, that is the belief that social phenomena can be explained through individual preferences and behaviour; b) a utilitarian ontology of the self, which assumes that individuals seek to maximize their utility; and c) a uniform concept of rationality. And indeed, while explicit statements such as “migrants make their own rational cost-benefit calculations” (IOM 2005: 18) are rare, the mainstream contribution to the debate about migration and development leaves little room for non-generalizable conceptions of the utility contingent in particular social settings. This goes hand in hand with a striking amnesia of former research on the relevance of structural constraints and institutions in migration processes – an amnesia, which Hein de Haas (2007: 69) has interpreted as “the deductive echo of a general paradigm shift in research and policy away from dependency and state-centric to neoclassical and neoliberal views” in the social sciences.

The influence of economics on this debate is not the only reason for conducting an analysis of the gendered foundations of neoclassical theories of migration. In addition, we follow the insights of economic historians and poststructuralist feminist economists that neoclassical economics functions as a hegemonic discourse. Its hegemonic power is not derived from the fact that it aptly describes ‘reality’, but because, over the centuries, the theory managed to construct its subject – the economy and the subjects acting in it – according to its basic rationales (Manstetten 2002: 120; Habermann 2008). Its central figure, homo economicus, serves as a hegemonic ideal, which prescribes a certain rationale of behaviour that has been more and more internalized by individuals (Habermann 2008). From that perspective, throwing some light on this rationale is a worthy endeavour even though economics is contested within migration studies and there is no one-to-one translation of economic models into policy. Furthermore, we consider the analysis of the gendered foundations of migration theories as an important step in further overcoming the ‘add women and stir’-approach in the field. While it has been rightly argued that, since the 1990s, much of the scholarship has gone beyond that approach and has developed gender as a central category in migration processes (Curran/Shafer/Donato/Garip 2006), the fact that this has mainly left migration theories unchallenged hints at the difficulties in conceptualizing migration as a gendered process (for valuable exceptions see Katz 1999; Kofman et al. 2000: 21; Boyd/Grieco 2003). Finally, we consider a gendered analysis of neoclassical migration theories as an important contribution to overcoming the lack of dialogue between feminist and mainstream researchers in the field.
Economic theories of migration differ according to paradigms (Marxist, neoclassical and institutional economics), levels of analysis (micro or macro) and to the issues they address: Why do immigrants come? Which persons are most likely to move? How do they fare at their destination locations? How does immigration affect receiving countries? And finally, how does emigration affect sending societies? Within that broad field, we will focus on the neoclassical approaches, and more specifically on the ‘who and why models’, which are particularly relevant as they underpin the rest of migration economics (Clark/Hatton/Williamson 2004: 1).

The neoclassical macroeconomic theory of migration dates back to John R. Hicks’ *Theory of Wages* (1932), according to which migration is determined by geographical differences in economic opportunities. Above all it is wage differentials due to different endowments of labour relative to capital, which trigger mobility from places where labour is abundant and earnings are low to labour-scarce and high-wage destinations. In other words: “Workers respond to regional differences in economic outcomes by voting with their feet” (Borjas 2000: 1). The reason for this behaviour is given by the microeconomic human capital approach, which was first outlined by Larry A. Sjaastad (1962) and given its classic form by Michael P. Todaro (1969). The Todaro-model claims that individuals make a rational decision to migrate when a cost-benefit calculation leads them to expect that future payoffs from the movement exceed its costs. Since the present costs have to pay off in the future, migration is interpreted as a human capital investment.

This basic theorizing of migration has been refined, extended and tested by numerous authors (for a selection of milestone articles see Zimmermann/Bauer 2002). A leading figure in this process has been Harvard economist George J. Borjas. His selection model (Borjas, 1987, 1991) is one of the most important benchmarks in the field and perfectly suitable to exemplify neoclassical accounts of individual migration. The model deals with the question of which workers tend to engage in migration processes – the more or the least skilled – and was developed in the context of seemingly deteriorating labour market performances and declining skills of US immigrants in the 1980s. Up to then, the standard proposition within neoclassical economics was that, irrespective of their country of origin, immigrants as a self-selected group were “more

---

2 Apart from wage advantages, non-monetary factors are also considered important migration benefits – at least in empirical studies. They include political (e.g. civil liberties, political rights, stability, security), socio-cultural (e.g. love, social integration, educational opportunities) and ecological gains (e.g. environment, climate, health). However, due to problems of empirical measurement, there is a certain hesitation among economists to include these factors (Fischer/Martin/Straubhaar 1997: 57f).

3 Within theory, the costs of moving more often than not equal transportation costs with distance used as a proxy. Empirical studies include income losses due to potential unemployment in the host society, psychic costs, adjustment costs for job training or learning a new language as well as the costs of gaining information about feasible destinations. Costs resulting from emigration and immigration barriers have also been included.
able and more highly motivated” than their fellow citizens (Chiswick 1978: 900). Yet, Borjas argues that the skill composition of migration flows depends on regional differences in the rewards to skills, because “[w]orkers ‘selling’ their skills behave just like firms selling their product. Both, workers and goods flow to those markets where they can get the highest price” (Borjas 1996: 298). Taking income inequality as a proxy for returns to skill, Borjas hypothesizes that the skill composition of migration flows depends on migrants’ position in the home-country wage distribution and on the ratio of variances in the income distribution of home and host society. Workers with above-average skills will move from countries with a more egalitarian income distribution to places with more income inequality while unskilled workers will prefer countries with a more equal income distribution where payoff to skill is lower.

While this approach has also been applied to family migration (Borjas/Bronars 1991), up until today, the standard neoclassical family relocation model is Jacob Mincer’s application of the New Home or Household Economics4 to migration. It is particularly noteworthy as a first attempt within neoclassical economics to address patterns of gender-specific migration within households, but is deeply rooted in a mode of thinking, which has met with fierce criticism from the side of feminist economists for the naturalization, rationalization and legitimization of white, middle-class, Fordist and patriarchal family arrangements (e.g. Ferner/Birnbaum 1977; Bergmann 1995). At the heart of Mincer’s model is the assumption “that net family gain rather than net personal gain […] motivates migration of households” (Mincer, 1978: 750). Couples move or stay in order to maximize the sum of their incomes, not individual well-being. This may imply forgoing opportunities, which would be optimal from a personal calculation. So, whilst for “tied movers” engaging in family migration implies sacrificing private gains, “tied stayers” would personally gain from geographic relocation, but decide against it for the sake of maximizing family welfare. Mincer assumes that women are more likely than men to be the tied partner as, empirically, their labour force participation is discontinuous and they earn less. This is why “husbands’ gains (or losses) from migration usually exceed the losses (or gains) of the wife” (ibid.: 754). Yet, forgone opportunities are compensated within the household, so that, overall, the family migrates if the future gains of one spouse exceed the other spouse’s losses (net of migration costs).

Neoclassical accounts of migration have repeatedly been criticized from outside of economics for being gender-blind or overtly sexist (Katz 1999; Kofman et al. 2000: 21; Boyd/Grieco 2003). More recently, economists have also acknowledged the necessity to incorporate gender into economic migration theories (Pfeiffer et al. 2007). We will in the following section analyze the models of Mincer and Borjas through the

---

4 The New Home Economics is a research program that developed out of the neoclassical tradition in the 1960s and focused on issues such as marriage, divorce, fertility, inner-household division of labour and the labour market participation of family members. It theorizes non-market exchanges such as the decision to marry or to have children as the utility-maximizing choice of individuals and families respectively. The program is closely associated with Nobel Prize winner Gary Becker.
lens of the analytical framework of gender knowledge developed earlier to exemplify that while neoclassical approaches to migration have a thin comprehension of gender as a relevant factor in migration processes, they implicitly assume the male as the prototypical migrant.

Naturally born tied movers? – Explicit gender knowledge in the models

What gender knowledge do the models by Mincer and Borjas reveal? Do they consider gender differences and if so, how are they presented and explained? What relevance is ascribed to gender as a social structure? Starting with Borjas’ model, the answer is straightforward: It is carefully crafted in gender-neutral terms and thus reveals no explicit gender knowledge. On the contrary, Mincer’s approach rests on the explicit and empirically derived assumption that men’s labour market power exceeds that of their female partners, which does lead to gender differentiated migration-patterns. Due to their higher wages, men gain and lose more from migration, which is why they tend to be the independent mover (or stayer), while dependent partners (movers and stayers) are disproportionately female. So, according to the Mincer model, gender differences do matter in relocation processes – at least indirectly via the labour market.

While Mincer does not explain these gender differences in his 1978 text, his argument must be seen in the context of the New Home Economics of the 1960s and 1970s. Here, authors like Gary Becker argued that the household’s gender division of labour and gender wage gaps were the result of a comparative advantage of women in domestic labour, which was “partly due to the gains from specialized investments, […] [and] partly due to intrinsic? [i.e. biological] differences between the sexes” (Becker 1998: 37). Similarly, Mincer and Polachek (1974) argued that due to genetic endowments, women expected discontinuous labour market participation and hence chose to under-invest in human capital, which, in turn, lowered their productivity and wages. Within the New Home Economics, women’s lower earnings are thus fully attributed to their decisions on the basis of biological imperatives. Mincer makes a similar argument about the relationship between migration and gender segregation in the labour market:

The expectation of becoming a tied spouse, which characterized most women until very recently, may have had some influence on women’s initial occupational choices. The preference for occupations which are most easily transferable geographically may have contributed in part to the concentration of women in such traditional occupations as teaching, nursing, and secretarial work.

(Mincer, 1978: 756)

Here, gender segregation in the labour market is taken as an endogenous variable to explain women’s status as tied partners, while this status is taken as an exogenous variable to explain the continuity of a gender segregated labour market. A few lines later, the finding that migration reduces employment and earnings of women who move as tied movers while increasing those of their spouses is legitimized in terms of family welfare maximization:
The adverse effects on the labor market experience of some married women may be seen as ‘social oppression’ from a private point of view. Such a view, however, fails to note that the behavior we analyzed is a product of family welfare maximization. This is Pareto-optimal, since private market losses can be internalized by the family, that is, compensated by a redistribution of gains. (Mincer, 1978: 757)

Feminist economists, by contrast, have claimed that interpretations of that kind “are thinly disguised apologies for the existing social hierarchies” (Barker/Feiner 2004: 2) and have argued that economic inequalities are rooted “in social processes of inclusion, valorisation and representation” (ibid.) that constitute individuals differently and thus mediate their articulation into the economy. Masculinist immigration policies, which devalue feminized labour like the Canadian point system (Harzig 2003: 45) or which disregard the fact that women’s labour is often times less formalized than men’s, which is why they are more likely to lack the required certified records of their work experience (Dodson/Crush 2004: 105), constitute a case in point. Gender role beliefs in the context of family migration are another example: As men’s and women’s household contributions are valued differently, men might be pushed into migration through the male breadwinner ideal. Women, on the other hand, often privilege their male partner’s careers in relocation decisions – at times even to the detriment of family welfare (Bielby/Bielby 1992; Jürges 2006). Furthermore, critics of Mincer’s approach have questioned the presumed consensual nature of the family decision process, the alleged inner-household redistribution of benefits and losses and the tendency to treat both men’s and women’s migration as determined by labour market opportunities while ignoring other motives (Bielby/Bielby 1992: 1244; Katz 1999: 558). In fact, studies on gender and migration show that while employment factors are indeed important for men’s migration decisions, due to household gender divisions of labour and gender roles, women are more concerned about reproductive requirements (Willis/Yeo 2000; Morokvasic 2003).

Let us summarize the points about the explicit gender knowledge: While Borjas’ account does not explicitly draw on gendered assumptions, Mincer’s does. However, even in his model, there is little awareness of gender as a powerful factor in migration processes. Neither gender role beliefs, nor gendered power relations nor discriminatory immigration policies affect the relocation decision of Mincer’s couple. Where gender differences are considered in the labour market performances of men and women, they are taken for granted and legitimized in terms of biological inclination and welfare maximization.

5 The ‘gender division of labour’ concept can be criticized as heterosexist as it assumes a male-female couple. While we do not want to universalize opposite-sex relationships, we still want to name the phenomenon that women who live with men undertake the bulk of unpaid domestic work and will therefore continue to use the concept.
The prototypical male migrant – the implicit gender knowledge in the models

A second look at the models’ assumptions is indicative of the implicit gender knowledge at work in both texts. Let us first consider Mincer’s presumptions about the family: his allegedly universal family consists of a man and a woman, who are obviously married, so that they are called “husband” and “wife”. Between the lines, the model smoothly links the assumptions that a normal adult a) belongs to one of the major genders, b) forms a romantic and sexual relationship with someone from the opposite sex which c) leads to the formation of a family conceptualized as d) inherently build around a heterosexual couple of this kind. It is therefore firmly rooted in a heteronormative gender knowledge (for this conceptualization of heteronormativity see Danby 2007: 30). The supposed inner workings of the family – altruism, pooling of resources and consensual decision-making – further underscore the notion of gender complementarity. The latter has not only been challenged by queer theory, but also by feminists, who have criticized the masking of gender-based power asymmetries, gender roles and responsibilities, all of which structure decision-making processes, household divisions of labour, resource allocations and, consequently, migration (Lawson 1998). That Mincer (1978: 766) is either unaware of or content with these mechanisms can be further illustrated by the fact that he explains women’s withdrawal from the labour force after migration with “a temporary increase in family demand for non-market activity necessitated by setting up a new household in a new environment.” It is women’s responsibility to set up this new household while their male partners – the male breadwinners – are responsible to financially support the family.

Outside of the family context, where they act altruistically, the prototypical migrants in Borjas’ and Mincer’s theories act like the archetypical being of classical and neoclassical economics: economic man or homo economicus. Feminist economists have targeted this figure and the underlying axioms of narrow rationality, selfishness and social isolation for resting on a “subject position predicated on a particular identity – that of propertied men of European ancestry” while claiming universal human nature (Barker/Kuiper 2003: 9). They have argued that this allegedly separate individual does not “spring from the ground like Hobbesian mushroom men” (Barker/Feiner 2004: 5), but is in fact dependent upon caring, and numerous other reproductive tasks that are still preponderantly performed by women. By presupposing these activities but rendering them invisible, economic man exposes himself as “not an abstract, unsexed consciousness, but a textual production of a male subject position” (Hewitson 1999: 4). The fact that neither Borjas nor Mincer waste a paragraph on the role of reproductive work in migration processes – the brunt of which is also still borne by women – indicates that they implicitly assume a man as their prototypical migrant. It comes as no surprise then that women’s migration is relegated to the context of family migration.

This male-bias is further underlined by their notion of risk-neutrality and skill as well as the assumed universal preference for higher wages. In light of laws and customs that restrict or even prohibit women’s control of money and their access to paid employment, the latter can indeed be criticized as a generalization of the male experience.
The same argument can be made about the assumption of risk-neutrality, which ignores the specific risks of female migrants due to limited access to legal protection in feminized labour market sectors and greater exposure to sexual harassment and violence (Piper 2003; Huang/Yeoh 2003). Finally, Borjas’ understanding of skill demonstrates a male-bias as it exclusively refers to the human capital produced in formal education and employment while coding abilities conveyed by parents and acquired in the household as natural endowments. Feminized reproductive skills of, for example, domestic workers, are thereby implicitly devalued. By the same token, the deskilling that occurs when norms, limited access to finances and family responsibilities curtail women’s access to education and training is deemed irrelevant. On the contrary, studies on gender and migration have shown that before and after migration, women are more heavily affected by deskilling than their male counterparts and that this has to be considered in gender-sensitive accounts of migration (Man 2004; Kofman/Raghuram 2006: 294).

This leads on to another indicator of the implicit gender knowledge at work in the migration models by Mincer and Borjas – the assumed functioning of labour markets. Here, earnings adequately reflect workers’ skills, which are perfectly transferable between different labour markets as “profit-maximizing employers are likely to value the same factors in any market economy” (Borjas, 1987: 534). Thus, gender-wage gaps between migrants can only be attributed to different preferences and skills because “[m]ean earnings of migrants depend on the mean education of migrants […] and on the mean level of their unobserved characteristics” (Borjas 1991: 33). Through that lens, the fact that the bulk of female immigrants is clustered in sectors such as domestic labour, sex work, public health, food processing and service, cleaning or in labour intensive industries like textiles or microelectronics also comes down to women’s affinity to these sectors. This points to an implicit gender knowledge that interprets and legitimizes existing labour market gender inequalities as a result of voluntary choice. Feminist economists, on the other hand, have argued that labour markets are social institutions within which the supply and demand of labour are highly gendered and wages “serve as a means of establishing and reinforcing what men and women should be doing and how they should live” (Power/Mutari/Figart 2003: 74; see also Elson 1999). They have repeatedly stressed “the hegemonic capacity of patriarchal norms to define women’s labour as not only ‘cheap’ but socially and economically worthless […] that makes a gendered labour force so crucial to the accumulation strategies of global capital” (Mills 2003: 43). Again, the models by Borjas and Mincer show no comprehension of these gendered processes, which also affect migration decisions and experiences.

To conclude the discussion about the implicit gender knowledge, it can be argued that Mincer’s and Borjas’ models reveal a very thin knowledge of gender as a social structure that constitutes individuals differently and sets the parameters for their migration. It can even be contended that their methodological individualism points to a gender knowledge that interprets and legitimizes existing gender inequalities in the labour market as a result of voluntary choice. And one could even go as far to argue that allegedly universal and gender-neutral categories like ‘migrant’ and ‘skilled
worker’ carry a masculine connotation, which in turn suggests that women simply don’t move, at least not independently (see table 1 for a summary of the gender knowledge analysis). Yet, this is not to claim that these concepts adequately capture the migration patterns of men. Regarding Mincer’s model, for example, it is obvious that gay men are as much part of the category of the ‘other’ as are families who do not match his middle-class ideal of a male breadwinner with a wife who cares.

Furthermore, the assumption of a perfect correlation of skills and earnings across countries is incompatible with the experience of many immigrant men who are marked as cheap labour and deskilled due to their ethnic or racial background or with the discrimination older people experience in the labour market. We would thus like to argue that the basic assumptions of neoclassical models of individual and family migration is linked to a certain type of masculinity – a white, young or middle-aged heterosexual and middle-class masculinity.

Table 1: Explicit and implicit gender knowledge in Borjas’ and Mincer’s migration models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are gender differences acknowledged and if so, which ones?</th>
<th>Explicit gender knowledge Borjas</th>
<th>Explicit gender knowledge Mincer</th>
<th>Implicit gender knowledge Borjas</th>
<th>Implicit gender knowledge Mincer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are gender differences explained and if so, how?</td>
<td>weaker labour market attachment and lower wages of women compared to men leads to tied migration of women and independent migration of men</td>
<td>result of biological predisposition and voluntary choice</td>
<td>result of voluntary choice</td>
<td>result of biological predisposition and voluntary choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What relevance is generally ascribed to gender?</td>
<td>apart from gender-specific labour market participation, gender ≠ relevant</td>
<td>gender ≠ relevant</td>
<td>apart from gender-specific labour market participation, gender ≠ relevant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the analysis of the explicit and implicit gender knowledge in Mincer’s and Borjas’ migration models show that Patricia Pessar’s (1999a: 578) findings have not gone out of date. She showed that in the 1950s and 60s neoclassical reasoning about migratory movements was heavily influenced by the role model of ‘Western man’ headed off to the cities where the benefits of modern life could be attained’. Despite the feminist critique of neoclassical economics and empirical research, which clearly
shows that migration is a more complex phenomenon than the assumed universal quest for higher wages, both models continue their career as standard accounts of individual and family migration within economics. From a post-structuralist perspective, which takes economics seriously as “a discourse, which actively produces its objects as well as its subjects of knowledge” (Hewitson 2001: 223), it can therefore be argued that both models participate in setting a certain type of masculinity as the norm while framing less privileged subject positions and the respective influences on migration patterns and experiences as deviant and somehow irrelevant.

Historical legacies: why women disappeared from migration studies

Even though today a plethora of empirical studies and theoretical contributions on gender and migration as well as on women and migration exists, gender has still not successfully been integrated into mainstream migration studies, ‘women’ are mostly added or relegated to chapters of ‘family and household’ and ‘gender’ is still equated with ‘women’. An insightful example is the International Migration Review (IMR), the leading journal in the field. In 1984, Mirjana Morokvasic edited a special IMR-volume on “Women in Migration” in which she criticized most migration theories for offering only very narrow explanations for the movement of women (Morokvasic, 1984: 896ff.). Twenty years later a special IMR-issue on the “general” state of the art (Portes and DeWind, 2004) did not even contain a single piece on gender and migration, let alone papers which included the gender dimension, except for one anthropological contribution (Levitt and Schiller, 2004). Moreover, the edited volume “Migration Theory. Talking Across Disciplines” (Brettell and Hollifield, 2000a), a major reference for migration scholars, does not include gender issues, except for, again, an anthropological article (Brettell, 2000). In the following section, we briefly move back in history to trace the academic reasoning about migratory movements. This “suggests where, when, and by whom particular modes of thinking about migration earned the imprimatur of theory, and why work by female researchers on women or gender so rarely achieved that status” (Donato et al., 2006: 8). There are at least five reasons for it: the exclusion of women from academia, the development of hierarchies between research methods and disciplines, gender-biased data and historical sources, the resultant focus on men as sole research subjects and the assessment of women’s migration as a-theoretical or simply not interesting.

Yet, migration studies started quite promisingly with regards to gender issues. In his “laws of migration”; the founding father of migration theory Ernest G. Ravenstein (1885) stated that women tended to migrate more than men, at least over short distances. However, subsequent studies did not test this law, but focused on the other laws Ravenstein discovered. The rapid feminization of trans-Atlantic migration at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, which clearly violated Ravenstein’s finding of the short-distance character of female migration, generated equally little research (Donato et al., 2006: 8). Women and gender issues were important to the studies on U.S. immigration
and the assimilation of immigrants in the first decades of the 20th century. A considerable amount of researchers were women, many of them were sympathetic to women’s rights and the suffrage movements. In the important “Pittsburgh Survey” (1907-8), female researchers like Elizabeth Beardsley Butler participated in order to guarantee that female workers and the immigrant communities from Eastern and Southern Europe were included in the survey, because women were outnumbering men in the sweatshops three to one (Donato et al., 2006: 8). While male researchers were able to establish themselves in university departments, most women researchers found employment in local governments, as administrators of social welfare or in public health (ibid.: 9). Already at that time, their research was evaluated differently: at the University of Chicago, where some of the groundbreaking early migration studies were conducted (such as *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Thomas and Znaniecki, 1958 [1918]), the knowledge produced by male scholars in the department of sociology was considered theoretical, whereas the studies conducted in the more casework-oriented School of Social Service Administration (SSA) were not – despite the pioneering work of the SSA Dean Edith Abbott on immigrants, female employment and criminality (ibid.). This tendency was further cemented through research funding, which went almost exclusively to male researchers with university appointments. After World War I, the Russell Sage Foundation and the Social Science Research Council denied funding for projects that they considered as being too closely associated with the reform movement (ibid.). Consequently, “the main theory shaping U.S. immigration research for the next half-century (e.g. assimilation theory) emerged from the brains and pens of a sociology department that had separated itself from women researchers in the settlement houses [the SSA] and in the new applied field of social work” (ibid.). This brief excursion into the history of US migration studies is a telling example of the well-known exclusion of women researchers and gender issues from science and academia.

Another important factor in the devaluation of gender issues in migration studies was the development of hierarchies between research methods, so called ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ methods. The debate was dominated by positivist and quantitative scholars who asked “what characterizes a theory?” (prediction, explanation, interpretation) and “which methods are most likely to advance theory?” (replicable, quantitative, qualitative, rigorous, eclectic). Research on women and gender relations tends to be more relational and non-positivist, which is why it had and still has a difficult time in migration studies and other disciplines (Donato et al., 2006: 11). However, qualitative methods, and in particular ethnographic ones, are not only chosen by feminist migration scholars. In his grand Mexican Migration Project, Doug Massey examines why census data, surveys or apprehension and deportation statistics only provide very imperfect data on questions about undocumented migration or informal money transfers. Instead, he proposes the methodology of “ethnosurveys” which includes interviews with individual migrants, families and communities of origin and data gathering in these communities (Massey, 2004; Portes and DeWind, 2004: 838). In fact, historical data on migration is often gender-biased, as in cases where surveys were undertaken in order to register men bound for military service or in labour statistics which excluded
the ‘amoral’ category of (mostly female, rural to urban migrant) sex workers (Hahn, 2000: 79). In her survey of migration studies, Patricia Pessar (1999b: 54) quotes research, which purposefully only included men as subjects of research, for example, a 1975 book on migrant workers in Europe by John Berger and Jean Mohr: “Among the migrant workers in Europe there are probably two million women. Some work in factories, many work in domestic service. To write of their experiences adequately would require a book in itself. We hope this will be done. Ours is limited to the experiences of the male migrant worker” (quoted in Pessar, 1999: 54). In 1985 Alejandro Portes’ published a study on Mexicans and Cubans in the United States, his study is equally explicitly restricted to the male heads of families, as otherwise it “would become excessively complex”, however, those family heads were asked about their wives (quoted in Pessar, 1999: 54). Instead of considering the complexity gender brings to migration studies as a theoretical challenge, it was often argued that the experiences of male migrants were gender-neutral and the norm, thus making it unnecessary to include women or to ask gender-specific questions. Some authors worked with data on the movement of women indicating, but concluded that men were “naturally” more apt to leave their homeland and thus made women disappear from migration studies (Hahn, 2000: 81). This invisibility of women in research on international migration has been ‘discovered’ only lately, as it was not before the early 1980s that publications of pioneering scholars on gender and migration were perceived by the scholarly migration community (Morokvasic, 1984, Phizacklea, 1983). An important political forum for the acknowledgement of the role of women in migration processes has been the 1990 UN expert group on “International Migration Policies and the Status of Female Migration” (UN, 1995), which gathered the first global data on female migrants, and which provides a basis for comparisons until today.

To sum up, this brief survey of the history of migration studies suggests that whereas the existence of gender differences is either not dealt with explicitly or negated, implicit gender knowledge assumes the male migrant as the ‘normal migrant’. This seems to be a recurrent thread from early research on migration until the late 20th century and has only recently been questioned and contrasted with counter historical gender-sensitive interpretations.

Why are some disciplines more open towards gender issues than others?

Disciplines have their own gender orders and knowledge and some are more persistent to the inclusion of gender issues than others. Donato et al. consider the openness of “any given discipline to qualitative research and to methodological eclecticism […] to be the key factor in drawing gender analysis from the margins into the disciplinary mainstream” (Donato et al., 2006: 22). Another important factor is the gender knowledge embedded in the academic disciplines’ foundational theories. In that sense, the openness of anthropological thinking towards the inclusion of the category of gender (Brettell, 2000; Donato et al., 2006: 4; Mahler and Pessar, 2006) can be at least partially
explained by the fact that the differentiation between men and women in society is regarded as a fundamental organizing principle of different cultures and societies (Lévi-Strauss, 1969; Donato et al., 2006: 10). Studies about the public-private divide in different cultural contexts as well as an immanent critique of the binary gender order led to important empirical studies and theoretical advancements, which were taken up in other disciplines. As political science studies of migration mainly deal with issues of migration control, national security and immigrant incorporation (Hollifield, 2000), gender issues were hardly felt necessary to be included. The impulse to deal with gender came from disciplines like anthropology or sociology or from the interdisciplinary engagement of scholars, such as in Ethnic Studies or Women’s and Gender Studies (Donato et al., 2006: 16, 22; Piper, 2006).

Counter knowledge on the move? – Gender knowledge and migration practice

Having diagnosed a rather traditional understanding of gender roles in migration studies, which is also partly reflected in migration policies, the time is ripe to relate this knowledge to migration practices. Does the identified traditional gender knowledge reflect (a relevant part of) the realities and minds of migrants? Or are there contradictions? A helpful starting point is Mirjana Morokvasic’s thought provoking article “Migration, Gender, Empowerment” (2007), which asks in how far migration practices challenge or stabilize gender orders. In fact, early research on female migrants assumed that despite their ascribed roles as dependents, migration processes had clear emancipatory effects on women. Yet, subsequent studies criticized this conclusion as being rooted more in a Northern-Western notion of superiority and orientalism (‘oppressed women migrate out of patriarchal cultures’) than in real migration processes. More recent reviews of the gender effects of migration report mixed outcomes (e.g. Donato et al., 2006, Chang and Ling, 2000, Mahler and Pessar, 2006, Morokvasic, 2007).

Let us first turn to the empirical evidence, which points to the stabilizing effects of migration practices on traditional gender orders and knowledge systems. Morokvasic (2007: 71) argues that “international migrants albeit women and men in different ways, tend to use the traditional gender order and rely on it for their own purposes, if they don’t challenge or question it” (Morokvasic, 2007: 71, emphasis in original). This means that most migrants do not question the dominant knowledge about their gender and about (correct) gender relations or even explicitly reproduce respective images of femininity and masculinity if they facilitate their migration. The migration of women into female ‘niches’ of the labour market such as domestic work, care services or sex work is a telling example. “These occupations are built on gendered assumptions of women’s innate affinities to work in the reproductive sphere and hence not conducive to destabilizing the gender norms about the division of labour in the household, but rather reinforcing gender hierarchies” (ibid.: 92). When traditional gender orders seem to be at risk, for example, when women leave their family, they employ a range of
strategies that make them appear adhering to norms of motherhood and family-life and widen their room for manoeuvre. A good example is the women worker going abroad to send remittances to her family. She may regard herself as a good mother who cares for her children by sacrificing herself (ibid.: 83); she may even consider herself as a ‘better mother’ than those who stay and do not enable their children education and health care through remittances. The conventional argument (‘mother leaves children behind’) is reversed and even employed against the poor non-migrant mothers. The norm of motherhood is thus changed, but not deconstructed. Leyla Keough’s study of Moldovan women (Keough, 2006) and Mirjana Morokvasic’s research on post-socialist pendular migration (Morokvasic, 2007) show that this argument fits a “new moral economy” (Keough, 2006). This order is “a new way of organizing and understanding the responsibilities, rights, and entitlements of workers, consumers, and citizens” (ibid.: 433), which is in line with neo-liberal rationales according to which everybody has to care for themselves and fits at the same time the persistent “ideal of a socialist good worker-mother superwoman” (Morokvasic, 2007: 84). Or in the words of Leyla Keough: “neoliberalism greets postsocialist collapse” (Keough, 2006: 437). This exemplifies how migrant women engage with traditional gender knowledge and try to adjust it to new circumstances.

According to such findings, it is unlikely that a majority of female migrants challenge traditional forms of gender knowledge and existing gender orders (Morokvasic, 2007: 71). However, other empirical studies point to the use of non-confrontational “hidden transcripts” (Scott, 1990) and spaces of resistance in the case of Vietnamese brides in Taiwan (Wang, 2007) or to a pragmatic queering of Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong (Chang and Ling, 2000). Vietnamese brides, who came to Taiwan through matching-agencies, for example, threaten to divorce and leave Taiwan (Wang, 2007: 719). As this would mean that the husband and his family lose the money they paid to the matching-agency, their reputation in the neighbourhood and the women’s reproductive work, this threat becomes a weapon in the women’s hands. They also use governmental integration courses to exchange Vietnamese goods and information, even though the state tries to normalize them as good daughters-in-law (ibid.: 723). In their study on migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong, Chang and Ling found that migrant women, disembedded from their traditional social space and gender roles, experienced a higher degree of freedom, while at the same time being confined to their ethnicity and genderedness. They cope with this dilemma by either adhering to conservative norms (e.g. Catholicism) or by giving new gender roles a try (e.g. „Tom Boyism“ as a form of homo- or bi-sexuality). Chang and Ling conclude that the coping strategy depends on individual networks and resources. Agency is thus an arrangement with contradictory conditions (Chang and Ling, 2000).

The heterogeneous empirical evidence shows that even if established gender orders and more traditional forms of gender knowledge are not openly challenged, incremental changes and moving mind sets can be at work. These developments may lead to societies with more just gender orders and more non-traditional gender knowledges.
Conclusion

The excursion back to the origins of migration studies and the cursory view on some of the most important disciplines in the field reveal the role gender played in the evolution of migration studies and the different degrees of openness towards gender issues in the respective disciplines. It can be argued that, with the exception of anthropology, until the late 20th century, migration studies did neither deal with gender differences nor explicitly negate them. Yet, implicitly, they assumed the male migrant as the ‘normal migrant’. This finding was supported by a more in-depth analysis of the two neo-classical models of migration. Here, explicit gender knowledge reveals that different migration patterns of men and women are considered as a result of the assumed fundamental differences between the genders. The models’ implicit gender knowledge is equally biased: Women are considered as dependents, following men or waiting for their return (the “left behind”, Toyota et al., 2007). Women are considered to represent tradition, while mobile men embody modernity (Brettell, 2000: 109). This thought is compatible with modernization theory, thus not only academic disciplines such as economics, but also metaconcepts like modernization theory are based on very fundamental gender knowledge, in this case due to its dichotomizations ‘traditional – modern’, ‘female – male’.

The conceptual framework of gender knowledge allows us to trace these different forms of knowledge in migration studies. In the sense that gendered knowledge is always produced and in constant need of reproduction, the very basic assumptions in and applications of migration theories are indicative of the ways, migration studies participate in constructing and reproducing certain gender orders. Yet, as has been argued in the sections about the relationship between migration theories, practices and policies, these theories and their underlying gender knowledge do not need to go unchallenged. Nonetheless, the linkage between theory, practice and policy needs further investigation, particularly the question of how ideas, and more specifically ideas about the existing and ideal gender orders, and the diffusion between theory, practice and policy.

From a social constructivist perspective, all theoretical approaches and empirical studies quoted above illustrate that femininity and gender are constructed in various ways and are always in conjunction with other social stratifications such as age, class, ethnicity or sexual orientation (see also Aufhauser, 2000: 111-118). Demand and supply of female labour in ‘typical’ gendered sectors such as care or sex work are a result of these construction processes. The main locations in which gender knowledge and such images are produced – and thus where they can be challenged – is within the gender culture of the countries of origin and destination, intermediaries such as recruitment agencies and informal migration networks, migration policies (visa categories, regulations for family unification, etc.) – and last but not least migration studies and their theoretical foundations.
References


112
Neoliberal economic policies have been profoundly problematic for women workers. Feminist scholars have documented effects including unemployment, the informalization of women’s labor, enslavement, the construction of new gender hierarchies within firms and the privatization of public services shifting increasingly more care burdens to women (Beneria 2003, Beneria and Feldman 1992, Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002, Agathangelou 2004). Feminist economists have explained these outcomes in different ways, but a major element of their explanation has focused on the gender bias in neoliberal theory. Liberal economics assumes an androgynous, self-interest, disembodied, rationally choosing subject that more closely approximates the life experience of men than those of women with care responsibilities (Elson 2000, Ferber and Nelson 1993). In this way, neoliberal knowledge is gendered.

When abstract knowledge becomes the basis of policy-making, agents in the political process reinterpret this knowledge and accordingly its effects vary in particular contexts. States and their agents still constitute the most authoritative in such contexts. Neoliberal gendered knowledge has informed state projects internationally, and state apparatuses have translated such knowledge into everyday practice. In the process of translating neoliberal knowledge, states themselves have been transformed, authority reorganized both spatially and functionally, and gender produced in new ways. I argue that, in order to understand the impacts of gendered knowledge such as neoliberal theory, it is necessary to probe its translation and operation within the arena of the postmodern state. In this arena, neoliberal knowledge becomes structured by masculinist and capitalist interests previously inscribed in the state, and it becomes part of governmental rationalities that employ gender while administering populations. Inserted in policy-making contexts, neoliberal knowledge morphs to both reproduce masculine domination and challenge it. It becomes productive of new gender identities that both normalize new femininities while empowering women to become valued economic actors.

I illustrate the structuring authority of the masculinist/capitalist state and the productive powers of neoliberal knowledge using the case of European agricultural policy reform. Throughout the 20th century, European agricultural policy – both at state and regional levels – has been strongly interventionist, promoting state projects ranging from food security, agricultural modernization and rural welfare to, more recently, global competitiveness and environmental preservation. Neoliberal knowledge has informed reforms of this policy since the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations when
agriculture became a target of international liberalization. Since then the European Union has thoroughly restructured its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), most importantly by de-linking subsidies from the market mechanism. As European commodity prices (still largely managed) begin to approximate world prices, farmers increasingly receive direct payments to supplement their incomes as long as they comply with animal health, hygiene and environmental sustainability standards.

In parallel to delinking agricultural subsidies from the price mechanism, the European Union has expanded its rural development policy and established a new European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). The fund is tasked with helping to accomplish three goals: (1) increase the competitiveness of European agriculture, (2) improve the rural environment, (3) improve the quality of rural life and diversify the rural economy. Mainstreamed throughout the text of the rural development regulation setting up the fund is the requirement to advance equality between women and men. Thus, the goals of the fund encompass neoliberal agendas geared towards increasing competitiveness, but include as well environmental, rural welfare and gender equality objectives.

Thus CAP reform participates in several projects of the European postmodern state. It translates neoliberal knowledge into a restructuring of European commodity markets and their competitive integration into global markets. In addition, it entails a series of flanking measures advancing the industrialization of farming in order to increase competitiveness while buffering environmental and welfare impacts of restructuring in order to ensure sustainability and rural welfare goals. Finally, the European postmodern state’s gender equality project has found rhetorical entry into the policy documents of flanking measures, though it has been quarantined from market-making policies.

My exploration of the reproduction of rule in the European postmodern state and the productive power of neoliberal knowledge begins with a theoretical specification, bringing to bear feminist, neo-Marxist, and post-structuralist theories. I develop a model of the state as a reproducer of masculinist and capitalist rule and as a site of the operation of governmental power. In a second step, I explore the reproduction of rule and the gendered productivity of power in the context of CAP reform.

The Postmodern European State and Gendered Knowledge

The reorganization of political authority in Europe has become a central preoccupation of scholars writing on European integration and global governance. On the one hand, they have observed that authority increasingly is dispersed to local and regional levels. On the other hand, they have identified a vertical unbundling of authority along func-

---

1 Note that the formation of a European common market in agriculture combined liberalization, i.e. free trade among European states, with protectionism towards countries outside Europe.

tional issue areas and the organization of political constituencies along these issue areas where they address their demands to state apparatuses at multiple levels. Both types of unbundling augur a reorganization of the Westphalian state, the separation of authority from territory, and the formation of what James Caporaso has called a postmodern state (Caporaso 1996; Sassen 2006; Ruggie 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Schmitter 1996, 2000). In contrast to the Westphalian state, the postmodern state is “abstract, disjointed, increasingly fragmented, not based on stable and coherent coalitions and constituencies, and lacking in a clear public space within which competitive visions of the good life and pursuit of self-interested legislation are discussed and debated” (Caporaso 1996: 45).

The image of state restructuring in this literature is spatial – it emphasizes dispersal (of authority) and fragmentation (of populations and constituencies). It resonates with feminist and neo-Marxist state theory, and with postmodern theories of governmentality, which long have disassembled the image of the unitary state to suggest multiple, sometimes contradictory state projects and dispersed sites of power. Indeed, using Foucaultian notions of the political, Wendy Brown has conceptualized the state as “a significantly unbounded terrain of powers and techniques, an ensemble of discourses, rules, and practices, cohabiting in limited, tension-ridden, often contradictory relation with one another” (Brown 1995: 174). Moreover, Neil Brenner (2004) and Saskia Sassen (2006) have suggested that the state is reassembling in a way that is producing new “state spaces,” new extension of authority in a non-territorial, networked space.

Understanding the role of the postmodern state in the reproduction of masculine domination requires conceptualizations of the way in which gender operates in dispersed locations of authority and in new political spaces. It is unlikely that we encounter, in the disjointed and fragmented terrain of the postmodern state, coherent gender constructions warranting the label “patriarchy” as a singular formation. The question of what replaces patriarchy must be answered empirically, but requires an understanding that can make sense of evidence of both the permanence of masculine domination and of the pervasive change of gender constructions. What is the role of the postmodern state in these seemingly contradictory processes?

German feminist state theorists remind us of the Weberian distinction between rule and power, i.e. the state encodes both Herrschaft (rule)3 – legitimated by law, tradition, or charisma – and Macht (power) that lacks such legitimacy. Marion Löffler (2001) has argued that a concept of Herrschaft is central to a feminist analysis of the state, because it allows for an understanding of the permanence of domination (see also Pühl 2001, Sauer 2001). At the same time, power comes into play when feminists appeal to the state to effect changes in patriarchal rule. In the following I flesh out the distinction.

Unlike Weber, Löffler defines rule as the attempt to create order. As such, Herrschaft is not necessarily attached to states, but operates both in the state and in society.

3 Following Onuf (1989) and in line with my adoption of his theorizations about rules and rule, I translate Herrschaft as rule. More common translations are authority and domination. With the concept of rule, I hope to capture two meanings of the term, i.e. the sense of legitimacy implied in the term authority, but also the sense of subordination conveyed by the term domination.
Löffler’s understanding of *Herrschaft* recalls the neo-Marxist understanding of the state as a social relation not opposite to society but extending into society. Indeed, neo-Marxist approaches have informed feminist reformulations of the state as implicated in the reproduction of patriarchal rule. Thus, Sauer (2001: 158) has described the state as a condensation of gender relations suggesting that there are masculine interests institutionalized in the state that circumscribe the chances of feminist political forces to assert themselves. Similarly, Bob Jessop (2001) has used the term “strategic selectivity” to describe the state’s tendency to privilege masculinist interests over feminist ones. Strategic selectivity is the outcome of earlier struggles, and it structures the chances of different social forces to assert their interests through the state. The state must be considered masculine, because it reflects social relations of rule in this way.

In addition to reflecting relations of rule, the state also participates in reproducing these relations. It does so not as a unitary actor or a clearly bounded entity, but produces results in society through the enactment of diverse and sometimes contradictory “state projects.” Such projects may compete for hegemony in that they define the nature and the purpose of the capitalist state, i.e. its role in securing continued capital accumulation (Jessop 2001: 77; Brand 2007). Hegemonic state projects entail hegemonic gender relations as state discourses “produce, distill and filter identities and interests” (Sauer 2001: 159).

Notions of *Herrschaft*, strategic selectivity, and state projects reformulate the concept of the patriarchal state by pluralizing it. They also account for processes of social construction while retaining an understanding of the permanence of masculine domination. But they tell us little about operations of power (*Macht*) anchored in notions of truth or reality that work to counter challenges to the relations of rule. Fleshing out Weber’s concept of *Macht* with a Foucaultian understanding of power provides an inroad to conceptualizing such encounters. It requires foregrounding understandings of the state’s selectivity as anchored in the languages deployed in state projects and discourses.

At the center of Foucaultian theorizing is an understanding of social forms as phenomena combining knowledge and power. The state constitutes a unique instance of such phenomena, producing what Foucault (1991) has called “governmentality.” Governmentality results from the state’s need to administer populations in order to accomplish a variety of state projects, including the furthering of welfare, health, and wealth. The state develops an art of administration, which includes the classification, categorization and sorting of populations, making the objects of administration legible, and maintaining the right disposition of things. The state’s exercise of power is not primarily the bending of things to accomplish the interests of the powerful, but the production of a reality, including the definition of objects and orders, and the definition and empowerment of subjects. This process of “subjection” entails dual effects of power, on the one hand empowering subjects to become agents, on the other hand subjecting them to a particular order. Gender is pervasive in these operations as an identifier of classes of subjects, as a producer of binary order, and as a marker of
normality. Administrative discourse and state knowledge in this sense are constitutive of relations of rule.

In sum, the postmodern state can be conceptualized as an agglomeration of practices and discourses (including legal and administrative deliberations) that reproduce relations of rule and elicit operations of power. These practices and discourses include, on the one hand, various expressions of masculine domination institutionalized in dispersed sites of the state, giving them a semblance of permanency. On the other hand, these practices and discourses produce gendered objects and identities, empowering and disciplining populations in new ways. In line with my understanding of dispersed reproductions of rule and operations of power, I adopt the term masculine domination – rather than patriarchy – to designate the permanence of rule produced through the postmodern state.

In what follows, I probe two questions about the reproduction of masculine domination through the postmodern state: First, how do the European postmodern state’s translations of neoliberal knowledge in the agricultural sector reproduce the gendered selectivities of the state and with them masculine domination? Second, how do these translations operate as techniques of power to challenge gender constructions and produce newly gendered objects, identities, and realities?

CAP Reform and Gendered Knowledge

In pursuing the project of agricultural market liberalization, European states employ two bodies of seemingly gender-neutral knowledge – neoliberalism and environmentalism. Neoliberalism has informed trade negotiations in the WTO, suggesting that states should refrain from setting prices, subsidizing exports, or restricting imports. Instead they should “free markets” and allow the forces of supply and demand to set prices, which will produce the most efficient allocation of resources on a global scale. But at the European level, environmentalist knowledge has played a significant role in tempering neoliberal arguments. Environmentalist discourse suggests that certain production practices (resulting from either free or managed markets) hurt the natural environment. Economists have sought to account for environmentalist discourse by suggesting that markets produce not only efficiencies, but also “negative externalities,” which can be counteracted through public policies. In the context of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the EU, economists have related this suggestion to agricultural policy and the role it can play in alleviating environmental degradation. They have argued that agriculture is “multifunctional”, because farmers produce not only private goods (food and fiber) but also public goods: they maintain the rural landscape and with it the environment and a European rural heritage. Accordingly, agricultural policy needs to ensure not only the efficient allocation of private goods, but also preserve the public goods function of agriculture. Therefore the project of market liberalization needs to be circumscribed by a second
project – that of environmental preservation. European trade negotiators have adopted this understanding and insisted on international trading rules that allow for state intervention geared towards ensuring that agriculture continue to provide public goods. In practice, this has meant the retention of subsidies as long as they are tied to sustainability goals, such as the preservation of small and mountain farming, the promotion of organic and of extensive forms of farming.

Gender equality goals have not entered these economic formulations. Nor have they been a topic of WTO negotiations despite lobbying from feminist groups and despite high level commitments in the UN system and in the European Union to gender mainstreaming, i.e. to considering unequal impacts on women and men in all phases and areas of policy-making. As a result, the strategic selectivities of patriarchal rule have operated in an unchecked manner, reproducing masculine domination in a largely unintended fashion. But gender mainstreaming has had some effects in the area of rural development, the area where the postmodern state actively seeks to channel the forces of a liberalized market. Gender mainstreaming has produced a discourse that has made rural women a target of intervention and constructs rural femininity in a new way. In the following, I first provide an outline of the way in which the CAP encoded gender in a way that furthered masculine domination. I then explore how policies of market liberalization reproduce the gender selectivities institutionalized in the CAP. Finally, I probe the governmentalities of gender mainstreaming, the power effects in efforts to insert gender equality goals into rural development projects flanking the project of market liberalization.

The Gendered Selectivities and Governmentalities of the CAP

The EU’s agricultural policy embeds strategic selectivities resulting from previous struggles engaging agricultural and industrial interests. It is widely viewed as a compromise between France and Germany, trading off the German interest in gaining wider market access for its industrial goods for a French interest in gaining a wider market for its agricultural products and German financing for the modernization of French agriculture. It also is the result of victories of agricultural interests led by large farmers and agro-industrial companies that have benefited disproportionately from subsidies provided via the market mechanism. Not surprisingly, over the years the overwhelming majority of payments from the EU’s agricultural fund have gone to large farms, food processors and exporters. This was particularly the case in the mid-80s when the EU spent 43 percent of its agricultural funds on export subsidies and 22 percent on storage (Schunter-Kleemann 1999: 155).

Thus, the interests of industrial capital, large farmers, and food processors all found their way into the Common Agricultural Policy. But so did masculinist interest. The regulatory target of the agricultural welfare state was the family farm, constructed as the basic organizational unit of agricultural production in Europe. Two characteristics typify family farms: The family owns the means of production, and the family provides
most of the labor. The unparalleled flexibility of family farms in adjusting to changing labor needs may have been an element of the EU commitment to family farming. But perhaps more importantly, the commitment was ideological. Family farming became a trope in various discourses throughout the Cold War, illustrating the superiority of private entrepreneurship over communist collectivism, the health and harmony of the countryside over the estrangement of urban living, and allowing for the celebration of the peasant as a bulwark of national identity and as an object of nostalgia. Wrapped up into the fantasy of a rural idyll was an image of harmonious family life absent conflicts between genders and generations.

But the family farm has a decidedly masculinist constitution. It favors male offspring in inheritance rules, designates the farmer as the head of household and enterprise and, with modernization, increasingly has constructed women farmers as flexible laborers. Together with the governmentalities of the patriarchal welfare state, which provided health and pension benefits to male farmers but only derived rights to women farmers, it has produced distinctly gendered identities. Thus, in 1997, men accounted for over 80 percent of all farm managers in Europe (Fremont 2001). Modernization guided by masculinist selectivities (of the welfare state and the family farm) typically entailed a loss of women’s status and a reduction of their economic role on the farm. In Germany, scholars found that the introduction of technology was linked to women’s loss of status (van Deenen and Kossen-Knirim 1981). Furthermore, modernization led to the elimination of women’s independent sources of income from the direct marketing of agricultural products, and women became flexible laborers on farms managed by their husbands (Kolbeck 1990, Prügl 2004). Commercialization and market integration accelerated these processes, as Sarah Whatmore (1991) has shown in the UK, where gender orders vary with the degree of a farm’s commercialization. The wives of farmers on large, highly commercialized farms exited from farming, started their own businesses, took jobs off the farm, or became housewives, while their husbands managed the farms like industrial enterprises with employees. In contrast, in mixed farming structures, women tended to remain more closely involved in the enterprise and retain more say in the operation.

While masculinization resulted from modernization in the North, CAP support for family farming has resulted in feminization in Southern Europe and in areas unfavorable to agricultural production. Here subsidies enabled the survival of small farms under female management, while men often found jobs in industry. Thus, women managed 31 percent of farms in Austria, 24 percent in Greece, and 23 percent in Portugal and France in 1999/2000, and in all these countries this represented an increase of two to three percentage points over 1997 (European Commission 2002). Europe-wide statistics show that women’s farms tended to be much smaller than those managed by men. In 1997, 82 percent of all women farm managers ran holdings classified as small, while only three percent ran holdings classified as large. This compares to 68 percent and nine percent for men respectively (Fremont 2001: 4-5). There also is some evidence that women provide a disproportionate share of the labor on small farms. In Germany,
for example, women accounted for over 80 percent of full-time family labor on small farms throughout the 1990s (Prügl 2004: 356).

In committing to the maintenance of family farming, the CAP thus encoded not only structural selectivities favoring industrial and agricultural capital, but also those that perpetuated, and in some instances furthered, masculine domination. Women largely appear in European agriculture today as “spouses” providing flexible labor and as farmers keeping small holdings. Thus, liberalizing trade on a European scale while seeking to cushion the effects of restructuring by setting high prices led to an intensification of masculinist rules on family farms, where property rights have long favored men and labor divisions have constructed women’s work as non-productive. The governmentalities of patriarchal welfare states complemented these selectivities to define women farmers as supplemental laborers. Current policies of international trade liberalization encounter these strongly gendered structures of farming, and the struggles over the reorganization of European farming selectively favour groups whose interests have previously been institutionalized. At the same time, a new discourse of multifunctionality, linked to environmentalist goals, has entered contestations over the liberalization of agriculture, empowering new political forces and opening the policy field to reconstructions of gender.

Gendered Selectivity and CAP Reform

Trade liberalization is likely to accelerate the restructuring of European agriculture that has been underway throughout the 20th century in Western Europe and has drawn in Eastern European agriculture from various starting points (and with often starkly different gendered selectivities) since the 1990s. Previously observed processes would suggest that this restructuring can entail profoundly different effects on gender relations and gender identities depending on farming structures and alternative economic opportunities. These effects are circumscribed by new types of knowledge that have emerged from contestations of agricultural trade liberalization formulated by the agrarian opposition, environmentalists and feminists. They make visible not only the strategic selectivities institutionalized in the CAP, but also the newly asserted interests of industrial capital and organized agriculture.

Trade liberalization meets the interests of European capital, because trade negotiators from agricultural exporting states have linked further liberalization in other sectors to the reduction of EU subsidies. Liberalizing trade in agriculture also is in the interest of the thoroughly globalized European agro-industrial firms eager to compete in world markets. Their interests resonate with those of industrial-style farmers including the large farm conglomerates that have developed from communist cooperatives in some of the new member states. Against them, environmentalists and the agrarian opposition have developed oppositional agendas, demanding more sustainable forms of agriculture, a more humane treatment of animals, and the inclusion of welfare and job creation goals into agricultural policy. European feminists have rarely intervened in interna-
tional trade negotiations from the perspective of European women farmers, but more commonly within a discourse of international development. But feminist ideas are operative in agrarian circles, and while they have not informed opposition to CAP reform, they have operated to undermine the strategic selectivities of the family farm and the agricultural welfare state.

Several developments are of interest here: First, in a Europe-wide campaign, women farmers organized in the 1980s and 1990s to demand an employment status. Rather than simply being a “spouse” or an “unpaid family laborer”, they demanded a status as (co-)entrepreneur that would entitle them to financial and social insurance benefits and would empower them to participate in cooperatives and farmers’ organizations on equal terms. While European governments have made progress on the matter, the issue of the status of women farmers is far from resolved. Second, women farmers increasingly have refused the role of the “spouse” in practice. Evidence of this refusal is seen in the difficulty male farmers have had finding wives in some European countries and in the tendency for the spouses to increasingly keep their off-farm jobs after marriage to a farmer. Third, women farmers increasingly have taken advantage of new policies that encourage the diversification of farm income by reintroducing direct marketing and by developing on-farm services, mostly in the area of tourism. As a result of these choices, the family farm and the rules by which it operates are undergoing revolutionary changes. Indeed, they may be changes that spell the end of family farming.

Market-liberalization intersects with the feminist aspirations of women farmers in encouraging but also problematic ways. To begin with, it undermines the agricultural welfare state, including its masculinist commitments, but also its commitment to providing equivalent incomes in agriculture and industry. It has accelerated the number of people moving out of agriculture and the destruction of small farms unable to compete in a global market place. Furthermore, international competition has increased pressure on family farms to modernize or diversify. These changes – guided by gendered selectivities and contested by feminist knowledge – have entailed a significant restructuring of gender arrangements in European agriculture. Global market competition favors large, specialized farms over smaller ones and those with mixed production. Management positions on rationalizing and industrializing farms remain attractive to men even as more women pursue professional training in agriculture, foreshadowing continued difficulty for women to become farmers. But women on large farms have taken advantage of emerging opportunities to start their own on-farm businesses, in particular in the area of direct marketing. Smaller farms continue to survive with subsidies geared towards the public goods function of farming, in particular environ-

4 The number of farms in EU member states has been falling rapidly: Between 1975 and 1997 it declined by almost 28 percent in the EU-9. In the same time period, the average economic size of farms increased about four-fold (Vidal 2000). Employment in agriculture declined even more rapidly, shrinking by almost 50 percent between 1975 and 1999. The rate of decline accelerated markedly between 1987 and 1989/90 when it reached an annual rate of 5.1 percent, compared to 3 percent prior to 1979/80 (Vidal 2001).

5 For an exploration of these processes in Germany see Schmitt 1997.

6 See for example Fahning 2001.
mental preservation. There is an emerging gendering of activities considered worthy of support, with projects coded masculine, such as the production of alternative fuels, gaining more support in some areas than projects coded feminine, such as rural tourist accommodations, direct marketing, or adventure holidays.

In sum, a liberalization of agricultural markets combined with feminist and environmentalist knowledge, has produced gendered outcomes guided by existing selectivities. One outcome has been the continued gendering of farming as masculine, keeping in place existing property rights, labor divisions, and the identity of the entrepreneurial, independent farmer. While women have not entered modern agriculture in significant numbers, they have found new opportunities in the flanking measures provided by CAP reform combined with their own egalitarian aspirations. These new opportunities arise outside agriculture both on the farm and off the farm, in direct marketing and services. Thus, neoliberal knowledge when paired with oppositional knowledge and knowledge institutionalized in the state produces contradictory outcomes that differentially benefit and/or disadvantage women and men, and that both reproduce and challenge masculine domination.

Neoliberal Knowledge and Gender Mainstreaming: The Operations of Governmentality

CAP reform has entailed not only market liberalization, but also flanking measures geared towards increasing the competitiveness of European farms, promoting environmental stability, diversifying rural incomes, and improving the rural quality of life. Accomplishing these goals is considered the new second leg of the CAP, i.e. rural development. Funding for rural development increased significantly in the 2007-13 budget period; it accounts now for about 20 percent of the EU’s agricultural expenditures, compared to 10 percent previously (Council of the European Union 2005: 23). Different types of rural development measures have different significance for women and men. Measures to diversify rural incomes and improve the rural quality of life tend to draw in women disproportionately (Commission 2002: 8).

The EU’s rural development policies are implemented through the structural funds, in the past the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF) but now the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, in partnership with member state governments. When the EU adopted gender mainstreaming as a new strategy to advance gender equality in 1996, one of the areas where it mandated such mainstreaming first – through a Council resolution – was the structural funds. In the EAGGF, implementation has been sketchy at best, in particular in areas pertaining to modernization and market policies, but mainstreaming has had some effect in “soft” areas.

7 The allocation of resources for different purposes differs by member-state and indeed by region within member states. For example, the bulk of rural development funding in Bavaria goes to environmental goals while Saxony-Anhalt spends most on rural job creation, reflecting different needs in these regions.
such as training, agrotourism, and crafts (Braithwaite 2000: 7). Indeed, a 2002 communication of the Commission on gender mainstreaming in the structural funds suggests that “measures which might have a positive impact on gender equality mainly cover areas such as diversification, training, new employment opportunities and setting up small enterprises in rural tourism, producing and selling regional products, childcare” (Commission 2002: 8). There is an image in these suggestions of a rural feminine gender identity, one that constructs rural women as employment creators and entrepreneurs reviving direct marketing and helping to commercialize the countryside for urban visitors.

According to the Commission communication that introduced gender mainstreaming in the EU, the strategy entails “mobilising all general policies and measures specifically for the purpose of achieving equality by actively and openly taking into account at the planning stage their possible effects on the respective situations of women and women [sic] (gender perspective)” (Stratigaki 2005: 174, emphases in the original). The translation of this mandate into concrete administrative tools has been the task of a small number of thoroughly networked gender experts in various niches of the postmodern state apparatus. They have probed definitions, shared best practices, developed and exchanged tools, and communicated their experiences. Their practices involve a contestation of knowledge in the postmodern state less concerned with countering a masculinist interest, but with contesting implicit assumptions. Gender mainstreaming thus in many ways is a politics of knowledge and its tools – gender training, gender analysis, gender monitoring/controlling – are geared towards changing unquestioned verities with an eye towards creating sensitivity about the differential impacts of policies on women and men and with the intention of changing such policies to advance equality goals.

Gender mainstreaming does not specify a priori the kinds of rules it seeks to change nor the direction of change, but relies on situated agents – including bureaucrats and gender experts – to judge whether a policy is equitable or how to make it so. In doing so, gender mainstreaming turns a political process of contesting binary definitions and masculine domination into a process of rational administration. It enlists the competence of the postmodern state administrations for a political project, i.e. the contestation of the state’s gendered selectivities, activating the power of knowledge in ambiguous ways.

The German agriculture ministry’s pilot project on mainstreaming into regional development in Saxony-Anhalt illustrates this process. It shows that gender mainstreaming has the potential to address disempowering gendered labor divisions in a sophisticated manner: In the documents associated with the project there are suggestions to increase the value of women’s work (e.g. in a project that turns an old mill into a museum, the suggestion to document the lives of the whole family, not just the miller). There also are suggestions that undermine disempowering divisions of labor (e.g. in local development groups, making men the leaders and women the secretaries and cashiers). These suggestions question masculinist rules that perpetuate hierarchical gender roles.
But the message may be more ambiguous with regard to rules of identity. The production of knowledge about employment and work patterns, most importantly statistics and gender analyses, invite categorizations, typifications, and the making of truths that invariably become both descriptive and prescriptive. Gender mainstreaming needs such knowledge in order to make possible state interventions. But creating such knowledge also is a form of power politics – it normalizes identities while providing resources and empowering agents in specific ways. In the case of gender mainstreaming in rural development, neoliberal knowledge has favored a framing of rural women as equal entrepreneurs. In the German context, this has been supplemented by knowledges anchored in the agricultural welfare state that have produced women as fundamentally different. These diverse and seemingly contradictory knowledges shine through the narrative of officers in an economic development office in Saxony-Anhalt recruited for purposes of gender mainstreaming rural development.

This is how counselors in the office characterized women starting businesses: They are more likely to have idealistic than economic reasons. They tend to deliberate more extensively and tend to keep alternatives open. They are more process-oriented and more inclined towards cooperation. They are more flexible, used to carrying double burdens, have good organizational skills, have higher formal qualifications, are highly motivated, and are more careful and modest in their aspirations (Putzing and Schreiber 2003: 35). In framing women as beacons of entrepreneurial expertise in the rural economy, these counselors effect contradictory outcomes. On the one hand, they attack an image of the entrepreneur as male and empower women to think of themselves as people who can make money and contribute to rural development. On the other hand, they tame the notion of feminine entrepreneurship and construct it as different. Rural women starting businesses emerge as a new type of economic actor: feminine entrepreneurs. Their normalization allows for their better administration, the provision of targeted means of support to make them useful for the state project of rural diversification. Through gender mainstreaming, the postmodern state thus empowers women to become economic actors while channeling their empowerment into gendered paths. Governmentality enables both the realization of feminist goals and the instrumental use of women.

**Conclusion**

In European agriculture, neoliberal knowledge has produced outcomes guided by the strategic selectivities of the postmodern state and by the operations of governmentality. The policies of CAP reform have activated neoliberal knowledge in addition to environmentalist knowledge for new state projects. The cross-cutting goal of gender equality has touched CAP reform at the margins. The confluence of different state projects and intersecting knowledges defines the political struggles around regulating agriculture in Europe. Strategic selectivities of the state have favored the interests of large farmers and of the food-processing industry, which thrived under the CAP wel-
fare state built on the basis of the patriarchal family farm. While the rhetoric of preserving family farming has receded in the aftermath of the Cold War, there is a remarkable taboo around challenging its continued masculinist constitution. This constitution (endorsed by state welfare policies) has produced women farmers as flexible laborers and operators of small farms. The new governmentalities of CAP reform are reconstructing these identities in a way that largely maintains men as farmers and produces women as rural entrepreneurs, but also as profoundly different.

The empirical evidence advanced here illustrates the continued relevance of the masculinist state in organizing economies. State selectivities meet abstract knowledge as it is translated into concrete policies, empowering particular interests and producing gendered realities. The European postmodern state has adapted neoliberal knowledge into policies that further empower large farms and food processing conglomerates, typically run by men and based on the exploitation of women’s unpaid and low-paid labor, but also have brought to the table environmental, consumer protection, and rural welfare interests that have motivated rural development programs. In these programs, the European Union has mandated gender mainstreaming and has been able to produce some changes in local development practices that have co-opted and empowered women.

While the translation of international knowledge necessarily produces variably gendered outcomes in different locales of the de-centered state, reproductions of masculine domination are not random but structured by previous commitments and governmental logics. Thus, the European postmodern state continues to be patriarchal to the extent that it is guided by structural selectivities that encode gender equality and to the extent that its governmentalities disempower. But, by co-opting women for its projects and empowering them to become economic agents, the postmodern state also creates openings for women’s emancipation. Filtered through the postmodern state, neoliberalism thus refracts to simultaneously effect the reproduction of masculine domination and its demise.

References


The Fragmented Hegemony of Sustainable Development – Gendered Policy Knowledge in Global Environmental Politics

Ulrich Brand

1. Introduction

Since the fall of 2006, global environmental problems have been and continue to be at the top of the global political agenda. The publication of the Stern Report and the Fourth Report of the Intergovernmental on Climate Change produced an enormous international debate and put the question of climate policies on the centre-stage of political deliberation (Stern 2006; IPCC 2007). Sharply growing energy and food crises in 2008 also caused intense debates and the development of political strategies. The two key concepts of sustainability and sustainable development became issues of legitimation and should give direction to debates and politics.

This is not new. Twenty years ago, after two decades of environmental protests, public debates, scientific publications, and clearly increasing bio-physical degradation, the major conference in human history, The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), was organised and took place in June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. Even in the twenty years before Rio, perceived political problems led to a large number of international environmental agreements (Axelrod et al. 2005; Lipschutz 2004).

Important in the social sciences was the identification of the concept of a “risk-society” with its central assumption that the growing domination of bio-physical processes does not lead to more control. Rather, it rebounds in the destruction of nature and in ever greater dependence on the results and secondary effects of the domination of nature (Beck 1992). Another prominent insight was that environmental problems could be socially recognised through “ecological communication”, i.e. that society is alarmed about ecological problems but does not have the means of prognosis and practical guidance (Luhmann 1989).

Therefore, it can be said that environmental politics is taking place, problems are acknowledged, institutions are changing, and knowledge about problems and possible solutions are created. The “environmental question” became important and the question of if environmental politics takes place is no longer the point, but rather how and to what extent. If we consider the forms of environmental politics, one aspect becomes important: Environmental politics is embedded in complex and domination-shaped societal relations and because of this, a critical understanding of the latter is important in order to understand the socio-ecological crisis. Four dimensions of this process are

---

1 I am indebted to Gülay Caglar, Christa Wichterich and Markus Wissen, as well as to the participants of the Workshop “Constellations of Inequality” at the Institute for Human Sciences in December 2008 in Vienna, for their useful comments, and Wendy Godek for the excellent editing of the text.
of utmost importance and often neglected in the manifold analysis. Under conditions of a capitalist world market and related politics there is a tendency, first, to transform elements of, and knowledge about nature into marketable products and, second, that for its politically mediated protection, market mechanisms tend to predominate (like in climate politics). Thirdly, from a general perspective, we can call the actual societal relationships with nature forms of a reflexive domination of nature (on the concept of societal relationships with nature, see Görg 2003; Görg and Brand 2006; Becker and Jahn 2006).

Analytically, and fourthly, it is important to note that environmental problems do not exist objectively, nor do environmental policies. Instead material or bio-physical dysfunctions are constructed and represented socially as problems – or very often not as problems but certain practices are normalized despite the fact that people die, soil erodes, and air is polluted (Görg 2003; Hajer 1995; Fischer 2000). The social constitution of problems and the process of dealing with them depend on different forms of knowledge and they take place in a political, economic, and cultural context, as outlined above. If relationships with nature are linked to different forms of knowledge, and if knowledge is considered to be inherent to belief systems, institutions, and practices, then the question needs to be asked as to which form(s) of knowledge is diffused and becomes dominant or hegemonic as “universal”, and which knowledge is seen as peripheral or even marginal and therefore “local”, ignored, and forgotten (Singer 2005: 215). Moreover, knowledge is crucial in the constitution of the capacity to act.

The first aim of this article is to show how selectively and domination-shaped a specific form of environmental knowledge and especially environmental policy knowledge (the difference is quite important) emerged in the last twenty years: the knowledge of sustainable development. This hegemonic policy knowledge about environmental problems and how they are dealt with is Western and thus oriented towards technical and technological solutions. The second aim is to show how this hegemonic form of environmental policy knowledge is masculine and gendered. Within this andocentric policy knowledge, many aspects of social reality are hidden such as social divisions of labour in many respects and especially in the appropriation and use of nature, the separation of the private and the public, and a specific understanding of state and interstate environmental politics (which is considered to be a task of male bureaucrats, diplomats and high-ranking politicians).

I do not argue that sustainable development is a hegemonic project of the dominant forces in global capitalism and therefore it is not the hegemonic state project, but rather sustainable development is hegemonic in the specific policy field of environmental politics. Socially, i.e. in a much broader sense, hegemony is the ongoing and even intensified valorisation paradigm of societal relationships with nature (Brand et al. 2008; on the neoliberalising of nature, see the overviews of Castree 2008a, 2008b, Brand 2009). This is widely shared and demonstrated by transnational corporations.

2 When I refer to the concept of hegemony, it is used in the sense that societal relations are broadly shared and institutionalised, and that different societal relations do not question hegemonic relations or are not able to articulate differing or even opposing interests, norms, and values effectively.
appropriating resources, consumers accepting and reproducing specific consumption patterns, and governments which support more or less the valorisation paradigm. The valorisation paradigm implies at the level of international environmental politics that there is little conflict among different governments (in the global North and South) that nature has to be appropriated. Conflicts emerge about the how, i.e. the adequate sharing of benefits arising from the use of nature (oil and other resource prices, the commodification of genetic resources, the role of intellectual property rights, activities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions). The valorisation paradigm is complemented by moral, sometimes alarmist, appeals from intellectuals like Al Gore and even private firms and their associations themselves, which articulate environmental concerns and potential economic problems (insurance companies play a prominent role here). Many NGOs – being convinced or using it as suitable way to be politically heard – support a strategy of “protection through utilisation”. Therefore, it is not surprising that the “calls for urgent action” have little policy relevance with respect to shaping the dynamics of global capitalism (on the catastrophism in climate change politics, cf. Swyngedouw 2009).

The concept sustainable development as a vague and undefined concept (see below) emerged as the hegemonic policy knowledge in environmental politics – and not in all policy fields. The concept opens a discursive space which recognises the manifold socio-ecological problems and potentially enlarges the political-economic perspective towards issues which are usually beyond the centre of political and economic attention, like gender issues, i.e. questions of an unequal division of labour, of economic reproduction besides formal production and distribution, and of patriarchal politics. This was and is at least the hope of progressive actors. However, the hegemonic policy knowledge of sustainable development does not question the overall valorisation paradigm. On the contrary, both its obvious and hidden dimensions frame this paradigm. Through this process, specific forms of policies are legitimised, and these policies and their knowledge pick up gender issues, but in a selective way and without transformative perspectives.

The second section sketches the links of gendered knowledge, environmental knowledge and environmental policy knowledge, and in the third section I aim to outline major dimensions of this powerful and gendered policy knowledge and its productive and hidden aspects. Finally, after some concluding remarks, I will present some tentative thoughts about environmental justice and necessary socio-ecological controversies which could open the way for undermining the hegemonic policy knowledge on sustainable development.

2. Gendered Environmental (Policy) Knowledge

Gender knowledge (Andresen and Dölling 2005) embraces different forms of collective knowledge and creates evidence about identities and interpersonal relations, divisions of labour, adequate state policies, and the “right” forms of the appropriation
and protection of nature. Gender and its knowledge are a social structure which reproduce and shape gender relations, i.e. as symbolic imaginaries and ideals of masculinity and femininity, domination-shaped societal divisions of labour, and the exercising of political and social power. Therefore, one important aspect of hegemonic knowledge is to integrate asymmetrically differing or even opposing forms of knowledge. Gender knowledge is then the hierarchical and hierarchising ascription that assigns specific social roles to women and men – in the division of labour, in the public-political sphere, in the family, in science, etc – and constitutes specific subjectivities. The production and meaning of knowledge is linked to asymmetric societal divisions of labour (especially, but not exclusively, the division between mental and manual work). Specific forms of living are more acknowledged than others and privileged through the state and its legal and material system. Therefore, the state is part of the construction of identities, i.e. the “mode of existence” (Maihofer 1995) and, thus, gender “is a process category which can historically vary along hegemonic constellations of forces and meanings” (Wöhl 2007: 32). Power is also distributed along gender lines which are historically constructed. Specific “lead systems” in society and the state are condensed in such a way as to privilege certain male interests and forms of living (Kreisky 1997: 163). These reflections on gender knowledge help us to develop an understanding of environmental knowledge and its gendered implications. In order to discuss the actually hegemonic policy knowledge – sustainable development – I distinguish between environmental knowledge and environmental policy knowledge.

Environmental knowledge is about the “true” forms of the appropriation of non-human nature – and to a lesser degree its conservation (which is also a form of (non-)appropriation) –, i.e. societal relationships with nature, and the role of “nature” for societies in general. The socially accepted “rules” in modern societies of adequate societal relationships with nature are to dominate nature and to exploit it and very often to “externalise” the negative consequences of the appropriation of nature (e.g. removing sites of dirty industries out of relevant societal attention). This implies the “right” functioning of political institutions and economic entities, of international, class-related, gendered, and racialised divisions of labour, of production and consumption patterns, understandings of progress and economic growth, and specific subjectivities related to the domination of nature. Other relationships with nature are considered as pre-modern or traditional. The andocentric concept of nature is that of societal domination of nature and of dualisms like culture-nature and men-women (Merchant 1995; Mies and Shiva 1993; Warren and Nisvan 1997; Singer 2005; on different variants of eco-feminism see Vinz 2005). The gendered division of labour shapes and is shaped by historically specific societal relationships with nature where, according to tendency, food is prepared and care work is usually done by women and, in the case of environmental degradation, responsibility is mainly assumed by women whereas access to resources and assets is mainly reserved to men.

3 The knowledge about the human body and related practices is a different issue which is not dealt with in this article.
This relationship became problematic through the materially and socially-constructed ecological crisis and is now modernised towards more reflexive forms of the domination of nature. Therefore, the concept of environmental knowledge is used in a broader sense and the distinction to environmental policy knowledge is important because it sheds light on the fact that societal relationships with nature – and not only the policy knowledge to deal with its problems – are highly gendered. The concept of environmental knowledge emphasises that there is an enormous and irreducible plurality of societal relationships with nature and, therefore, different gender relations implied. Production and consumption patterns, labour, housing, public services, and state policies are constituted through societal relationships with nature and shape them. Policy knowledge is distinct in that hierarchical gender relations are much more obvious. It is clear that historically-specific and different societal relationships with nature with its material and symbolic dimensions are also diverse power-knowledge relations. Moreover, knowledge about nature is not neutral and is intensively linked to the appropriation of nature. It is linked to socio-economic developments including globalisation, the export and cash-crop orientation of the agricultural sector in many countries, and the programme of the Western-rationalist domination of the world.

Another important aspect which is usually hidden in environmental policy knowledge, but important with regard to environmental knowledge, is the fact that “modern” societal relationships with nature are produced and mediated through techno-sciences. Dominant forms of environmental knowledge – especially scientific knowledge – represent themselves as universal and transboundary. However, modern science and technology are based on Western rationality which assumes a universal way of the processes and contents of knowledge. Western science was through many procedures able to constitute itself as a universal, modern, and superior knowledge system. Other cultures are represented as “native”, territorially bound, and culturally homogeneous (Singer 2005: 219-20).

The most dynamic science – life sciences, especially genetic engineering and nanotechnologies – is highly normative and related to far-reaching promises concerning the deletion of hunger and the “battle” against sickness. Modern techno-science is global in its character because research and development of the most advanced forms of the appropriation of nature take place under highly competitive conditions on a global scale, i.e. among globally-oriented research institutes and companies which are mostly located in the industrialised countries. Local and situated (“traditional”) knowledge exists and is also more or less acknowledged, but it is clearly inferior to Western modern and especially techno-scientific knowledge (Singer 2005). This has consequences for international environmental politics. State and intergovernmental politics cannot intervene into the “transformation core” (Becker/Wehling 1993) of technoscientific developments, which is extremely andocentric.

The Brazilian sociologist, Henri Acselrad (2008), refers to the concept of “ecopower”, which is similar to Foucault’s biopower (1977). The latter intends to fence productive subjectivities and bodies in order to make them compatible with modern societies. Ecopower aims to fence and appropriate (physical-material and social) ter-
ritorial elements through knowledge, political institutions, property rights, and the creation of physical artefacts. The manifold societal relationships with nature, i.e. socio-spatial territories and existing social relations, are shaped for its efficient use, commodification, and valorisation under conditions of economic competition (Altvater 1993). This is a hierarchical process which gives certain groups and actors a privileged access to nature and excludes others. Moreover, the negative effects of the appropriation of nature are distributed unequally, which raises questions of environmental justice. In that sense, we can interpret the modern forms of global environmental politics as a kind of institutionalised and discursive ecopower, because societal relationships with nature are acknowledged to be problematic and should be shaped in specific ways. They tend to structures and practices of a reflexive domination of nature. These forms of environmental knowledge are an important dimension to understand societal relationships with nature.

Environmental policy knowledge – which is the focus in this article – intends to deal explicitly with environmental problems and environmental politics. It is not by chance one of the most prominent fields, where the role of expertise and scientific knowledge is examined, given the complexity and uncertainty of problems and adequate forms to deal with them (Fischer 2003; Conca/Dabelko 1998; Lander 2006; Kütting and Lipschutz 2009). Environmental knowledge, on the one hand, and policy knowledge, on the other, are linked, but the former does not determine the latter. Peter Haas argues persuasively that the role of epistemic communities is crucial in the societal recognition of environmental problems (in my terminology, to create relevant policy knowledge). He sees an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognized experience and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992: 3). Members of an epistemic community are bound together by “their shared belief or faith in the verity and the applicability of particular forms of knowledge or specific truths” (Ibid). This definition was especially used for the analysis of environmental politics (e.g. Young 1999). However, there are many criticisms of this view. The political influence of expert networks remains somehow opaque. The notion of expertise is vague, given the fact that there is an enormous variety of expertise and also non-expert forms of knowledge, all of which might be contested, and, finally, the role of norms and “shared beliefs” is unclear, i.e. that expertise is not a neutral fact and the question of who develops and controls them has to be asked (Forsyth 2009; Jasanoff 1996; see next section).

With respect to the gendered character of global environmental policy knowledge, we have to consider in what sense gender aspects play a role in dominant policies and its knowledge and, if they do not play an explicit role, how they are hidden. Usually, and this is shown in detail below, gender issues are not part of the dominant expertise. The remaining parts of this article focus on gendered environmental policy knowledge and its institutionalisation – and not the various forms of societal gendered environmental knowledge.
Generally speaking, (international) environmental politics intends to shape societal orientations and practices which are considered to be harmful for “nature” or to damage societal relationships with nature. Respective policies intend to counter the manifold crises of societal relationships with nature and we can see how dominant and increasingly hegemonic policy knowledge emerged in the last twenty years. The dominant paradigm of global environmental policy knowledge is a particular paradigm, i.e. it frames global environmental politics in a specific way and creates evidence. What is known about the environmental crisis or crises constitutes, in a certain way, the corridors to deal with it/them. The policy knowledge constitutes power-shaped rules in order to distinguish true or right politics and policies from wrong ones. The struggles about concrete institutional policies “takes place within boundaries” (Dryzek 1999: 36; see also Fischer 2003, Prügl 2004). If they are broadly accepted or opposed, actors are not able to question them effectively; we can call the hegemonic forms of knowledge “environmentality” (Luke 2009).

In this sense, the concept of sustainable development or sustainability, respectively, emerged as a “container concept” in the beginning of the 1990s, because very different political, economic and societal actors consider it a discursive terrain to promote their norms and interests. Like “gender mainstreaming” (Wöhl 2007; Andresen and Dölling 2005) or “global governance” (Scherrer and Brand 2006; Brand 2005), sustainable development creates a consensus formula which enables actors to pursue their interests and norms and to de-legitimise other norms and interests which go beyond these “consensuses” (Wichterich 2002; Bruyninckx 2006; Brand and Görg 2008). Many institutional mechanisms, scientific studies, prominent speeches and thousands of seminars, articles and features in the media, conferences like the “Rio plus 10” conference 2002 in Johannesburg, everyday practices of policy makers, NGOs, and private companies contribute to the hegemonic character of actual global environmental politics (for instance, in Johannesburg, women’s politics was less successful than in Rio 1992; Vinz 2005). Therefore, it is important to consider what is taken for granted and what is left out and therefore implicitly accepted as an unchangeable frame of this kind of policy knowledge.

In which historical context did the policy knowledge of sustainable development emerge? In the last three decades, societal reactions to the diverse dimensions of the ecological crisis emerged. Of course, in earlier times, many political and societal actions have already taken place against environmental degradation, floods, droughts, the overuse of land, and the pollution of air. Prior to the broadly acknowledged environmental crisis, Rachel Carson (1962) politicised industrial agriculture with her book *Silent Spring*. But it was in the 1970s that the various dimensions were acknowledged as part of an environmental crisis. This was not due to the material degradation “objectively” reaching a certain point, but rather because societal actors, such as social movements, intellectuals, scientists, international organisations like the FAO...
and sensitive state officials, began to politicise the environment or societal relationships with nature, respectively. The Stockholm Conference on Human Environment in 1972 played an important role and imbued the concept of human environment with an environmental bias (the foundation of the UN Environmental Program, UNEP, was one institutional outcome). Moreover, the increase in the price of oil and the report to the Club of Rome, “Limits to Growth” (Meadows et al. 1972), were important starting points of international debates and policies. The politicisation of the ecological crisis was also a questioning of existing forms of knowledge production and knowledge structures as well as of the institutional forms of the appropriation of nature. Vocal criticised areas were industrialised agriculture (“Green Revolution”), the pollution of air and water, the production of certain drugs (in Germany the most prominent case was the drug, Contagan, which caused birth defects when taken by pregnant women), and, later, the use of nuclear power. In sum, Fordist orientations of universal progress and growth via modernisation processes were questioned by emphasising that this went hand in hand with an overuse of resources and sinks. However, it was not clear how to produce societal innovations or radical transformations in order to deal with these issues.

This changed during the 1980s and 1990s. Due to a different understanding of the ecological crisis, a hegemonic perception emerged and became condensed in the broadly shared understanding of sustainable development. This is less a concrete policy concept, but a broader discourse about adequate forms to deal with the ecological crisis. The report of the World Commission on Sustainable Development (WCED 1987; also called Brundtland Report, named after the chair of the commission, former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland) was a cornerstone of an emerging discourse and knowledge. UNCED in 1992 was an attempt to promote more coherent environmental and developmental policies – the “crisis of development” was not an issue in Stockholm 1972 – claimed after the “lost decade” for many countries in the 1980s. In the 1990s, a “liberal environmentalism” ( Bernstein 2000) became the dominant way of thinking and acting which implied, among other things, a strong market-orientation of public environmental policies.

From the beginning, the official Rio process was not at all sensitive to gender issues. But feminists and especially the Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) tried to integrate different feminist political currents. The most explicit crystallisation moment of these efforts was captured in a conference in Miami, “Women’s World Congress for a Healthy Planet”. Experiences were shared concerning the analogies of the oppression of women and the domination of nature and topics such as the relationship between economic growth and environmental degradation were emphasised. In the adopted “Women’s Action Agenda 21”, three claims were crucial: global justice, resource ethics, and the empowerment of women. Interestingly, the concept of sustainable development is not used in the document. The NGO network

---

4 It should be noted that in some countries environmental issues were politicised and certain policies enacted since the 1960s, e.g. in Germany, because of water and air problems.
of women of the Global South, Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), promoted the concept of sustained livelihood, which refers explicitly to the human body and to care work (which has to do with different experiences of women and their social position in the societal division of labour). Everyone should have the possibility and resources to lead a self-determined life and this argument includes a harsh critique of the existing dominant concepts and developments (Wichterich 2002; Vinz 2005; Agarwal 1992; www.dawn.org.fj). However, sustained livelihood was not considered to be policy relevant.

Liberal internationalist environmentalism and a related liberal feminism became constitutive for a specific type of global environmental politics and sustainable development became its hegemonic policy knowledge. The andocentric concept of nature and respective dualisms (culture-nature, men-women) are not questioned but they constitute the basis of this knowledge. From my perspective, there are five central elements of the broadly shared understanding of sustainable development. It became hegemonic because the relevant actors accepted this discursive terrain and struggled with shared assumptions concerning the relevant policy knowledge. Differing perspectives encounter the problem of being considered legitimate on that terrain.

Firstly, the Brundtland report says it explicitly, the crisis has to be dealt with through economic growth. The central political document of sustainable development, Agenda 21, which was agreed upon at the Rio Conference in 1992, recommends in article 2.3 that the global economy should create conditions for the promotion of environmental and developmental issues by promoting sustainable development through the liberalisation of trade (article 2.3.b). This continues to be a cornerstone of global environmental policy knowledge. Despite global environmental diplomacy, a de-politicisation of societal relations takes place through the creation of hegemonic, unquestionable assumptions like the necessity of growth, the superior role of the market, etc. This has highly gendered implications. The orientation towards economic growth is gendered in the sense that growth means an expansion of the formal – and, in many cases, the export-oriented – economy. The patriarchal forms of the societal division of labour as well as the non-remunerated economic activities, like care work or the non-paid work in local communities, are neglected and considered as unimportant (Biesecker and Hofmeister 2006). The actual transformation of societal reproduction through world market-oriented and privatisation policies are hidden; especially in countries of the Global South, many women lose the control over and access to natural resources through the privatisation of land, seeds, water, and other resources (Rodda 1991; Wichterich 2002; Braidotti et al. 1994).

Additionally, this orientation towards growth and the market, which is assumed to deliver superior solutions when it is embedded in “sound politics”, goes hand in hand with the creation of a knowledge corridor that views private property as an adequate means of protecting the environment and using it sustainably. This perspective – partly realised in the Climate Convention (Brunnengräber 2006) and in the field of biodiversity through the acceptance of the role of agro and drug companies (Brand et al. 2008) – is highly gendered, because women at the global scale posses approximately only
ten per cent of property and men ninety per cent. Therefore, the policy knowledge of sustainable development is not opposed to the valorisation paradigm, but an integral, however partly contradictory, part of it.

Policy knowledge, which focuses on growth and political cooperation, hides the fact that competition is a structuring feature of international economic and political relations. Therefore, it is no surprise that “globalisation”, which became important in the mid-1990s, entered the epistemic and institutional features of sustainable development as a process to be accepted, i.e. as a material constraint (Sachzwang), which cannot be questioned. To quote the former general secretary of the U.N., Kofi Annan (2001), in the preparation of the “Rio+10” conference in 2002: “We have to make globalisation work for sustainable development.” The economy is not seen as a site of power relations and the hierarchical and power-shaped divisions of labour along gender, class, and race are disregarded. Therefore, it is very difficult to develop policies along those lines. The only politicised division of labour is the international one, which is an acknowledged problem for different developmental stages. Therefore, a central dimension of international environmental policy knowledge is that of intergovernmental – and not societal – conflicts, negotiations, and compromises.

A second element of the policy knowledge of sustainable development is the orientation along ecological modernisation (Acselrad 2008; Hajer 1995). The main assumption is that within the existing institutional and epistemic framework a shift towards more ecological production, consumption, orientations can occur. The dominant type of politics, via the state and through cooperation and consensus, without questioning the (capitalist) market, is considered as sufficient. Expert knowledge plays a prominent role here and is in fact a largely “technocratic expertise” (Fischer 2000). This dimension of policy privileges Western and masculine knowledge as universal and, at the same time, superior. The concept of a Western “global expertise” was introduced by the former World Bank president, Robert McNamara (1968–1981) in order to promote a Western-oriented type of development and related developmental knowledge (Goldman 2009: 147-50). Not incidentally, the World Bank calls itself today a “knowledge bank”. Other forms of knowledge are considered as traditional, not adequate for the size of the problems to be dealt with. Michael Goldman shows in his analysis of global environmental elites that “the relationship and identities of global panels of experts, scientific advisory boards, NGOs and business councils, and international aid agencies should not be taken for granted; their genealogies and biographies do matter. Who is billed as scientific or political, public or private, global or local, and inside or outside of civil society has its consequences.” (2009: 162-3).

Part of the policy knowledge of ecological modernisation is the fact that (high-)technological innovations are seen as crucial for the treatment of the environmental crisis. Social problems can be solved with technological means and the hegemonic forms of the production of scientific knowledge are seen as an important tool. But the domination-shaped character is rarely referred to. The concept of sustainable development leaves the feminist critique of science, technology, and development aside (Wichterich 2002; Singer 2005). Moreover, there is a strong tendency to focus on
material aspects of the ecological crisis – to be dealt with by creating objective limits like the percentage to reduce greenhouse gas emissions – and hide societal dimensions like power relations or symbolic-discursive dimensions.

Thirdly, gender relations are also reproduced and stabilised through the polity of international environmental politics, i.e. in the institutions themselves and in embodied knowledge. There is a broad range of literature about the concrete gendering processes of international political institutions and how feminist claims are co-opted in a power-shaped way, and how the embodiment of gendered norms and power relations take place (see the overview in Prügl 2004). In political institutions, a strong dualism contributes to the functioning, creating, one the one hand, subordination and gender inequalities and, agency on the other. As Prügl points out, “Institutions stabilize through naturalization of social classification, by connecting social categories to bodily analogies and to analogies of nature. Notions of femininity and masculinity play a central role in this process” (Ibid: 77). Of course, stabilisation does not mean unchangeable fixing, but rather to frame thinking, action, and power relations and their dynamics in specific “corridors”.

This articulates with another fact: The mode of international politics is that of cooperation and the only widely acknowledged conflicts are those around “national interests”. Governments are the major players in international politics and they formulate “national interests” and “human interests” but not along class, gender, or ethnic lines. The manifold social problems and conflicts around the domination-shaped forms of the appropriation of nature are converted into global problems as well as into political and, more precisely, diplomatic conflicts. The national state and the international state apparatus claim to be the authoritative instances to deal with the ecological crisis. This is a crucial function in modern societies. Problems and conflicts are usually dealt with politically and institutionally mainly through the state. Societal “general interests” are formulated here; in the rest of society, especially in the economy, particular interests are legitimately pursued. The transformation of the manifold problems and conflicts into political issues does not take place in a neutral form, but on discursive and institutional terrains which are highly selective and also gender-selective. Sustainable development enables different strategies of various actors to formulate and inscribe strategies into discursive and political-institutional terrains, where the historically developed terrains are themselves structurally selective (Jessop 2008, chapter 1; on state and nature Wissen 2008; on the strategic-relational approach in international biodiversity politics, cf. Brand 2010).

The long-lasting conflicts around the coming into force of the Kyoto Protocol of the FCCC (finished in 1997, in force since 2005, ending in 2012) are an example of this specific gender-blind type of politics. Governments do not act if others do not agree with the argument that negative consequences on international competitiveness must be avoided. This hegemonic perspective of politics, as an intergovernmental structure and process enhanced by other actors to achieve environmental governance, has an important impact. Christa Wichterich calls the Rio conference the beginning of a “decade of agreed language” in international environmental and women’s politics.
(similarly to the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995), and women are the first “major group” on the Rio Agenda 21, followed by other “minorities”. The chapter on women in the Agenda 21 underlines the “vital role” of women and that gender equity is a precondition for the realisation of sustainable development. However, this is not per se critical, but can also lead to the cooptation of feminist demands and the instrumentalisation of women to deal with the many everyday crises caused by the neoliberal transformation of society and societal relationships with nature. Gender mainstreaming and empowerment, which were originally critical concepts, have been integrated into mainstream policies and have lost their transformative orientation. It aims to enhance efficiency and to reduce damage by fostering adaptation to changing natural circumstances. Many lobbying strategies try to act consciously on this terrain. The famous and often quoted phrase from Bella Abzug, a prominent liberal feminist in the Rio and Beijing processes, condenses this orientation: “We need to get women into the oceans”, i.e. to lobby women issues so that they appear in the chapter on oceans in the Agenda 21 (quoted in Wichterich 2002). Wichterich concludes that the compromise was not successful. Gender and sustainable development became “cross-cutting issues”, demonstrating how difficult it is to implement these practically. Gender-sensitive approaches are mainly realised in the sectors on agriculture, water, and forests. But gender equity in the sense of equal access to and ownership over resources, of the duties and benefits from the appropriation of nature, has found little support.

Fourthly, sustainable development as policy knowledge frames environmental politics as a top-down process. The earth brokers (Chatterjee/Finger 1994), the eco-bureaucrats and diplomats, and the “global bargainers” – to use just a few critical expressions – consider themselves crucial in a process where problems are framed as problems of humanity on the “Spaceship Earth” (Boulding 1966) as a whole and as collective-action problems. This constitutes policy knowledge that Michael Redclift (1992) called “managerialism”. One major result is a technocratic policy approach where conflicts are considered political-diplomatic, but not societal. Despite that the local is considered as an important scale of societal relationships with nature, environmental problems and the crisis are considered as a global one and the collective action problem has to be overcome by international cooperation (Luke 2009). The Earth Summit, i.e. UNCED itself is the best example of such a top-down perspective. More recent proposals to create a UN “Global Environmental Organization” (Rechkemmer 2005) is the most consequent outcome of such thinking. Only such an organisation could concentrate the dispersed – and therefore ineffective – environmental institutional capacities at the international level.

The fact that policy situates itself in a managerial perspective goes hand in hand with a masculine understanding of politics. State identities, which are the foundation for international diplomacy and bargaining, are highly gendered through an understanding of the state which pursues a rational (i.e. national) interest, through “hegemonic masculinities” (Robert Connell). Politics, and especially international diplomacy, are masculine and the management model presupposes an understanding of politics which deals with the “big questions” in the public arena (Sylvester 1994).
mous “glass ceiling” still exists for women in the state apparatus and its diplomatic career paths. And indeed, gender issues are rarely raised. In international conventions like the FCCC or the CBD, the role of women is mainly referred to in the preamble, i.e. the part which is not legally binding. Managerialism, as a specific mode of governance, gives “civil society”, i.e. non-governmental stakeholders as NGOs or private companies, a role in delivering knowledge and legitimation, defusing the tendency towards social conflicts (Conca 2008). However, some NGOs and social movements are the only actors who explicitly refer to gender relations. In addition, the development of stakeholder participation or governance takes place in light of a transformed state. The boundaries between state and society, and especially the state and the economy, were reshaped in the process of neoliberal state transformation. Experts and expert councils, which are not democratically legitimised, but presumed to argue strictly along perceived problems play an important role in the formulation of what is important, what should be done, how and by whom. “Output” legitimation (Scharpf 1998) became an important rationale of politics, and also how criticism can be de-legitimised as hindering political efficiency.

Finally, for quite some time – and in opposition to the proclaimed cross-sectoral character of sustainable development – environmental policy knowledge was assumed to be “issue-specific”. Issue-specific orientations (climate, biodiversity, water, forests, etc.) are deeply inscribed into the existing epistemic and institutional patterns. The weak explicit relations between these orientations and economic or gender issues have become a mode of functioning for international politics. Sustainable development, as hegemonic policy knowledge of diplomatic negotiations on environmental politics, focuses on cooperation and collective action which take place in an issue-specific context.5 One development is striking. The still existent and even aggravating crisis of development and environment could not be coped with by the end of the 1990s. In response, the U.N. in 2000 developed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). They were developed on the basis of the hegemonic assumptions of the policy knowledge of sustainable development. Women’s issues got more recognition, which is an outcome of manifold gender-mainstreaming strategies. Five of the eight MDGs deal explicitly with women’s issues. But it is not at all clear how this integration of gender issues – which might shift some concrete policies – can change the overall policy knowledge of sustainable development.

From the very beginning, the emerging policy knowledge oversaw certain important developments. In the euphoria of Rio 1992, it was almost forgotten that U.S. President Bush declared 17 months before – right before the war against Iraq in 1991 – a “New

5 This dimension of sustainable development might change in the coming years. The already mentioned Millennium Ecosystem Assessment urges the promotion of cross-sectoral perspectives and policies (MASR 2005). Indeed, environmental or more specifically, climate knowledge is only one aspect of various societal knowledge dimensions. It is articulated with other knowledges of problems and institutionalised policies concerning economic development, the creation of competitiveness, distributional aspects in society, etc. Seen from this perspective, the most important institutional innovation at the international level, which was able to shape societal relationships with nature, were not the two Rio conventions (FCCC and CBD), but the WTO.
World Order”, designed to rely much more on military force than on politico-environmental cooperation. Moreover, in 1991, the U.S. government integrated environmental issues into its National Security Strategy for the first time. Since then, a discourse on environmental security has emerged, which also justifies growing military expenditures after the end of the Cold War, but it is not at all part of the policy knowledge on sustainable development. Another striking example is how the “Group 8” – and in the future possible the “G 20” - deals with energy security and environmental degradation (especially those related to climate) as separate issues (cf. Brunnengräber et al. 2008). Part of the militarisation is the development of sophisticated surveillance methods, i.e. a multi-billion project to control the Amazon with satellite techniques. Whereas economic aspects are present and shape environmental thinking, security aspects are absent, while in fact an enormous “environmental-military-complex” exists within its surveillance techniques (Acselrad 2008; Ceceña 2006) and emerges for the militarisation of sustainability. But it is not difficult to predict that these issues will become part of the global environmental policy knowledge over the next years, embedded in which are strong gender implications. Security issues are among the most male and masculine in society. Private and public military and security tasks are almost exclusively performed by men, and the logic of coercion is part of masculinity and male rationality (Kreisky 2008).

For Foucault (1977) “truth” is not so much the ensemble of true things, but the power-shaped rules that are the basis from which to distinguish the true from the wrong. As I argued, this becomes clear against the background of global environmental politics. Its universalistic construction – to save the planet and humanity steered by state officials – implies not only the securing of existing (Western) knowledge corridors, processes of capital accumulation, and related practices, but it is also immanently male. The manifold concrete practices of the appropriation of nature are gendered, but we can identify a decreasing attention to gender issues on an international scale. In international environmental politics, a strategic selectivity towards the exclusion of gender-sensitivity is occurring. If there is any explicit policy, we can call it a “symbolic gender policy” which reproduces hierarchical gender relations and specific forms of gender knowledge. Therefore, we can argue that the policy knowledge of sustainable development is a form of ecopower in times of the ecological crisis, i.e. of the reflexive domination of societal relationships with nature. This form of knowledge and power constitutes and reproduces specific types of gender relations under the heading of sustainable development (more general on related processes of othering, cf. Habermann 2008).

4. Feminist epistemic and practical alternatives

The outlined processes are not at all homogeneous and uncontested. Global climate politics, to give an example, bears the potential to question the profitability of energy corporations and creates problems of legitimacy for dominant politics. Dagmar Vinz
(2005: 17-20) proposes, among other things, gender mainstreaming in environmental politics which should consist of learning processes from Southern societies and a “greenstreaming” of existing institutions. However, it seems difficult to politicise other structuring features and conflict lines beyond modes of global management, ecological modernisation, and intergovernmental bargaining in line with the valorisation paradigm. Therefore, we can call the actual structures and processes of global environmental politics hegemonic, because its forms are not effectively questioned, i.e. the knowledge corridors are quite stable and the opposition is not able to mount an effective challenge. Economic growth and the superiority of “the market” (which is assumed to go hand in hand with private property), Western expertise, and technological innovations are accepted as fundamental; managerialism is considered an adequate form of politics, and patriarchal gender relations hardly play an explicit role. Gender is added for reasons of ethics or legitimation; however, there is limited institutionalisation of gender equity, but rather a modernised instrumentalisation of the patriarchal division of labour.

Surely, there were many attempts to get women’s and feminist issues on the political agenda and promote respective policies. One main reason for the limits of gender agenda-setting and policies, i.e. their concrete forms in the outlined institutional and epistemic contexts, is the result of gender-mainstreaming strategies not questioning the deeply embedded dominant or even hegemonic forms of gender knowledge. Criticising gendered policy knowledge in global environmental politics has normative implications, i.e. to criticise dominant or even hegemonic developments as unjust and subject to change. Feminist and radical socio-ecological thinking and politics intend to shape institutional and discursive societal relations by making their hierarchical, hegemonic, and/or oppressive character visible in order to change them. Beside processes, like enhancing the capacity to act for excluded or oppressed forces through collective actions, and the shaping of institutions, a major dimension of feminist and radical socio-ecological thinking is to change the epistemic foundations of societal power relations. One experience of critical intellectuals and social movements, especially feminist intellectuals and movements, is important here: In order to politicise gender and environmental issues, i.e. gendered environmental issues in international politics, there is a need to undermine both the existing societal and policy knowledge about the “right” or “legitimised” appropriation of nature and the process through which the ecological crisis, which is itself not only a material crisis but socially constructed, is managed. The “flawed and outmoded governance model” (Park et al. 2008: 9) of global environmental politics needs to be questioned conceptually and practically.

The feminist strategy to make domination-shaped and especially patriarchal societal relations visible is crucial in order to promote alternative forms of knowledge and alternatives: To analyse and uncover the highly gendered strategies behind globalisation, “structural adjustment”, new forms of the international division of labour, the role of paid and unpaid formal and informal labour, the dramatic transformation of the agricultural sector through export and cash crop orientation, the role of the state and international political institutions in the reproduction and transformation of a gendered
division of labour, linkages to class, religious and ethnical dimensions of social structures (Caglar 2009; Young 2006; Bakker 1994). Feminist networks differ concerning adequate strategies, how to refer to existing political and economic institutions, and what role the state should play. The concept of “environmental justice” might become a crucial term in order to bring quite different experiences together and give them orientation. The environmental justice perspective reflects the uneven access to natural goods and the enjoyment of their benefits. And it makes clear that the understanding of problems and the selective dealing with them depends on knowledge (Parks and Roberts 2006; Kaiser and Wullweber 2007; from a feminist perspective: Salleh 2009).

Forms of alternative knowledge for the democratic shaping of societal relationships with nature would mean to deconstruct dominant or even hegemonic forms. In this context, Ken Conca (2008) argues that the major failure of the Rio type of politics is that it did not, and does not, recognise and engage “transnational socio-environmental controversies” about local problems. This means that local problems are not only local but translocal, i.e. often politicised and politicisable along different spatial scales. It would not focus so much on the myth of global management of the environment (Görg and Brand 2008), but on “protecting the planet’s places”, i.e. to deal with the cumulative local problems such as soil erosion, water scarcity, loss of biodiversity, etc. (Conca 2006). It is not about “stakeholder dialogue”, but about conflicts and, of course, institutional politics which result from a process in which different actors, norms and interests have had a chance to be formulated and heard, and to which a precautionary principle is crucial. The flawed realisation of the politics of sustainable development has to do with its focus on economic growth, cooperation, managerialism, statism and related knowledge. Environmental conflicts beyond the negotiation table are often ignored – in practical politics as well as in social scientific research. Conca’s concept of socio-ecological controversies might help to shed light on feminist orientations. That is, because the engendering of concepts and theories, as well as practical politics and every-day action, has to do with the challenging of dominant thinking and practices. Different policy knowledge is crucial for this. This means a weakening of the dominant and presumed gender-neutral policy knowledge of sustainable development and the opening of intellectual and practical spaces where environmental justice can be fostered.

References


Stern, Nicholas (2006): Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/sternreview_index.cfm).


The Study of Global Finance in International Political Economy: Introducing Gender – a research agenda

Eleni Tsingou

Questioning and unveiling assumptions about gender in the generation and reproduction of economic knowledge is at the heart of this volume. As well as showcasing research informed by feminist analysis, the editors have been keen for the volume to act as an impetus for scholars not usually accustomed to dealing with gender issues in their work, to start thinking about them in a more systematic way. The challenge for me, and others, has been to look at our research topics and consider how gender is a factor. The concept and theories of ‘gender knowledge’ have been at the basis of this common dialogue.

In this note, I review the areas of my research and how I have been thinking about the issues differently since embarking on this collaboration, outlining a future research agenda that would introduce the gender dimension explicitly in ongoing projects. In the first place, I look at the effects of knowledge networks on financial practice by focusing on patterns of inclusion and exclusion in the production and dissemination of technical knowledge in the banking and insurance industries. Financial governance rules and practices are widely understood to be governed by theories of economics and finance which have heavily relied on scientific modelling in forecasting and in assessing risks. The International Political Economy (IPE) literature has long sought to look within and beyond these models and explore neglected facets in the making and consequences of the governance practices that ensue. The analysis in this chapter engages in these debates by focusing on three specific aspects of the financial industry and by exploring the emphasis on/neglect of gender-related considerations: (i) the making of financial governance and the role of transnational policy communities in the policy process; (ii) practices in the banking industry resulting from changes in the past ten years in anti-money laundering legislation and in particular, the development of risk assessment and the gender-related effects of the financial marginalisation of certain communities; (iii) the world of the insurance industry and the construction of knowledge within the actuary profession. These empirical cases help explain emphasis and neglect of gender considerations within financial knowledge networks and highlight significant effects of these inclusion and exclusion choices. Finally, having concentrated mostly on impact, the chapter explores the possibility of research on conceptualising change or opportunities for change, through a greater focus on agency and ‘everyday’ finance.

In this analysis, knowledge networks, in the context of global finance, are understood as producers, disseminators (and often primary users) of expertise. The latter is highly technical and specialised, relying principally on scientific modelling, forecasting and risk-assessment as the basis for financial governance arrangements. These networks also have an overwhelmingly North-American and European geographical
focus and membership. The chapter explores whether this expertise is accepted or contested and, if so, on what grounds. The relevance of the gender dimension is then discussed, more specifically, the extent to which the knowledge structures under consideration are gendered. These questions are addressed in the context of the three main research projects identified above. It becomes apparent that assumptions about gender are at the heart of these financial activities and that IPE research can be further enriched by integrating gender considerations in its guiding questions.

The regulation and supervision of financial conglomerates

As the global credit crisis has highlighted, the activities of large financial institutions matter; so does the governance of these activities, the rules and principles setting the global regulatory and supervisory framework. A close examination of the trends and policies in the regulation and supervision of financial conglomerates over the past twenty years shows the gradual but definite development of a framework of self-regulation and self-supervision, closely linked to the interests and priorities of large financial private institutions, which helped establish best practice for the industry at large. This is manifest in the main global banking rules, as seen in the standards produced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee), known as Basel 2. Agreed in 2004 after a long period of consultation, the Basel 2 standards can be interpreted as the perfect example of regulatory and supervisory capture: they benefit big financial players, do not include tough regulation and the complex approaches on offer are a clear market entry barrier. Basel 2 was developed on the basis of a three-pillar framework and with the understanding that banking rules must reflect the needs and sophistication of financial institutions. The pillars, minimum capital requirements, supervisory review and market discipline formally aim to deliver standards more suitable to financial practices (Basel Committee, 2004).

The first pillar deals with minimum capital requirements. It offers provisions for banks, with the approval of their supervisors, to self-assess capital adequacy requirements on the basis of the complexity of their activities and the status of their internal risk-management systems. The largest global conglomerates, (arguably the most sophisticated but also the least risk-averse), are thus subject to market-based regulatory arrangements – in essence, internal risk-management practices are institutionalised and financial institutions which can show that they have well-developed internal systems are relieved from additional costly regulatory requirements. The second pillar focuses on the supervisory review process, proposing practices that would allow supervisors to evaluate banks’ risk-management techniques and internal procedures and encouraging continuous dialogue between the private and the public sectors. This has long

151

1 The Basel Committee was comprised of key regulators and supervisors of the G-10 countries (actually 12 in number): Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The credit crisis has increased its membership to include other G-20 countries and key financial centres.
been the practice in the United States but the inclusion of the pillar in Basel 2 formalises the practice of market-based supervision and encourages bank-by-bank risk analysis instead of broad supervisory principles, rules and direction. Finally, the third pillar aims to strengthen disclosure requirements and market discipline by improving transparency provisions to market participants, including access to qualitative information on risk-management and measurement, and hence on the capital adequacy of the institution.

In developing Basel 2, it can be said that banking regulators and supervisors had three key aims. In the first place, the Basel Committee wished to be responsive to the needs of institutions and designed a capital requirements framework that relied on best practice in internal systems for identifying and measuring exposure to risk, all the while acknowledging that different firms require different types of treatment. Secondly, the Committee set up a framework for active supervision of banks’ internal practices, eschewing rules for a risk-based system of examinations, case-by-case assessments and partnership among the regulators and the regulated. Thirdly, the Committee attempted to encourage market discipline mechanisms, by providing guidelines for improved disclosure and transparency. Throughout the process, the private sector was extensively consulted, both formally and privately and the final document is a product of these consultations. In so doing, the Basel Committee assisted the consolidation of a system of regulation and supervision which has the interests of transnational financial institutions at its core.

This is not a straight story of private sector influence, however. Rather, I argue that private actors became an integral part of a transnational financial policy community which brings together key actors from the world of finance at large, including public, private, think tank and academia. In this context, agreement over governance arrangements is reached through a socialisation process of continuous interaction of public and private actors and the sanctioning of private sector preferences and practices, underscored by a framework of shared understanding about the nature (and appropriateness) of regulation and supervision and what constitutes ‘good governance’, as well as an appreciation of financial knowledge based on scientific risk measurement and principles of transparency, disclosure and market discipline. This community can be said to have formed gradually to bring much-needed technical expertise and coordination to policy-making and to address issues arising from liberalisation and intensive financial innovation from the 1980s onwards. The first point is that the principal source of influence of such communities is their elite status and technical expertise and more generally, the power of ideas and that of those who control them. It will be hardly surprising to note that this community is primarily male (as a cursory glance at the holders of positions in central banks and supervisory authorities, major financial in-

---

2 This was part of the overall consultative process which included four rounds of proposals and responses in the 1999-2004 period (all comments were published on the BIS website, www.bis.org). It should be noted, however, that the majority of comments came from private sector institutions.

3 For an overview of my work on this subject, see Tsingou (2007).
Studying these institutions, private sector working groups and financial member-only clubs will testify. While more women are now likely to be found in some senior finance positions, their presence in the policy community remains marginal. 4

This transnational policy community has long identified efficiency, innovation and stability as the key goals of its activities. This in and by itself offers only a narrow set of preoccupations. Yet what is also important is the extent to which the above set of priorities prevents other issues, related to social and distributive justice, to be actively considered, let alone promoted. Policy priorities, however, produce winners and losers.

In other aspects of economic governance, policy outcomes in terms of winners and losers have been more easily apparent; the identification of losers in the politics of banking regulation and supervision has, until recently, been much more problematic. We could see how securitisation and financial innovation moved an increasing number of financial activities off the balance sheet, thus raising concerns about the capacity of institutions to stay on top of their obligations in a time of crisis. We could also observe a high level of individual involvement in global finance (especially in the Anglo-American systems) through the so-called ‘democratisation of finance’, yet were also able to identify the many shortfalls of these developments in terms of an individual’s competence to effectively function in the system over a sustained period of time (Ertuk et al., 2007). The ongoing credit crisis has clearly shown the pitfalls of the de-politicisation of finance – and has brought to the fore a growing number of losers.

The credit crisis has, however, also underlined the resilience of the transnational financial policy community which has arguably not been severely tested. Reform proposals have concentrated on ‘tweaking’ of the system and a remarkably predictable set of policy options is being debated and adopted. Which brings us to the question of opportunities for change or reform of the system: the relevant actors in the policy community have consistently acted as gatekeepers in the process and are apparently continuing to doing so.

Introducing gender: while exclusion and inclusion questions relating to the governance of global financial activity have long been at the heart of IPE scholarship, how does thinking about gender issues in the above context move the debate forward and add useful insights? In the first place, the following questions need to be addressed:

1. How have studies on transnational elite networks dealt with gender bias and its consequences?

As is evident from the above overview, the transnational financial policy community exhibits several biases: it is elite, predominantly Anglo-American and ideologically grounded in the neoliberal strand of the Economics discipline in its training and professional skill-set. Yet the male character of this community is often overlooked. This is illustrated in the case of the Group of Thirty, a private organisation that showcases

4 On the other hand, more progress has been made in terms of geographical representation. Though the bulk of the community is still located in North America and Europe, some efforts have been made to include financial experts from other parts of the world, especially Asia (mostly China and India) and the Middle East; African officials remain a rarity, however.
the workings of the policy community.5 At the forefront of many of the debates on financial regulation and supervision since its creation in 1978, with influential work on issues such as clearance and settlement in securities markets, derivatives regulation, banking supervision and the treatment of systemic risk, and most recently financial reform, the group is made up of the great and the good of global finance, with members from the public and private sectors, as well as academia. The group has thirty members at any one time — of which two have been female for most of the past thirty years (though the group has only one female member at the time of writing). While this is seen as a concern in a general sense, akin to a slight embarrassment at the imbalance, the lack of female representation is explained away due to the lack of senior female officers in global finance and the over-commitment of the females in such positions. Significantly, interviews with members as well as participants in the policy community at large suggest that this apparent gender bias is not problematic, nor does it affect the substance of discussions and ensuing policy priorities and decisions (and this sentiment continues to hold post-crisis).

Future research should focus on challenging this assertion and explore how significant this bias is as well as its consequences. Besides empirical research on the education and hiring practices in global financial institutions, the impact of this imbalance on the substance and on the type of knowledge at the centre of discussions needs to be further examined. Indicatively, attitude to risk and reaction to particular incentive structures have been identified as factors for consideration.

2. Even as the models at the heart of financial governance appear faulty, attention focuses on ‘gaps’ and not the architecture of the system — among the policy community, but also beyond, financial knowledge is not seriously challenged or contested (in contrast, for example, to economic knowledge in monetary, trade, development issues) — why?

Financial knowledge remains a ‘tight box’, with heterodox economics not included in the parameters of what is considered appropriate financial governance. The language remains elitist and highly technical and the relationship between the dominant academic community and the practitioners of global finance is very tight. This is coupled with a tradition of ‘revolving doors’ where there is high professional mobility between the public and private sectors. Material reward structures are also such that there is little incentive within the community for major adjustments. In this context, future research should also focus on arenas where other types of knowledge may gain access to important discussion fora.

3. Who are the losers? And what language can be used to address the issues affecting the losers in the process?

Losers are most clearly identified in a time of crisis. But what is considered a crisis is also dependent on the type of knowledge at the heart of governance. In the world of the regulation and supervision of global financial conglomerates, for example, the

---

5 For more information on the Group of Thirty, its membership and publications, see www.group30.org; for an in-depth analysis of the group, see Tsingou (2007).
Asian crisis of 1997 was not seen as a significant crisis moment. The subprime crisis and subsequent credit crunch are much closer to the policy community and losers are identifiable in its immediate ‘constituencies’. It remains to be seen whether the focus on the losers of the crisis will extend to include long-term considerations on how changes in the real economy affect society at large and how the language will be adapted in the long-run to the needs and preoccupations of the wider public. Importantly, research on these issues should explore whether in examining the impact and potential role of under-represented sections of society, gender can be a different factor or simply a component of these discussions.

The politics (and unintended consequences) of the global anti-money laundering regime

Originating in the war on drugs of the 1980s and intensifying since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the anti-money laundering (AML) regime has developed on two fronts: prevention and enforcement. Prevention is mostly about sanctions, regulation and supervision, reporting and customer due diligence; enforcement is about confiscation, prosecution and punishment and investigations. In essence, however, despite the criminalisation of money laundering and the recent prominent and public role of enforcement agencies in the AML regime, the process is mostly a regulatory one. As promoted by the key global institutions on AML, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) but also the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, regulatory requirements on prevention have been greatly strengthened in recent years and are frequently reviewed and updated. The resulting knowledge structures are negotiated in international bureaucratic arenas and though heavily influenced by public and foreign policy priorities in leading states, they follow a traditional economic rationale.

As a consequence of the focus on prevention, in practice, frontline responsibilities lie with private financial institutions; these have some straightforward incentives to take AML measures seriously, mainly to do with reputational and legal issues but, in line with increased requirements, have adopted a series of additional procedures: these include special identification measures, the ‘know your customer’ mantra applied to all financial services; monitoring processes based on internal systems and a comprehensive system of dealing with suspicious activity; up-to-date training programmes; the implementation of auditing procedures and accountability measures such as signed attestations of knowledge of anti-money laundering measures, and evaluations; and the setting-up of specialised (and ideally sophisticated) anti-money laundering units. While complaining about the “private costs of a public policy” (Serrano and Kenny,

6 For an overview of my work on this subject, see Tsingou (2010).
7 The Financial Action Task Force was created in 1989 and has 35 members, mostly OECD countries, as well as some recent significantly large members such as China. For more information on the organisation’s activities, see www.fatf-gafi.org.
2003), financial institutions are learning to focus on the process of compliance, with a high volume of suspicious activity reports being filed.

An important by-product of the AML regime has been the development of global compliance programmes that also serve as sophisticated database and marketing tools for the major financial institutions. Indeed, at the ‘high end’ of the market, banks and securities firms are working with complex compliance programmes that produce consistent standards for their global business and allow for the identification of clients, the monitoring of their transactions, the reporting of suspicious activities and the regular update of global regulatory and legal requirements. The programmes are developed following a risk-based approach, where customers are categorised as high, medium or low risk at various stages in their dealings with the financial institution according to a variety of parameters, the most important of which seems to be the country factor. While the initial cost of such programmes is high, financial institutions admit that it has several valuable uses, including getting to know more about clients’ needs and customise products accordingly, offer global consistency for clients (corporate and individuals) who have global financial relationships, and create sophisticated ‘valuable customer’ profiles. Along with developing a competitive edge, large private players have the possibility to invest on ever more rigorous systems which often go beyond strict requirements so as to ensure the smoothest possible relation with authorities and avoid potentially damaging threats to their reputation.

These programmes, along with the marginalisation and financial exclusion of distinct groups of individuals (students, migrants, black/informal economy participants) through ‘know your customer’ banking practices, and the increasing criminalisation of cash, are addressed in academic circles (de Goede, 2003; Amoore and de Goede, 2005) but appear at the bottom of policy priorities and agendas. Indeed, in the United States, recent developments with respect to remittance systems are particularly worrying: enforcement cases and the interpretation of rules on wire transfer businesses, coupled with the relatively low profit margins that such businesses offer ‘mainstream’ financial institutions, have led most of the latter to effectively sever ties with the majority of such businesses. This has considerable consequences for access to the mainstream banking system of small but significant parts of the population, often the weakest members of society who operate in the non-criminal black economy, notably through casual work. Migrant groups are also explicitly targeted through tougher wire transfer requirements. In essence, in the effort of ‘cleaning’ the financial system, inequalities are creeping in the regulatory requirements.

This issue is also pertinent in the context of the developing world. The scope of FATF-developed standards extends beyond the organisation’s membership, including through a FATF campaign to name and shame non-cooperative countries and territories.

There are some sound economic reasons for the globalisation of these standards: (i) in some developing countries, the sums laundered may correspond to a substantial part of national wealth; (ii) money laundering activities can also alter investment patterns as funds are allocated to sectors where the risk of detection is lower (e.g. construction) and not necessarily to ones that are profitable or in need of investment; (iii) developing countries may also see their privatisation policies hampered should launderers become the main beneficiaries of such schemes and also, suffer reputation damage, if they are seen to tolerate such activities on their territory and (iv) finally states are affected through loss of tax revenue (McDowell and Novis, 2001).

At the same time, however, the focus of FATF standards is not always suitable to the conditions in some developing world countries; substantial efforts (financial and of institutional capacity) may be diverted from more urgent matters to the AML framework in order to comply with international requirements. Most significantly, the standards adopted may not be appropriate in societies where only a small fraction of the population has 'standard' banking relationships and all the necessary paperwork to engage in such transactions.

Introducing gender: Empirical work suggests that the effects of marginalisation (and the higher cost of using the financial system) on women are particularly high. These cases need to be investigated and studied more systematically both in the countries where those standards first originate and in the developing world. The focus of such analysis, however, would be on impact. A closer review of work on immigrant communities in the US (e.g. remittances sent to Mexico from US-based immigrants) would be particularly useful here too, especially in relation to the reaction of the immigrant community to more stringent requirements and the possible development of activities.

The life insurance industry and the actuary profession

The life insurance industry is a manifestation of new forms of privatisation of social risk. In this instance, life insurance is a product / policy which guarantees a financial provision to specified beneficiaries in the case of death (or critical illness) of the holder. This is an area of financial activity where the gender dimension is taken into consideration and as such might provide useful insights in the inclusion of gender parameters and biases in the construction of economic and financial knowledge.

Professional practice in the insurance industry is highly specialised and predictably esoteric. Following a precise training pattern which includes professional qualificati-

---

9 The programme, known as the NCCT list, has now been wound down but twenty-three emerging and developing countries were deemed non-cooperative in the early 2000s.
10 De Koker (2006) provides a useful account of the effects of FATF standard implementation on the wider population in South Africa.
11 This is a new project; I started thinking about this issue when looking at areas in the workings of financial institutions where gender is a factor.
ons and with a typical background in mathematics, actuaries use economic knowledge from statistics, finance and business in order to assess the risk of a particular event or situation taking place and to devise policies and products that mitigate the financial consequences of such a risk.

There are typically two roles performed in the actuary profession: mortality and pricing. Mortality actuaries consider life expectancy issues, looking at mortality improvements, age, as well as gender. Pricing actuaries interpret life expectancy, assessing which assumptions regarding improvements in life expectancy to take into consideration and pricing products accordingly. This is an industry where there is formal gender discrimination; female clients face positive discrimination with respect to life insurance premiums (as women statistically are likely to live longer) and negative discrimination with regards to pension provision.

The industry builds knowledge and expertise on the basis of highly sophisticated models – many socio-economic indicators affect the way life expectancy tables are interpreted: occupation, income, marital status, post-code, as well as medical factors – assumptions which often reproduce traditional roles and expectations. At first glance, professional practice in this industry thus appears quite rigid and possibly impenetrable. Yet precisely because of the socio-economic nature of many of the indicators examined, the opportunity for a greater degree of contestation may be present: in essence, should different information / knowledge about socio-economic factors reach an actuary’s desk, the tables, assumptions and calculations may also look different.12

Conclusions – ‘everyday finance’ in the study of IPE

In moving this research agenda forward, it will be important to consider the impact and effects of the gendered production and use of economic knowledge, but also to analyse these issues in the context of the ‘everyday’. There is now a growing literature on IPE and the ‘everyday’ that is of relevance in introducing gender to research on global financial governance.13 Of particular interest will be work that focuses more explicitly on agency and “Global Economic Change from Below” (Hobson and Seabrooke, 2007). This literature considers: (i) how the weak can influence the agendas of the elites and how elite agendas depend on everyday actions; (ii) “axiorationality”, i.e. everyday activity (in the absence of defiance or uncertainty) informed by interests and values (which allows for an understanding of identity); and (iii) how policies, not

12 A particularly interesting precedent in this case can be found in race-based discrimination in the insurance industry in the United States. For a long time, assumptions about the life expectancy of particular groups were formally part of pricing calculations. While such practices are now formally illegal, the socially constructed assumptions themselves have been challenged and are less likely to be a factor in the pricing of policies.
knowledge, can be adjusted / challenged through everyday actions – which may lead to reinforcing knowledge structures, or changing them.

Everyday actions do not constitute knowledge of a typified nature. Experiential forms of knowledge may be seen as populist and have not been traditionally valued, yet it may be that in looking for alternative practices beyond the elites, opportunities for dialogue, contestation, destabilisation or change can be created. The world of investment (where socially responsible investment and broader repercussions of female attitudes and tolerance to risk are in evidence) provides an indication of the usefulness of such an approach; more systematic work in other areas of global finance and financial services should provide further insight.

References


Introduction

This essay views feminism as a broad social movement made up of coalitions for egalitarian systemic changes. The relations between feminisms and knowledge forms are historical as are the types of coalitions fostered. Understanding feminist politics and its epistemology in these terms is helpful to reflect on the current challenges facing feminist knowledge networks engaging with issues of security. Beyond war and peace, feminist politics today address many transnational issues such as trade and financial liberalisation, the impacts of their fluctuations across the world, the links between economic crises and environmental deterioration, and their practical meanings for people’s security in daily lives. A human-centred approach to security opens up an opportunity for mutual learning between feminist critical thought – on the practices of sciences and cultural values set in them – and critical thought on security which extends the meanings of the term to daily lives. Both streams of thought accord significance to issues of equity, justice, and rights, and how cultures influence human agency in knowledge systems and responses to change.

Globalisation as multi-layered processes of social transformation has brought to the fore many issues of contention arising from differing interpretations about gender problems, their scales and implications, and actions for change. Problems of choice between engaging with knowledge and policy-making entities to rewrite gender from within, and or maintaining autonomous critical voices external to the institutions of power, have placed limits on coalition building. Internal diversity and major external pressure become intensified when feminist politics take on transnational and trans-local dimensions, especially when factors such as the geopolitical positioning of actors, resources and generation gaps within the movement are taken into consideration. Dominant knowledge systems have displayed a persistent insensitivity to how the intersection between different structures of power can produce significantly varied experiences of exclusion and political subjectivity in different contexts. A singular understanding of gender is incapable to capture the multi-dimensional nature of social exclusion. At the same time, the alternative understanding of gender – as an outcome of intersection of diverse power structures and particular articulation – falls short of helping to foster political and cognitive alliances due to an overemphasis on the diversity of the content of the subjective experience (Hancock; 2006). Within the women’s movements, differing approaches to gender knowledge, modes of engagement with the ‘margins’ and practices of participation can also fail to realize the commitment to inclusiveness of different voices (Ackerly, 2007).
The essay proposes to re-orient feminist debates towards the care-security nexus as a pathway that can plausibly provide an integral understanding of a human-centred and eco-minded notion of security. Seeing ‘gender’ in binary terms tends to produce the understanding of ‘care’ as ‘female’ and ‘security’ as ‘male’. Yet critical feminist inquiries into ‘development’ and ‘security’ in daily lives show how the two domains are closely interlinked – rather than two separate compartments as they have been styled for administrative purposes. Practices of caring are implicit in both when understood through Tronto’s conceptual map (1993). She identifies four ethical elements of care: attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness; and delineates four modes of caring – caring about, taking care of, care-giving, and care-receiving. The ‘public’ side of ‘caring about’ is to be found in the construct of the political subject (deliberation and rationality). Likewise taking care of something is a ‘public’ activity resulting from the translation of deliberation into organizational agency. By contrast, care-giving and care-receiving acts are culturally constructed such that they are recognized primarily in private and emotional aspects of interpersonal relationships. Re-working this conceptual map of care to show the dialectical interaction between public and private modes of caring is important for feminist epistemology.

By viewing feminist epistemology as a canvas in which the themes of care and security have been articulated in different ways – in response to particular audiences and needs — an underlying unity in streams of thought that is valuable to foster alliances for peaceful change may be found. Revisiting two distinctive features of feminist knowledge – ‘situated knowledge’ and knowledge-making as ‘quilting’ – may also be helpful to reflect on how to respond to today’s realities: transnational politics with multi- and trans-local dimensions, and security-searching activities on a planetary scale. The former requires corresponding means of appreciation and communication of knowledge as flows of ideas between different locations and situations; and the latter requires a refashioning of ‘identity’ as unity – the Homo sapiens whose lives and cultures depend on other life forms and eco-systems – while recognizing the contextual power of identities and subjectivities as immanent in responses to change.

II The writing on care in feminist epistemology

Feminist epistemology and knowledge networks are the outcomes of long-standing women’s engagements with diverse social movements inspired by diverse causes: peace, national liberation, labour rights, sexual rights, faith-based, and environmental concerns. Recognizing the historical contingencies and the seemingly dispersed lines of thoughts is helpful to appreciate feminist epistemology and politics as ensembles of practices with distinctive rationales formed at various levels of social and political life. Approaching diversity in these terms would treat feminist thought not only as currently existing, but as something contingent on what Foucault calls a ‘history of ‘veridictions’ (Foucault, 1984: 943). In other words, the entry point to the diversity of feminist thought would be to examine how a particular feminist discourse strive to validate itself
with regard to specific audiences, and how a specific perspective comes to be considered as valuable and valid, or unconvincing, in a particular domain. Rather than isolated instances of ‘doing gender’ or ‘acting feminist’ in an idealized sense, feminist knowledge is considered here as arising from care as a deeper stream of knowledge of the senses, manifest in diverse cultural forms of thinking and social action.

Derived from women’s act of positing themselves as subject of knowledge in relation to gender constructs, along with other relations that made up their quotidian universe, feminist knowledge begun with reflections on caring as the repetitive activities to sustain life. It questions why these are treated as secondary to other concerns in scientific theories and social reforms programmes and how this treatment coincides with the subordination of women, children and other life forms under specific political rules. Initially developed by women who have entered the academia in the Western world, feminist epistemology took a critical stance towards the Enlightenment and affiliated scientific paradigms – considered to be tainted by three main heuristic biases: male, European and ‘productive age’ (Fox Keller and Longino, 1996). The goal of feminist epistemology is to redress the rationale of an epistemic injustice in the world of science and to follow through their consequences in social reform programmes. The inclusion of feminist values in the acquisition of knowledge, its justification of validity and credibility in representation has revealed the complex relations between the writings of ‘gender’, ‘race’ and age in knowledge systems and their translation into organizational agency in ways that buttress the power of particular groups and re-enforce extant relations of social inequality and/or generate new ones.

Sandra Harding’s seminal work (1986) discerned four main feminist epistemological approaches: empiricism, standpoint, post-modernism and post-colonialism. Harding’s classification of different positions is useful to identify the lines of interactions, issues of contestation, and possible innovation. Her narrow approach to empiricism, initially identified uniquely with positivism, has shown to be problematic. She classified feminist empiricists as those practicing natural and social sciences who rely on logical positivist theories, which mystify social facts by first abstracting them and then treating them as reality. Harding maintains her scepticism about the possibility of correcting positivist science through a critique, in view of vested interests in the social structure of science and given the absence of a countervailing power by marginalised groups (Duran, 1998). The conflation between positivism and empiricism has led to sceptic, if not hostile, tendencies among post-modernist feminist knowledge agents towards empiricism as a paradigm. Markie (2008) notes that the original meaning of empiricism accords significance to experiences of the sense in shaping our concepts and knowledge. This aspect of empiricism is generally obliterated in the writings of feminist post-modernism even though the knowledge of the senses is central to feminist concerns.

1 The term ‘epistemic injustice’ was coined by Craig (1990) to refer to non-egalitarian norms of credibility that tend to lean more in favour of the powerful than they deserve while denying credibility to the powerless. This can occur both in testimony and heuristically.
Since Harding’s intervention, debates on feminist social knowledge have produced a spectrum of epistemological positions. On the one end, some scholars hold the view that there is merit in retaining the modernist foundational requirements of ‘good knowing’ in science, emphasising the significance of evidence, shared standards of justification and procedures in knowledge-making as a cumulative process. On the other end, some post-modernist scholars discard the idea of knowledge as a cumulative process, together with universal standards. They emphasise instead its context-dependency and culturally shaped modes of knowing, for which the standard of ‘good knowing’ may be understood as the ability to account for diverse subjectivities and voices.

Feminist-standpoint theory gravitates between the two ends of the spectrum and affiliated standards of ‘good knowing’ using the constants of the female lenses. Borrowing from Marxian debates on consciousness and class position, this body of thought aims at bringing issues of gender identity, consciousness and cognitive style to bear on theorising in social knowledge and transformational practices. It establishes a close connection between epistemic perspectives and the social location of women. For example, women’s practical experiences as central actors in systems of reproduction (Hartsock, 1987), as social objects on to which male desires are projected and acted upon (McKinnon 1987), or as possessing different cognitive styles (Gilligan, 1982), are considered as significant realities based on which an alternative epistemological and moral perspective can be developed. In this view, the nexus of women’s gender identity and social position are believed to be capable of sharpening their knowledge about gainers and sufferers from a social system built on the principle of male superiority. Men are considered uninterested to access this knowledge due to their privileged positions. In claiming to represent the world from the perspective of women’s subordination, this stream of standpoint theory seeks to justify its epistemic authority about the condition of being female that can inform political programmes.

Socially and politically contested issues such as prostitution, pornography, sexual labour, sex-work, the value of domestic labour, women’s choices and agency formed by different interests and subjectivities have placed limits on these claims. These issues demand more scrutiny of the character of social inequality that defines the sub-groups among women, the specific features of their marginalisation, affinity and consciousness. Parallel to this, pressures of globalization and the diverse affect of connectivity have exposed the limits of a hegemonic definition of gender – a single unit of analysis above other social categories – and pushed for the refinement of feminist-standpoint theory (Collins, 1990; Martín-Alcoff, 2007). Studies of the interactions between social categories – gender, race, age, class, sexuality – and the resultant experiences of inequality, are now a core area of reflection and debate. A critical question, that various

2 Starting from the observation that women are more oriented towards concern and commitments that arise from relationships, Gilligan argued that women’s identity is built on a relational self. Their moral judgments necessarily include feelings of compassion and empathy for others. ‘Care reasoning’ is a female feature – distinct from ‘justice reasoning’ as male. In care reasoning, women’s own and other’s responsibilities are grounded in social context and interpersonal commitments.
feminist knowledge communities contend with, is how to find ways to possibly draw from a diversity of epistemological resources in order to (a) make the intersection between different forms of social vulnerability more visible to the public eye; and (b) create an environment with necessary mechanisms to facilitate fair debates on the meanings of gender equality and justice to guide action.

In revising standpoint theory, Harding (1993) retains the view that partiality is the inevitable effect of the location of the inquirer, and emphasizes the need to place oneself on the same critical, causal plane with the objects of knowledge. She proposes the concept strong objectivity, taking into account the roles of good as well as bad values in the production of knowledge. Considering that the knowledge agent is always placed in an environment where cultural beliefs function at every stage of scientific inquiry, strong objectivity requires that scientists and their communities adopt practices of self-reflexivity to mediate the perspective of the oppressed groups and integrate the good values – such as democracy-advancing ones – to their projects. Thus, according to this perspective, an assessment of ‘better’ knowledge does not depend on eliminating subjectivity (beliefs and values) and conforming to some false ideal of objectivism. It depends on examining whether and how self-reflexivity and the incorporation of democratic values generate new viewpoints that can improve understanding about a given domain (Narayan and Harding, 2000; Crasnow, 2006).

As Michaelian (2008:75-76) points out among the good biases which are of particular interest to Harding is the political commitment of science to serve the interests of the marginalized rather than the dominant groups. However, the concept of ‘marginality’ is hardly clarified. Accepting ‘good’ bias in this way means that the political can be considered internal to the epistemic without having to specify the beneficiaries on the margins. Furthermore, this position is surprisingly close of the modernist antecedent of rationality, yet it is not supported by a meta-narrative to assess the validity of claims to strong objectivity (Michaelian, 2008: 78). Rolin (2006) points out that the bias paradox in Harding’s epistemology is built on two main claims: epistemic privilege and situated knowledge. The assumption that a standard of impartiality (strong objectivity) enables one to judge some perspectives as better than others contradicts the situated knowledge claim — which purports that all knowledge is partial. A resolution to this paradox, Rolin suggests, is the adoption of a contextualist theory of epistemic justification that explains how claims to an epistemic privilege may be warranted when a broader shift in context calls into question the credibility of assumptions formerly accepted as an entitlement.

Rolin’s suggestion may help in resolving the difficulties posed by the concept of intersectionality that shows how marginalized groups occupy a social terrain in which the workings of multiple axes of power produce unique experiences of subject position,

---

3 The selection of problems, the formation of hypotheses, the design of research (including the organization of research communities), the collection of data, the interpretation and sorting of data, decisions about when to stop research, the way results of research are reported, and so on (Harding, 2004, 136)
structurally invisible to policy and law-making as well as to the politics of social movements (Crenshaw 1994, 2000). Applying the concept of an epistemic privilege in such cases remains problematic. As Hancock (2006: 250) observes, the restriction of understanding of intersectionality as an issue of ‘content of the social experience’ has led to what has been termed as an ‘Oppression Olympics’ where groups compete, rather than cooperate, in a struggle to obtain access to the fringes of opportunities and resources. How intersectionality works and what it does to the experience of inhabiting a ‘marginal universe’ depends on the specific location of the subjects concerned. The challenge intersectionality has posed to feminist standpoint theory is greater that what feminist standpoint’s proposed concept of epistemic democracy has to offer. When the differing meanings of marginality as a mode of existence, and the implications each of these has for understanding the articulation of power and distributive justice, are taken into account the weakness of strong objectivity is revealed, as it provides little insight on how to rank epistemic privileges.

Haraway’s (2004) concept of ‘situated knowledge’ – often used interchangeably with Harding’s strong objectivity – begins with the acknowledgement of diversity and hybridity. She takes this as a starting point to guide the knowledge agent to find unlikely coalitions between systematically oppressed groups. In other words, she resists an a-priori assumption on oppression and affinity. Like Harding, her application of post-structuralist analysis endorses the rejection of neutrality and context-free knowledge-making, while holding on to the quest for constant clarification by the knowledge agent about his/her positioning and evolving sense of affinity. Positioning always means partiality; and partiality can be justified by the active learning from a thoughtful and caring engagement with others. She explains: ‘A part of my consciousness is micro-cosmic: every microcosm explodes into a universe as a function of what you are asking, not because it is out there waiting to show the interesting intersections or borderlands or whatever. It is your own relationship with what it is that you care about that opens up the borderlands that are interesting (Haraway in Schneider, 2005: 116, 120). Any act of caring is considered to have the potential of making the knowledge agent more worldly, through the multiplication of connections which her/his engagement develops. Careful attentiveness to others, including other systems and life forms is a central value to good science. ‘As you care you change, and you are changed so that your questions change and your partners are different’ (Ibid: 120). Positioning thus implies a process of constant ethical revision of one’s relations towards others.

Positioning works together with ‘diffraction’ – defined as a method to record different patterns of knowing and seeing arising from the interactions with others, to track their impact on the course of the research process and note the subsequent understand-

---

4 A mode of existence involving multiple identities in a particular location can be the case of a woman of colour who has been trafficked across border for sex work, who is ‘rescued’ and detained while waiting for judicial decision on asylum or repatriation. Another mode involves the circulation between multiple locations of marginality as experienced by many trans-Saharan African nationals, who are in a semi-permanent transit status on their way to, and even when they reach, Europe. Each of these modes of marginality entails particular consequences for political economy, judicial systems and moral reasoning about inequality.
ings (Haraway, 2004). Whereas positioning serves to locate the knowledge agent relationally, diffraction serves to envisage the process of recording the knowledge developed. In her view interaction, interruption, difference, and possible discovery of novelty about affinity – rather than identity – produce the conditions for building coalitions.

Positioning and diffraction makes Haraway’s version of social constructivism distinct from Harding’s strong objectivity. It is characterised by a fuller notion of being “relational” shown as a choice of position to be directed by the sense of care (caring about and caring to know) which she thinks is more likely to lead to a sense of affinity as something to be gained rather than assumed. She also does not endorse a reduced understanding of empiricism as positivism and take distance from a teleological view regarding a pre-given value (such as epistemic democracy) as the determinant of transformative knowledge and change. In combining ethical, scientific and political concerns her proposal to interpret objectivity in terms of ‘situated knowledge’ gives consideration to agency of both the subject and the objects of knowledge. Agency is mutually implicated in an ongoing creation of new hybrids of knowledge as outcomes of the fusion of substantively different knowledge forms but capable of delivering more insightful explanations.

In the defence of empiricism, Nelson (1990; 1993) proposed a neo-empiricism that can avoid the implications of positivism. She draws on Quine’s (1951) ‘naturalistic’ empiricism built on the view that theories are bridges of the scientist’s own construction, constrained by their experience. All activities in knowledge-making and organizing science constitute a web of beliefs in which the distinction between ‘knowledge as discovered’ and ‘knowledge as a social construct’ is artificial. Endorsing the view of science as part of, rather detached from, society she extends Quine’s view on beliefs held by the scientists to those embedded in the institutional arrangements in scientific inquiry itself. Institutional arrangements of science, not just scientists, are under the influence of political, economic and epistemological factors, which in turn affect the theories produced. Feminist knowledge – regarded as an emergent web of knowledge in which networks of scientists function within male dominated institutional rules of power – occupies a lower position in the hierarchy of cognitive labour and authority. She coins this phenomenon as ‘androcentrism’ to avoid biological reductionism and takes into account recent research findings that show how ‘men’ and ‘women’ are neither exclusively biological nor social, but enormously plastic and complex (Nelson, 1993: 190). The sciences – particularly natural sciences – are no longer concerned with ultimate truths but with data that is corrigible and revisable to fit agreeably into the web of beliefs. Empiricism, she argues, must be understood as a theory of evidence –
distinct from empiricist accounts of science. In this respect, androcentrism (in methodology, categories, organizing principles) can be corrected since in the advancement of science male scientists cannot afford to remain blind to what feminist scientists have made visible. Acknowledging this, she advocates that feminist scientists should incorporate political views, including those shaped by, and those that are shaping the experiences of gender. They should contribute to theories based on evidence through critical assessment among communities of knowledge agents.

Longino (2002) suggests four governing norms for interaction in a knowledge community: (a) publicly recognized forums for criticism; (b) an uptake of criticism; (c) publicly recognized standards; (d) interaction in mutual respect (allowing for differences in intellectual capacity and equality of authority of judgement). Ackerly (2007) warns that deliberations within transnational feminism is far from these aspired norms since the language of feminism and gender is not shared, and unequal access to feminist space prevails. Politically driven consensus can also stifle marginal voices. Ackerly’s warning resonates the post-colonial perspective in which the acts of seeking knowledge about, and ethical engagements of its actors with ‘Third World’ subjects are treated critically at best, and with suspicion at worst.

Spivak (2005), for example, calls for vigilance and attention to self-implication and cautions about the dialectics of ‘self’ and ‘other’ that refers only to upper-class multiculturalism. In a socially differentiated and hierarchical world, intellectuals do not function outside geopolitical institutions that circumscribe their epistemic agency. Pursing the goal of removing epistemic injustice requires hyper self-reflexivity, critical narration and interpretation with accountability as regards the social realities scholars engage with (Kapoor, 2004). Referring to a specific group for whom epistemic injustice matters significantly, she calls attention to the specific meaning of the ‘Subaltern’ in Antonio Gramsci’s work, recorded by Ranajit Guha (Spivak, 2005). The term refers to ‘the space of difference inhabited by those who have no access to the lines of mobility within a society’, and emphasises a kind of class rather than identity – a class without political agency (but not necessarily without knowledge).

Spivak (2005: 311) asserts that the contemporary use of the term ‘subaltern’ in the light of diversity and diasporas has lost its meaning due to its conflation with identity. Urging scholars to revisit assumptions about epistemic responsibility, she points out the futility of responding to the silencing of the subaltern woman by representing that woman, or by presenting her as a speaking subject. Lacking of any class description, it is not possible for the new class of intellectuals to see class (like gender) as a social category that organises understanding and therefore cannot fully portray the subaltern subject. The impulse to rewrite the human, the body and the social figure (in rethinking

As Quine pointed out, modern empiricism has been conditioned by two dogmas. One is a belief in a fundamental cleavage between analytic truths – grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and synthetic truths – grounded in fact. The other is reductionism or the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct – upon terms which refer to immediate experience. In the social sciences, empiricist accounts are characterised by the tendency towards operationalism, the desire to objectify and quantify, the emphasis on correspondence rules, deductive certainty, empirical tightness, and so forth.

167
politics, agency and connection) appears to her as a strategy to undo particular narratives. In doing so, there is a tendency to retrieve information about layers of identities and transmogrify them into ‘subject’ with agency – as institutionally validated action. For this reason, she considers the act of deconstructing science in itself, as insufficient in safeguarding a political programme. It can only safeguard against generalisations about the ‘subject’ within the same paradigm of emancipation. Rather than rewriting, she purports that unlearning one’s privilege (as one’s loss) might be a better strategy since it opens up the mind for new creative possibility: rearranging one’s own desire to learn from the act of learning about, and with, others must be a deliberate position (Morton, 2007: 172).

Code’s (2008) approach to ecological thinking integrates feminist thoughts on situated knowledge, strong objectivity and post-colonialism to rework feminist naturalized empiricism through the language and practices of ecology. She proposes the concept of epistemic location which deepens the meanings of situated knowledge and standpoint to cover a wide set of things to be scrutinized and specified. Beyond the requirement to scrutinize the standpoint of the knower and the nature of the known, she proposes re-imaging subjectivities and specificities in regard to place, habitat, habitus and ethics. A terrain of inquiry is constitutive of, not just context for, the background against which enactments of interpretation occur (Code, 2006:199). It is always in practice empirically-informed, specifically situated, and locally interpretive. The responsibility of knowledge agents is to question themselves as their own ‘objects’ of knowledge: how they come to acquire a given understanding, and how they learn about, and negotiate across and through the epistemic terrain to address issues of diversity and particularity. New norms of reliable and responsible knowledge requires the principle of cohabitability to be achieved by strong reflexivity, negotiation and careful selection of methods that can live well together, forging an alliance against destructive aspects of power hierarchies in knowledge systems and institutions. Code’s notions of epistemic responsibility and epistemic virtue resonate of Spivak’s post-colonial critique, which directs thinking towards analyses of ethico-politics as a dimension internal to the knowledge agent.

As Wylie (2006: 7) observes, the expansion of the scope ‘the social’ encompasses feminist epistemology has shed light on the forms of epistemic diversity that track power and institutional conditions that have the capacity to systemically suppress dissenting voices. Addressing these social dimensions of knowledge would require the refinement of models of the deliberative as well as the kinds of empirical research that illuminate the group dynamics, patterns of social inequality, and institutional conditions that generate epistemic diversity and structure its reception. Reflecting on Thayer-Bacon’s (1999) use of the metaphor of quilting to define constructive thinking as a trans-active socio-political process, in which knowledge agents need to establish a common language to work together to produce something purposeful and of value, we may consider feminist debates on social epistemology as a process of quilt making, in which work may have been hampered by different understandings of empiricism. Far from being distinctive blocks, feminist approaches to knowledge (empiricism, stand-
point, post-modernism and post-colonialism) have transformed one another through their interaction, and in turn is transforming the fabric of feminist social epistemology. Attention to practices of co-learning in the making of a responsible knowledge agent may help to achieve a form of knowledge that can express the holistic character of knowing about ‘self’ and ‘other’ in a model that replaces the image of the solitary knowledge agent with a relational and caring one.

III Quilting Gender into ‘Security’ and ‘Development’

Gender matters have been implicit in security and development concerns, but have been written through the male eyes. A policy field and a domain of knowledge, ‘development’ emerged at the end of World War II within the agenda of international cooperation for peace as one of the two main set of issues: (a) control over the arms race (nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction), (b) promotion of ‘modernisation’ – the economic and social development of post-colonial societies – conceived as instrumental in achieving peace. In a bifurcated world dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States, the meaning of ‘security’ was fragmented through administration: foreign policy was divorced from policy related to international political economy. This gave rise to two separate fields of study – security and development. Security studies are concerned with the rationale for or against war; development studies with the rationale of modernisation. Bipolar writing depicted the global order as ‘free’ versus ‘communist’ worlds – each one hustling for the reigning position – obliterating any significant alternative meanings. In the modernisation model the ‘modern’ is counterpoised with the ‘traditional’. Tradition is treated as a residue of history expected gradually to vanish in the linear progression towards an ideal system of the ‘free world’. In the communist model ‘collective interests’ were counterpoised with ‘individual interests’ – the later being treated as a historical feature of capitalism expected to disappear in a linear progression towards a classless society. Both systems adopted a mechanical worldview in which the human subject is treated as a fairly fixed and stable element whose desires and identities can be moulded for the greater good of the respective social projects.

Gender was written within the capitalist vision of equality as a distinction between ‘instrumental’ and ‘expressive’ qualities of being males and females. Gender difference justifies the social roles assigned to each gender as being natural (Parson and Bales, 1955). By contrast, gender was written in the communist vision of social equality as sameness: something primary to the aspiration of a classless society. The efforts of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) set up after 1945, combined with three decades of agitation by feminists from different political strands, galvanised a new consciousness to change the above visions and the status they ascribed to gender.

6 For example Mao Zedong’s famous slogan ‘women hold half of the sky’.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was adopted in 1979; continuous attempts to give substance to women’s rights have revealed the fallacy of ‘impartiality’ in structures of governance and assumptions about ‘tradition’ as being historical residues. The six decades of women’s engagement with the United Nations have to some extent transformed the practises of development agencies in all domains of gender justice: work, health, education and gender-based violence (Jain, 2005). But the discrepancy between the world of legal rights and the world of social positioning remains a challenge. Feminist scholars have shown how social identities (gender and ethnicity) and class position pre-structure the conditions of entry to a political community and the market, and ‘traditions’ – deeply embedded in cognitive structures – bestow institutions their power of consequences (Agosin, 2001).

Various aspects of these problems were raised in critiques of ‘development as modernisation paradigm’ emerged in the 1970s. Arising from concerns about the interplay of culture, gender and international political economy, this critique sought to reveal the social positions of women as agents of change in the development process. In 1985, a collective – Development Alternatives with Women in a New Era (DAWN) – presented a manifesto which put forward a definition of ‘development’ as constituted by evolving systems characterized by intrinsic violence causing multi-layered crises in social reproduction (Sen and Crown, 1987). The manifesto posited the thesis that gender issues in ‘development’ are embedded in a broader context of cumulative violence growing out of priorities given to trade (both national and international) rather than to security in daily life. The consequent degrading impacts on both rural and urban environments were triggering new and complex poverty-generating processes. These in turn caused a deepening of social divisions and an intensifying of oppression by way of transferring the burdens of production adjustments and costs on to specific groups: women of the working poor. Women’s protest and resistance had led to states exerting their disciplinary powers with increased militarization. The manifesto called for qualitative change in social relations and improved interaction between all the levels of society – household, community, market, state and inter-state. A wholesale reduction in military expenditure was demanded to divert resources into more socially oriented activities. An emphasis on women as agents of change brought to the fore their capacity of seeing and acting on gender-based issues of justice in arenas of power at different levels.

Critique of the DAWN manifesto has been directed at its structuralist understanding of gender and its assumption about homogeneity of women’s interests which does not give sufficient attention to how gender identities are articulated through diverse discourses and structures of inequalities (Marchand and Papart, 1995). Women’s actual experience, consciousness and organisational strategies are often neither predictable, nor reducible to any single aspect gender oppression (Chhachhi and Pittin, 1996). A

7 This manifesto emerged from consultations among women’s grass-root organisations in several regions in the ‘developing’ world (Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean).
continuing thread in DAWN’s is to be found in Enloe’s (1989) insights on the link between ‘development’ and ‘militarization.’ She places the social construction of masculinities and femininities within the connection between export-oriented growth strategies and security issues and demonstrates how the presence of military bases in developing countries coincided with direct foreign investment (in light industries, agribusiness and tourism). The masculine ideal of the warrior is to be found in a continuum of protector, conqueror and exploiter of the feminine and feminised ‘Other’. Enloe (2000) shed more light on militarization as a gradual process through which something becomes controlled by – depending on, or deriving its value from – the military and militaristic criteria. In masculine-dominated societies, this subtle process encroaches on civil institutions and social space, hence clear-cut distinctions between the two domains of the civil and the military may well be a fallacy.

Post-colonial scholars have demonstrated the link between masculinity and military force in the forging of a homogenised national entity. Wieringa (1996), for example, analysed how the inscriptions of social constructs of sexuality, gender, class and ethnicity in the nationalist discourses in Indonesia during the creation of the New Order led by Suharto (backed by the foreign policy of the United States) were consciously crafted into a strategy to destroy the socialist-inspired women’s organization. The triangulation of power – between gender construction plus the sexualisation of women’s identity at one angle, and state and nation at the other two angles – provided the legitimacy both for brutal acts against the corporal and personal dignity of members of this organisation, and the social marginalization of survivors. In the case of ‘miracles of development’ within those countries aspiring to catch up with the West, the conflation of national identity, modernisation and industrial competitiveness was built on the cultural construct of gender in those value-systems present in families, communities, firms, and states (Truong, 1999). Furthermore, in order to ensure policy success, security agreements had been made between allies, which involved the sexualization of women’s identities and covert organization of commercial sex as a necessity for employees of the security apparatus (Truong, 1990; Moon, 1997). Such social experiences confirm the more general historical continuity of masculinity. As Rai (2002) has clearly demonstrated, emasculated norms of nationalist responses have been woven into anti-colonial struggles and nationalist agendas. National strategies of ‘development’ have mostly tended to reinforce gender inequalities and produce complex intersecting power structures of class, gender and ethnic identities that cannot be easily accommodated by the language of gender equality.

Feminist scholars concerned with gender issues in global political economy, have revealed how neo-liberal structural reforms introduced in the 1980s has been guided by a body of knowledge built from androcentric, middle-class and ‘productive-age’ standpoints and has ‘naturalised’ specific activities central to quotidian issues of security – found for instance in caring relations within the social economy (Young, 2003), and in maintaining the balance in ecological relations. This has sidelined the value of such activities in national and global accounting systems, and excluded them from planning processes (Beneria, 2003; Elson, 2002). Spike Peterson (2003) shows how
neo-liberal reforms have led to the rise of finance-driven decision-making processes along with increased fragmentation and flexibilisation of labour which together have forged complex and transnational circuits of integration between productive, reproductive and virtual economies. Analyses of contemporary processes of economic re-structuring are giving significance to changing boundaries of institutional responsibilities for care provisioning and services. Activities in this crucial but invisible domain – the coined appellation being ‘the care economy’ – involve both paid and unpaid work. Being both purchasable (under a variety of arrangements) and/or subsidized, services in the care economy straddle public and private domains; contraction in one type of arrangement affects another. Care deficits in industrialised countries arose from a convergence of factors such as the increased percentage of elderly persons, the withdrawal of state subsidies for caring activities, and the introduction of the new ‘workfare’ regime by which employment rather than the state provides the basis for social entitlements (Razavi, 2006). The emergence of global ‘care’ chains – with migrant women from low-income countries as care providers – caters to the ‘care deficits’ in high-income countries. Per pro migrants’ remittances, care for dependents in their countries of origin is sustained and the burdens of any debt crises therein are eased. Gender, ethnicity, and age influence relations of labour in global care chains as well as differential treatment by employers and by the state (Chang, 2000; Sassen, 2003). Inequalities of race, gender, class, and nations have interacted in ways that are now part of the scaffold supporting the ideals of neo-liberal globalisation.

Contributions to the study of intra- and inter-state conflicts by feminist scholars on conflict studies have highlighted how gender underpins a war system and how rape can be used as a tool to destroy the manliness of the ‘Other’ with humanitarian implications (Farwell, 2004; Hutchings, 2000). The nexus between militarization and masculinity can also result in violence against men and boys who are deemed to be the protagonist ‘Other’. Selective targeting of males – based on their ethnicity, sexual orientations, religious affinity – for massacre, sexual abuse or forced recruitment in armed conflicts – is a special issue which confronts the hegemonic understanding of gender violence being coincidental with violence against women (Carpenter, 2002; 2006). Conventional security studies conducted within the binary understanding of gender are likely to produce non-congruent definitions of gender-based rights and, thus, disadvantage those who do not fit such established categorisations. A focus on women as individuals with rights to protection – though necessary in view of the depth and scale of violence facing them during protracted conflicts and crisis situations – is insufficient to address the deeper seeds and the subsequent manifestations of violence. Multiple processes of gendering and the re-configuration of social divisions have produced complex terrains of power in which systematic abuse no longer fits the clear-cut framework of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’.

The discursive changes within UN organisations and governmental agencies to respond to these problems are based on an a-historical and a-political understanding of gender. This understanding classifies gender under the rubric of women’s rights, gender mainstreaming and women’s empowerment, and has limited relevance to women
(and men) positioned at an intersection of axes of social power. The tendency to write ‘gender’ in the planning machinery without sufficient contextual understanding of its meaning can reinforce experiences of social exclusion resulting from gender identities which do not fit the templates of planners. Issues of participation and representation can acquire instrumental values and therefore can become socially meaningless at best, oppressive at worst (Saunders, 2002). Viewing ‘development’ and ‘security’ from diverse feminist epistemological perspectives reveals the many circuits of power that connect the two domains and how their administrative separation at national and international levels are more virtual than real.

To recapitulate, critical writing into the knowledge about ‘development’ and ‘security’ has produced what may be considered as another outcome of ‘quilting’ among diverse communities of knowledge agents. The craft of quilting involves the handling of differences in texture and form; differences are not necessarily discerned on the basis of a-priori conceptions but require a full engagement with the materials to sense, feel and see how they may fit together in small patches, which then – when assembled – allow the broader patterns to emerge (Flannery, 2001). These contributions have come from diverse feminist knowledge networks, drawing insights from different streams of feminist epistemology and motivated by a common concern about the contemporary unjust word order.

**IV Human Security and the Ontology of Care**

Built on a ‘relational ontology’ care offers an alternate understanding of social reality. It posits that the constitution of each and every entity in the human-scale reality is made up of a nexus of relationships, and all entities have a shared being and a mutual constitution. Caring for the self in this regard also means an openness to ‘otherness’, to that something that cannot be totally dominated and controlled, nor made to acquire features of the ‘self’ – otherwise there is no one with whom to have a relationship (Slife, 2005: 159, 167).

Aspects of a relational ontology on matters of security at the international level are to be found in the Brandt Commission Report (Independent Commission on International Development, 1980). The report envisaged the crisis at the end of the 20th century as one in which state and inter-state institutions have failed to address human deprivation, the spread of disease, environmental stress, political repression and the arms race. The ‘inevitability’ of a crisis required an understanding of ‘security’ which goes beyond the sovereign rights of a government, to include both the multiple referents of security – institutions, communities and persons – and the relationships that link them. Achieving people-centred security (human security) is defined as a collective endeavour, which must recognise the significance of the quality of relations between nations, citizens and their part in the ecosystems. The report brought to the fore the multi-dimensional and interconnected character of vulnerability of human beings and their societies, albeit restricted to relations between nation-states. Re-reading the Report in
the light of the ongoing contributions to the fields of human development, human rights and human security reveals a historical continuity of ideas along with fuller understanding of both the role of institutions and the ‘social’ as a multi-layered entity. In a globalized world, the ‘social’ transcends the boundaries of nation-states and demands a corresponding conception of ‘justice’.

Work on a normative account of human development began in the late 1980s as a joint effort between two South Asian male economists, Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen. The American feminist philosopher Martha Nussbaum joined the team in the 1990s. This enterprise – sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme – began with a conceptual framework for human development, the main goal of which is to build a human-centred parameter for the assessment of development impacts in order to re-orient policy. Its concept of human development extends the meaning beyond the rise or fall of national incomes to include the social, political and cultural environments which foster (or obstruct) people’s capability to develop their full potential and to lead productive and creative lives in accord with what they themselves value. It seeks those meanings of development that are more reflective of human lives (Gasper, 2004). The Human Development Annual Report (first launched in 1990) provides a yearly worldwide assessment of the major dimensions of wellbeing: health, education, employment and longevity. The concept of Human Security was first introduced in the 1994 Human Development Annual Report and became more finely tuned in the following years. Endorsement of the concept of human security galvanised efforts by policy makers and civic organisations to draw up and act upon specific forms of direct violence and insecurity, such as landmines, recruitment of child soldiers and trade in small arms. This endorsement also led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court. In 1999, a Human Security Network was launched composed of 12 like-minded countries, as well as activists and scholars. The goal was to establish an informal and flexible mechanism to bring a ‘human security perspective’ to bear on political processes aimed both at preventing or solving conflicts and at promoting peace and development. Japan and Canada – in 1998 and 2000 respectively – took the bold step of trying to make human security the defining characteristic of their foreign policy. The former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, instituted a Commission on Human Security (co-chaired by Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata) whose report released in 2003 has resulted in a permanent UN Advisory Board on Human Security.

8 The 1994 report defines the major dimensions of human security as follows: (a) economic security: the ability of a government to assure every individual a minimum requisite income; (b) food security: guaranteed physical and economic access to basic nutrition; (c) health security: guaranteed a minimum protection from disease; (d) environmental security: protection from short- and long-term ravages of nature and from human-made deterioration of the natural environment; (e) personal security: protection from physical violence – whether from external states, or internal sources of violence including abuse in personal relations; (f) community security: the protection from loss of traditional relationships and values, also from sectarian and ethnic violence; (g) political security: receipt of full respect for basic human rights.

9 Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, and Thailand. South Africa participated as an observer.
The prominence of the Human Security concept is growing in different regions. In the European Union there is increasing recognition that the security of European citizens cannot be separated from human security elsewhere in the world, and that contribution to global human security on the part of the Union is exigent (Glasius, and Kaldor, 2006). The nexus between climate change, human security and violent conflicts has recently been brought to the fore, with a realisation that intersections between different social dimensions of vulnerability – such as fragile livelihoods, poverty, weak states and large-scale migration to neighbouring areas – can indeed provoke violent conflicts (Barnett and Adger, 2007).

The contributions of Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (1995; 2000) gave a fuller understanding of human development from the perspective of moral theories based a species-specific concept of capabilities. Nussbaum links the articles of the Universal Bill of Rights with 10 basic capabilities,\(^\text{10}\) clearly stating her commitment to make the nation-state and inter-state institutions more accountable. Sen does not commit himself to such classification and prefers to keep the definition of human capabilities as a process of deliberative democracy (Gasper, 2005; Truong, 2006). Sen’s silence on which capabilities matter the most is puzzling for many. Giri (2000) points out that Sen’s concept of human development omits an ontological striving for a deep conceptualisation of self and self-realisation in which the meaning of ‘development as freedom’ needs to be accompanied by the meaning of ‘development as responsibility’. A more friendly reading of Sen’s work on human security would suggest that he seeks a more apposite conception of the ‘social’ in which human subjects have ‘plural affiliations’: a conception which perhaps demands a corresponding conception of ‘justice’ and ‘responsibility’. The notion of ‘plural affiliations’ would seem to require a historical dimension to be made explicit. Sen (2001) distinguishes between international equity and global equity; the former referring to just and fair relations between nations as aggregates; the latter to just and fair practices by diverse institutions operating across borders (firms and business, social groups and political organisations, non-governmental organisations of different types). These institutions have to face issues of purpose, relevance and propriety – issues that cannot be dissociated from concerns of justice (and responsibility). The contributions of these institutions to human capabilities and freedoms need to be subject to evaluation. Sen (2001) seems to suggest a multi-level approach to matters of global justice. This will need placing the social practice of all institutions operating across borders in their contextual boundaries, vetting the values they hold and the legitimacy of their actions and outcomes. Taking this route would require more specificity on issues such as the level, the actors, the evaluator and standards appropriate to the assessment of security enhancement and human fulfilment. It requires an understanding on how any combination of the seven components of human security are intermeshed to produce a specific situation that threatens (or protects) the vital core of human lives.

\(^{10}\) These 10 are: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; relations with other species; play; control over one’s environment at the political and material levels.
There is a great degree of resonance between feminist critiques of development, ecological thinking and the type of reasoning in the ‘Human Security’ discourse – notably in its shift of security concerns from the state to society, and the emphasis on democratisation to build a meaningful commitment towards universal well-being. Concerns about the narrow understanding of group rights and a singular understanding of identity require security concerns to be more epistemologically grounded and rooted in particular geo-political contexts (Hudson, 2005; Hyndman, 2004). The demand for such ‘situated’ understanding and action does not imply a whole rejection of universal norms, rather, a more reflexive approach to: (a) the existing institutions; (b) their contextual performance; and (c) their capacity to improve on human development and security goals.

In this vein, the ethics of care can strengthen a rationale of a vision on human security which accords significance to diversity, particularity and context (Gasper and Truong, 2009). One important example is Hutchings’ (2000) application of care ethics to international relations. Acknowledging that care discourses as deeply tainted by gender constructs – conflating acts of caring as they do with the female identity, and given dominant use of the male prototype as the benchmark to validate ethical judgements, she shows how care ethics do not blend well with the accepted value of ‘universality of rights’. Informed by conception of a ‘fixed and stable subject’ rights, discourses tend to marginalise care as streams of thought in global affairs – except in humanitarian intervention. Yet care ethics can show how the virtual dichotomy of violent and non-violent means of international intervention is problematic. For example, from the lens of care the gendered effects of ‘non-violent’ economic sanctions would appear capable of provoking more profound forms of violence since they undermine quotidian security and turn violence inward without any external physical force. Likewise, ‘rape as a crime against humanity’ can be non-transformative, since it is build on a given understanding of the gender of the offenders and victims, and is considered a crime only in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups. The hegemonic meanings ascribed to ‘violence’, ‘non-violence’, ‘rape’ in international intervention can benefit from deepening the understanding of characteristics of a particular condition of its occurrence, and that of its judgement, which can help correct and/or challenges the fixed nature of moral assumptions. Care ethics in this regard would appeal to intuitiveness and self-reflexivity in understanding and judging to identify an injustice stemming from institutional rigidity which fails to recognise gendered power relations within a particular structure and decision making process (Hutchings, 2000). In other words, a justice system should be able to interrogate itself to arrive at careful judgements (or to practice care as reflexivity and prudence in judging).

Engster (2007) takes a rather different track and seeks to integrate care ethics with political theory. He departs from an acknowledgement that inter-dependence is a realist view of humanity, meaning to say, care giving and care receiving have evolved as universal and permanent features of human society. Engster echoes Hutchings in demonstrating how Western political theories are deeply gendered and therefore create
a dichotomy between ‘particularistic’ care and ‘universal’ justice. He offers a notion of care that has aligned with natural law theory where he demonstrates that the responsibility to give care facilitates the most basic goals in life (survival, development, and basic functioning). Bringing care back into the realm of moral reasoning is imperative because its erosion has the potential to generate chaos and anarchy. Engster offers a ‘rational theory of obligation’ within his theory of care, defined as one which goes beyond the dominant practice of provision for one’s immediate group. It seeks to produce collective caring arrangements that address the needs of a society. This obligation is grounded neither on sympathy nor compassion, but on the fact of interdependence. Care theory in Engster’s view can serve as a minimal capabilities theory, because it does place emphasis on human needs – and to some extent tallies with the theory of justice advanced by Nussbaum – although he resists her listing of capabilities as being too closely linked with the Western model of democracy and calls for greater flexibility to account for cultural diversity. Generally, care theory calls for public support to sustain a flexible and decentralised approach to caring activities, which maximises the particularity of context and allows the space for individuals to determine how they may arrange care in ways that can protect their ‘autonomy’.

Baker et al (2004) treat dependency and autonomy as different moments in the human life cycle rather than binary opposites, and offer a model of an egalitarian society. In their view an egalitarian society must pay attention to: (a) equality in economic relations and access to resources; (b) equality in the social and cultural domains: systems of communication, interpretation and representation (media, education, the churches) ensuring equality of respect and recognition of differences; (c) equality of power in both public and private institutions (formal politics, governing boards, work committees, family/personal relations); and (d) equality in affective relationships (being able to receive and provide on equal terms love, care, and solidarity which operate at different sites – personal relationships, work relations, community and associational relations). Affective equality integrates concepts of autonomy and interdependency with our understanding of equality and ‘citizenship’; it recognises the citizen as an economic, social, cultural and political actor as well as a universal caregiver and care recipient. These contributions show the acknowledgement of a ‘relational ontology’ present both in the writing on human security and care, although the degree of depth of being ‘relational’ may differ. In the human security discourses, the notion of ‘relational’ is still restricted to how separate entities are linked together and not necessarily how the constitution of each and every entity is dialectically linked. Feminist discussions on care are directed at a deeper level of being, inclusive of, but going beyond institutions, to address also care in the process of ‘subjectivation’ – or the making of the subject as a caring subject. Recognizing mutual constitution or how the ‘self’ is to be also found in ‘others’ and the ‘others’ in ‘self’ is necessary for a cognitive alliance against dominant meanings of security to be possible.
V Conclusion

By deepening the dimension of the social in epistemology from a gender perspective, feminist scholars have provided an opportunity to reflect on the role of care in real lives and in epistemic interactions, and how the values of care (attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness) can help create new pathways of understanding the social world. Care, when free from the constraints of gender as a binary construct, can show its wider relevance for social transformation built on an affinity among humans, and between them and other life forms. Institutional rigidity that fails to fully honour this affinity and accept the changes required to achieve a more secure and sustainable future can benefit from Rolin’s ideas of contextual epistemic justification which calls into question the credibility of formerly accepted assumptions on harms and benefits, and place these justifications on a given scale of social and ecological disharmony. Haraway’s notion of diffraction and Spivak’s concept of hyper self-reflexivity – though articulated from different standpoints – may be understood as the recognition of different types and moments of ‘awakening’ through an open attitude in epistemic interaction and the recognition of other possibilities of knowing. The work of Code would underline caring in the relations between different knowledge systems and promote a type of schooling that emphasize mutual respect for co-operation and co-learning. Understanding of care and security can be integrated if the schooling of the knowledge agents would be attentive to the value of openness, relationality and epistemic humility.

References:


Non-‘White’ Whites, Non-European Europeans and Gendered Non-Citizens: On A Possible Epistemic Strategy from the Semiperiphery of Europe

Marina Blagojevic

Introduction: ‘Strategic silence’ about the semiperiphery

‘Is Serbia, according to UN discourse, on the South or on the North?’
(M.B. question to UNDP representative in Belgrade, Serbia, June 2007).
‘It is on the East.’ (UNDP representative, smiling).

After much optimism in the beginning of the 90s that ‘the transition’ will create a logical catching-up with Western democracies, a new wave of skepticism is taking place. In the light of the present global financial crises, those initial assumptions seem naive and misleading. This chapter will focus on knowledge construction about women and gender in the countries which are usually denoted as Eastern European Countries, Central European and South-Eastern European countries, and also on the knowledge construction about the countries themselves. Definitions and classifications are conflicting among themselves, showing how the symbolic geographies are extremely dynamic, borders of inclusions and exclusions are changing, resulting from the definitions mainly applied from the ‘outside’ (Wolff, 1994; Todorova, 1997; Bjelic and Savic, 2002). Regardless of the fact that some countries from the semiperiphery are already EU members, and others are in different stages of the accession process, the fact remains, that these countries are more similar than different (Antohi and Tismaneanu, 2000). If their geostrategic position, namely their closeness to western EU borders, is ignored as an important factor in the dynamics of accession, it becomes even clearer how their developmental characteristics, with few exceptions, cluster them together (Blagojevic, 2003).

Although East European countries experienced in many spheres of social life a process of de-development, those costs were largely ignored or pushed aside, or simply treated as ‘necessary’. Countries in “transition” were faced with increased social insecurity, decreased social protection and stability, increased crime and violence, population crises, increased mortality, and even ‘barbarization’ through violent conflicts (Antohi and Tismaneanu, 2000; Poznanski, 2000; Verdery, 2000; Stiglitz, 2003; Mundiju-Pipidi and Krashev, 2004). While economic indicators might have improved, the change of the social climate and feelings of loss were, and still are, present for much of the population (Nations in Transit, 2004).

The losers of the transition have been many, and the losses were highly gendered (Gal and Kligman, 2000a; Blagojevic, 2003). Both men and women were the losers,

1 I would like to express my thanks to the Ministry of Science Republic of Serbia and to the Institute for Criminological and Sociological Research, Belgrade, for financial support.
but in different ways. Some feminist research studies in the mid 1990s have identified different sources and aspects of this process of social regress, but since these studies are mainly based on qualitative methodology, they did not succeed in convincing development planners or global decision makers (Gal and Kligman, 2000b; Jahnert et al. 2001). Some demographic data, on the other hand, did show the high human costs due to the chaos of the transition, but due to the nature of their collection, processing and dissemination, these issues were disregarded. Although one can put the blame on the absence of data, absence of research, or simply delayed ‘discoveries’ of the evidence, another explanation is equally valid. Namely, it could be inferred that there was a kind of a ‘strategic silence’ about gender and economic policy (Bakker, 1994).

The major blame throughout the 1990s for the worsening of women’s conditions was put on traditional patriarchal values, regressive ideologies, communist failed promises, and a conservative climate, while the influence of structural adjustment was treated as secondary, and as highly necessary (Gal and Kligman, 2000a; 2000b). However, already in the 80s, even before the transition of the communist countries of Eastern Europe had started, it was evident that there was no simple connection between development and gender equality, and that the first does not necessarily benefit the second. Still, this knowledge has not been integrated into the policy recommendations for the countries entering into “transition” in the 1990s.

While the communist institutions were collapsing together with the welfare state, a void was created which additionally disempowered those who were already marginalized, in particular women. The fact that the main employees in the education and health sectors were women and accepted to maintain these sectors while being severely underpaid, enabled the extraction of their resources in an unprecedented way (Blagojevic, 2003). Women in countries in the transition became ‘survival agents’, both in private and in public spheres.

Not only that the semiperiphery is veiled by a ‘strategic silence’ about the impact of macro-economic policies on gender relations, the role of the semiperiphery itself is ‘strategically silenced’. The semiperiphery almost does not have a name, neither is it theorized. The lack of a name, of a label, is in fact creating repeatedly its invisibility and decreasing its negotiable power in the global context. In cultural studies, the problem of Eastern Europe, as being ‘semi’, has been explored (Kovacevic, 2008), but it has not been connected to the very mechanism of neoliberal globalization. Economic and political issues of the semiperiphery have been simply integrated into the ‘global picture’, or into EU enlargement discourse, and reduced mainly to crude economic and demographic indicators. The semiperiphery has not been recognized by any official discourse practiced by the major international players. It is classified as either North or South, depending on some formal criteria (EU Enlargement). Gender policies, donors, activities, even the stakeholders are defined depending on the stage in which the country is situated in the continuum of former-communist (Global South) – future European (Global North) (Blagojevic, 2003). The representation of the semiperiphery is through the geographical region or through the status of countries in relation to the
EU. In other words, there is almost no effort to deal with the specificities of the semi-periphery as part of the world which has some substantive characteristics of its own. In a paradoxical way, gender issues in postcommunist countries have been an object of interest to gender scholars from the West since the early 1990s. However, the theoretical approach was not well developed, or it was biased since the transition was treated as a unilinear (progressive) development and logical consequence of globalization. Even the so called ‘East-West feminist debate’ with Eastern scholars trying to articulate their voice of difference (Weiner, 2004; Wohrer, 2004), did not lead to a clearly articulated theoretical position on differences about gender at the semiperiphery and at the core. Before gender in the semiperiphery can be analyzed, it is essential to understand what is the meaning of the semiperiphery in structural terms.

In the first part of the paper, I argue that the semiperiphery is undertheorized, and its differences both in relation to the core and periphery are underestimated or ignored, partly due to the self-colonizing tendency of the semiperiphery itself. In the second part of the text, I will discuss the necessity for different knowledge paradigms and the negative consequences for gender policies are highlighted. Different indicators used for measuring the social, economic or human development criteria tend to hide rather than reveal the existing gap in the quality of social realities between the core and the semiperiphery. The discourse on gender at the semiperiphery was shaped within the transition paradigm which was itself a stereotype of the unilinear progressive development discourse. In reality, however, many regressive tendencies, or de-development, took place, intensifying diachronities (pre-modern, modern and post-modern elements) and hybridization of the semiperiphery. Since there are obvious limitations of the knowledge created in the core and by the core, it is argued in the third part that an adequate epistemic strategy is one which fully acknowledges the difference of the semiperiphery and reveals how that difference is related to the core. The fourth part discusses the major epistemic challenge for the use of the semiperiphery as a standpoint, focusing on the discursive void of the semiperiphery. The semiperiphery thinks about itself through the concepts which are being imported, and it observes itself through the eyes of others. The alternative is to address the epistemic and discursive void by reflecting on experiences of women subjects living at the semiperiphery. Finally, a double epistemic strategy is advocated: reaffirmation of the semiperiphery as an epistemic standpoint, and reaffirmation of gender as ‘ontology as epistemology’, which means that ‘gender as epistemology is also ontology’ (Wickramasinghe, 2006). Within this double strategy, the epistemic advantage of the semiperiphery could fill this discursive void, which would affirm the relevance of the specific experiences of the semiperiphery and encourage its theoretization.
The semiperiphery: More Life than a Construct

“Yugoslavia was too good an example, therefore it needed to be destroyed”.
(Zarana Papic, feminist from Belgrade, in personal conversation)

The semiperiphery has several crucial characteristics that are different both from the core and the periphery, although this very classification is subject to change and intensely drifting cartography, especially in the context of the present overall economic and financial crises (Wallerstein, 1979; Arrighi, 1985; Wallerstein, 1991; Roncevic, 2002; Adam at al, 2005). Ignoring the differences and pushing the semiperiphery either to the core or the periphery, not only sustains distortions, but, through inadequate policies, creates in addition many invisible, underconceptualized losses and losers (Verderdery, 2000; Poznanski, 2000).

The semiperiphery is essentially shaped by the effort to catch up with the core, and to resist the integration into the core, so as not to lose its cultural characteristics. This creates a paradox in the very identity of the semiperipheral nations, since it is not simply a one-directional ‘colonization’, as much as it is a ‘desire of the West’ and the ‘self-colonizing tendency’ of the semiperiphery, as observed by Kovacevic:

“Because of Eastern Europe’s direct geographic, political and cultural proximity to Western Europe and indirectly, to North America, its acceptance of Western models has, overall, been far smoother, more voluntary and more urgently executed than in other colonial locales. In fact, it is this voluntary – and largely unrecognized – self-colonizing tendency vis-à-vis the West which distinguishes Eastern Europe from other targets of Western colonialism” (Kovacevic, 2008: 5)

The semiperiphery is in its essence transitional, in a process of the transition from one set of structures to another set of structures, and therefore it is unstable, and often has characteristics of the void, chaos, or the structurelessness. The instability of the semiperiphery comes from the fact that it is open to two different set of possibilities at the same time: those coming from the center, and those coming from the periphery. It can turn into the one or the other almost at any moment, and its dominant state is most often one of ‘wobble’. This is in many ways reflected in its political life, which is continually confronted with both types of forces: those that advocate ‘modernisation’, ‘Westernization’, or nowadays ‘globalization’, and those which oppose change in the name of tradition (or, more precisely, pragmatic interpretation of tradition) and advocate isolation or autarchy. Being between the core and the periphery opens up an almost third dimension of the semiperiphery, a kind of unintelligible, chaotic condition. The semiperiphery often finds itself in a condition of ‘permanent reform’, which in reality means that one reform is following the other while the previous has not been finalized, nor its effects explored. Those reforms are repeatedly aimed at ‘modernisation’, and they imitate or follow the models from the core. But implemented at the semiperiphery, they necessarily produce different effects in these countries (Poznanski, 2000; Verdery, 2000).

Profound or even innovative social change in the semiperiphery is often doomed to failure even when it is, or exactly because it is, progressive and ‘revolutionary’. Former
Yugoslavia with its developed welfare state, the high level of guarantees and protection of minority rights, the ‘social ownership’ project, industrial ‘self-management’, balanced federal set up, strong involvement and leadership in the nonalignment movement, openness to the East and West, North and South, strong promotion of peace and security on the international level, and strong support of women’s rights, locally and internationally, etc. was in many ways ‘more modern’ than the restrictive position of the country at the semiperiphery could allow it to be. (Blagojevic, 2010).

In comparison to the core, the semiperiphery is in a condition of ‘being different, but not being different enough’. This results in an attitude of the core which is reflected in a constant effort to ‘improve’ the semiperiphery, through paternalistic behavior, with colonial and neocolonial aspects. We-know-what-is-good-for-you-because-we-have-already-done-it-philosophy resonates in most of the core-semiperiphery communication, as is also visible in accession ‘conditionality’ logic. From the perspective of the core, the semiperiphery is always ‘lagging behind’ and it needs to be ‘updated’, exposed to the newest knowledge, skills and inventions which have ‘just’ been created in the center and which are being ready for export, or selling on the international ‘know-how’ market. As Arrighi (1985) had argued already in the 1980s, the relevant distinction between societies is not the one based on the production of industrial versus primary goods, but between ‘intellectual’ activities (i.e. those that involve strategic decision-making, control and administration, R&D, etc.) and ‘executive’ activities.

From the perspective of the periphery, the semiperiphery is ‘different and not similar enough’. The semiperiphery is ‘too white’, too industrial, too developed and it does not share the colonial experience, at least not in the sense of how the concept is mostly used when referring to the ‘South’. This is why, in feminist activist circles, where hierarchisation of victimhood is still very much alive, coalitions between women from the semiperiphery and the women from the periphery seem to fail repeatedly.

The image that the semiperiphery has about itself is largely reflecting the impression of ‘lagging behind’. However, from the perspective of the Eastern European semiperiphery, it is itself ‘European’, but it is often described as more ‘oriental’ or ‘nesting Orientalisms’ (Bakic Hayden, 1995). As argued by Kovacevic, Eastern Europeans feel not to be ‘quite there’ and they feel themselves to be “more like semi-European, semi-developed, with semi-functioning states and semi-civilized manners” (Kovacevic, 2008:3). The semiperiphery usually addresses itself and describes itself as being ‘in-between’ the East and the West. This ‘in-betweeness’ has numerous local interpretations and meanings. However, this ‘melting pot’ quality of the semiperiphery can easily be tracked in all spheres of social, political and especially everyday life, where different civilisational layers are still active and in interplay.

Because of the essential quality of structurelessness, chaos, void, transition and reform as ongoing processes, the scientific analysis of the semiperiphery often slips away from a framework of rational discourse which is characteristic of the scientific discourse. Dealing with the semiperiphery should imply not only scrutinized judgments to ensure that statements reflecting colonial or neocolonial feelings of some ‘civilisational superiority’ are avoided, but also, a different epistemic approach.
While structural analysis might be of great value where structures and stability prevail, in the case of the semiperiphery it is the search for the nucleus of social change which is at issue. The lack of system-based determinism which arises as a consequence of a structural void being reflected in the ‘epistemic void’ (Ivekovic, 1993) creates different epistemic challenges. This is the main reason why the semiperiphery cannot simply rely on a theoretical framework created by the core and then just ‘add’ local examples (Blagojevic, 2006).

The epistemic consequences of these ontological characteristics of the semiperiphery are enormous. This validates a need for specific paradigms, coming from the semiperiphery itself, in the form of contextual knowledge, and often in the form of grounded theories. In other words, it would be unreasonable to claim that knowledge created at the center could ‘cover’ the realities of the semiperiphery. The knowledge which claims to be universal should strive to incorporate the knowledges from both the semiperiphery and the periphery. Otherwise ‘universal knowledge’ simply reproduces power imagery of the core, implying that the world could be understood, and consequently, successfully governed, based on the ‘knowledge from above’. ‘Globalization from above’ corresponds well with these epistemic illusions. However, an understanding from ‘the below’ is equally limiting. Many of the structural changes in the globalization process cannot be understood from the perspective of the semiperiphery itself, since it inclines to overemphasize ‘small differences’ and overlooks the wider, more general global trends of social change. Although knowledge is essential for development, for the core no less so than for the semiperiphery, there is little genuine incentive in the core and the semiperiphery to produce knowledge with a critical edge which would contribute to an understanding of the interconnectedness of the human condition globally, interconnectedness of the core, the semiperiphery and the periphery. In the semiperiphery, intellectual elites are either eager to be integrated into the core, or they express narrow minded resistance to the integration. Therefore, sadly, the opportunity for constructive analysis of the interconnectedness is largely missing.

The epistemic strategy should be one which would enable both translations and integration of different layers of knowledge formation, from ‘below’ to the ‘top’, and which will, therefore, include also contextual knowledges coming from the semiperiphery. The feminist strategy of the epistemic standpoint can be useful both for the core and for the semiperiphery, or the periphery. However, the precondition for the cognitive leap is not in summing up different ‘standpoints’, but in creating deeper understandings of why and how different ways of knowing and different knowledges are shaped by those standpoints, and how they are connected to global power hierarchies. The real challenge is to understand how the core is reproducing the semiperiphery, and how the semiperiphery is reproducing both the core and the periphery, through their exchanges and interconnectedness.
Simulacrum versus Knowledge

What is essential from the epistemological point of view is that the semiperiphery is not some unimportant residual category, but that semiperipheral conditions create deep needs for different knowledge paradigms. Inadequate knowledge paradigms, briefly discussed in the beginning of this text, and inadequate public policies derived from them, have negative consequences. In particular, knowledge about gender regimes at the semiperiphery is either missing, incomplete, distorted, dislocated or devoid of its political and often practical relevance. Many structural obstacles for the successful implementation of gender policies coming from the economic, cultural or political spheres are under-theorized and under-researched, leading to a weak knowledge base for policies. In other words, social engineering to which these countries have been exposed in the process of ‘the transition’ from socialism to capitalism largely overestimate their capacity for change ignoring their social, political, cultural even demographic structural dispositions. This contributed to a deepening of the problems, since the engineering encouraged changes on the surface, ‘on paper’, in public discourses, and not at the level of social realities.

Many of the indicators of the social development, economic development, human development frameworks are hiding rather than revealing the existing gap in the quality of social realities, which has dramatically and regressively changed for the majority of the people living in those countries. Throughout the transition, indicators which were and are used to ‘measure’ women’s position are simply misleading. For example, the employment rate is blurring the fact that if women are unemployed, they nevertheless are often engaged in the grey economy and are additionally exposed to exploitation, and if they are employed, they are severely underpaid. Gender gaps in salaries in countries with a high percentage of a grey economy do not adequately reveal the problem, especially when salaries are in general very low. For women, under the new market conditions, it could additionally be difficult to finance their own costs related to employment, such as, for example, clothing or make-up, or transportation costs (Tallos, 2001). If differences in salaries between women and men are compared with differences in West-East, it would become obvious that it is not gender, but location, which has a much higher influence. But, although this fact is self-evident, it is under-theorized in women’s and gender studies, which usually give preponderance to gender. Also, the often high education of women at the semiperiphery is blurring the fact that education, although extremely important for personal empowerment, in reality is not reflected in higher wages nor upward social mobility. Similarly, participation of women in politics, another key indicator for measuring women’s position in countries in transition, cannot be analyzed separately from the fact that the real political decisions are often made outside the official institutions, and that women in politics are often simply representatives of a new political class, and not gender aware political players. Citizenship in countries at the semiperiphery is strongly limited not only by the intra-state power hierarchies, but even more by global hierarchies between the core, the semiperiphery and the periphery.
The whole discourse on gender at the semiperiphery was shaped within the transition paradigm (‘transitology’, according to Wessely, 1996), which was itself a stereotype of unilinear progressive development, which in many counties of the transition, and in large parts of the population never materialized. Under communism, the countries of East, Central, and Southern Europe displayed a paradoxical combination of strong patriarchies which exhausted woman’s resources in the private domain together with the ideological ‘fog’ of gender equality. The strong egalitarian ideology created educated women power with high inclination to employment. ‘Male bread winner’ model, in fact, was non-existent or very weak, since both partners were employed (Bodrova and Anker, 1985).

Since the transition has not proven to be simply a step forward, but instead is characterized by multiple processes some of which are favoring modernisation and globalization, and some of which are favoring re-traditionalisation and ethno-centrism, the result is the existence of societies which have a complex hybrid nature, which is also reflected in their gender regimes. That hybridity is an outcome of intensified diachronicities (pre-modern, modern and post-modern elements), as well as of complex and ambivalent processes of globalization itself, which largely re-shape classic institutions of the polity, society, and economy.

Semiperipherality, the prevailing condition of the semiperiphery, is not a set of stable characteristics, but rather an unstable condition, a conditional reality, a mixture of simulacrum and authenticity, part of the continuum between the core and the periphery, and above all, it is a context-as-a-whole. To explain or understand any social phenomena at the semiperiphery one has to fully acknowledge the power of the context, which means that everything is shaped by the context as a complex system (Walby 2003) open to its environment on different levels. If the context is ignored, or treated superficially, as a set of measurable characteristics using the set of problematic indicators, then the power of the context-as-a-system is seriously underestimated, and the explanations which follow will necessarily be limited, and policies will not be applicable or will be inefficient. But context here is not taken as a concrete historical, economic and political context (measured by internationally established ‘indicators’ which allow global comparisons for global decision makers). Rather, ‘the context’ is itself a theoretical concept, which calls for an integrated and complex approach which will enable vivid and substantial dialogue between the local and international, contextual and contextualized knowledges and the knowers.

The semiperiphery might have a very similar institutional set-up, but the essence of the institutional life might be very different. It often has a deceiving similarity; it is in many ways a simulacrum. For those designing public policies, it is often striking how under the same ‘official names’ of institutions and bodies, a huge variety of practices exist in different countries. What is called a ‘university’ is strikingly different, for example, in terms of conditions, equipment, and requirements in different countries.

2 This is why so many collections of articles related to Eastern Europe have a very low heuristic value, they do not bring new epistemic insights and only allow for superficial comparisons.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are yet another example with obvious differences between East and West. But the semiperiphery, because of its complex relationship with the core, has different intellectual traditions which make the simple import of knowledge paradigms from the ‘West’ highly problematic. For example, as shown by Nannette Funk, different intellectual traditions in the ‘West’ and ‘East’ contain different relations towards liberalism (Funk 2004). Feminist critiques developed in the ‘West’ are largely missing the point when applied to liberal thought in the ‘East’, since Eastern liberal thought also developed partly in a counter position to Western liberal thought. In other words, if the semiperiphery is not taken as a context from which one can understand ambivalent relationships towards the core, any feminist critique of the Eastern liberal tradition is incomplete. Feminist scholars in the East are faced with contradictory requirements unless the semiperiphery is taken, as a kind of explanatory variable, into account.

Simulacra created by the theories and concepts which are ‘imported’ to the semiperiphery to provide an easy adaptation of globalization, but are not adequately linked to the realities of the semiperipheral countries, have shaped and still are shaping much of the ‘knowledge’ and policies based on it, including gender policies. This simulacrum is hiding a bitter fact that the semiperiphery has experienced de-development and that it is being pushed, with a few exceptions, towards the periphery. Theories are almost always, and in a globalized world even more so created in the center. The perspective of the semiperiphery is simply incorporated into the already defined theoretical framework, thus silenced even when officially present. The counter epistemic strategy would be to define the standpoint of the semiperiphery by incorporating experiences of people living there into the knowledge about the semiperiphery, and subsequently, based on that knowledge, to encourage critical thinking, adequate theorizing on globalization, and developing practical policies and political actions based on it.

**The Semiperiphery as a Relevant Standpoint Location**

Since there are obvious limitations of the knowledge created in the core and by the core to relate to the semiperiphery, a different epistemic strategy is needed. Creating knowledge from and about the semiperiphery is necessary for effective and efficient gender policies. But, this strategy is more than simply an advocacy for contextualized knowledge, which recently got widely accepted by both international and multilateral organizations. In practice, what is considered as ‘contextualized’ knowledge is often a kind of ‘knowledge import’ with the added flavor of local contexts. This is largely due to the fact that much of the international consultancy related to gender policies at the semiperiphery is developed by experts coming from the core countries. When po-

---

3 It is not important whether in some cases, or even in many cases, the actual knowers are by their origin from the semiperiphery or periphery. The important thing is that the development of the theories comes from the core.
licy recommendations, defined by the ‘North’ to fit the ‘South’, are applied to the semiperiphery, the ‘implementation is difficult’. For example, it is different to approach the problem of rural poverty as an international expert in a country or a region where there is high illiteracy rates for both women and men than in some postcommunist country, where even in the most remote and undeveloped region, women and men normally have secondary education, where there is regular public transportation, health coverage, although basic, and where women give birth in hospitals regardless of how poor they are. It is also very different to work on development projects in contexts where there is a vivid memory of being employed, working in organizations, or enjoying health insurance and social security. It is different to design gender policies in a setting which still has a living memory of the ‘good times’ when unemployment was non-existent, also for women, and when communities and communal life were strong.4

Therefore, the only adequate epistemic strategy is to acknowledge the difference of the semiperiphery, to reveal how that difference is related to the core (i.e. cheap labour, migrations, sex trafficking, cheap caring work, strengthening of the patriarchal values etc.) on the one hand, and to establish standpoints for knowledge creation relying exactly on these differences, on the other. Moreover, the knowledge production is a necessary strategy for those who do not have power, or who have lesser power, because through knowledge making they empower themselves and also accumulate political and activist power to change the power imbalances. Through and by the knowledge production, the agency of the powerless can increase and contribute to a better balanced world. This is not in contradiction with the ‘traveling theory’, a seductive idea of the free flow, but it reaffirms the right to knowledge articulation as part of the process of empowerment, from ‘below’, which is also a fundamental feminist strategy.5 Empowerment ‘from below’ is necessary to counterbalance ‘globalization from above’.

An epistemic strategy acknowledging the semiperiphery as a specific epistemic standpoint needs to deconstruct not only the theoretical universalism of the core, but also the universalism of post-colonial theory. The semiperiphery remained invisible because of post-colonial universalism, which in many ways is a ‘negative’ of the colonial universalism and is equally blind to the existence and difference of the semiperiphery, of ‘white’ post-communist non/Europe (and other semiperipheral parts of the world). This binarism, moreover, is perpetuating wider blindness for the way globalization works. It largely works in the sphere of the absence of knowledge and lack of

4 The author derives these claims based on her international gender expert experience in postcommunist countries, such as: Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbajian, Armenia, Bosnia, etc.
5 At the conference in Vienna, in 2006 devoted to the discussion of canons in feminist theory, a well known British feminist stated that there is ‘no need to discover the hole in the pot’, meaning that feminists from Eastern Europe can rely on the knowledge which already exists and simply continue in this direction. This is problematic for at least three reasons. The first is that everybody has the right to articulate the knowledge the way s/he considers how it should be done, and that everybody has the right to search for justification and legitimization of that knowledge within the epistemic community s/he chooses. And secondly, knowledge making itself is a process of empowerment. Thirdly, who is to define, to make the final judgment, of what is adequate knowledge for someone else?
The semiperiphery is a relevant standpoint, because it is becoming increasingly relevant for the positioning of individuals and groups within the global hierarchies. Citizenship related to the semiperiphery is a major attribute for individual positioning themselves in the international labour market (Lutz, 2002; Sassen, 2003).

Whiteness? Europeaness? Citizenship? Gender?

‘...No one should be permitted to occupy the Universalist centre, to ‘own’ universalism. This continues to be the case even (alas) within feminist discourses’.
(Gunew, 2007: 146)

One possible critique is that epistemic standpoints are difficult to develop, since it is quite difficult to speak from ‘white/nonwhite’, European/non-european ‘postcolonial/non-postcolonial, citizen/non-citizen, and gender/non-gender positions, which is in fact a location of a discursive void. If concepts are deconstructed, and the ‘in-betweeness’ is invisible and pushed into extremes, what are then the possible epistemic strategies? Whiteness, Europeaness, citizenship and gender are all being defined and shaped, practiced and discursively constructed within a specific process of neoliberal globalization, with all its negative effects. It is a combination of these oppositions, or spaces between them, which create the condition of the semiperipherality, as core/non-core, periphery/non-periphery, and development/de-development. ‘In-betweeness’ is a condition of semiperipherality, and needs to be constituted as a new, legitimate standpoint to allow voice and visibility to those who are part of the semiperiphery. The semiperiphery thinks about itself through the concepts which are being imported, and it observes itself through the eyes of others. It is defined through ‘they-ness’, not ‘we-ness’ (Ringer and Lawless, 1989), by its difference from the core as the model, in a very similar manner as when women are defined in the androcentric discourse by their difference from men. Difference of the semiperiphery is itself not a problem unless it is used against the semiperiphery to prove that it is ‘lagging behind’.

The epistemic void is also the void of an epistemic standpoint, and the void of the presently indefinable position of a reflective ‘subject’ which is lost in unidentified and undefined spaces of binaries: white/non-white, European/non-european, male/female, postcolonial/neocolonial, state-citizenship/global-citizenship. Such a subject, a living woman in the semiperiphery, cannot locate herself within any of the discourses. The discursive void related to the semiperiphery can be addressed by reflecting on experiences. Central to the standpoint epistemologies is that woman’s embodied experience is a privileged site of knowledge about both power and domination. But that standpoint, following Jaggar (1989) should not be identified with women’s viewpoints or actual experiences. Rather ‘standpoint’ refers to the way of conceptualizing reality which reflects women’s interests and values and draws on women’s own interpretation of their experiences.

Still, experiences of women from the semiperiphery should not be reduced to the standpoint advantage. A further step would be to reaffirm conceptualization of gender
as ontology, as advocated by Wickramasinghe (2006). The author argues that gender epistemology (or a way of knowing) is also ontology (or a sense of being). She tries to bridge the two different traditions of analysis: one focusing on ontology (or the conceptualizations of forms, nature or aspects of reality), and the other on epistemology (as to what constitutes knowledge and how much confidence we can have in it) in feminist research and writing.

The experiences of gender are at the crux of conceptualising realities in knowledge. These, however, are notoriously slippery conceptions at the best of times. In particular, the concepts of ontology and epistemology, require one to distance oneself from the regular, familiar, experiences of life and positivist processes of knowledge-making in order to reconsider how reality is conceptualized instinctively and normatively by an individual. In doing so, I have become aware that the gender as ontology as epistemology argument is a circular explanation of gender; and that gender as epistemology is also ontology. (Wickramasinghe, 2006:28)

So, a possible feminist epistemic strategy applied from the semiperiphery could be a double strategy: reaffirmation of the semiperiphery as an epistemic standpoint, on one hand, and reaffirmation of gender as ‘ontology as epistemology’, which means that ‘gender as epistemology is also ontology’. Only this kind of a double strategy can link actual gendered experiences and the location, such as the semiperiphery.

Within this double strategy, the discursive void could become epistemic advantage of the semiperiphery, which would affirm the relevance of the specific experiences of the semiperipherality, and encourage its theorization. For the standpoint to exist and develop, it is essential to have community for dialogue through active conversation among women in marginal social positions. The important possibility for this epistemic endeavor comes from the fact that the position of an individual at the semiperiphery is increasingly being shaped by factors which are not recognized by classical social theory. According to Sprague (1997), theory in sociology is constructed as a canon: social theory is organized exactly as it should be if one ‘think(s) like a White male capitalist’. Conceptual frameworks with hierarchy, logical dichotomies, decontextualized abstraction, and a strong individualist approach are in accordance with the ‘hegemonic masculine consciousness’. The author argues for the development of an ‘epistemology of connection’ which will enable theory to create bridges between different standpoints, disciplines and between knowing and being. Maybe even faster than at the core, the limitations of sociological theory become visible in the void of the transition, and at the semiperiphery (Blagojevic, 1996). Individual social positions are influenced by increasing contingencies due to global restructuring. In the present moment of global crises, a growing void is taking place at the core, as well. Paradoxically, it is exactly from the semiperiphery where the paradigm of de-development could best be developed, since the semiperiphery has already gone through the reversal of development.
Conclusion: The Standpoint and Ontology

Gender can be made visible at the semiperiphery through a double-pronged epistemic strategy, stemming from the feminist tradition. That strategy should re-affirm the standpoint with the semiperiphery being a strategic standpoint for knowledge articulation, and it should re-affirm the connection between the ontology and epistemology of gender (Wickramasinghe, 2006). However, when applied, this strategy will necessarily lead to a deep change of the knowledge project itself. Instead of focusing on 'Theory' production, the knowledge project should constitute itself as an interactive knowledge matrix. It should become a grid which would allow endless communication of ideas, concepts, paradigms, facts and figures, heavily relying on and reaffirming the value of contextual knowledges. That kind of knowledge could enable better understandings of the global interconnectedness and interdependence between the core and the semiperiphery through gender lenses. It could encourage the empowerment of the weaker, transnationalisation on equal terms, and consequently, social inclusion on a global scale. This project, in fact, is already on its way.

“It is vital and imperative that people on the peripheries, people on the margins, reclaim and reoccupy the universalist centre, and lay their claim to share in the ownership of universalism. For too long the centralising institutions of power (financial institutions, military machines, government machines, educational bureaucrats, official great religions, experts etc.) have claimed the right exclusively to colonise the central ground, to speak for truth and justice and moderation…Now is time for the excluded margins to liberate the centre in the name of a genuine universalism, that is compassionate, caring, intelligent, holistic and sensitive to the full range of human intelligences and wisdom” (Thomas Daffern, English philosopher, e-mail exchange, November, 2008).

References


Notes on Authors and Editors

Marina Blagojevic holds Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Belgrade. She is currently Scientific Counselor at the Institute for Criminological and Sociological Research, Belgrade. Blagojevic has taught at the University of Belgrade, Gender Department of CEU (Budapest), and currently teaches gender and development in the Gender Studies postgraduate program at Sarajevo University. As a recognized international gender expert, she has worked on gender policies for UNDP, UNIFEM, IFAD, USAID in many different post-communist countries. She was also a member of the Enwise expert group of the European Commission. Blagojevic has conducted research on a wide range of issues, including women in professions, parenthood, everyday life, migration, ethnic relations and reconciliation, gender and science, women’s movements and misogyny. Her most recent book is titled *Knowledge Production and the Semiperiphery: a Gender Perspective* (2009).

Ulrich Brand is Professor of International Politics at Vienna University (www.univie.ac.at/inpol). Previously he worked as an Assistant Professor at Kassel University. His research focuses on a critical theory of the internationalization of the state, global environmental and energy politics, the role of NGOs and social movements in global politics and actual crisis politics. Recent publications are: Special issue of the journal Antipode on the Internationalisation of the State co-edited with Markus Wissen (Blackwell 2010), Postneoliberalism. A beginning debate co-edited with Nicola Sekler (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 2009), Conflicts in Global Environmental Regulation and the Internationalization of the State co-authored with Christoph Görg, Joachim Hirsch and Markus Wissen (Routledge 2008), and article in Review of International Political Economy (2008/4).

Gülay Çağlar is a research fellow in the Division of "Gender and Globalization" at the Faculty of Agriculture and Horticulture at the Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany. She graduated in political science at the J.W. Goethe University in Frankfurt/M. and received her doctoral-level degree at the University of Kassel. Her research interests focus on international political economy, feminist economics, global governance and transnational knowledge networks. She recently published the book: (ed. with Christine Bauhardt) *Gender and Economics. Feministische Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (Feminist Critiques of Political Economy), Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010.

Rosalind Cavaghan is a PhD candidate at the University of Edinburgh, UK. During 2010 she is a visiting scholar at Humboldt University Berlin, Germany. Her research interests include interpretative policy analysis, knowledge and gender. Her PhD Thesis
examines Gender Mainstreaming practices in the European Commission's science and research policies. Before her PhD studies she worked in management consultancy as a public policy analyst.

**Pia Eberhardt** M.A, is a researcher and campaigner with the lobby watchdog Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) in Brussels, Belgium, where she focuses on corporate lobbying in EU trade policy. Before coming to Brussels she worked as a research associate in the research project "economic gender knowledge in the governance of migration" at the University of Kassel, Germany.

**Rachel Kurian** is a Senior Lecturer in International Labour Economics at the International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, in The Netherlands. She has degrees in Mathematics and Economics, has studied in Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, University of Cambridge, UK, and completed her PhD at the University of Amsterdam in 1989. Her research interests relate to poverty, gender, migration, trade unions and other labour concerns (including child labour) in the context of economic restructuring. Her publications include “The Globalisation of Domestic Care Services” in Engendering Human Security: Feminist Perspectives edited by Thanh-Dam Truong, Saskia Wieringa and Amrita Chhachhi, Zed Press and Women Unlimited, 2006, and Trade Unions and Child Labour: Challenges for the 21st Century, Maastricht, Shaker Publishing, 2005.


**Christoph Scherrer** is professor for Globalization and Politics, Department of Social Sciences, University of Kassel. He holds a M.A. in economics and doctoral-level degrees in political science from Frankfurt University and the Free University Berlin. He is executive director of the International Center for Development and Decent Work, co-director of the PhD program Global Social Policies and Governance, a member of the steering committee of the Global Labour University. He has recently received the Excellency in Teaching Award of the State of Hessa and the Excellence in Develop-
ment Cooperation Award from the DAAD. He has held the position of a Kennedy-Memorial Fellow at Harvard University.

**Diane Stone** is a Professor of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick (http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/staff/stone/). She is also Professor of Public Policy at the Central European University in Budapest (www.ceu.hu/dpp). From 2011 she will be Winthrop Chair in Politics and International Relations at the University of Western Australia. She teaches in the area of globalisation and governance. Research has focussed on international organisations, transnational policy networks, think tanks, philanthropy, policy transfer and the politics of knowledge.

**Helen Schwenken** is Assistant Professor in Political Sciences at the University of Kassel (Germany). Her main fields of interest are migration studies, gender and work, feminist theory and social movements. She serves as co-speaker of the research committee on “Gender and Politics” in the German Association for Political Science. She has published widely, and is the author of: “Without rights, but not without a voice. Political mobilizations on irregular migration in the European Union (2006, Bielefeld). Her current research focuses on the modes of knowledge production and governance in international labour migration policies.


**Eleni Tsingou** is Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR) of the University of Warwick and Programme Manager of GARNET (an EU-funded FP6 Network of Excellence) on ‘Global Governance, Regionalisation and Regulation: the role of the EU’. Her research work in CSGR has focused on global banking regulation, transnational policy communities, regulatory responses to the global financial crisis, the global anti-money laundering regime and the fight against terrorist financing. Her work has appeared in a range of collections and journals on issues related to global financial integration and transnational private
governance and she served in the Second Warwick Commission on “International Financial Reform: In Praise of Unlevel Playing Fields”

**Brigitte Young** is professor of International Political Economy, Institute of Political Science, University of Muenster, Germany since 1999. She is a member of the EU-Network of Excellence, “Global Governance, Regionalisation, and Regulation: The Role of the EU” (GARNET). She was an Expert Advisor to the Enquete-Commission of the German Parliament on “Globalization of the World Economy (2000-2002), and served in the Warwick Commission on “The Multilateral Trade Regime” (2007). In 2008 she was guest professor at Science Politique/CERI in Paris. She is also a member of the EU-COST project "Systemic risks, financial crisis and credit" (2010-2014). She has written extensively on globalization and global governance, world trade; financial market crisis and reforms; and feminist macroeconomics.