Origin and Tasks

The classic accountability structure of international organisations, according to international relations theory, always involves the nation state as a member of the international organisation, leaving very little space for non-state actors to manoeuvre in. The structure of the IP in many ways defied the traditional accountability structure, in that it provided a means through which international organisations could be directly held accountable by the people whose lives were affected by its projects. For this reason, the invention of the IP was considered by many observers as an advancement in international law. But how did this seemingly genius institution come to be?

The IP was established in 1993 by the Board of Directors of the WB. This came in the aftermath of what has come to be known as the “Narmada Disaster” at the Bank. The Narmada Valley Development project was a WB project that sought to develop 3,200 dam projects in India, the biggest of which was the Sardar Sarovar dam in Gujarat. According to the Indian government, this dam would irrigate 1.8 million hectares of land and bring clean drinking water to drought prone areas. According to opponents, a total of 300,000 people, a majority of whom were indigenous, were to be displaced by the projects without adequate compensation. The project was financed by the WB between 1985 and 1993 to the tune of US $ 280 Million. The “Narmada Bachao Andolan”, a grassroots movement, resisted the dam, criticising its lacking of environmental and social impact assessment. The movement gained considerable international support, and in 1991, an independent review commission was established for the case, a first in the history of the WB. Surprisingly the report of the commission sided with the grassroots movement and called out the WB for failing to comply with its own rules, and indeed asked the bank to step down from the project.

Unsurprisingly, the WB was reluctant in heeding the advice it had asked for and instead presented a proposal on how to tackle the now apparent problems while proceeding with the project. Widespread protests from NGOs in the run up to the WB annual meeting in 1992 further complicated the situation for the Board of Directors, who agreed to proceed with a six month action plan that would seek to address the raised concerns while continuing the project. In 1993, the problems persisted and the government of India announced that it would continue with the project without the WB. The NGOs were however successful in their lobby work. In the board, executive directors from the Netherlands, Germany, Malaysia, Chile and Switzerland proposed a new accountability mechanism, citing current events and problematic aspects with the Banks internal structure that has been revealed by the Wapenhans Report in November of 1992 (World Bank 1992). On September 22. 1993, the Board of Directors issued a resolution that created the IP.

As per the resolution, the IP consists of three members, appointed by the board for five-year non-renewable terms, and is headquartered in Washington DC. Members of the IP may never work for the WB again after the end of their terms. The IP, to ensure independence, is not part of the WB management structure but reports to the Board. The IP functions as follows:

• The IP receives complaints with regard to adverse consequences caused by noncompliance to social and Environmental standards as stipulated in WB policy. Any two or more people thus affected may lodge a complaint with the IP openly, with an anonymity option or through representatives.

• The IP examines the eligibility of the complaint and contacts WB management for a response and visits the project site to talk to the affected persons. If the complaint is deemed eligible,

• The IP submits a report to the Board and recommends investigation. Pending authorization by the Board,

• The IP conducts a fact-finding visit and submits an investigation report to the Board and President of the WB. The Management has six weeks to submit its recommendations in response to the IPs findings and the Board decides about measures to be taken.

The IP has no decision making powers. Nevertheless, its investigations and recommendations should be able to suspend, improve and stop projects that negatively affect complainants.