Detailed version - Excursion Berlin - Council Presidency

90% mandatory, 10% optional - opportunities for the
German EU Council Presidency 2007

In mid-July 2006, the participants of the seminar on "Preparing the German EU Council Presidency" held by Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schroeder, Chair of the System of the Federal Republic of Germany / Statehood in Transition, University of Kassel, traveled to Berlin to talk to experts and gain an insight into how the German EU Council Presidency will be prepared in 2007. The Council presidency is held by the individual member states for six months at a time in a fixed order. The task of the Presidency is to organize and chair the meetings of the European Council and the meetings of the Council of Ministers and to represent both the Council vis-à-vis other EU institutions and the European Union as a whole vis-à-vis international organizations and third countries.

The aim of the excursion was to find out what kind of profile the Federal Republic of Germany or the Federal Government wants to give the European Union during its Council Presidency in the first half of 2007 and which players have an influence on the content. From this perspective, European policy becomes a component of domestic policy.

Germany is taking over the Council Presidency at a time when there is talk everywhere of a deep crisis in the European Union.

Even before the official date of the Union's eastward enlargement, which was celebrated as a milestone in the history of integration, a deep rift had opened up between some of the old and new member states as a result of the dispute over the war in Iraq. The "Open Letter of the Eight", a declaration of solidarity from eight member states to the USA, about which neither Paris nor Berlin was informed in advance, prompted the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to speak, not without a certain amount of malice, of a split between the "old" and the "new Europe".

Enlargement was also associated with many fears, particularly in the old member states, which found their most impressive and at the same time most nonsensical expression in the figure of the now legendary "Polish plumber" invading France and other countries and stealing jobs there.

Closely related to these fears is the next big bang that rocked the Union: the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands of all places, two of the founding states of the European Community.

There have also been failures in other areas: for example, the ambitious Lisbon Strategy, which aims to make the EU the "most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world" by 2010, has largely failed.

Is the Union facing a shambles? Or are these partial setbacks a necessary part of the integration that is nevertheless progressing?

How can the German Council Presidency respond to this situation? Germany, together with France known as the driving force behind integration, has high expectations in this situation. Can it meet these expectations or are the Council Presidency's options limited by the crisis?

The seminar participants hoped to find answers to these questions in discussions with representatives of a selection of institutions and players who are particularly involved in preparing for the Council Presidency: Federal Chancellery, ministries (Federal Foreign Office and Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs), political parties (CDU and SPD) and associations (German Trade Union Confederation and Federation of German Industries).

The large number of relevant players is characteristic of a feature of Germany's European policy that became very clear again and again during the discussions: European policy is not limited to one institution - there is no central "Europe ministry" - but rather forms a cross-sectional task that is scattered across many institutions, between which there are not infrequently coordination problems and wrangling over competencies. How does the Council Presidency's program come about in the interplay between these institutions?

The program is coordinated at ministerial level as follows: First, all ministries submit their desired topics without any restrictions. The Chancellery, Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Federal Foreign Office then have to turn these points into a political program, i.e. set certain priorities. The cabinet is scheduled to approve the program in mid-October 2006. However, they are still trying to keep a low profile so as not to give the impression that they want to pre-empt the current Finnish Council Presidency.

The information on how much influence a Council Presidency can have on the direction of the integration process was very sobering: About 90% of the presidency's execution consists of continuing programs that are already underway; only 10%, referred to as "freestyle", can be given its own emphasis. Of this 10%, however, at least 5% is determined by current political events. They can therefore not be planned in advance. One example of this is the uncertainty as to how the situation in the Congo will develop and what European policy responses this will require. In all programmatic considerations, the German government is also heavily dependent on the European Commission, with which it has therefore been in close contact since the start of preparations.

However, the fact that 2007 is an almost entirely election-free year in Germany gives the Federal Government a certain degree of independence, which means that there are fewer domestic political considerations to take into account.

Despite the uncertainty surrounding the actual course of the Presidency, a number of priorities have already emerged: energy policy and economic modernization, education and research policy, strengthening Europe's social dimension and the Constitutional Treaty: the German Council Presidency has been tasked with presenting a report on the status of ratification of the Treaty during its term of office.

How are parties and associations now trying to influence the agenda; what priorities do they want to set?

The unanimity between the parties of the Grand Coalition with regard to both the direction of general European policy and the expected agenda of the Council Presidency was astonishing. The representatives of the federal executive of the CDU and SPD emphasized that the European policies of the two parties differed only in nuances, for example in social policy or - somewhat more clearly - on the issue of Turkey.

somewhat more clearly - on the issue of Turkey. They were in agreement on the main European policy guidelines. Is this a result of the grand coalition and the unity it has enforced? Or simply an expression of loyalty to the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Foreign Office, where the guidelines are laid down?

However, the (all too) harmonious picture was then broken up by the statements of two association representatives, the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB) and the Federation of German Industries (BDI).

The representative of the DGB began by describing the difficulties in being able to put forward the ideas and objectives of the DGB with regard to the Council Presidency, as the competences were distributed across the government institutions and there was no clear point of contact.

The DGB's top priority is to campaign for a more social Europe. It would like to use the new discussion of the Constitutional Treaty to emphasize the social components even more. In preparation for the Council Presidency, the DGB is working closely with the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).

The BDI is also directly linked to the European level through its office in Brussels. It is also in close contact with the ministries at national level, particularly the Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The BDI's main concern, also with regard to the Council Presidency, is to make the EU more competitive and reduce bureaucracy. In contrast to the intentions of the DGB described above, it is trying to influence the new discussion on the constitution in this direction.

The following initial answers to the seminar's questions emerged from the discussions with the stakeholders:

Firstly, at the day-to-day working level, the engine of integration continues to run regardless of the conjured up crisis. One effect of the crisis on the preparations for the Council Presidency can at most be seen in the desire of the actors to push ahead with the European constitutional project during the Presidency. However, it is clear to all players that this project seems relatively hopeless in view of the upcoming elections in both the Netherlands and France - the process of forming a government will not be completed until the end of the German Council Presidency; fundamental decisions are therefore unlikely.

Secondly, there is a broad consensus among the players on the orientation of European policy as domestic policy. There only seems to be a real dispute between the associations, although their influence on the direction of European policy is considered to be rather low.

The observation that the integration process is continuing on a day-to-day working level despite the crisis being hotly debated in the (media) public was confirmed by the academic view of Europe that was conveyed to the seminar participants at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. The expert defused the image of a crisis by describing the integration process from the outset as an unfinished, incrementalist process that is constantly experiencing setbacks, but whose institutions are firmly established and functional, so that integration will continue to progress in the long term. In this sense, the German Council Presidency can be seen as one of many small cogs that keep the "construction site" of the integration process running.

A third perspective on the crisis of the Union crystallized in the discussion with an editor of the weekly magazine DIE ZEIT about his recently published book, in which he puts forward the main thesis that the European Union can only find its true identity through conflict. Accordingly, he does not see the discussion caused by the current crisis as a step backwards, but rather as an opportunity for the Union to move forward. According to this view, it is the task of the German Council Presidency to deal with the crisis productively by not avoiding the debate, but rather by seeking it out.

Even if it has become quite clear that the German government can only influence its own Council Presidency to a very limited extent, after this overview of very different players with different perspectives on European policy, the seminar participants will be eager to see what the German Council Presidency will actually look like. All participants pointed out that a highlight will be the celebration organized by the German government to mark the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome in Berlin in March 2007. This is an opportunity for the government, especially for the Chancellor, to make a name for itself outside the 5% freestyle program that remains alongside the compulsory program and perhaps set its own accents after all.