Fallstudien
The Institutional Reform Development Policy Grant (IRDPG) project was approved by the World Bank in 2007 as part of a Poverty Reduction Strategy plan in Yemen. The political and economic situation in Yemen had not been stable since the country's unification in 1990, so the government hoped to appease the opposition and demonstrators with a series of reform projects. The IRDPG was intended to increase non-oil growth and strengthen governance. Even without the subsequent Inspection Panel case, the terms of the loan were not met, and so only half of the loan was distributed.
The Inspection Panel claim against the project, one of the first IP cases in the Middle East/North Africa region, was brought to the Inspection Panel by 2 individuals on their own behalf and for the Yemeni Observatory for Human Rights (YOHR). They believed that the IRDPG violated the World Bank policy on Development Policy Lending (OP/BP 8.60) as well as usual Bank policies on information disclosure, especially to civil society actors. It took more than a year for the Panel to make its final recommendation, due to a deferral for Bank Management to implement an action plan to address the issues in the project. This action plan not only altered how Management interacted with local stakeholders for this particular project, but also became a model of how to engage with stakeholders throughout the MENA region for future projects. After Management showed progress in implementing their action plan, the Panel withdrew its recommendation to investigate and the case was closed.
The Institutional Reform Development Policy Grant case of the Inspection Panel centered on issues of transparency and engagement with local stakeholders. While the request for inspection was not based on any issue as sensational and visible as forced relocation or environmental destruction, the issue was raised at an opportune time and led to a significant impact on the World Bank processes in the region. While the Bank Management's action plan was developed to avoid a full investigation, it led to a larger internal shift than many previous cases which were fully investigated. The action plan not only addressed the issues faced by civil society stakeholders in Yemen, it also suggested new Bank processes for information disclosure, translation, and engagement with civil society organizations to be implemented throughout the Middle East and North Africa region.
The Medupi power station project, or Eskom Investment Support Project (EISP) as it is called
in World Bank circles, gained vast attention. For its enormous size and capacity, as the biggest
single project of Eskom, the highest loan ever granted by the World Bank and because of its
controversial stance in South Africa and internationally. The latter because of its potential
negative impact on the local, national and global environment in general and especially due to
effects on water resources and air quality. In addition, the EISP is the first large scale project
based on a borrower country’s own legal system and institutions, instead on the World Bank’s
safeguard policies as usual. This led to a faulty project application on the structural level and
influenced the projects impacts on environmental and social sphere. Finally, it is questionable
in how far the funding of a large-scale coal plant by the World Bank, in relation to the project’s
volume, is an effective tool on poverty alleviation, which is the primary declared objective of
all World Bank action.
This paper aims at examining the Inspection Panel cases No. 66, 74 and 96 on South-West Roads project in Kazakhstan. It will include three different requests to inspect the activity of the World Bank in the South-West Roads project. It will provide the response of the Management on the request for inspection from the claimants and the report from the Inspection Panel on the eligibility of the request. The paper ends with the conclusion about the institutional culture of the World Bank based on the cases mentioned above. The South-West Roads project is a part of the Kazakhstan Government's program aimed at the construction and reconstruction of 2,840 km road, connecting Europe and Russia with China through Kazakhstan. The idea is to improve the efficiency of transport in South of Kazakhstan, Almaty Region and Kyzylorda, besides, to improve the safety of traffic and management of the road.
In the reviewed cases, there were such claimants as local citizens from Kazakhstan and NGOs located in vicinity of the South-West highway. In the first request, there were four citizens from Birlik village through which the South-West road passes, who claimed that the project would cause damage due to its deficiencies or omissions. Besides, as some authorities promised to plant trees and hedgerows between houses and the road, and to provide a school bus for transportation of pupils to school, claimants wanted the help of the Inspection Panel in putting the promises of the authorities on paper, so that the latter would not deny their responsibilities afterwards. In the second request, two family members stated the loss of property and income because of the implementation of activities related with acquisition of land in order to implement the Project of the World Bank. More than that, there were other requesters claiming underpayment of compensations for the resettlement as well as claims to change the project of the World Bank due to violations during Environmental Impact Assessment. The third request was not accepted because submitted by a single person who tried to raise concerns about the decision of a local court submitted it.
In sum, the requesters claimed that during the execution of the project the following violations of the World Bank policies were happening:
· Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01);
· Natural Habitats polices (OPIBP 4.04);
· Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11);
· Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12);
· Project Supervision (OP/BP 13.05)
· Project Appraisal (OMS 2.20)
· World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information
While writing this research I consulted the following documents: Inspection Panel Report and Recommendation of 2010 and 2011; World Bank home page; Inspection Panel Website with Case Tracker; Request for investigation from 2010; 2011 and 2014; Bank Management Response to Request for Inspection Panel Review of the Kazakhstan South-West Roads project of 2010 and 2011; Legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan; Lessons Learned article by Treakle, Fox and Clark and newspaper articles.
The question of energy sector, especially when it comes to discuss the electricity production has been an intensely discussed issue in Kosovo since the declaration of independence in 2008. Near the entire electricity production of Kosovo stems from thermal plants which burn lignite, one of the lowest quality forms of coal. At the moment two lignite-fired power plants, Kosovo A and Kosovo B provide the country with electricity, but they are not able to satisfy the demand of the population. Moreover, due to its technological backwardness Kosovo A is supposed to be shut down in 2017 which poses even greater challenges for Kosovo with regards to energy supply.
To contribute to Kosovo’s energy safety, the WB is considering to support the construction of a coal power plant referred to as Kosovo C under the umbrella of the Kosovo Power Project (KPP - Project ID: P118287). The Lignite Power Technical Assistance Project (LPTAP – Project ID: P097635) was closed in 2011, which designed the local investment environment to be attractive for foreign financing. The Second Clean-up & Land Reclamation Project (SCLCP - Project ID: P131539) is already running, which assists the preparation of fieldwork for the power-plant and a mine as a fuel source. What makes the situation complicated is that the coal reserves of Kosovo are located on a broad, densely populated territory with highly arable land; therefore its exploration requires involuntary resettlement from the residing population.
Individuals and NGOs, among others the Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ), GAP Institute of Advanced Studies (GAP) and the Institute for Development Policy (INDEP) from Kosovo have filed two complaints to the IP in 2012 (Case no. 78) and 2015 (Case No. 103) in connection with the planned construction of the coal power plant and the field-works preceding it, with a great concern to involuntary resettlement. The claims affect the power plant’s two, widely accepted negative consequences: its environmental impact is adverse, and the involuntary resettlements are deteriorating the livelihood possibilities of the population in the surrounding area. According to the claims, the WB has not fulfilled its duty to satisfactorily monitor the resettlement, and due to their “improper technical assistance” the displacement was not in compliance with either international or WB standards.
The subject of the claims was the social, economic and environmental impact of KPP and LPTAP. According to the request for inspection, the community had already perceived the impact of the works and they had also notified the WB staff; however, they did not react to their complaints. The WB policies violated by the project are the following:
"OP 4.01 – Environmental assessment;
OP 4.12 – Involuntary displacement
OP 10.04 – Economic evaluation
OMS 2.20 – Project evaluation"
The Protection of Basic Services Project and the Promoting Basic Services Project (PBS) are different phases of a program aiming at the provision of basic services in the state of Ethiopia. It is a multi-year program, operating nation-wide, which is multi-donor funded through a trust fund and runs until 2019. The program’s stated objective since its establishment in 2006 is the expansion of access to and the improvement of the quality of basic services in different sectors. It is implemented through sectoral budget support to the Ethiopian Government for the provision of basic services. The budget support is organized through block grants from the donors to the Government of Ethiopia which distributes the money to the regions. The regions implement policies for providing the basic services and pass money to the woredas (districts) which use them mainly for the recurrent expenditures of the concrete implementation, e.g. salaries.
Two local representatives on behalf of 26 Anuak, an indigenous people living in the region of Gambella, filed a claim to the World Bank Inspection Panel with the assistance of the US-American NGO Inclusive Development International (IDI). The Anuak are a specifically vulnerable ethnic group in Ethiopia which have suffered violence and discrimination often before. They claimed that they had suffered harm due to forced resettlement and villagization which led them to flee the country. The requesters stated that the PBS program was directly and substantially contributing to the forced villagization and that villagization was the principle means to implement PBS in Gambella.
Supposedly Violated WB Policies and Procedures
• OMS 2.20 Project Appraisal
• OP/BP 10.04 Economic Evaluation of Investment Operations
• OP/BP 4.10 Indigenous Peoples
• OP/BP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement
• OP/BP 13.05 Project Supervision
The results of the investigation process did not satisfy the requesters as the WB’s responsibility for the harms experienced was not seen and no compensation was given to them. Non-compliance was only seen for OMS 2.20 Project Appraisal and OP/BP 10.00 Investment Project Financing. The Anuak’s suffering, the proximity to land grabbing and the IP process itself were covered in several newspapers and by various organizations, also because other Development Partners were deeply involved.
This paper traces and analyzes the whole inspection process and its outcome to shed more light on the Inspection Panel as an institution of accountability. Important aspects that were taken into consideration are the nature of the project, its design, implementation and monitoring as well as the conditions and content of the investigation process. The most important point of debate during the IP process was the nature of the linkage between the Government program and the WB program as it determines the (non-)taking of responsibility. The analysis leads to open questions of potential general mechanisms used by WB to avoid taking responsibility which would need further investigation.
The NRMP, Environmental Category B, is a Specific Investment Loan approved by the World Bank’s Board on March 27, 2007. After delays in the elaboration of secondary credit agreements between the Ministry of Finance and the Implementing Agencies, it became effective on December 10, 2010. The time of implementation was also affected by the election turmoil in December of 2007. The actual costs of the Project were approximately 61.9 million US$ and were financed by the International Development Association. Originally the Project Development Objective (PDO) was to enhance “institutional capacity to manage water and forest resources, reduce the incidence and severity of water shocks such as drought, floods and water shortage in river catchments and improve the livelihoods of communities participating in the co-management of water and forest resources".
The NRMP comprised of four components:
1. Water Resources Management and Irrigation
Actual cost: 31.8 million US$ / Appraisal cost: 44.2 million US$
The focus was on “strengthening the capacity of the Water Re-sources Management Authority (WRMA) including direct invest-ments in the Upper Tana Catchment”, as well as, the “Consolidation of irrigation reforms and investments”.
2. Management of Forest Resources
Actual cost: 19.9 million US$ / Appraisal cost: 20.0 million US$
This component contained “institutional reforms in the forest sector”, “community participation and benefit sharing” and “community and private sector investments in commercial forestry”.
3. Livelihoods Investments in the Upper Tana Catchment
Actual cost: 5.6 million US$ / Appraisal cost: 5.5 million US$
The third aspect “supported a Community Driven Development (CDD) approach for managing catchments and forest perimeters”.
4. Management, Monitoring and Evaluation
Actual cost: 4.6 million US$ / Appraisal cost: 4.3 million US$
Component four “promoted an integrated approach to management and measuring results”
The NRMP was implemented by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Ministry of Water and Irrigation and the Kenya Forest Service (KFS). The Project was restructured two times during its implementation. The first restructuring was carried out in June 2011: the PDO was simplified, components 1 and 2 were overworked, 21% of the loan were reallocated and outcome indicators were modified. Some outdated contracts were also erased and disbursement percentages by category were raised. The second restructuring followed in June 2013: the unspent credit of 7.24 million US$ was cancelled and some of the remaining finances were reallocated under disbursement categories (Independent Evaluation Group 2016). The NRMP was closed on June 30, 2013
Das Giza North Power Project (GNPP) beinhaltete ursprünglich den Bau von zwei Gas- und Dampf-Kombikraftwerken (GuD-Kraftwerken) mit einer Leistung von jeweils 750 MW, zusammen also 1500 MW. Unter GuD-Kraftwerken versteht man eine technische Kombination aus Dampf- und Gasturbinenkraftwerken. Der Projektstandort befindet sich ca. 30 km nord-westlich der ägyptischen Hauptstadt Kairo, Nordlich von Giza, am El-Beheiry-Kanal im Dorf El-Kata. Als Datum des Projektabschlusses ist der 31. Dezember 2017 vorgesehen.
Der Projektantrag wurde am 8. Juni 2010 durch das Exekutivdirektorium der Weltbank bestätigt, d.h. der Antrag auf einen Kredit der Weltbank („specific investment loan“) für dieses Projekt in Höhe von 600 Millionen US-Dollar. Ein weiterer Kredit in Höhe von 240 Millionen Dollar wurde im Februar 2012 bewilligt. Die Umwelt- und Emissionsschutzvorschriften der Weltbank sollten bei dem Projekt eingehalten werden. Der letztgenannte Kredit von 240 Mio. Dollar wurde für den Bau eines dritten Kraftwerks mit zusätzlichen 750 MW bereitgestellt. Die Gesamtkapazität des GNPP beträgt damit 2250 MW, ausreichend für die Versorgung von mehr als fünf Millionen Haushalten. Die geplanten Gesamtkosten des Projektes betragen 1412,11 Mio. Dollar. Der erstgenannte Kredit wurde am 12. August 2011 und der zweitgenannte Kredit am 19. Dezember 2012 ausgezahlt.
Neben den Kraftwerken selbst umfasst das GNPP auch Nebenanlagen und eine kurze Übertragungsleitung zum Anschluss der Kraftwerke an das ägyptische Stromnetz sowie eine kurze Gaspipeline, mit der die Anlage an das Gasversorgungsnetzwerk angeschlossen wurde. Projektträger ist die ägyptische Gesellschaft „Egyptian Electricity Holding Company“ (EEHC) mit einer Reihe von Tochtergesellschaften, insbesondere der Cairo Electricity Production Company (CEPC). Weitere nennenswerte Investoren die das Projekt mitfinanzieren sind die Europäische Investitionsbank (European Investment Bank, EIB, 307 Mio. US-Dollar) und der OPEC-Fond für Internationale Entwicklung (OPEC Fund for International Development, OFID, 30 Mio. US-Dollar)
Das Board of Executive Directors der Weltbank hat dem Nepal Power Development Project (PDP) am 22. Mai 2003 zugestimmt. Eine der Komponenten des PDP war das Khimti-Dhalke¬bar 220 kV Transmission Line Project, das sich über eine Strecke von 75 Kilometern und vier nepalesische Bezirken (Ramechhap, Sindhuli, Mahottari und Dhanusha) erstreckt. Der überarbeitete Finanzierungsplan von 2012 sah eine Gesamtfinanzierung in Höhe von 150.150.000 US-Dollar vor.
Die Klage an das IP wurde von Shankkar Limbu, einem Anwalt der Lawyers‘ Association for the Human Rights of the Nepalese Peoples (LAHURNIP), eingereicht. Er repräsentiert 103 indigene und nicht-indigene Familien aus Sindhuli. Ziel der Klage waren vier Weltbankrichtlinien:
a) Operational Policy 4.01 (Environmental Assessment),
b) Operational Directive 4.20 (Indigenous People),
c) Operational Policy 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement) und
d) Operational Policy Note 11.03 (Management of Cultural Property).
Die Beschwerde fokussiert sich insbesondere auf die schlechte Ausführung des Projekts in Hinblick auf Konsultationen, Diskriminierung, Kompensationen, kulturellem Schaden und potenziellen Gesundheitsauswirkungen. Das IP hat vier Hauptprobleme mit insgesamt 13 Kriterien festgestellt: sieben Kriterien stellen eine Nichtübereinstimmung mit Weltbankrichtlinien dar, vier Kriterien stimmen mit den Weltbankrichtlinien überein, über ein weiteres Kriterium wurde (noch) nicht entschieden und einmal wurde keine Angabe gegeben. Im Zusammenhang mit dem vom Management implementierten Action Plan sollen diverse Probleme beispielsweise durch die Einstellung eines Kommunikationsspezialisten sowie eines Verbindungsoffiziers angegangen werden. Außerdem sollen Kompensationen ausgezahlt und Konsultationen angeboten werden.
Die Situation in Sindhuli hat sich bis Sommer 2016 nicht beruhigt. Als die Bauarbeiten am Projekt im April 2016 wieder fortgesetzt wurden, haben projektbetroffene Personen protestiert. Dieser Protest allerdings wurde unter der Anwendung von Gewalt von der Polizei niedergeschlagen. Ferner wurden mehrere Gemeindeleiter von der Polizei festgenommen und sind gezwungen worden, ein Dokument zu unterschreiben, welches sie verpflichtete, nicht weiter zu protestieren. Im Juli 2016 wurde wieder friedlich protestiert, jedoch hat die Polizei 14 Personen festgenommen. In der Zwischenzeit kämpfen neben LAHURNIP und dem Accountability Counsel auch das International Network für Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (ESCR-Net) für die projektbetroffenen Personen in Sindhuli.
Die vorliegende Fallstudie zum 98. Fall des Inspection Panels (IP), befasst sich mit dem Uganda Transport Sector Development Project (TSDP). Ein Folgekredit an die Regierung Ugandas, in Höhe von 75 Millionen US $, galt vor allem dem Ausbau der 66.2 Kilometer langen Straße zwischen Kamwenge und Fort Portal im Nord Westen Ugandas. Die Bauarbeiten begannen im August 2013, der Projektabschluss war für Januar 2016 vorgesehen.
Aufgrund der Vielzahl und Ernsthaftigkeit negativer Projekteinflüsse (u.a. sexueller Missbrauch durch Bauarbeiter, zunehmende Schwangerschaften Minderjähriger) entlang der Straße, reichten 28 Bewohner*innen aus Bigodi am 19. Dezember 2014 eine erste Klage beim IP ein. Neun Monate später lag keine Fallregistrierung vor und die Kläger*innen sahen sich noch immer den negativen Projektauswirkungen ausgesetzt. Deshalb wurde eine zweite Klage von nunmehr 58 Bewohner*innen aus Bigodi und Nyabubale-Nkingo verfasst.
Um die Identitäten der 58 Unterzeichner*innen zu schützen, wurde die zweite Klage am 11. September 2015 durch die zivilgesellschaftliche Organisation Joy for Children Uganda (JFCU) eingereicht. Ein Jahr später, im Dezember 2015 und bereits bevor das IP seine Hauptuntersuchung durchführte, zog sich die Weltbank aus der Finanzierung des TSDP zurück.
Infolgedessen steht die gegenwärtige Umsetzung des IP Prozesses sowie die Rolle der involvierten zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen als Vertreter*innen der betroffenen Menschen im Mittelpunkt der Fallstudie. Die forschungsleitende Fragestellung lautet: “Which Role do Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) play in empowering Claimants in the Inspection Panel Process, and which restrictive conditions are inherent in the existing Inspection Panel Procedures?”. Zur Erhebung semi-strukturierter Interviews mit Projektbeteiligten erfolgte auf methodischer Grundlage einer Dokumentenanalyse eine zweimonatige Feldforschung in Uganda.
Festzuhalten bleibt, dass es der primär relevanten Organisation JFCU gelingt, die lokalen Beschwerden der betroffenen Menschen in politisches Handeln auf Seiten der Projektverantwortlichen zu wandeln. Kennzeichnend dafür steht der Finanzierungsabbruch des TSDP als auch die Unterbrechung der Finanzierungen von zwei weiteren Straßenbauprojekten in Uganda. Insgesamt zeigt sich, dass das Mandat des IP prozeduraler Abhängigkeiten seitens des Managements und dem Exekutivdirektorium der Weltbank unterliegt. Zugleich wird verdeutlicht, dass aus der Nichtberücksichtigung lokalspezifischer sozialer und politischer Gegebenheiten strukturelle Zugangsbeschränkung zum IP resultieren.
Dem entgegenwirkend liegt die Schlussfolgerung einer Erweiterung des IP Mandats nahe, um so Einfluss auf projektrelevante Entscheidungen zu ermöglichen. Außerdem ergibt sich daraus die Notwendigkeit eines niederschwelligen Zugangs zum IP Prozess. Die Verbesserung der derzeitigen Umsetzung erfordert die konsequente Einbindung betroffener Menschen sowie lokaler zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisationen als auch deren Stärkung hinsichtlich der Einflussnahme auf allen Projektebenen.
As one of the scarce natural resources essential for living things, the importance of water cannot be emphasized enough. However, the growing world population coupled with unsustainable use of natural resources is adding strain on the ecosystem explaining the apparent global climate change which the growing shortage of water supply is one of its manifestations. Hence, taking this reality into account the United Nations incorporated the sustainable management of water as one of it's the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to be achieved in 2030. Kenya is among the countries where provision of water supply has been a problem for a long time and the capital Nairobi is no exception. Thus, in a bid to solve the problem and increase the country's water supply, the Government of Kenya has taken both legislative reforms and water development initiatives with the help of international donors. First the Water and Sanitation Service Improvement Project (WaSSIP) in 2007 which was fully financed by the World Bank and later its Additional Financing (WaSSIP AF) in 2012 co-financed with the WB and the French Development Agency were projects aimed at assisting the governments' endeavour to enhance water supply in Nairobi and its environs. WaSSIP AF had three components of which the Northern Collector Tunnel Project (NCT1) is one of the sub-components.
The project which is aimed at supporting the rehabilitation of the city's water supply system include the construction of water intake structures from Maragua, Irati and Gikigie rivers, construction of access adits at Gikigie, Irati and Kaanja; and the construction of concrete lined water tunnel from Maragua intake to Githika outfall located upstream of the Thika Dam (i.e. the main source of Nairobi's water supply). Launched in February 2015, the project's Environmental Assessment (EA) category was changed eventually from category B to category A hinting its potential environmental and social impacts.
On November 29, 2016 with the help of a local NGO a Request for Inspection was made on this controversial project by 47 residents of Mouranga County who claimed their livelihood would be endangered upon completion of the project. The Requesters claimed to the WB IP that, by causing water shortage and thereby food insecurity, the diversion of water from the rivers in their county would bring an irreversible environmental damage to the area. Implying they have previously expressed their grievances to the Bank on two occasions, they indicated the response they received was not satisfactory. Hence, the World Bank safeguard policies that came into the limelight under the NCT1 project are mainly:
(i) OP/BP 4.01 - Environmental Assessment;
(ii) OP/BP 4.04 - Natural Habitats;
(iii) OP/BP 4.11 - Physical Cultural Resources;
(iv) OP/BP 4.12 - Involuntary Resettlement;
(v) OP/BP 4.10 - Indigenous Peoples;
(vi) OP/BP 4.37 - Safety of Dams; and
(vii) OP/BP 7.50 - Projects on International Waterways
Two workers who were formally working at the construction site of the Lom Pangar Hydropower project in Cameroon, a project that was co-financed by the International Development Association of the World Bank, handed in a request for inspection at the Inspection Panel of the World Bank in December 2017. In this request, they reported about deficient working conditions at the construction site of the project. They inter alia claimed that the constructor failed to pay for overtime work, provided indecent accommodations, discriminated against Cameroonian workers, and dismissed workers who got injured or sick at the construction site instead of providing medical treatment and compensations. These claims were consistent with several previous reports and complaints as well as with demands of workers who went on strike to point to their poor working conditions at the construction site.
The Inspection Panel approved the eligibility of the request for inspection and confirmed that the issues raised might constitute a violation of the Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines of the World Bank as well as of the Operational Manual / Bank Procedure 4.01 on Environmental Assessment. Nevertheless, they did not recommend an investigation of the case to the board. As justification for this decision, they mainly endorsed the argumentation of the World Bank Management that the World Bank has proven their efforts to comply with the relevant regulations and approved the action plan that the management suggested in response to the request for inspection. This action plan that was implemented by June 2019, envisaged mainly the review of outstanding complaints and the set-up of a Grievance Redress Mechanism where former workers of the project could file complaints. Through this mechanism, several complaints were assessed to be legitimated so that for example compensation payments were done. As at the time at which the request for inspection was handed in, most construction works were finished, an improvement of the working conditions as such were no longer possible.
This Inspection Panel case demonstrates a reluctant instead of offensive approach of the Panel, rather acting in favour of the management instead of constituting a strong mouthpiece of the civil society and people that are negatively affected by World Bank projects.
The “Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project for Low Income States” (RWSSP) was a World Bank-funded project that was implemented in India from 2014 to 2020 and whose objective it was to improve the infrastructure as well as institutional capacities in the water and sanitation sector in four different Indian states. In 2018, members of an indigenous community in the state of Jharkhand filed a request for inspection with the IP, claiming that a water treatment plant constructed on a sacred hill near their village in the context of the RWSSP had adverse effects in terms of the environment, cultural practices, and the local economy. They also pointed out that the process leading up to the construction had not been in line with Bank regulations. They mainly elaborated on insufficient Environmental Assessment, lack of local participation and consultation (and thus violation of the Bank’s Safeguard Policy on Indigenous Peoples), as well as the fact that the Bank’s Safeguard Policy on Physical Cultural Resources had not been triggered. The requesters’ demands included the termination of the construction work until a solution would be found, sound social and environmental assessments, community and expert consultations, as well as compensation for the damage caused and for police violence at the construction site.
The IP registered the request and received a Management response in December 2018, in which Management rather downplays the adverse economic, cultural, and environmental effects of the water treatment plant, but admits to the procedural flaws that the requesters had pointed out. While they rule out a termination of the construction, they suggest intensified community consultations and better communication, an official application of the Bank’s Safeguard Policy on Physical Cultural Resources, redoing the Environmental Assessment, as well as compensatory measures. After conducting a project visit soon after, the IP recommended an investigation in February 2019. They confirm the flaws mentioned by the requesters and, unsatisfied with the Management’s suggested way forward, announce a thorough investigation. As of the writing of this paper in September 2022, there had not been an official Investigation Report. *
*Update: In fact, an Inspection Panel Investigation Report seems to have existed since January 2020, but it had not been published until March 2023 (and had thus not been available at the time of writing the case study). It is now available on the IP website, alongside the Management Report and Recommendation and a Press Release (https://www.inspectionpanel.org/panel-cases/rural-water-supply-and-sanitation-project-low-income-states-p132173-first-request). There is no reason given for the severe delay in publishing.